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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on the political and philosophical significance of the dialogue 
between Kemalism and the nouveaux traditionalist conservative circle which emerged 
from within the modernist Republican elites. The circle was shaped at the crossroads of 
ismail HakkI Baltac1oglu's traditionalism, Peyami Safa's conservatism, Ahmet 
Agaoglu's personalism, Hilmi Ziya Olken's moralism and Mustafa Sekip Turn;'s 
Bergsonism. 
Throughout the study, Turkish traditionalist conservatism has been 
conceptualized as an historically unique philosophical and political movement. In this 
respect, the study deviated from the prevailing tendency to relate "conservatism" with 
the mode of socialization and/or political aspirations of the descending classes and/or 
groups in an all encompassing modernization process. Turkish traditionalist 
conservatism has provided an alternative understanding of modernism, which at the 
same time safeguarded and legitimized Kemalist institutions and structures. This 
understanding of modernism can be read through concepts formulated in the works of 
the circle concerned, for the explication of the Kemalist status quo. This body of 
literature was collected in the books of the intellectuals mentioned above and their 
writings on politics, philosophy, sociology, arts and literature, published in various 
journals, such as Kultiir Haftas1, Yeni Adam and insan. 
Apart from the fact that this group of intellectuals was priviliged as being a part 
of the Kemalist ruling cadre, the significance of Turkish traditionalist conservatism lies 
in the diffusion of its conceptual matrix to the legitimizing grounds for the political 
actors at various stages of Turkish political history. It is concluded that, by providing 
the conceptual matrix for legitimizing Kemalism with all its political, cultural and 
economic institutions within the process of nation-state building, this political and 
philosophical stand has marked the emergence of a state-centered conservative circle 
within the ranks of modernist-secular Republican intelligentsia. 
iv 
OZET 
Bu ara~tlrmanm konusu gelenek9i-muhafazakar bir fikir 9e\Tesi olarak modernist 
Cumhuriyet9i se9kinler arasmda yer bulan bir aydm grubu ile Kemalizm arasmda 
geli~en bir fikir diyalogunun felsefi ve siyasal i9erigi ile ~ekillenmi~tir. Sozkonusu c;evre 
ismail Hakla Baltac10glu'nun gelenek9iligi, Peyami Safa'mn muhafazakarhg1, Ahmet 
Agaoglu'nun ~ahsiyet9iligi, Hilmi Ziya Olken'in ahlak91hgi ve Mustafa Sekip Tun9'un 
Bergsoncu felsefesinin 9ak1~ma noktasmda varhk bulup, geli~mi~tir. 
Bu c;ah~mada Turk gelenek9i muhafazakarhgi felsefi ve siyasi bir akun olarak 
ele almacakttr. Bu ac;1dan, 9ah~madaki egemen anlayi~, "muhafazakarhgi" 
modemizasyon surecinde statti kaybetmi~ struf ve/veya gruplarm toplumsall~ma 
~ekilleri ve/veya siyasi tutum alt~lartyla ili~kilendiren genelgeyer yakl~tmlardan 
aynlacaktrr. Turk gelenekc;i muhafazakarhgi esasen Kemalist kurum ve yaptlart gozeten 
ve m~rul~trran ozgiin bir modemizm kavrayi~1 geli~tirmi~tir. Bu modemizm kavrayi~t 
sozkonusu c;evrenin siyaset, felsefe, sosyoloji, sanat ve edebiyat 9al1~malartnda Kemalist 
stattiskoyu a~amaya yonelik olarak kullamlan kavramlar c;erc;evesinde 
~ekillendirilebilir. Bu literattir, yukartda ad1 geyen aydmlarm yaymlanan kitaplart ile 
l 930Ju ve l 940h ytllarda, Kulttir Haftas1, Y eni Adam, insan, ve diger dergilerde bastlan 
yaztlartnda toplanm1~tJ.r. 
Turk gelenekc;i-muhafazakarhgm1 onemli ktlan neden soz konusu fikir 9evresi 
i9inde yeralan aydmlartn Kemalist yonetici seykinlerin bir parc;as1 olmalarimn yan1stra, 
geli~tirilen kavramsal matrisin de Turk siyasi tarihinin degi~ik safhalannda yonetici 
devlet ve/veya siyasi sec;kinler tarafindan ol~turulan siyasalara m~ruiyet zemini 
haz1rlam1~ olmasmda yatmaktad1r. Sonuc; olarak, sozkonusu aktm Kemalizmi rum 
siyasi, ktilttirel ve ekonomik kurumlartyla rasyonell~tirme ve me~rul~ttrma adma 
sundugu kavramsal ~emayla, ulus-devletin kurulma surecinde din temelinde ~ekillenmi~ 
topluluk y~anttsmdan ulus yap1sma gec;i~i yonlendiren modemist-sekuler Cumhuriyetc;i 
se9kinler arasmda devlet-merkezli muhafazakar bir c;evrenin do~una da i~aret 
etmektedir. 
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CHAPTER I 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The Aim and Scope of the Study 
The nature and dynamics of the Republican People's Party (RPP) rule from 1923 
to 1946, its intellectual foundations, historical reasons for transition to multi-party politics 
in 1946 and the electoral victory of the "liberal-conservative" Democratic Party (DP) in 
1950 have stirred up the interest of many students of Turkish politics. Concomitantly, the 
term, "conservatism" has indirectly been employed in social and political research 
vocabulary to identify the social and cultural policy choices of the rising Democrats in the 
1950s and the various right wing parties that emerged at various stages of Turkish 
modernization. The term has most commonly been used to indicate "(conservative) 
commitments" in social and cultural policy orientations. As a result, it has always had the 
power to explain, at least, some part of the political agenda of the 'right-wing' politics in 
Turkey. The term also hints at the existence of a set of conservative ideas, ideals, practices 
and a style of thought which lead to these patterns of practices. 1 Since conservative ideas 
have had a visible existence in Turkish political vocabulary its is legitimate to undertake a 
study on 'conservatism' as the political manifestation of certain groups who called 
themselves as traditionalist and conservative in the early Republican era. Indeed, the 
general objective of this study is to analyse the intellectual history of modern 
Turkish conservatism at the crossroads of diverse claims "to conserve" the novelties 
brought up by the Kemalist state in the early Republican era between the late 1920s and 
1 For conceptual definitions, see Roger Eatwell and Noel O'Sullivan eds., The Nature of Right (London: Pinter, 1989) 
pp. 47-76. For examples of studies on the right-wing and conservative thought, see Robert L., Schuettinger ed., The 
Conservative Tradition in European Thought (New York: G. P. Putnams, 1975): Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber eds., 
The European Right (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966). See also Clinton Rossiter, 
'·The Problems of Conservatism: Some Notes on Methodology," The Journal of Contemporary History, 13, 4 (1978) 
pp. 803 -17. Also Rossiter C., "Conservatism,"' in International Enyclopedia of the Social Sciences 3, D. Shils, ed. 
(New York, 1968), pp. '.?90-4; Robert Michels, '"Conservatism," in Enyclopedia of the Social Sciences. RA 
Seligman, ed. (London, 193 I), pp. '.?30-'.?. 
1940s. This era can roughly be characterized by the rise of the modem nation state, 
development of a national capitalist market, the rise of the individual subject as a citizen, 
and the consolidation of a new social ethics with the rise of a romantic culturalism on 
which the nouveaux traditionalist-conservative claims had flourished. 
More specifically, the focus of the study is on the nouveaux conservative ideals and 
aspirations which began to appear as an intellectual orientation by the beginning of the 
1930s and distinctively articulated in the writings of a small group of intellectuals with 
common political ideals and philosophical inspirations. Members of this group were ismail 
Hakkt Baltac1oglu ( 1886-1978), a prominent academician and a Republican politician, 
who became the founder of a distinct politico-philosophical perspective which he himself 
labeled as "traditionalism;" Peyami Safa ( 1899-1961 ), the famous conservative literary 
figure; Ahmed Agaoglu (1869-1939), a prestigious Turkist politician with particular 
personalist philosophical orientations; Hilmi Ziya Olken ( 1901-197 4 ), a distinguished 
academician well-known for his moralism, culturalism and Anatolianism and Mustafa 
Sekip Tuny (1886-1958), the advocator ofBergsonism in early Republican era. This small 
group of men of letters, academicians and politicians created a corpus of writings with a 
distinct philosophico-political orientation which led to the emergence of a conservative 
milieu within the ranks of the progres,gve secular radical Republicans in the early Kemalist era. 
These intellectuals, especially Tuny, Baltac10glu, and Olken in the Republican era, 
worked as educators and held posts in the bureaucracy of the education. Tuny started his 
career in 1908 as a deputy governor of a provincial district, Kosovo. He was even named 
"Hoca (Hodja) Local Governor" because of his activities and interest in the field of 
education. The Ministry of Education sent him abroad in 1913 and he received his 
doctorate degree in psychology from the Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute in Switzerland. 
When he returned to Turkey, he held various posts in the Ministry of Education. He 
became associate professor at Dariilfiinun (antecedent of the University of istanbul). It 
was Baltac10glu who supported his appointment at Dariilfonun. His interest in politics, as 
3 
compared to Baltac1oglu, Agaoglu and Safa, was limited. He worked at Dariilfanun until 
his death in 1958 with a short break during the 1933 purge. Besides his academic 
activities, he was also the chairman of the Turkish Philosophy Association in 1931. He had 
a deep interest in the Bergsonian philosophy. In 1937, Tun~ and Olken were sent to Paris 
as members of the Turkish delegation to participate in the International Philosophy 
Congress. He was also selected as member of the Turkish delegation to the 14th 
International Sociology Congress to be held in Bucharest in 1939. However, the Congress 
was canceled due to the Second World War. He was also an active figure in the Councils 
of Education and Morality which were convened in the years of 1939, 1943 and 1951, 
respectively. What was significant for the purposes of this dissertation was his 
philosophical orientation which provided a common vocabulary to the traditionalist-
conservative figures to mirror their common philosophical tendencies. His statement to the 
Congress, named Descartes Congress, reflected this commonly shared attitude among the 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals in comprehending the novelties brought about by 
the Kemalist Revolution. For Tun~, "Turkey is building itself according to the formula of 
Mr. Bergson."2 
According to Olken, it was Baltac1oglu who provoked Tun~'s interest in the 
Bergsonian philosophy. Like Tun~, Baltac10glu also had an academic career. He had a 
wide range of interests in the fields of ethics, education, literature, politics, philosophy, 
sociology, pedagogy. He also had a striking personality. This "traditionalist" intellectual of 
the Republic was among the first innovators of the late Ottoman era. In Berkes' words: 
., 
he became best known through his campaign against something that would probably occur to 
no one under normal conditions: the tassel attached to the fez! In innumerable lectures he 
ridiculed the tassel. showed it to be wasteful. unaesthetic, and above all utterly devoid of any 
function, yet stupidly carried about by everyone. At the climax of each talk he used to draw 
out a pair of scissors and cut the tassel off his own fez. for which he was known until the 
adoption of surnames in 1935 as Puskulsiiz (Tassel-less) ismail Haklo.3 
- Mustafa ~kip Tww, "Descartes Kongresine Hitap," (Statement Addressed to The Descartes Congress) Bilgi, 11, 
132 (March, 1958), p. 17. 
3 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press,1964), pp. 403-4. 
4 
Even though, "for year he was the only Turk without a tassel...(and) this crusade," in 
Berkes' words, " had a cultural and educational meaning . . . which symbolized the revolt 
of the new education against the things that had no meaning or function - economic, 
religious, national, or social - and yet continued to exist simply through dogged adherence 
to custom.'"" This criticism of innovators, for which Baltac1oglu' s case was an example, 
"signified the beginning of the process of revising values and institutions. " 5 This crusade 
reached to its zenith in the Republican radicalism, which, paradoxically, gave its first signs 
of radicalism in the acts and ideas of the "traditionalist" Baltac1oglu. 
Berkes also noted that he was one among the first generation of orators in the late 
Ottoman-Turkish politics.6 Indeed, he became a well-known orator after his statement on 
pedagogy delivered at izmir in the first years of the Second Constitutional period. 7 He also 
delivered various lectures and public speeches at schools opened by the Union and 
Progress Party in Selonica, Adrianople and istanbul. After his visit to France, England, 
Belgium and Switzerland he had a tenure from Dariilfonun in 1913. Besides his academic 
activities he also held post in educational bureaucracy. He was appointed chairman of the 
Board of Inspectors of the Ministry of Education in 1918. In 1920 and 1922, he was 
elected as the dean of the F acuity of Literary Arts. In 1923, he became the undersecretary 
of the Ministry of Education. The same year, he was selected as the rector of Dariilfonun. 
He also delivered lectures in the Faculty ofFine Arts and Faculty of Theology. In 1925, he 
resigned from the rectorate. In 1931, he, like Agaoglu, was participated in the Free 
Republican Party and became the chairman of the istanbul branch of the party. 
Baltac1oglu's article, entitled Bizim Tapt1g1m1z Mustafa Kemal (Mustafa Kemal Whom We 
Worship) published in the journal, Yann in 1930 was a turning point for his academic 
4 Ib" td., p. 404. 
5 Idem. 
6 Ibid., pp. 494-5 
7 Sabr"i Koli,:ak, lsmail Hakkt Baltaciogl11, Egitimin Felsefesini Yanan Pedagog (ismail Hakkt Baltac1oglu, The 
Pedagogue Who Formulated the Philosophy of Education) (izmir: Ege Universitesi Matbaas1, 1968), p. 64 
5 
and political career. In his article Baltac10glu, companng Mustafa Kemal with 
Michelangelo and Delacroix said that 
Mustafa Kemal. whom we worship, is not that Mustafa Kemal who is the chairman of the 
People's Party, but. like genius Ingles. he is the ··Eternal Mustafa Kemal" who carries the 
heritage of the past that is the spiritual forces of the Turkish nation and creates the future of 
the Turkish nation. 8 
Mustafa Kemal did not show any sympathy to Baltac10glu' s comparisons among 
Delacroix, Michelangelo, Ingles and himself, and initiated a campaign against Baltac1oglu 
through Re~it Galip and urged Agaoglu strongly to apply Fethi Bey (Okyar), chairman of 
the Free Republican Party, to dismiss Baltac1oglu from the ranks of the party. 9 
Followingly, in the 1933 Purge of Dariilfanun he was unseated from his post in the 
academy. Then, in 1934, he started to publish the journal, Yeni Adam. Until his death in 
1978, the journal was published with some periods of break. After the death of Atatiirk, in 
1942, inonu encouraged him to become a republican deputy from the province of Afyon. 
The same year, he also had a tenure from the Faculty of Language, Histocy and Geography. 
He also became the chairman of the Board of Terms at the Turkish Language Association and 
worked in this institution as the chairman of this board until 1957. In 1946 elections, he was 
elected as a republican deputy from the province of~. His political life came to an end by 
the triumph of the Democratic Party in the 1950 elections. He had innumerable books and 
articles written in the fields of art, aesthetics, social science and philosophy. 10 
Among the intellectuals concerned only Agaoglu had such an interest in politics 
which was comparable with Baltac10glu. As noted, they worked within the ranks of the 
same party until Atarurk forced Agaoglu to have a stand against Baltac1oglu. As a matter 
of fact, Agaoglu's experience in the Free Republican Party not only became the end of his 
involvement in politics but also his academic career which had started in 1909 after his 
8 AhmedAgaoglu, Serbest Ftrka Amlan (Free Party Memoirs), 3rd ed. (lstanbul: ileti~im Yaymlan, 1994), pp. 86-7. 
9 See Agaoglu, ibid., pp. 86-91. 
IO See, ~it Oymen, "Baltac1oglu ve Yeni Adam." (Baltac1oglu and Yeni Adam) Yeni Adam, 920 (April 1978), pp. 
10-1. Also M. Zerrin Akgiin. ''<;~itli YOnleriyle Baltac1oglu," (Baltac1oglu from Various Aspects), Yeni Adam 920 
(April 1978), pp. 38-43. 
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return from Azerbaijan as a prominent Turkish figure of the time. Following his return to 
the homeland, Agaoglu started to have close relations with the Turkist circles of the time 
and became a member of the Turkish Hearths (Tiirk Ocaklan) founded in 1912. The same 
year he was elected as a member of the Central Committee of the Union and Progress 
Party. In 1918, he was again in Azerbaijan as the advisor of the chief of the army which 
was sent to help the independent Azerbaijan. In 1919, he returned to istanbul and then 
was exiled to Malta Island. In 1921, he participated in the War of Independence and 
became the editor-in-chief of the daily, Hakimiyet-i Milliye (National Sovereignty). Then, 
he was elected to the parliament and served as a representative until the closure of the Free 
Republican Party. From then on, he was not elected to the parliament and his political life 
came to an end. Followingly, he started to publish the daily named Akm and published various 
articles in Safa's Kiiltiir Hajtas1 in the early 1930s and Olken's insan in the late 1930s. 11 
In this respect, Safa's Kiiltiir Haftas1, was an important journal for at least two 
reasons; firstly, it became a common platform for the intellectuals concerned; secondly, it 
marked a turning-point for Safa' s individual career turning from novelist and man of 
letters to a conservative intellectual with a political motivation. The journal Kiiltiir Haftas1 
and his conferences delivered at the Turkish Philosophy Association by the beginning of 
the 1930s reflected his affinity to an informal group of intellectuals, including, Agaoglu, 
Tun~, Olken and Baltac1oglu. He became a well-known figure through his polemical 
discussions with the socialist poet Nazim Hikmet in the mid-l 930s. 
He was also the only figure among these intellectuals who did not occupy a post in 
the state. He earned his living through his writings. Throughout the 1940s, he became one 
of the best known public figures for his conservative and nationalist aspirations. In 1950 
elections Safa was offered to be a Republican deputy from the province of Bursa but he 
11 For lite of Agaoglu, see Hihni Ziya Dlken, TUrkiye'de Cagdas Dil§once Tarihi (History of Contemporary Thought 
in Turkey), 3rd ed. (tstanbul: Dlken Yaymlan, 1992), pp. 408-12. 
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could not be elected. Then he became the spokesman of the Democratic Party. By the 
beginning of the 1950s, he started to publish his journal Tiirk Dii~ncesi and by the mid-
l 950s, he contributed to the journal Din Yolu which also became a platform for 
Baltac1oglu, Olken and Turn;: to provide the key terms of philosophy of religion. 
It was Olken who helped Safa to publish the journal Tiirk Dii~ncesi. Still, he had 
a limited interest in politics and mostly made his career in the academy. His career as an 
educator started in 1921, and then he was offered a post in the newly established 
University in 1933 by the initiative of Atatiirk. His contact with the intellectuals concerned 
had started by the end of 1920s through the activities of the Turkish Philosophy and 
Sociology Association. The Association published the journal titled Felsefe ve i9timaiyat 
Mecmuas1. However, only two issues of the journal were published. Its activities slowed 
down in 1930. Then, Olken revived it in 1931. It was renamed the Turkish Philosophy 
Association. The Association published the journal, Felsefe Yllilgz and held various 
seminars. Safa, Baltac1oglu, Olken, Tun~ and Agaoglu were all participated in the seminars 
organized by the Association. The~ in 1938, he started to publish the journal insan. Still, 
he mostly engaged in academic activities. In 1949, he participated in the establishment of 
the Association International de Sociologie, and after his return to Turkey, he founded the 
Turkish Sociology Association. In the mid- l 950s, he published various articles in Safa' s 
journal Turk Du~ncesi. 
All in all, these intellectuals presented a common way of thinking and acting in the 
early Republican era. Thus, this dissertation will deal with the intellectual and political 
aspects of this common stand which, though ignored by the political scientists and 
historians, significantly shaped the conservative agenda in Turkish politics in the 
succeeding decades. For analytical purposes, this common way of thinking and acting will 
be characterized by the term "traditionalist conservatism." The term, which will be 
elaborated in detail, refers to common philosophico-political motivations which intersects 
with Baltac1oglu' s "traditionalism" and Safa' s "conservatism." Both tendencies were 
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deeply influenced by Tun9's Bergsonian philosophy, and shared common ideals and 
aspirations with Olken' s moralism and Agaoglu' s personalism. Olken sought for an 
institutional basis for the circulation of the "traditionalist," "conservative" and 
"personalist" aspirations of the group of intellectuals concerned. For this reason, he took 
the initiative for the revival of Turkish Philosophy and Sociology Association in 1931 
where Safa, Baltac10glu, Agaoglu and Tuner also delivered various seminars. Olken also 
encouraged Tun9 to become the chairperson of the Association in 1931. It is also not 
surprising to see numerous articles of these figures appearing in Kiiltiir Hajtasi in the mid 
1930s, a journal published by ilhami Safa, Safa's brother. Besides a corpus of books, 
numerous articles of these figures also appeared in the dailies and in journals, such as 
<;marait1, as in the case of Safa and Tun9, or in Baltac10glu's Yeni Adam, Olken's insan 
and istanbul in the 1930s and 1940s, and/or Baltac10glu's Din Yalu, or Safa's Turk 
Dii~iincesi in the 1950s. Thus, one of the basic aims of this study is to provide a scheme of 
this holistic approach to moral, aesthetic, political ideas and aspirations of these intellectuals 
who gathered around common ideals, institutions and philosophico-political inspirations. 
The chief intention in this study is to display how aesthetic, political, moral and 
political ideals and concerns were articulated in the main traditionalist-conservative texts of 
the five self-styled intellectuals of the time. Various traditionalist-conservative themes and 
motives, which appeared in their own journals, such as Kiiltiir Hajtas1, Yeni Adam and 
insan, had important repercussions in understanding their conception of Kemalist 
modernism which had provided various distinct ways of thinking about Man, society and 
institutions. Kemalist modernism radically altered the tempo of life compared to the 
preceding Ottoman era. This radical change can be understood as a change in habits, 
attitudes and consciousness in every field, from politics to daily life. Within this 
framework, research on the articulation of conservative themes and motives in the early 
Republican era will prompt a new understanding of Kemalist modernism. 
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To do this, the study also aims to analyse the intellectual climate and cleavages 
among the secular-modernist Kemalist intelligentsia who were responsible for the 
emergence of traditionalist-conservative ideas. These cleavages were built around the 
debate on how Turkish modernism had to be conceived and manipulated. Traditionalist-
conservative aspirations represented one of these cleavages within the Kemalist world 
view. In other words, they developed within the confines of Kemalist modernism. Modem 
Turkish traditionalist conservatism, as a distinct philosophico-political vocabulary, was based 
on a modem-secular cosmology and emerged concomitantly with the rise of the structures of 
modernity, such as the nation state and capitalist market. Thus, the study will attempt to 
delineate and isolate the modernist themes and motives within the conservative milieu which 
emerged within the ranks of modernist-secularist intelligentsia during Turkish transition from 
religiously-framed structures of the preceding Ottoman Millet system to the world of nations. 
The dominant Kemalist themes drew heavily upon nineteenth century scienticism, 
Enlightenment radicalism, Comtian positivism and societalist (cemiyetr;i) solidarism of 
Ziya Gokalp. 12 The traditionalist-conservative milieu came to challenge the dogmatic faith 
in science, technology and progress upheld by the Kemalist ruling elite. They also 
developed competing conceptions on the nature of the state, its legitimacy and its relations 
with the society. They offered a philosophical critique against the Kemalist vision of 
modernity and against its anti or a-religious posture. Yet, despite their resistance to the 
positivist-nominalist framework of Kemalism, these intellectuals also tended to see 
themselves as a faction within the Kemalist elites. It must be noted, however, that it was 
their differing interpretation of the newly established Kemalist status quo through some 
alternative concepts in the 1930s which set the tone of their relations with the Kemalist 
power center. 
12 Ali Kaz.anc1gil, "The Ottoman-Twkish State and Kemalism," in Atatilrk: Founder of a Modem State. Ali 
Kaz.anc1gil and Ergun Ozbudun, eds. (London: C. Hurst&Company), p. 37. 
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Within this framework, an historical account will be provided in chapter 2 to delineate 
the Ottoman problematic inherited by Kemalism. Historical generalizations will be provided to 
characterize Kemalists' claim of historical rupture from the past and the novel traditionalist-
conservative claim to conserve the Kemalist status quo. Special emphasis will be placed on 
Kemalist patterns of politics. A detailed account of Kemalist realpolitik will also be provided 
to illustrate the basic features ofKemalist moderniz.ation. The events and processes which led to the 
emergence and consolidation of nation state will be evaluat.ed to portray the basic characteristics of 
Kemalist revolutionary philosophy which stimulated the development of traditionalist-OJnservative 
aspirations. The sources and patterns of Kemalist radicalism, with special emphasis on its 
obsession with science will be elaborated. This will provide a firm ground to indicate the 
disjunctions and parallelisms between Kemalist and traditionalist-conservative imaginations 
which will be assessed in the succeeding chapters in detail. Particular importance will be 
given to the cultural, political and economic processes that transformed the Kemalist state 
to, what Anthony Smith has called a "scientific bureaucratic state," since the Kemalist ideas 
on the state and society relationship became the leitmotifs of traditionalist-OJnservative 
resistance to the Kemalist positivist vision ofmodernity. 13 
The analysis of nation-state building patterns is relevant to understanding the 
underlying political, cultural and economic processes in which the traditionalist-
conservative aspirations were crystallized as modern convictions of"conservation," among 
the modernist traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia located in Kemalist power circle. In 
chapter 2, a picture of the political and intellectual life of modern Turkey in the early 
Republican era will be drawn to illustrate how different trends and motives from numerous 
13 Anthony Smith defined the term as follows: "New interventionist role of the state on the grounds that it alone can 
raise the living standards of the population, educate them, unify them, give them a sense of pride and well being and 
administer the public affairs in a 'rational' and collective manner." "Scientific state" Smith argued '·is a polity which 
seeks to homogenize the population, within its boundaries for administrative purposes by using the latest scientific 
techniques and methods for the sake of 'etficency.' The rulers use the bureaucratic machine and the fruits of scientific 
and technological application to harness resources and mobiliz.e the people in their territory." See Anthony Smith, 
Theories of Nationalism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983). pp. 231-2, 249-52, 254, 264,269. See also Anthony 
Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991 ), Ethnicity and Nationalism (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992). 
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currents, such as the traditionalism of Baltac1oglu, conservatism of Safa, personalism of 
Agaoglu, Bergsonism of Tun~ and moralism of Olken, interfused to form a peculiar 
traditionalist-conservative understanding of Kemalist modernism and politics. 
In order to understand the nature of the new elite fragmentation within the 
Kemalist power structure and the emergence of a new consciousness among the secular-
modernist intelligentsia around traditionalist-conservative themes, a textual analysis of the 
manifestations of these themes and motives in the writings of five-self styled intellectuals is 
required. Thus, in chapter 3, a preliminary analysis of the fundamental characteristics of 
two capitalism-centered styles of thought, namely Kemalism and traditionalist 
conservatism, will be provided to characterize their mode of rationalization of the 
consolidation of capitalism under the tutelage of the Kemalist nation-state. 
At this stage of analysis, the basic aim is to hint at the formative conceptions in the 
main traditionalist-conservative texts which were responsible for the growing traditionalist-
conservative consciousness and aspirations among the five self-styled intellectuals. These 
characteristic conceptions were also employed to form a traditionalist-conservative 
rationalization of the institutionalization of the structures of modernity, such as the nation-
state and capitalism. These conceptions also paved the way for the development of new 
political and cultural convictions through which traditionalist-conservative intellectuals 
distanced their respective stands from the traditional religious reactionaries of the 
Revolution. Diverse themes and motives were articulated mainly in the traditionalist-
conservative texts in response to the political, economic and cultural ideals of Kemalist 
modernism. Still, Kemalism, the state-building ideology, formed the most ubiquitous 
ground that framed the emerging traditionalist-conservative ideals and aspirations. The 
relationship between these intellectuals and Kemalism is not accidental but rather causal. 
Neverthel~ 'personalist,' 'anti-rationalist,' "anti-intellectualist' and 'anti-scienticist' 
motives in main the traditionalist-conservative texts were articulated to form a competing 
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but not necessarily completely alienated position from the politico-philosophical 
perspective of the Kemalist positivist model of modernism. 
Within this framework, basic traditionalist-conservative themes, which served as a 
basis of legitimization for Kemalist nation state practices will also be delineated. In this 
regard, special attention will be paid to culturalist convictions of traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals. This appeal to culturalism was responsible for traditionalist-conservative 
devotion to most of the political ideals of Kemalism. The Kemalist framework was 
ultimately seen as the historical attempt which would free the creative spirit of the nation 
from the cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman state. Indeed, it_ is this culturalist emphasis 
which makes traditionalist conservatism an essentially modernist impulse, while at the 
same time, brings Kemalism to a stance closer to traditionalist conservatism. 
In the early Republican era the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals also tried to 
give a full account of their own vision of modernism. Bergsonism provided the basic 
philosophical inspirations for the development of a kind of romanticism and/or 
modernism. As noted by Lestek Kolakowski, most of the prominent figures of the 
modernist movement by the beginning of the twentieth century were also influenced by the 
Bergsonian philosophy and Bergsonism ultimately paved the way for the development of a 
new trend of Catholic modernism. 14 Bergsonism had a reformist effect on the dogmas of 
the Catholic Church by viewing them as "provincial and changeable forms in which 
Christians express their faith according to historical circumstances. " 15 Still, Kolakowski 
argued that "Bergson" did not leave behind "any school which would develop his ideas; 
he had admirers, propagators, defenders, but no disciples or intellectual successors in the 
proper sense."16 Nevertheless, Bergsonism was the most influential philosophical trend 
between 1900 and 1914. In the field of literature, his irrationalist philosophical orientation 
14 Lestek Kolakowski, Bergson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 97-8. 
15 Ibid., p. 99. 
16 Ibid. p. 101. 
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had an influence on Charles Peguty and Marcel Proust. Bergson's time conception was 
inspired by George Bernard Shaw, particularly as reflected in his play, Back to 
Methuselah, published in 1921. 17 Bergson's intuitionist philosophy was inspired by 
George Sorel to combat Marxist historical determinism. Moreover, in the field of fine arts, 
Claude Monet, and in the field of music, Claude Achille Debussy, have provided works 
which were blends of Bergson's intuitionism and impressionism. Bergson also had a 
significant impact on the development of the historicist philosophy of William Dilthey, 
Benetto Croce, and even on the pragmatist philosophy of William James. 18 
In this respect, basic manifestations of Bergsonism revealed themselves in varying 
tones in the main traditionalist-conservative texts. The development of Safa's conservative 
novel, Baltac10glu's educational philosophy, together with Olken's moralism and 
Agaoglu' s highly qualified views on individual and historical evolution owed a lot to the 
Bergsonian vocabulary which had been introduced by Tun~. These common philosophical 
and political assumptions and aspirations, which were responsible for the development of a 
common approach to Kemalist modernism, have to be identified. 
Still, Bergsonism was not the only source of inspiration, though it was the 
dominant one. In the case of Safa the influence of the German Historicist Schoo~ Dilthey, 
and Frederick Nietzsche revealed itself in his book Felsefi Buhran (The Philosophical 
Crisis) or in the case ofUlken, the influences of Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger and/or the 
phenomenological school were openly praised in his book, Yirminci Aszr Felsefecileri 
(The Twentieth Century Philosophers). Even though Baltac1oglu was a life-time devotee 
of Bergson in his philosophical orientations, he was also inspired by the philosophy of Jean 
Jacques Rousseau. The impact of different authors, which could be observed in the 
17 Nejat Bozkurt, 20. Yilzvil DO.siince Akrmlan. Yorwnlar ve Elestiriler (The 20th Century Currents of Thought, 
Interpretations and Criticisms) (istanbul: Sarmal Yaymevi, l 995), pp. 45-6. 
18 Ibid., p. 46. 
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writings of these intellectuals, were not taken into consideration, when they did not lead to 
a qualitative difference in their respective flows of thought. 
Besides the cause-effect relationship, another problematic issue is methodological 
vagueness in drawing the limits of "influence" among the intellectuals concerned. There is 
no direct means to show that certain ideas and aspirations of a thinker were internalized by 
another unless one of them openly revealed it. For example, in the cases of Tun~ and 
Baltac1oglu it is proper to think that they were the protagonists of Bergsonism since both 
of them declared that they had adopted the Bergsonian precepts in their philosophical 
orientations. However, in the case of Safa and Agaoglu, the question is more complicated 
although they also praised Bergson as the founding philosopher of metaphysics in the 
modem age. Dlken' s case is yet the most complex one and needs further elaboration on a 
thematic level. A thematic analysis of Ulken' s philosophical stand can reveal the diffusion 
of Bergsonian anxieties into his moral philosophy. But it must not be forgotten that his 
ideas were derived from many sources, such as Heidegger, Scheler and even from 
Frederick Hegel. 
With these difficulties in mind, chapters 4 and 5 will show Bergson's significance 
for traditionalist-conservative intellectuals in their quest to understand the Kemalist vision 
of modernism. It will be made clear that Bergsonian philosophical inspirations of this 
milieu were intensely politicized in their clash with other factions of Kemalism. In this 
respect, special emphases will be placed on the traditionalist-conservative search for an 
institutional recognition of their Bergsonian philosophy and on their dispute with the 
Kadro circle - a group of ex-Marxist Kemalist intellectuals - who received semi-official 
recognition from the Kemalist ruling elites in the early 1930s. This controversy between 
the Kadro circle and traditionalist-conservative intellectuals in the early 1930s played an 
important role for the conservative intellectuals in clarifying their own political and 
philosophical vocabulary. For this reason, the individual reactions of these intellectuals to 
the Kadro circle will be elaborated with a view of observing the process by which their 
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Bergson inspired ideas were refined. Agaoglu and Baltac10glu' s personalism, Olk en's 
mystic moralism will be analysed with this concern in mind. Nevertheless, it must be noted 
that Bergsonism will not be treated as a cause for the individual self-consciousness of the 
group but rather as characteristic of certain tendencies and interests commonly shared by 
the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, especially in formulating their reactions against 
the Kadro circle or radical Kemalists. 
A specific emphasis will be made on the politicization of the Bergsonian 
philosophical background, especially in chapter 5. Traditionalist-conservative distance 
from what they regarded as the politics of rationalism of the Kemalist state had set the tone 
of their relations with the ruling elite. Within this framework, traditionalist-conservative 
ideas on the legitimate political rule, the nature of political power and elan engineering 
were based on an inner Bergsonian logic. Chapter 5 will delineate the implications of 
common Bergsonian terms in formulating a peculiar style of life politics which derived its 
basic stimuli from a "philosophy of man" and "time" that ultimately led to the critique of 
the politics of scienticism with an appeal to intuition. This critique of the politics of 
scienticism was responsible for traditionalist-conservative questioning of the modernizing 
policies and strategies of the Kemalist scientific state, if not its ideals as well The inherent 
contradiction between the ruling elite and the conservative milieu revealed itself during the 
University Reform in 1933 when Kemalists abolished the old Darii/ftinun. The University 
Reform, which will be focused on in chapter 5, is also significant since it revealed 
Kemalists' choice for the 'insiders' and 'outsiders' of the political game. Traditionalist-
conservative intelligentsia faced the sober reality when the Kemalist ruling elite divided 
them into 'insiders' and 'outsiders': accordingly, Baltac1oglu and Agaoglu would be the 
outsiders whereas Tun~ would be the insider. Republican strategies adopted in University 
Reform may be taken as the indication of the legitimacy of Bergsonism for the ruling 
Kemalist cadre. Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals with "traditionalist," and "liberal" 
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aspirations were left outside, whereas Berg;onism was registered as a philosophy which had the 
potential to adapt itself to the changes brought about in society by the Kemalist Revolution. 
Traditionalist-conservative challenge to scienticism mostly revealed itself in an 
appeal to art since members of this small circle were sensitive to the social and political 
function of art as a model of creation in this era of nation and state building. Moreover, 
Safa was a famous man of letters whereas Olken and Baltac1oglu were closely interested in 
literature. Starting in the early 1930s with Baltac1oglu's book entitled Demokrasi ve Sanat 
(Democracy and Art), and Olken's Resim ve Cemiyet (Painting and Society), art's social 
function, which was delineated as a mirroring effect of the individual and social spirit, was 
always praised. 19 These critics of rationalism promoted a new function of art and 
dynamics of artistic experience as a way of understanding the meaning of human action in 
a new world shaped by faith in the governing ethos of Reason. 
Chapter 6 will try to establish the historical significance of traditionalist 
conservatives' emphases on moral, social, and political concerns which underpinned their 
interest in art. The importance ascribed to art also stemmed from its function to popularize 
new modem tastes, cultural standards and values. Besides, art and especially literary art, 
also provided a more secure place for traditionalist-conservative intellectuals than a direct 
involvement in active politics in the Revolutionary period. Various political concerns 
revealed themselves in these literary works, for example in the novels of Safa or in some 
works of Ulken and Baltac1oglu on the cultural and political significance of art. In this 
context, the traditionalist-conservative conception of art had important political 
consequences. For them the arts, especially of the literary arts provided a new literary 
vocabulary which would mirror the value crisis felt by each stratum faced with the 
modernist drive ofKemalism. 
19 ismail Hakla Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat (Democracy and Art) (istanbul: Sanayi'i Nefi.se Basunevi, 1931); 
Dlken, Resim ve Cemiyet (Painting and Society) (1stanbul: Universite Kitabevi, 1943). 
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The potential of art was exploited by the traditionalist-conservative circle to 
illustrate the annihilative consequences of Kemalist modernism. Thus, literature became a 
realm for the extension of traditionalist-conservative themes and motives, as revealed in 
the works of Safa. Safa's conservative philosophy shaped his literary techniques and 
disclosed his latent political aspirations which were also shared by other traditionalist-
conservative figures. Indeed, Safa's conservative literature and Tun~'s Bergsonism were 
representative of the general convictions of the traditionalist-conservative circle. They 
displayed the common aesthetic and philosophical concerns behind the traditionalist-
conservative response to Kemalist modernism. Within this framework, chapter 6 will 
ultimately show how concepts of artistic creativity, freedom, spontaneity and imagination 
turned into concepts with political connotations. These concepts illustrated a model of 
legitimate relationship between the charismatic ruler and the people. 
Competing patterns of thought in the early Republican era on legitimate rule over 
the society were also shaped around the political and social problems generated by the 
grand processes of nation and nation-state building practices. In chapters 7 and 8, attention 
will be paid to traditionalist-conservative attempts to secularize the terms of political 
theory from which the Kemalist order had derived its legitimacy. The specific point to be 
evaluated in chapter 7 is the traditionalist-conservative emphasis on ethics, metaphysics 
and religiosity as a substitute for the dissolution of the institutional structure of Islam as a 
system of social sanctions. Within this framework, the traditionalist-conservative 
conception of social obligation is related to their conceptions on the sources, nature and 
development of morality and the place of religion in modem societies. The traditionalist-
conservative conception of new social ethics had important political repercussions since it 
resulted in a search for a pattern of leadership for the consolidation of this ethic. 
Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals advocated that Islam, which had previously 
functioned as the basis of social ethics, should be harnessed into a particular national 
development, i.e. into a kind of nationalism. 
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The traditionalist-conservative ambition to push every institution toward a national 
path of development, their conceptions of civil society, class and democracy will be 
elaborated in chapter 8. Kemalist modernism was derived from a model of civilization. The 
modernizer state and its faithful servants, be they the bureaucracy and/or devoted 
intelligentsia would be the carriers of this civilizing modernism. Science was assumed to 
characterize the universal ideals of this modernism. The traditionalist-conservative critique 
of rationalism, mechanism and atomist individualism paved the way for their adaptation of 
a "hybrid-organic" metaphor. This metaphor formed the basis for their criticism of 
contractual theories of society and politics of individualism. The traditionalist-conservative 
critiques of liberal utilitarian views on man and society was a deviation from the 
mainstay precepts of conventional Western liberal thought. This stance had special 
significance since some of the prominent figures of the traditionalist-conservative group 
also became the founders of the 'liberal' Free Republican Party in 1930 as in the cases of 
Agaoglu and Baltac10glu. The latter was the chairman of the istanbul branch of the party, 
likewise, Safa was acting as the spokesman of the 'liberal' Democratic Party by the mid 
1950s. This may give a hint about the early history of the emergence of "conservative-
liberal" anomaly in the Turkish case that which surfaced with the rise of the Democratic 
Party by the mid 1940s and displayed itself at various stages of Turkish politics mostly 
through the right wing parties. These political platforms derived their legitimacy from this 
anomaly in varying degrees. 
The focuses in chapters 7 and 8 are on the hybrid organic approach that accounted 
for a unique conception of state, democracy and society by these intellectuals. This hybrid-
organicism was employed to denote that structures of modernity and its political and 
cultural institutions could not be arbitrarily implanted from one country to another. If this 
was done, it would harm the uniqueness of the Kemalist institutionalization of the nation-
state, its political, economic and cultural institutions. Still, this hybrid organic approach did 
not result in the subordination of the individual to the society, as in the case of Ziya 
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Gokalp' s solidarist collectivism which revealed itself in the Republican motto of "no right 
but obligations, no individual but society." The inherent traditionalist-conservative ideas on 
personalism posed individuality in a radical fashion. Hybrid-organism, while distancing the 
traditionalist-conservative circle from the vague solidarist-organism of Kemalism, inherited 
from Gokalp, also provided the means of giving form to a holistic approach where the 
functioning of the whole could be grasped intuitively. In this respect, the intuitionist 
approach became a basis for the traditionalist-conservative characterization of the 
uniqueness of the institutionalization of politics. Intuitionism enabled this group to 
delineate rule through charisma, represented by the Kemalist power structure as the 
legitimate form of political power. Therefore these chapters will analyse the affinity 
between Kemalism and traditionalist conservatism and will show that the latter group 
already presented itself as a definite trend in Kemalist modernism. It is important to 
understand the functionality of traditionalist-conservative themes for Kemalist modernism. 
The relevance of traditionalist conservatism for the regime was due to the fact that its basic 
concepts, orientations and ideals found a niche in the Kemalist power structure, if not 
always at its center. Baltaetoglu's political experience in the Free Republican Party with 
Agaoglu, or in the Republican People's Party, where he became one of its deputies in the 
parliament between 1942-1950, and/or Safa' s shift from Republicans to Democrats by the 
mid-1950s onwards and/or the secure place granted to these intellectuals in the Kemalist 
power structure can be seen as evidence of the fact that traditionalist-conservative themes 
and motives were not alien to omnipotent Kemalism. They can be taken as symptoms of 
the diffusion of traditionalist-conservative themes into the dominant Republican ideology. 
A Terminological Clarification 
The term "traditionalist conservatism" needs further terminological clarification. The term 
is specifically coined in this dissertation. It is drawn from the "traditionalism" of 
Baltac1oglu and "conservatism" of Safa. Having been inspired from the Bergsonian 
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philosophy of Tuny, Baltac1oglu's traditionalism shared common elements with Agaoglu's 
personalism and Dlken' s moralism. Safa' s conservatism had also many moralists and 
personalist aspirations which stimulated the development of a literary style that manifested 
many of the interwoven trends. The convergent themes and motives in these texts 
outweighed the different emphases in their philosophical, sociological, political and literary 
texts. 20 The inner logic of their reasoning makes smooth distinctions among these 
intellectuals synthetic because the term "traditionalist-conservative" simply denotes a will 
on the part of these intellectuals to think and act together on the basis of a set of shared 
premises and themes. 
This small but qualified group of intellectuals can be considered as "traditionalist" 
and/or "conservative," in a descriptive sense in terms of their respect for tradition, history 
and culture. 21 But this does not mean a total consensus among the members of the group 
on every theme they developed in their works. Even though these five intellectuals had 
much in common, they were also so different in temperament that they held different 
views on a wide range on issues and had different central intuitions and aims. Even though 
Baltac1oglu and Safa had similar views on the social and cultural functions of art, they 
somehow held dissimilar view on the future course of the development of the nouveuax 
novel of the Republic. Though personalism was a common stand that shaped the 
philosophical and political orientations of Baltac1oglu and Agaoglu, their orientations 
towards religion differed widely. Even though Dlken and Tuny had praised Bergsonism as 
the modem arch-critic of vague positivism, each would hold different views on which 
aspects of Bergsonism would be considered worthy of incorporation into their respective 
20 In this study, I have drawn upon Karl Mannheim's definition of intellectuals. Accordingly, '"intellectual stratum,' 
is a group of people belonging to a certain social unit and sharing a certain 'world postulate' (as part of which we 
may mention the economic syst~ the philosophical syst~ the artistic style 'postulated' by them) who at a given 
time are 'committed' to a certain style of economic activity and of theoretical thought." See Kurt H. Wolff, From Karl 
Mannheim (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971 ), p.111. 
21 For such an usage of the term "traditionalist conservatism," see Kemal Karpat, ''Modem Turkey," in The 
Cambridge History of Islam, vol. l, P.M. Holt, Ann K. S. Larnbton, Bernard Lewis, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), p. 559. 
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critiques of the Republican scienticism. Still, all of them, might have agreed that they could 
be grouped as a distinct movement in philosophy and politics in the early Republican era. 
In this respect, the term "traditionalist conservatism" implies parallelisms and overlapping 
concerns among their individual intellectual aspirations. The denominators they shared led 
them to a common pattern of reaction against materialism, mechanism, positivism, 
scienticism, rationalism, Islamic orthodoxy, Marxism, cosmopolitanism and formalism. 
The intellectuals, who gathered around the journal Kadro, were the first to realize the 
parallelisms between this conservative group. Critical articles on Baltac10glu's 
"personalism," Agaoglu's "liberalism" Olken's "mystic-moralism" and Tum;'s 
"Bergsonism" appeared in various issues of the journal. 
The most serious difficulty with the term "traditionalist conservatism" is related to 
its conservative component. In main traditionalist-conservative texts, the terms 
"conservatism," or "conservative" were held synonymous with "irtica" (reaction) and 
"miirteci" (reactionary), respectively, which specifically referred to the religiously-framed 
reaction to Kemalist modernism. This is due to the political history of the period. During 
the heyday of the Turkish revolution, there emerged a tendency within the Republican 
ranks to label any opposition current of thought as 'conservative' and/or 'reactionary.' 
These 'conservative reactionaries' were seen as the followers of the former Ottoman 
regime who still wished to conserve the traditional religious political institutions of the 
preceding regime, such as the Sultanate and/or Caliphate. The Republic simply stamped 
them as 'conservative.' Thus, there was a desire in the early Republican period to stamp 
every kind of reactionism as 'conservative.' However, the new Regime also produced its 
own unique forms of conservatism( s) wit!\ a qualitative difference from the 'old 
conservatism' of the reactionaries. It is this insight which is the central objective of this 
study. Qualitative conceptual differences between the nouveaux conservatism 
[read traditionalist conservatism] of the Republic and old reactionism (which Kemalists 
originally labeled as "conservatism") can not be analyzed through the same terms and 
concepts. Thus, the term, which has been coined as "traditionalist conservatism," in the 
dissertation, firstly refers to an amalgam of these new concepts, terms, themes and motives; 
secondly to a new philosophical and political vocabulary which refers to certain common 
ideals and aspirations in apprehending the new realities of the Republic. Finally, it indicates 
a common pattern of philosophical reasoning which motivated group action of the 
intellectuals concerned. 
Still, these intellectuals, with the exception of Safa in later decades, did not label 
their individual political stands with the term "conservative" since in the early political 
vocabulary of the regime it had been used to refer to the religiously-framed resistance to the 
Revolution. They realized that organized political actions, which could be labeled as 
"conservative," would drive the ruling Kemalist intelligentsia into harsh measures. 
However, as noted, this did not mean that Revolution had bulldozed all claims to conserve 
because it was also in urgent need to conserve its vision of modernity. In this respect, the 
term, coined as "traditionalist conservatism," implies this novel claim for the conservation 
of Kemalist structures of modernity, namely the nation-state institutions, its political, 
cultural institutions and the capitalist market. 
The nouveaux traditionalist coriservatism of the Republic was in competition with 
the religiously-framed claims to conserve the political and cultural institutions and values of 
the preceding Ottoman Regime. In other words, there was more than one claim to conserve 
as well as more than one Kemalism in the early Republican era. If this new creed to 
conserve is held synonymous with "traditionalist religious reactionism," then we may fall 
into misconceptions about the nature of nouveaux conservatism [read traditionalist 
conservatism] since there was also more than one "tradition," namely, religious and 
national, which awaited an awakening and conservation in the ambivalent world created by 
Kemalist modernism. 
23 
Mainstream Approaches in Theorizing on Conservatism 
Most students of W estem political thought have suffered from the confusion on the 
meaning of the term conservatism. 22 Various approaches have emerged to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the origins and development of conservative politics and 
philosophy in western politics. Andrew Vincent has classified three comprehensive 
approaches to the study of conservatism in Western political and social theory. In 
Vincent's classification the first approach is the "nation state approach," the second, 
"chronological" and the third one is the "conceptual approach."23 Nation state approach, 
essentially sees conservatism as an historical cultural reaction to the rise of modem nation 
state in W estem European societies. 24 In this respect, the social, political and intellectual 
resistance of the descending classes to the rise of modem nation state, industrialization and 
democratization of politics are seen as crucial processes which provoked the emergence 
and development of conservative politics and affiliations in W estem European politics. 25 
Conservatism as a product of particular historical and cultural conditions, seeks to analyze 
different paths in nation-state building processes in W estem European politics to 
understand the reasons for the emergence of different national conservative traditions. 
Thus, emphasis is made on differences rather than parallelisms among different 
conservative politics and ideals in various countries. 26 Conservatism, in this sense, is 
22 See Eatwell and Noel O'Sullivan eds, The Nature of Right. pp. 47-76. Also Schuettinger ed., The Conservative 
Tradition in European Thought; Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber eds., The European Right Paul Gootfried, The 
Conservative Movement (New York: Twayne Publishers, Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan, 1993). 
23 Andrew Vincent, "Conservatism,., Modem Political Ideologies (Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992 ), p. 61. 
24 See Noel O'Sullivan, Conservatism (London: Dent, 1976 ), pp. 28, 82-3. 
25 For effects of democratization and indtL<>trialism on conservative politics, see Brian Girvin, The Right in the 
Twentieth Centurv: Conservatism and Democracy (London, New York: Pinter Publishers, 1994). Also Trevar 
Blackwell and Jeremy Seabrook, The Revolt Against Change: Towards a Conserving Radicalism (London: Vintage, 
1993 ). See also Robert A Nisbet, "Conservatism," in A History of Sociological Analysis. Tom Bottomore and Robert 
Nisbet, eds. (London: Heinemann, 1978 ), pp. 80-117. 
26 Vincent, "Conservatism," pp. 82-3 Also K. Epstein, The Genesis ofGennan Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1966); E.L. Wolward, Three Studes in European Conservatism (London: Frank Cass, 1963 ). 
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originally regarded as an unique pattern in politics which represent the historical "alliance 
among monarchy, established church religion and aristocracy. "27 
According to Vincent, other researchers on conservatism, like Robert Nisbet and 
Russell Kirk, also searched for the origins of conservative philosophy in the Medieval 
Period. 28 Still, they also assured that conservatism, as a modem political movement, had 
emerged by the beginning of the 19th century when political revolutions of the eighteenth 
century and an all-embracing industrialization had drastically altered the social, political 
and economic hierarchies of most of the European countries. 29 Conservative movements 
in Europe were further accelerated by the emergence of mass movements in the nineteenth 
century. The nation-state approach to conservatism has focused on the impacts of the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment thought and rationalist secularism on the development 
of conservative politics since these philosophical and political trends were adapted by the 
nation-states as policy frameworks. 3° For Vincent, conservative resistance of semi-feudal 
agrarian classes against the rising middle classes had fully developed between 1870 and 
1914.31 The nation-state approach has to a considerable degree resembles what Samuel 
Huntington referred to conservatism as an "aristocratic ideology." Both Vincent and 
Huntington have built differences among various conservative traditions on changing 
political and economic alliances among descending aristocratic classes. 32 The uniqueness 
27 For a comparative analysis, see John Weiss, Conservatism in Europe 1770-1945: Traditionalism. Reaction and 
Counterrevolution (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977). 
28 Vincent, "Conservatism," p. 55. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (London: Reinmann, 1970), Conservatism: 
Dream and Reality (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986 ); Russell Kirk, The Portable Conservative Reader 
(Hardmonsworth: Penguin, 1982), p.xi. 
29 Nisbet, "The Conservative Renaissance in Perspective," Public Interest, 81 (1985), pp. 128-41. Also see Nisbet, 
''Conservatism," pp. 80-117. See also Russell Kirk, The Portable Conservative Reader. 
30 See Jones Gray, Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at at the Close of the Modern Age (New York: 
Routledge, 1995). 
31 Vincent, "Conservatism," p. 56. Also F.J.C. Hearnshaw ed., Social and Political Ideas of Some Representative 
Thinkers of the Age of Reaction and Reconstruction (Cambridge: W. Heffer, 1949). 
32 Samuel HWltington, "'Conservatism as an Ideology," American Political Science Review. (1957) pp. 454-73. See 
Vincent, "Conservatism," p. 56; Robert Ecclesshall, Vincent Geoghegan et. al. eds., Political Ideologies, 2nd ed. 
(London: New York: Routledge, 1994 ), pp. 60-91. 
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of conservative politics has also been linked to the varying patterns of development of the 
nation states in various European countries. 
In this respect, the nation state approach, together with Huntington's aristocratic 
theory of conservatism, have conceived of conservatism as an unique historical 
phenomenon. This uniqueness stemmed from the particular political and economic 
interests of an historically unique class, namely the aristocracy which experienced a rapid 
decline due to the rise of modem nation states and industrialization. Thus, some students 
of European conservatism have argued that "general definitions of conservatism are 
difficult and ultimately fruitless, since conservatism is a national phenomenon in contrast to 
the more internationalist ideologies of liberalism and socialism. "33 Indeed, conservatism is 
a national phenomenon. Still, as implied by Karl Mannheim, a distinguished student of 
conservatism, a general basis for conservative flow of thought can also be identified. 34 
Having paraphrased Mannheim's seminal work on conservatism, Vincent implied that 
conservatism is "a philosophical deepening of the points Burke had posed, which are then 
combined with genuinely German elements.... Germany achieved for the ideology of 
conservatism what France did for progressive Enlightenment, - she worked it out most 
fully to its logical conclusions."35 Noel O'Sullivan, in his book Conservatism, has also 
pointed out that there is a common basis for various conservative traditions of thought. 36 
These common bases, which have been enriched by national traditions, are in opposition 
to the individualism of the Enlightenment thought and political rationalism of the French 
Revolution and a distrust of its political ideals such as, equality, freedom and democracy.37 
33 M. Grieffenhagen, "The Dilemma of Conservatism in Germany," Journal of Contemporruy History. 13, 4 ( 1979), p. 611. 
34 For a seminal work on conservatism, see Karl Mannheim, Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of 
Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). See also D. Kettler, V. Meja and N. Stehr, ''Karl Mannheim 
and Conservatism: The Ancestry of Historical Thinking," American Sociological Review. 49,1 (1984), pp. 71-85. 
·~ 
"- Mannheim, Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 47; Vincent, ·'Conservatism," p. 62. 
36 See O'Sullivan, Conservatism. 
37 Vincent, ·'Conservatism," p. 62. See also Thomas Philip Schofield, ''Conservative Political Thought in Britain in 
Response to French Revolution," The Historical Journal. 29, 3 ( 1986), pp. 601-22. 
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The second approach, which Vincent has specified for studies on conservatism, is 
the chronological approach. This approach to conservatism adopts a descriptive method. 
Conservative political organizations and especially political parties tum out to be the 
primary objects of analysis for those studies based on this approach. 38 Vincent has argued 
that in those studies concurrent stages of the development of conservative politics have 
been isolated in a chronological way. Dominant themes at each historical stage of the 
development of conservatism are used to provide an account of universal conservative 
politics. 39 The chronological approach has suffered from definitional problems. Thus, 
conservatism has been held synonymous merely with the political right. Clinton Rossiter' s 
definition of political conservatism is an example of this definitional limitation. For 
Rossiter, "political conservatism" apart from conservative philosophy, "is roughly 
synonymous with that worn but convenient label, the Right.''40 In this sense, for Rossiter, 
"the Tories of Great Britain, the Republicans in the United States, the Gaullists of France 
and the Christian Democrats of Europe are conservative in the most meaningful sense."41 
This approach does not give a whole picture of conservatism since the political right does 
not include only the conservatives but also the "reactionaries," with radical aims towards 
the establishment, who may still label themselves as "conservative." 
Huntington and some of the other prominent students of conservatism, such as 
Rossiter and Robert Michels, together with some well-known contemporary conservative 
writers such as Kirk and Nisbet have attempted to overcome the definitional problems by 
adopting a more abstract conceptual operationalization of the concept. This they have 
38 Vincent., idem. Ian Crewe, D. Searing," Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party," American Political 
Science Review, 82, 2 (1988), pp. 362-84; T. Mcgovern, "Conservative Ideology in Britain in the 1790s," History. 73, 
238 (1988), pp. 23~7; Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peels to Chmchill (London: Collins, 1970); 
Bruce Coleman, Conservatism and the Conservative Party in the Nineteenth Centwy Britain (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1988); J. S. McClelland ed., The French Right From de Maistre to Maurras (London: Jonathan Cape, 1971 ); 
E.H.H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics. Economics and Ideology of the Conservative Party (London, 
New York: Routledge, 1995 ). 
39 See Maurice Cowling ed., Conservative Essavs (London: Cassell, 1978). 
40 Rossiter," Conservatism," p. 291. 
41 Idem. 
done by deriving certain "core and universal conservative principles and values" from the 
corpus of conservative texts produced by classical writers, such as Edmund Burke in 
England, Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald in France and Adam Muller in Germany.A~ 
Huntington and Rossiter, with other conservative writers and/or students of conservatism 
have tended to think that some core principles, derived from the writings of Edmund 
Burke, Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald or to some extend David Hume could have an 
heuristic value to understanding the universal conservative temperament. ~3 These core 
principles, which are drawn from the writings of historical reactionaries of the French 
Revolution, became analytical tools in any research paradigm on conservative politics. 
Conservative politics everywhere in the world has been studied in reference to this apriori 
typology derived from the founding figures of W estem European conservative thought. 44 
Closeness and/or distance from these core principals tum out to be criteria so as to 
determine how "conservative" the organization, and/or current of thought or political 
ideology in question is. These core principals, which were provided by Huntington to form 
a typology of"conservativeness" and "non-conservativeness" include the following: 
support for universal moral order sanctioned by the organiz.ed religion; belief in the imperfect 
nature of men, belief in inequality of man in most qualities of mind, body and character; the 
necessity of social classes. groups and orders and a resistance to the leveling effect of law; the 
42 Nisbet, "Conservatism," pp. 800-17. Also Paul Viereck, Conservatism Revisited (New York: Free Press, 1962 ). 
~3 For lists of the key principles of conservatism see Ian Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism (London: 
Hutchinson, 1977); F.J.C. Heamshaw, Conservatism in England (London: Macmillan, 1933) p.22; RJ. White, The 
Conservative Tradition (London: Nicholas Kaye, 1950), pp 1-10; Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind (London: 
Faber, 1954), pp.17-18; Rossiter, Conservatism in America (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962); Lord Hailsham, The 
Conservative Case (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1959); Stanlis, Edmwid Burke and the Natural Law. See Joseph De 
Maistre, Considerations on France (Montreal and London: McGill -Queen's University Press, 1974 (1797]); Edmund 
Burke, Retlections on the Revolution in France. Conor Cruise O'Brien, ed. (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1968 [1790]). 
44 For an historical accowit of conservatism. see Robert L. Schuettinger ed., The Conservative Tradition in European 
Thought, Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber eds., The European Right Michael Freeman, Edmwid Burke and the 
Critique of Political Radicalism (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1980); M. Morton Auerbach, The Conservative Illusion 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Frank O'Gonnan ed., British Conservatism: Conservative Thought 
from Burke to Thatcher (London: Longman, 1986); David Willetts, Modern Conservatism (London: Penguin Books, 
1992); J.G. A. Pocock, Virtue. Commerce and History (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1985); Paul Smith, 
Disraelian Conservatism and Social Refonn (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1967); Paul Stanlis, Edmund Burke 
and the Natural Law (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1958); Hans-Jurgen Puhle, "Conservatism in Modem 
Gennan History," Journal of Contemporan· History 13, 4 (1979), pp. 689-721; J.H. Muirhead, Coleridge as 
Philosopher. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954); W.H. Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition: The Ideological 
Heritage, vol.2, (London: Methuen, 1983 ). 
primacy granted to private property of pursuit of liberty and defense of the social order: 
uncertainty about progress and rejection of any prescriptive method for progress; belief in the 
need for ruling and serving aristocracy; distrust of the human reason: importance attached to 
traditions and institutions: resistance to majority rule and desirability of balancing political 
45 power. 
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The third approach to conservatism, according to Vincent's classification, is the 
conceptual approach. 46 The conceptual approach to conservatism has been derived from 
highly qualified classifications and definitions of conservatism(s). In Huntington's 
classification, the conceptual approach to conservatism has corresponded to autonomous 
and situational theories of conservatism. 47 In contrast to the nation state approach, which 
tended to see conservatism as an historical temporal concept representing the articulation 
of the descending classes' interests in nation-state building processes, autonomous theories 
of conservatism have not linked it to any particular class or group. 
Huntington's "autonomous theory of conservatism" resembles what Rossiter 
defined as "temperamental conservatism," and Michels as "technical-political definition of 
• 
conservatism. "48 In Rossiter's characterization of "temperamental conservatism," 
conservatism has referred to a set of psychological attitudes and behavior, to a 
psychological trait shown against a disturbance caused by economic, social or even 
psychological change. 49 Nevertheless, Rossiter was aware of the explanatory weakness of 
abandoning the historical temporality of the concept. Thus, even though he referred to 
conservatism as "a cluster of traits that are on daily display by most men in all societies,"50 
he also tended to see particular milieus, such as township and rural areas, as the lacuna 
where conservative sentiments have often displayed themselves as signs of disturbance 
45 HWltington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," pp. 454-73; Heamshaw, Conservatism in England. p.22; White, The 
Conservative Tradition, pp. 1-10. For a conservative assessment of "conservative values," see Roger Scruton, The 
Meaning of Conservatism (Hannondsworth: Penguin Books, 1980). 
46 v· ··c · " 6"' mcent,  onservattsm, p. •. 
47 Huntington, ''Conservatism as an Ideology," pp. 454-73. Also L. Allison, Right Principles: A Conservative 
Philosophy of Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); P Norton and A Augley, Conservatives and Conservatism 
(London: Temple Smith, 198 l ); J. Weiss, Conservatism in Europe (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977). 
48 Rossiter, "Conservatism" pp. 2~; Michels, '"Conservatism'' pp. 230-2. 
49 R . 'd oss1ter, 1 em. 
so R . .b.d "'90 oss1ter, 1 1 ., p. _ . 
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against any claim for change. Still, Rossiter has reduced conservatism to the defense of 
traditional values and aspirations since the traditional sectors of the modem society, 
namely, traditional peasantry, by definition, were assumed to adhere to the traditional 
values and norms. 51 Traditional segments of the modem society were supposed to display 
traits very close to what Rossiter had referred to by "temperamental conservatism." This 
usage of the term implied that conservatism was a response of individuals and groups to 
sudden alterations of habits and traditions. This search to lay down the values and norms 
through which the universal conservative attitude had revealed itself was adopted by 
psychological studies on conservatism which associated it with negative concepts, such as 
authoritarianism, reaction, superstition against more positive-sounding concepts, such as 
liberalism, progressivism and flexibility. 52 
In Rossiter's and Michels' definitions, conservatism ultimately implied a mentality, 
set of attitudes and behavior ultimately sought to defend the status quo regardless of what 
it might be. Vincent commented on these definitional inadequacies as follows: 
It is revealed in commentators and journalists who, quite unwittingly, speak of conservative 
factions, within, say a socialist party. Conservatism in this readings not tied to any particular 
class, historical events, pragmatism or even to a specific disposition.... The situational 
perspective does not possess any definite substance. It has no ideal or utopia to strive for. 
Conversely, it reflects the self-conscious defensive posture of any institutionalized political 
doctrine .... In this reading it becomes possible of a "Conservative Left." There is therefore no 
content to conservative ideology. Any institutional order (communism or liberalism) can be 
conservative. 53 
Michels also provided another definition of conservatism, which he called "philosophical 
conservatism,"54 which formed another example of how the historical temporality of the 
concept has been abandoned to attribute universal validity to it. Instead, Rossiter and 
Michels have ultimately tended to see conservatism as the display of some traits, such as 
51 For a similar approach, see A Luloff, M. Miller and L. Beaudlieu, '"Social Conservatism: Determinants and 
Structural Stability Over Time;' Journal of Rural Studies. 2, 1 (1986 ), pp. 9-18. 
52 See Theodore W. Adorno, The Authoritarian Personalitv (New York: Harper & Row, 1950). 
53 Vincent, "Conservatism," p. 57. 
54 Michels, "Conservatism" pp. 230-2. 
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love of authority and tradition. Only on these grounds the specific conservative patterns of 
activism, values of the political conservatism and theoretical conceptions in conservative 
philosophy have been analyzed. 
When these definitions have been adapted in political party studies, all ruling 
parties, albeit Atatiirk' s Revolutionary Republican People's Party of the 1920s and the 
Republican revolutionary intelligentsia or the Russian Communist Party in the same 
period, may be considered "conservative," no matter what their original inspiration and 
purpose were. When conservatism has been held synonymous merely with a mentality and 
attitude willing to defend the existing order then those who politically and/or intellectually 
defend the existing order are considered to be "conservatives," by definition. 55 Thus, 
Huntington has rejected Rossiter and Michels' technical-political and temperamental 
definitions of conservatism which reduced it to merely an ahistorical defense of the status 
quo. He asserted that in order to preserve the fundamental elements in society, the 
founding figures of conservatism had found it necessary to have a sense of change. Indeed, 
this sentiment derived from Burke who was not opposed to change and argued that "a 
state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation. "56 
Huntington has argued that most autonomous theories of conservatism, which 
abandoned the historical temporality of the concept and viewed it as an universally valid 
autonomous system of ideas, with an ultimate manifestation of the desire to keep up the 
status quo, could not provide a comprehensive understanding of modem conservatism. 
Still, he has pointed out that the essential characteristic of conservatism was the defense of 
the existing institutions. 57 Having rejected Rossiter and Michels' definitions of 
conservatism, Huntington, exposing his situational definition of conservatism, has argued 
that essential values and core principles of conservatism can be grasped if the defensive 
55 See Rossiter, "Conservatism'' pp. 290-4. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," pp. 454-73. 
56 B.W. Hill ed., Edmund Burke (London: Fontana, 1975), p. 285; Lord Hailsham, The Conservative Case, p. 30. 
57 Huntington, "Conservatism as an teleology," pp. 454-73. 
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position of the existing set of institutions against any radical claim of change are taken into 
account. For Huntington, conservative values and aspirations were articulated as a 
recognizable ideology when a distinct challenge was directed at the established institutions 
and when the defenders of these institutions had used conservative themes and values in its 
defense. 58 Conservatism as a recognizable ideology could be conceptualized as an 
articulation of systematic and theoretical resistance to change. Huntington's attempt can be 
considered as a middle way. On the one hand, he tended to isolate basic universal 
conservative core principles, and on the other he asserted that conservatism as a 
recognizable strand emerges only when these principles are employed by the defenders of 
the existing institutions against radical and transcendental claims of change. 
Huntington's attempt can be considered as a willingness to reach a methodological 
and definitional consensus by articulating various themes from divergent definitions and 
approaches. There is one advantage of the conceptual approach to conservatism. Though 
Huntington rejects Rossiter's various definitions of conservatism, he still argues like 
Rossiter and Michels that there are some recognizable conservative core principles and 
values which shape conservative politics in different countries. Thus, a certain degree of 
consensus on the shared values and ideas among different conservatisms has been 
achieved. This formal unity on shared values and practices appears to leave some space for 
radical interpretations of these conservative manners and values, which has been shaped 
under the historical cultural constrains of particular countries. The conceptual approach to 
conservatism has also empowered the researcher to make classifications within 
conservative politics itself by incorporating the forces of change into the scope of the 
studies on conservatism. 
Still, conceptual approaches to conservatism led students of conservatism to adopt 
two mutually exclusive stands. On the one hand, the concept refers to historically unique 
58 Ibid. 
conservative patterns derived from genuine conservative thinkers and, on the other, it 
serves as a convenient term embracing all artificial similarities between historical 
phenomena read through the corpus of writings of these conservative writers. 59 It was this 
"semantic shift" which H.G. Schuman has referred to as the cause of methodological 
shortcomings in studies on conservatism since the concepts and categories derived from 
concrete social and political formations were formalized in an artificial theory of 
conservatism.60 
A Note On the Methodologies Adopted in Studies on Conservatism 
The term conservatism has widely been employed to denote a set of ideas and aspirations 
of particular groups and/or to identify a particular form of political action. The common 
point in all these diverse usages was that the term referred to some groups and/or 
individuals' Will to preserve and/or defend the traditional modes of behavior, values, 
norms and institutions which were considered to be 'traditional' for them. Thus, the term 
"conservatism" covers all diverse patterns of behavior willing to defend the "tradition." 
The term seemed to achieve an analytical value when seen as the manifestation of an 
universal human motivation to keep up the traditional modes of behavior. However, its 
heuristic value has been obscured since the economic, political and social factors behind 
these diverse creeds to keep up the status quo were underestimated. 
In this respect, most of the theoretical stands on conservatism, for which 
Huntington's "aristocratic theory," and "nation-state approach" can be taken as examples, 
tended to see the Enlightenment, French Revolution and nationalism as those currents 
against which self-conscious conservative intellectual and political reactions were born. In 
59 P.W. Buck ed., How Conservatives Think (Hannondsw~rth: Penguin, 1975); Maril)'ll Butler ed., Burke Paine 
Godwin and the Revolution Controversy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Paul Smith, Disraelian 
Conservatism and Social Reform. Also see Smith, Lord Salisbwy in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972): F. O"Gorman ed., British Conservatism: Conservative Thought from Burke to Thatcher. Scruton ed .. 
Conservative Texts: An Antology (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); T. Russel, The Tory Party (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1978); Z. Layton-Henry ed., Conservative Partv Politics (London: Macmillan 1980). 
60 Schuman, "The Problem of Conservatism: Some Notes on Methodology," pp. 80J-l 7. 
...... 
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these studies, conservatism has been understood as a temporal concept. It meant that its 
dynamics, nature and ideals, which shaped it as a unique political and intellectual 
movement against the ideals of the Enlightenment thought and French Revolution, strictly 
depended upon the dynamics of particular social fonnations in which it had been born as a 
unique resistance. 
However, in Rossiter and Michels' conceptions of conservatism, where it has been 
identified with a specific thought and behavior, as in the case of Huntington's 
"autonomous theory," and to some extent in his "situational definition," the temporality of 
the tenn was abandoned to deduce some core values from this historically unique 
phenomenon.61 These students of conservatism were aware of the fact that conservatism 
had emerged as a political and intellectual movement after the French Revolution. Still, in 
order to provide an universal validity, and therefore an analytical value for it, they have 
substituted the "core political and philosophical core values," deduced from an historically 
unique event as the universal dispositions of "conservatism temperament." Schuman 
pointed out that in order to reach an analytical and theoretical validity, political, economic 
and social detenninants of a particular temporal movement had been abandoned and 
emphasis was placed on the so-called universal conservative traits of human nature.62 
This looseness of the meaning of the tenn, which Schuman implied, has been more 
apparent in conceptual approaches than in the nation state approach and/or Huntington's 
aristocratic theory. In most of the studies based on this approach, the temporal aspect of 
the tenn has been neglected. Research has been directed to discovering a universal pattern 
of conservativeness, which was relevant in every historical formation at any time. 63 As a 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. See also Mannheim, "Conservative Thought." in Essays on Sociology and Sociology of Knowledge. trans. by 
Edith Schwarschild and Paul Kecskemeti (London: Paul and Kegan Paul, 1953), pp. 74-164. 
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result, conservatism was ultimately conceived as a psychological mood. 64 This conception 
of conservativeness has stimulated other studies on the topic where it has been treated as a 
d~scription of inherent personality traits. Schuman has noted that this usage of the concept 
was also employed in Theodore Adorno and his collaborator's in The Authoritarian 
Personality. 65 These kinds of typologies of conservativeness have been adapted in 
psychological research to draw up a picture of the conservative personality, which 
Schuman sees W. McClosky's study to be another example.66 In these studies, 
conservatism has been used to denote a structure of personality. Then, a relationship 
between this personality structure and social, political and economic location was 
sought. 67 Schuman has asserted that most of these studies were based on the assumption 
that there existed a "conservative" or "liberal" personality as an "anthropological reality" 
without any reference to its political and social determinants. 68 In Rossiter' s 
"temperamental conservatism," or McClosky's typology of "conservativeness" this 
peculiar psychological mood was assumed to clearly express itself within the ranks of 
64 See F. Walker, Y. Katz, D. Green, "The General Factor in the Conservatism Scale: A Multinational Multicultural 
Examination," Personality and Individual Differences. 11, 9 ( 1990), pp. 985-8. 
65 Schuman, "The Problem of Conservatism: Some Notes on Methodology," pp. 803-17. See Nevitt Sanford, The 
Approach of the Authoritarian Personality," in Pscychology of Personality, James L. McCary, ed. (New York: Grove 
Press, 1959), pp. 255-319. 
66 Schwnan, ibid., pp. 803-1 l; H. W. McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," American Politicial Science 
Review, 52 (1958), pp. 27-45; G. Wilson and J. Patterson, "A New Measure of Conservatism," British Journal of 
Social and Clinical Psychology. 7 ( 1968), pp. 264-9; C. P. Middendolll, Progressivism and Conservatism (The 
Hague: Mouton Press, 1978); S. Graham, "Class and Conservatism in the Adoption of Innovations," Human 
Relations, 9 (1956), pp. 91-100. See also J. Ray, "What Old People Believe: Age Sex and Conservatism," Political 
Psychology, 6,3 ( 1985), pp. 525-8; C. Bollas, "Moods and the Conservative Process," International Jomnal of Psvcho-
Analysis. 65, 2, (1984 ), pp. 203-12; V. Joe, "Factor Analysis of the Conservatism Scale," Jomnal of Social 
Psvchology. 124,2 (1984), pp. 175-8; D. Hanson, "Liberal-Conservative Bias in the Dogmatism Scale," Psvchology, 
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67 See S. Martin Lipset and E. Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremisn in America. 1790-1970 (New 
York: Harper &Row, 1970). 
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socially deprived ones. 69 This tendency to describe conservatism as a mode of socialization 
of the deprived groups, which lost power and status in the modernization process, leads to 
some misconceptions. For Schuman, J. Ray and A. Furnam, in contemporary social 
science research these "socialization patterns" were seen as the natural psychological 
constituents of' conservative politics with authoritarian ideals.' 70 
In line with D. Allen, Schuman has argued that terminological vagueness in the 
studies of conservatism was due to methodological shortcomings. 71 Schuman has further 
assured that "historical temporality" of the concept was ignored to provide an 'analytical 
value' to the term. 72 Thus, only the "ordinary usage"73 of the term has been incorporated 
into social and political research since the relationship between historically determined 
social and political "interests," and "institutional action," which corresponded to 
"conservative patterns of thought," have been rejected. 74 Schuman added that the 
contemporary political and social science research on conservatism was developed around 
the corpus of writing and the discussions around the ideas of Burke, 75 or debates on 
69 Wilson and Patterson, "A New Measure of Conservatism," pp. 264-9; Graham, "Class and Conservatism in the 
Adoption of Innovations," pp. 91-100. See also S. Johnson, J. Tamney, S. Halebsky, "Christianity, Social 
Traditionalism and Economic Conservatism," Sociological Focus. 19, 3 (1986), pp. 299-314. 
70 Schuman, 'The Problem of Conservatism: Some Notes on Methodology," pp. 803-17. For examples J. Ray and A. 
Furnham, "Authoritarianism, Conservatism and Racism," Ethnic and Racial Studies,7,3 (1984), pp. 406-12; J. Ray, 
"Achievement Motivation as a Source of Racism, Conservatism and Authoritarianism," Journal of Social Psvchology, 
123,1 (1984), pp. 21-8; H. Tarr and M. Lorr "A Comparison of Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Conformity and 
Conservatism," Personality and Individual Differences. 12, 3 (1991 ), pp. 307-11. 
71 See D. Allen, "Modern Conservatism: The Problem of Definition," Review of Politics. 43, 4 (1981), pp. 582-63. 
Also Schuman, "The Problem of Conservatism: Some Notes on Methodology," pp. 803-17. 
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73 Vincent, "Conservatism," p. 55-6. 
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leading conservative personalities. 76 Consequences of social and political interests, 
constituents of conservative thought in shaping of the political claims and philosophical 
justifications of conservatism as an historical movement have been underestimated. 
Schuman strenuously argued that the concept of conservatism can have an 
heuristic value in social and political analysis if it is taken as a particular political 
philosophical movement upholding the institutions and structures which safeguard and 
legitimize the social and political dominance of the groups concerned. 77 This dissertation 
will analyse the intellectual and political aspirations of a group of thinkers, who called 
themselves "traditionalist" and/or "conservative," along the lines suggested by the nation 
state-approach. In doing this the merits or the lack thereof in approaches to conservatism 
as analysed in this section, will be borne in mind. 
Some Portrayals of "Conservatism" in the Turkish Case 
Despite the lack of similar historical conditions with western experience of modernization, 
even the prominent students of Turkish politics and history, like, Niyazi Berkes and Kemal 
Karpat, who were particularly interested in the nature of traditionalism and/or 
conservatism in the Ottoman-Turkish polity, adopted biased and ordinary conceptions. 
Niyazi Berkes in his seminal work Development of Secularism in Turkey has employed the 
terms "conservatism" and "traditionalism," interchangeably to classify religiously-oriented 
"anti-westernist" reactions, which aimed to keep up the status quo defined by the "the 
structure of prevailing "din" (religion) and "devlef' (state). 78 He added that at various 
76 T. Smith, "Liberal and Conservative Trends in the United States Since World War 2," Public Opinion Quarterly, 
54,4 (l 990), pp. 479-507; J. Ra}'Tler "The Legend of Oakeshotts Conservatism: Skeptical Philosophy and Limited 
Politics," Canadian Journal of Political Science Review, 18, 2 (l 985), pp. 313-38; A Fossedal, "Conservatism After 
Reagan," ComrnentaJV, 79, l (1985), pp. 27-31; M. Gibbon, "Interpretation. Conservatism and Political Practice," 
Polity, 17, 4 ( 1985), pp. 777-94; R. Elrod, ''Bernard Von Rechberg and the Metternichian Tradition: The Dilemma of 
Conservative Statescraft," Journal of Modern History, 56, 3 (l 984 ), pp. 430-55; J. Nuechterlein, "George Will and 
American Conservatism," Commentary, 76,4 (l 983), pp. 35-43; R. Boesche, "Tocqueville and Le Commence: A 
Newspaper Expressing His Unusual Liberalism," Journal of the History of Ideas. 44, 2 (1983), pp. 277-92; Maril}'Tl 
Butler ed., Burke Paine. Godwin and the Revolution Contoversv (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, l 984 ). 
77 Schuman. "The Problem of Conservatism: Some Notes on Methodology," pp. 803-17. 
78 Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey. pp. 31, 52. 
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stages of the Turkish transformation, "the more reforms were attempted, the more the 
reaction was established as a distinct tradition. "79 "Conservatism" or "traditionalism" was 
conceived to be the claim to keep up the religiously framed social, political and economic 
organizations and traditions which were challenged by the ''westemizer/modemizer" 
forces. In other words, for Berkes, both "Ottoman conservatism," and "Republican 
conservatism" meant a religious resistance to change and innovation. 80 The lengthy 
quotation from Berkes below makes clear how Berkes elucidates the envisioned 
relationship between the "religious tradition," "change and innovation," and 
"conservatism/traditionalism." For him, these terms stood for the "embryonic form of the 
whole eighteenth-century debate on reform"81 and conservation. In Berkes' words: 
The earliest document clue to the realization that something new should be done comes from 
the years of the Treaty of Passoravitz , 1718. It was clear reaction to the tested and proven 
inadequacy of the traditional military institution in the face of the modem European military 
techniques already used by the Russians. 
The document is a record of a real or imaginary conservation between a Muslim and 
an unnamed "Christian officers." The question put to the Christian was simple and direct: 
What is the reason for our defeats? The Christian's immediate response: First of all, your 
failure to observe the prescriptions of the Seriat, and secondly, your ignorance of your 
traditional laws. He continued, however, to describe the decline of the old military 
organization and the use of the outdated methods of warfare and concluded that it was 
mandatory for the army to be refonned and for new officers to be trained Since the training of 
the officers in modem sciences and techniques was a time consuming, it would be permissible 
temporarily to Employ Christian officers. 
The Muslim conversant stopped agreeing with the Christian after the latter's 
introductory remark. The Muslim continually defended the traditional institutions against 
criticism. He frequently reaffirmed his conviction that '"perfection and truth are on the side of 
the Muslims," an opinion which the Christian critic did not contradict. 
This document contained in embryonic form the whole eighteenth -century debate on 
reform. The two conversant symbolized the eighteenth century reformer and the conservative 
or traditionalist. As the discussion indicates. the reformer had no doubt that there as anything 
amiss in the basic Islamic -Turkish economic, political, social, religious and cultural 
institutions .. He recognized only that new techniques of military art needed to be introduced 
He perceived this to be a simple matter and not one implying widespread consequences.. . .. 
The conservative, on the other hand, seem to have realized intuitively as traditionalists 
everywhere and at all times apparently do, that even a seeming(v insignificant innovation 
79 Ib"d 5" I .,p. -· 
80 Ibid., pp. 52-3. For Berkes, conservative forces in the first National Assembly in the early 1920s, like conservative 
reactionaries of the eighteenth century, were mostly represented by the 11/ema. see, ibid., 448. Berkes also referred to 
"conservative-Westemists" but he did not elaborate on the topic. See ibid., p. 450. 
81 Ibid., p. 31. 
would destroy the harmony of the whole. Hence, he on~v conceded the desirability of 
polishing up the traditional system. 82 (Emphases are mine). 
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For Berkes, the early claims of conservatism, as well as the late Republican conservatism, 
were restricted to the claims to conserve the religious status quo against every kind of 
innovation and change, including the Kemalist one. The main concern of the early claims 
to conserve was to maintain the harmony in "nizam" (traditional Order). The early 
conservative agenda was shaped by the concern to maintain traditional laws and Sharia 
against "criticism" backed by the "scientifically oriented-practical mind" claiming the 
adaptation of new techniques in the organization of the state to prevent further 
breakdown. 
The two "strongholders of conservatism" in the early reformation era, for Berkes, 
were the Janissaries in the traditional army and the u/ema. 83 Berkes pointed out that the 
"traditional order" had been supported by these "two orders" even though they deviated 
from the "medieval order" as a result of modernizing attempts. 84 The Janissaries were the 
most important conservative force in the military since they had lost status and power 
through the breakdown of the traditional Ottoman warfare system. Besides the Janissaries, 
transformation had also drastically altered the "structure and role" of the u/ema. For 
example: 
They too had undergone a change in social composition and role; an increase in quantity and 
a decrease in quality, stratification into higher and lower ranks, with the lower more and more 
parasitical, were the features of transformation. The higher Ulema was engaged in extra-
curriculum activities such as selling offices, degrees, ranks, and favors, usurious dealings, 
even in tax-farming and expropriation, odds estates (malikhane) and above all controlling the 
pious foundations. Al the lower levels too numerous clerical had to maintain in the same 
parasitical relationship to society as the Y eni«;eri corps did 85 
82 Ibid., pp. 30-l. 
83 Ib'd 6., l ., p. ~. 
84 Idem. 
85 Ibid., pp. 61-2. For a similar evaluation see Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kuran Shaw's History of the Ottoman 
Empire and J.Jodem Turkey. Janissaries and ulema were conceived to be major conservative forces. See Stanford J. 
Shaw & Ezel Kuran Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkev. Vol.II. Refonn. Revolution and 
Republic: The Rise of Modem Turkey. 1808 -1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 21, 69. 
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Besides these two orders, the third conservative force, which lost power and status by the 
innovation of new techniques and the dissolution of the traditional Ottoman system, was the 
"esnaf' (artisan).86 The basic criterion in Berkes' conception of the conservativeness of these 
strata was their "loss of status and power" in the Turkish transformation. This criterion, which 
was adapted by Berkes, more apparently revealed itself in the below quotation: 
In other words. the impoverished social classes and estates \\ere in common opposition to 
reform. irrespective of their original differences and antipathies. in order to maintain their 
parasitical status. Their primary opponents were the men who stood for reform. above all the 
rulers and secular minded statesmen who aimed at creating an effective. scientifically trained 
officer corps. Their dread of such a corps was justified - even until today - as it was the new 
class of the military and the intellectuals who invariably saved the cause of progress against 
conservative reactions. 87 
Conservatism and/or traditionalism in Berkes' seminal work literally denoted the claims of 
"impoverished social classes and groups" to uphold the religious cosmology which set up 
the traditional political, social and economic relations between the ruler and the ruled. The 
conservative themes of keeping up of the status quo, moral order and support of religion 
have been employed to denote the "religiously-supported arguments," claiming to • 
conserve the great umma tradition. 88 
Against the claims of reformation and modernization, conservatives, for Berkes, 
had found a strong support among the "corrupted orders," such as the "economic orders 
in decline. "89 There were two main groups, the modernizers-reformists and traditionalist 
conservatives. The latter groups' interests had been undermined by the rising reform 
claims of the "reformists. "90 These reformists, for Berkes, "represented no group or class 
interest, nor even their own. "91 Though conservatism became an ideology of the 
descending classes and groups, "the reformers were not reliant upon or indebted to the 
86 Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkcv, p. 62. 
87 Idem. 
88 Idem. 
89 Idem. 
90 Ibid., p. 63. 
91 Idem. 
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economic classes in the manner of their European counterparts. They did not encourage 
the development of a new entrepreneurial class. "92 The conservative reaction was initially 
stimulated by the introduction of new techniques especially in the military field. In reaction 
to these reforms, conservatives, namely the great coalition of ulema, military and the 
craftsmen, came to claim that these reform acts had deteriorated the "Sharia" and 
"traditions." The "well-being" of these groups was strictly related to the traditional 
hierarchy, and the new methods introduced would undermine the "traditional knowledge 
and techniques of industry."93 By the deepening of the reform movements, Berkes argued, 
the characteristic of the ulema namely its increasing conservatism, had surfaced. 94 
For Berkes, the gap between the "traditionalist conservatives," and "westemist, 
reformists," was further widened in the nineteenth century. Various attempts were made to 
reconcile the claims to conserve and to change. 95 The pathologies of the idea of progress 
and W estemization had widely been discussed among the Ottoman intellectuals and even 
the reformers, such as Narmk Kemal, searched "for those elements of the culture that were 
obstacles to progress and for those for those aspects of W estem civilization that should not 
be taken out. "96 By further elite fragmentation in the ruling center in the nineteenth 
century, Berkes came to employ the term "conservatism" to denote merely "Muslim 
conservatives" who claimed to modify the traditional religious institutions and acted 
against constitutionalists of the time. 97 It was in the nineteenth century that there emerged 
a structural transformation of the former "claims to preserve" which had been mainly 
articulated by the conservative forces among the military, ulema and artisans. For Berkes, 
92 Idem. 
93 Idem. 
94 Ibid., p. 124. 
95 Berkes used the tenn "traditionalist conservative" to characterize the political, social and economic demands of 
the great coalition, comprising of ulema and craftsmen, which was formed to uphold the religious status quo. See 
ibid., p. 215. 
96 Idem. 
97 Ibid., p. 231. 
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former reactionary conservative claims for the preservation of the traditional religiously 
structured "din" (religion) and "Devlet"(state) had been transformed by the mid-
nineteenth century to the "revival" of traditional and religiously-framed social, cultural and 
political institutions of the "Orient and the medieval Islamic past." 98 It was this revivalist 
current of Islamic conservatism which had been inherited by Republican Turkey. 
In the nineteenth century, the social composition of the forces of reform had also 
been radically transformed. Berkes points out that the former free-floating reformers, 
which had no affiliation to social groups, found a basis among "esnaf'J" (artisans) and 
"tiiccar" (merchants) in the urban areas for their claims to reformation.9'J By this time, the 
gap and distance among conservative and westemist intellectuals were further widened. Joo 
Meanwhile, the conservative Muslim groups were organized under the leadership of 
Mizanc1 Murad and were still the relevant actors of the political game by the beginning of 
the twentieth century. This Muslim conservatism, which the Republic inherited from its 
Ottoman past, was based on an amalgam of "traditionalism, anti-westemism, pan-
islamism. "Joi For Berkes, the basic features of conservatism in the late Ottoman period 
and early Republican eras were its anti-westernism and its desire to revive the medieval 
Islamic past Jo2 which had been voiced by religiously-oriented clergy in the first Turkish 
Grand National Assembly in the early l 920s. 103 
What was missing in this picture of conservatism was that the reformist westernist 
classes and groups were not considered as part of the conservative milieu with their own 
claims to conserve. New claims of conservation were developing especially among the 
Turkish nationalists, who were mostly organized under the Union and Progress Party in 
98 Ibid., p. 26 l. 
9') Ibid., p. 329. 
JOO Idem. 
JOI Ib.d "l6) I ., p. - . 
J02 Idem. 
103 Ibid., p. 451 
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the late Ottoman period and then in the Republican People's Party during the Republican 
era, in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Still, Berkes disregarded this early 
nationalist conservatism and regarded Islamic traditionalist conservatism [read Muslim 
conservatism] as the only form of conservatism inherited by the early Republic. He did not 
make distinctions between the conservative urge within the nouveuax traditionalist groups 
among secular reformers, and the Islamic perceptions among the ulema. This point has 
important repercussions for the purposes of this study since the nature of things worthy of 
conserving for the nouveaux traditionalist conservatism, such as the Kemalist state, its 
cultural and political institutions, cultural ideals, were in opposition to religious 
"conservatism(s)." Unlike the French case, the nature of modem conservatism in the 
Turkish case can not be understood solely with reference to the descending cl~' reaction to 
the claims of change. Even Berkes, one of the most innovative scholars of Turkish politics, has 
adopted this normative ideal-typical conception of conservatism. This approach to 
conservatism was based on a set of axiomatic precepts which characterized conservatism as the 
descending cl~' creed to defend the social, political and economic status quo. This ordinary 
usage of the term tended to see it as a human disposition. Still, it has limited heuristic value 
since it failed to elucidate the distinctiveness of the nouveaux conservatism which had 
penetrated into the rising middle clas.5e5, to the ranks of state bureaucracy and to the 
intelligentsia that emerged as the nation-state builder elites in the Republican period. 
Contrary to Berkes, Kemal Karpat, a prominent writer on Turkish politics, has 
deemed possible the penetration of conservatism into the ranks of the middle classes and 
bureaucracy, in his article Modem Turkey, published in the first volume of Cambridge 
History of Islam. 104 In Karpat's scheme of Turkish transformation, however, conservatism 
does not correspond to a well-structured current of thought through which new elite 
fragmentation within the modernist-secular bureaucratic elite could be delineated. What 
104 
Karpat, '"Modem Turkey," p. 540. 
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Karpat seemed to be interested in was the manifestations of potential conservativeness of 
various social and political groups at various stages of modernization. Conservatism and 
modernism have been illustrated in his Social Change and Politics in Turkey as antipodal 
forces which shaped the nature and direction of political, social and economic modernization. 
For him, social differentiation of the economic, political and social structures increased the 
tension among the upper social groups. This struggle within the upper strata "may appear as a 
struggle between conservatism and modernism."105 He pertinently pointed out that "the terms 
of reference of both groups have become so drastically altered as to make both conservatism 
and modernism appear in a modem context rather than a struggle between the old and the 
new."106 Indeed, the so-called controversy between modernism and conservatism in a 
modernizing environment is a more complicated issue than a political struggle between the 
forces of new [read modern] and old [read traditional]. 
Karpat in his Ideology in Turkey After the Revolution of 1960 tended to link 
conservativeness of various social and political groups to their response to the social and 
political "change" which became an "imperative" in social, political and economic 
modemiz.ation ofTurkey. 107 At various stages of the political and social transformation, Karpat 
argued, the "modern" may tum out to be a conservative force, whereas the "traditional" may 
acquire a dynamic forward-looking aspect. " 108 It meant that the "traditional," which originally 
implies the "backward looking, reactionary" groups that resist change may articulate 
progressive and "forward-looking aspects" under changing political, social and econorruc 
conditions. Karpat has further elaborated this point as follows: 
The uiema may be a conservative force in the initial phase of change. But if it presses for 
political rights and turns into entrepreneurial group interested in industrializ.ation it may well 
become "modem" whereas the reformist intelligentsia looking at the problem from the formal 
105 Karpat, "Ideology in Turkey After the Revolution of 1960," in Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A 
Structural-Historical Analysis. Karpat, ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973 ), p. 318. 
106 Idem. 
107 Idem 
ios Idem. 
viewpoint of authority may resist this economic-minded group and appear itself as a 
"conservative" force. During this process the ulema outwardly may preserve their garb. 
attachment to religion and habits. but their thinking about society, man and government may 
be so drastically changed as to make their formal attachment to tradition motivated by 
economic reasons. This in itself a fundamental change. since economic motivation is likely to 
create a chain of reaction among social groups and call for new roles completely different 
from the past when the u/ema·s role \\as mainly religious. 109 
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Still, Karpat's above quoted passage on the conservatism and modernism of social groups 
was based on nonnative assumptions about conservatism and modernism. "Pressing of 
political rights," "acting on economic motivations," "to have an attachment to relations 
motivated by economic reasons," "to be interested in industrialization," "turning into 
entrepreneurial group" were posed as criteria for modernism. In this line of analysis, 
conservatism was regarded as the rejection of nonnative assumptions and principles of 
modernism. Indeed, this conception of conservatism mostly revealed itself in his 
characterization of the nationalist bureaucratic middle class, "which derived its social and 
political outlook mainly from its association with the state rather than from affiliation of 
any particular social group."11° From this perspective, his characterization of the 
conservativeness of the bureaucratic intelligentsia is the most problematic and biased one 
since their conservativeness has strictly been used to denote "the social philosophy" of the 
ruling bureaucracy which supports the "primacy of the state... rejection of social classes, 
political parties, the class struggle and trade unions," to "foster unity."m For Karpat 
The nationalism of this class eventually acquired strong conservative tendencies. These 
manifested themselves in the form of opposition to the upward mobility of lower social groups 
and rejection of class differences and conflict of economic interests. They emphasized the 
utmost superiority of the nation and state over the individual and drew considerable strength 
from the glories of Turkish history. 112 (Emphases are mine) 
These manifestations of the conservativeness of the ruling bureaucratic elite were isolated 
through an ideal-typical model recognized through some "universally valid conservative 
core values." What Karpat conceived as "conservative tendencies" which appeared within 
109 Idem. 
110 Ibid., p. 319. 
111 Ka!pat, ·'Modem Turkey," p. 540. 
112 Idem. 
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the ranks of the bureaucratic middle class, was a kind of romanticism serving radical aims 
of establishing a nation-state, which, he, in the next page, also delineated as the "main goal 
of this ruling group."113 These "conservative tendencies," as underlined by Karpat himself, 
"gradually created a way of life in addition of being a form of political rule." 114 However, 
his definition of conservatism did not include "conservative tendencies," which could pave 
the way to a "way of life." 
The expansion of the meaning of the term conservatism, which Schuman had 
referred to revealed itself in Karpat' s utilization of the concept. Accordingly, conservatism 
referred to religiously oriented social groups which were opposed to forced-modernism 
and Western practices; 115 the cultural policy preferences of the rising new middle classes 
in the Republican era; 116 and the social habits, life style of secularist groups which were in 
alignment with nationalist-secularist bureaucratic intelligentsia during the War of 
Independence. 117 The usage extended into the political outlook of landowners and 
industrialists; 118 the social policy orientations of rural middle class and upper urban 
class; 119 and anti-reformist and anti-modernist groups "who saw their salvation in clinging 
to the old traditions both in the Ottoman and Republican period. 120 Similarl)I conservatism 
covered the political approach of the "religious leaders" in the First National Assembly; 121 
any political and/or cultural demand willing to uphold the traditional relations shaped by 
religion both in the Ottoman and the Republican eras; 122 and the landed social groups' 
113 Ib"d. 3'>0 1 , p. - . 
114 Idem. 
115 Karpat, "Change and Modemiz.ation of Social Groups," Social Change and Politics in Turkey, p. 45. 
116 Ibid, p. 60. 
117 Karpat, '·Social Groups and the Political System After 1960;' Social Change and Politics in Turkey, p. 129, 
Turkev·s Politics The Transition to Multi-Party Svstem (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 107. 
118 Karpat, Turkev's Politics, p. 114. 
119 Idem. 
120 Ib"d 1 ., pp. 7,9, 18-9, 37-8, 43-4 
Pl 
- Karpat, ·'Modern Turkey," p. 532. 
122 Ibid., p. 535. Also see Karpat, Turkey's Politics, pp. 7, 9, 18-9. 
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desire to keep up the patriarchal relations in the countryside in the Republican era. 123 In 
addition, Karpat associated conservatism with "respect for law and order prevailing in 
Turkish society as a whole,'''~" with sets of "middle-of-road" concepts, approaches of all 
major political parties of Turkey; 12~ with state policies which especially during the war 
years resulted in "a tortuous economic and social policy that went from one extreme to 
another and usually ended in a rigid, middle-of-road-conservatism:"126 and lastly, with a 
defensive psychological mood which revealed itself mainly through nationalism among the 
"pious conservatives who had lived in the past for and through religion." 127 
Despite the confusion involved in these varying usages of the concept, Karpat' s 
characterization of conservatism in Social Themes in Contemporary Turkish Literature, 
can be seen as an attempt to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of Turkish 
conservatism. In it, he sees conservatism as the main component of small town politics and 
culture. According to Karpat, 
At a place in our essay, we have tried to deal with how the small to\\'n and local notable. who 
dominates here, are elaborated in literature and their place in our modernization attempt. 
While doing this, we have approached to our small towns from a certain historical-social 
perspective. According to our thinking, the community, which we call small town in Islamic 
countries, is a human society which has imbibed the madrasah (medrese) culture and created 
an order according to the logical rules of sheer Reason by detaching man from nature. Small 
town is a social order which have established on village and developed through exploiting it. 
It is individualist as much as it is and even rebellious. It is extremely conservative to protect 
the economic and social superiority it gained over the village. 128 
In this characterization, conservatism has been held synonymous with the traditional life 
style in the countryside that had been mostly shaped by religion, which ultimately provided 
an ethical framework for economic, political and social life. Individualism in economics, 
123 v ~m~ T k , p l. . 3'"'., 
,....,put, ur ev s o 1tlcs, p. --· 
124 Ibid., p. 334. 
125 Ib"d I ., p. 390. 
126 Ib"d I .. p. 98. 
127 Ib"d .., -.., "8 I .. pp. _) __ ) . • 
1 ~8 Karpat. Karpat. Cagdas Tilrk Edebivatmda Sosval Konular (Social Themes in Contemporary Turkish Literature), 
'.!nd ed. !lstanbul: Varhk Yaymevi, 1971), pp. 9-10. The book was compiled from the following anicles; Karpal, 
·'Social Themes in Contemporary Turkish Literature," Middle East Journal. XIV (I %0), pp. 29-44, 153-68. Also see 
Karpat. Turke\''s Politics, pp. 107-8. 
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traditionalism and conservatism in the cultural field and social policy were seen as the basic 
features of this milieu. 129 
If, for a moment. we neglect other conflicting usages of the term, this 
characterization of conservatism is illuminating since this emphasis on conservatism also 
hints at the small town notables trying to protect their political and economic privileges 
over the village community. In many ways, it resembles Rossiter· s conception of 
conservatism. Still, there is one important nuance. The theme of conservation, contrary to 
Rossiter, has not been seen as the creed of descending social and political groups, but 
those ascending ones in an all-embracing modernization process. Thus, Karpat has 
portrayed the conservatism of middle classes in the 1950s as follows: 
Class differences are sharpened because of the unbalanced distribution of income and because 
those befitting from this imbalance favor the strengthening of government control. .\!embers 
of the middle classes, in particular the landed ones, while benefitting most from these 
changes continue their consen•atism in the belief that it would he possible to continue the 
socio-economic and political relations among various social groups on the same 
patriarchica/ foundations on which they had previous~v existed. 130 (emphases are mine) 
The rise of conservative sentiments in Turkish politics has been linked to the increasing 
activism of the big landowners and upper middle classes in Turkish politics. 131 For him, 
"all the major parties of Turkey, consequently, are the middle of the road parties, 
representing the conservative, traditionalist conceptions," in the Republican era. 132 This 
point can provide new horizons for any research on conservatism in Turkish politics and 
can lead to novel conceptions of Kemalism, modernization, and conservatism given the 
fact that within three decades after the proclamation of the Republic this process of radical 
modernism has resulted in the emergence of a conservative milieu in Turkish politics. 
A closer analysis of his evaluations on conservatism will display that Karpat has 
generally approached conservatism as the social philosophy of the upper middle classes 
129 Karpat. Cagdas Tiirk EdebiYatmda Sosval Konular, p. 26. 
13° K T k . P i· . ,..,.., arpat, ur ·ev s o 1l1cs, p. ·'--· 
131 lb'd l I ., p. l 4. 
132 lb'd I ., p. 390. 
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which had strong roots in the countryside in the Republican period. The conservative 
social philosophy of the upper middle classes was supposed to be an amalgam of 
traditionalism and modernism. This traditionalism mostly revealed itself as the defense of 
religious institutions and values. m Yet, religion also has an instrumental value for the 
"arch-conservative groups" of small towns since 
the political hold on the masses through Islam is possible only by preserving Islam in its 
omnipresent primitive fonn so as to dominate the masses and to gi,·e political leadership to a 
II h . 134 sma arc -conservauve group. 
Besides their conservative social policy orientations, landowners and upper middle classes 
were also politically conservative. 135 Though Karpat has not detailed basic characteristics 
of the middle class political conservatism, for him, political conservatism of "the upper 
rural middle classes ... has favored religious freedom, while the· upper urban classes, partly 
because of their cosmopolitan nature, favors secularism."136 However, he added that "in 
matter of social philosophy they are equally conservative."137 Another important feature of 
his characterization of political conservatism of the upper middle classes was his 
conception of conservatism as a search of respect for law and order. In his words 
The respect for law and order prevailing in Turkish society as a whole was also observed by 
the Democratic and Republican Parties alike. While this is true that this respect for law and 
order was in some part the by-product of conservatism, it was largely to an inherent respect 
138 for procedure and orderly change. 
Besides the increasing prevalence of upper middle classes in politics, increasing 
obsession with "hidden communism" by the end of 1940s has been held responsible for 
further solidification of political conservatism. 139 Karpat held "the one-party regime" and 
the "increasing tendency to control and channel thought into an excessive rightist 
133 Ib"d "0 I ., p. - . 
P.4 
- Ibid., 385n.93. 
135 Ib"d I ., p. 113. 
136 Ib"<l 11 I ., p. 4. 
13 7 l<li.'111. 
138 Ib"d 134 -I ., pp. - .· -). 
139 Ib"d 38" I ., p. ). 
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direction," responsible for the development of political conservatism in Turkish politics. 140 
He argued that "conservatism and religion are now defended by all political parties in 
Turkey as a means of opposing communism ... " 141 He concluded that it is this "political 
and social conservatism, regardless of whether it is motivated by interest or mentality, is 
the greatest danger for the general development of Turkey"142 
The common denominator for political conservatism of the upper urban and rural 
classes was their conservative traditionalist social philosophy in which religion has been 
privileged as the "spiritual need of the individual," and as "a part of the individual 
rights. " 143 Despite differences among the economic and social patterns through which the 
conservative groups maintained their domination, social conservatism of the upper middle 
classes has been characterized as a mistrust towards excessive secular modernism which 
was thought by them to have undermined the ethical basis of society. Indeed, religion has 
always been the demarcation line in Karpat' s characterization of the conservative-
modernist dilemma."144 Conservatives and/or conservatism has been isolated through the 
reverent attitude towards political and cultural traditions shaped by religion. 
Turkish transformation, for Karpat, has been shaped by tension-ridden relations 
between modernist-secular and conservative-religious groups. The first group had always 
"demanded reforms" whereas the "conservatives saw their salvation in clinging to old 
traditions."145 For him "the gap between them continued to grow as developments 
strengthened the modernist position," which ultimately resulted in the establishment of the 
Republic. 146 For Karpat, the modernist-secular and conservative-religious dilemma has 
140 Idem. 
141 Idem 
142 Idem 
143 Ib"d 1 7l I p. - - . 
144 Ibid .. pp. 7. 9, 18-9, 37-8. 
14~ Ib.d 7 I., p. 
146 Idem. For conservative-modernist dilemma in the Ottoman period, see Kalpat, ibid., pp. 9, 18-9. 
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also persisted in the Republican era. This has been supplemented with another original 
theme which linked the defense of religion and tradition with the economic and political 
interests and/or with the mentality of arch-conservative groups within upper social milieu. 
In Karpat's conception of conservatism, the criteria set for the conservativeness of 
the bureaucratic elite were different from those which had been employed to isolate the 
conservativeness of the upper middle classes. Karpat ultimately grounded the 
conservativeness of the bureaucratic elite, first, in their search for law and order; second in 
their nationalism. As already mentioned, this search of law and order, which has also been 
employed by Michels in his technical definition of conservatism, does not provide much 
insight about the nature of conservatism since the "revolutionary" Republican People's 
Party and "liberal" Democratic Party were both in search for order and law despite their 
different ideological claims. In this respect, related subthemes, which have been elaborated 
by Karpat to delineate the conservativeness of the bureaucratic elite, were "timidness 
towards upward mobility of social groups, rejection of class differences and conflict of 
economic interests."147 The conservativeness of the bureaucratic elite was bound to the 
nature of the "one-party regime and its restrictive monolithic philosophy, in time appeared 
utterly inadequate to meet the diversified socio-political needs of the society."148 
Conservatism was seen as the by-product of the nationalist ideology of the 
bureaucratic elites through which "modernist-nationalist indoctrination" had relentlessly 
been carried out. 149 The conservative aspect of nationalism, for Karpat, was due to an 
emphasis on "the utmost superiority of the nation and state over the individual," and it also 
"dre\v considerable strength from the glories of Turkish history."15° For Karpat, 
nationalism had completed its historical mission by giving way to the establishment of the 
147 Karpat, "Modern Turkey," p.540. 
148 Karpat, Turkev·s Politics p. 445. 
1
"'
9 Idem. 
150 Karpat, ·'Modern Turkey," p. 540. 
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Republic and to the revival of national consciousness. 151 Because of this emphasis on the 
past and primacy of the nation [read the whole] before the individual [read the particular], 
"extreme" nationalism., for Karpat, was "conservative," and tended "to become an obstacle to 
the individual's cultural and political development and to modernization as a whole."152 
Karpat held Ziya Gokalp (18 7 5-1924) responsible for the shaping of a 
"traditionalist conservative brand of nationalism,"153 which he characterized as an 
"autocratic, totalitarian, leader-worshipping nationalism, which takes its sap from Islam 
and is based on the rejection of individual, opposes all that democracy and freedom stand 
for." 154 The traditionalist-conservative brand of nationalism, which characterized the 
conservativeness of the social and political philosophy of the ruling bureaucratic elite, had 
its roots in the Durkheirnian sociology of Gokalp. Traditionalist-conservative nationalism, 
for Karpat, "looked upon nation as a collectivity ... and assigned to it absolute supremacy 
over the individual who could not have a life or identity outside his community. " 155 This 
traditionalist-conservative nationalism had also asserted "a theory of internal cohesion in 
the nation by combining the family attachments prevailing in the kinship groups and the 
feeling of brotherhood in the Muslim community. " 156 This nationalism had reasserted an 
"Islamic conservative traditionalist content,''157 and provided a new opening to the deeply-
rooted crisis of identity experienced during the Turkish transformation towards the current 
modernity. Even though "there was an official denunciation of the excessive forms of 
nationalism as practiced during the early periods of the Republic," for Karpat, the multi-
party struggle can also be characterized as a return to traditionalist conservatism to 
151 Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p. 455. 
152 Idem. 
153 ' .. - -Karpat, ·Modern Turkey, p. :i:i9. 
154 Karp T k . p 1·. ,-at. ur e\C s o itJcs, p. 4_ :i. 
155 K Modern ·r k .. - -9 arpat, ·· ur ·ey, p. )) . 
156 Idem. 
157 Idem 
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"appease the conservative-religious groups whose views have played an important part in 
the politics of Turkey since 1946. " 158 
There are at least two significant points m Karpat' s evaluations on the 
"traditionalist conservative brand of nationalism." First, he has creatively used the term 
"traditionalist-conservative" to delineate a certain type of 'nationalism,' serving 
conservative aims but still bound to the religious problematic. The ideal of this brand of 
traditionalist-conservative nationalism has ultimately manifested itself as three 
irreconcilable claims between Turkification, Islamization, Modernization which revealed 
themselves in the title of Gokalp 's one o~ost well-known books. 159 Still, the crucial 
issue for the present purpose is to show that Karpat has isolated a "traditionalist-
conservative" strand in Turkish political and intellectual life. Second, the "traditionalist-
conservative" stand in Karpat's scheme of the transformation of the Turkish society 
towards modernity is still conceptualized in reference to an "Islamic traditionalist-
conservative content." This "Islamic traditionalist-conservative content" was assumed to 
be shaped by the "traditionalist spirit of Islam."160 The problematic issue is that the 
"Islamic content" which has been isolated to characterize traditionalist conservatism 161 
was neither a straightforward factor nor perhaps was it relevant for the intellectuals that 
are studied in this dissertation. 
Karpat' s other usages of the term have ultimately denoted an inherent reaction of 
the descending bureaucratic elites against ascending upper middle classes which had begun 
to challenge the monopoly of power of the old modernist bureaucratic groups through 
their economic power in the 1950s. Karpat ultimately perceived the inability of the 
descending bureaucratic groups to cope with the political, social and economic 
158 K T k . P 1· . 45· arpat, ur ey s o 1hcs, p. :>. 
159 Ziya Gokalp, Tiirklesmek. islamlasmak. Muas1rlasmak. (Turkification, Islamiz.ation, Moderniz.ation) (lstanbul: 
Kiilto.r Yaymlan, 1976 (1918]). 
160 Karpat, Turkev·s Politics, p. 50. 
161 Ibid., p. 385. 
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transfonnation as the sine quo 11011 condition for the increasing conservativeness of these 
groups which was manifested in their claim for law and order. 
There is a methodological question here: if it can be shown that traditionalist 
conservatism has been articulated by the power-sharing ascending group(s) within the 
intelligentsia rather than the descending group(s) during the nation-state building process, 
then we might have to abandon the theoretical definitions of conservatism in the Turkish 
case as but both by Karpat and others. The misconceptions lie in the fact that these 
prominent students of Turkish politics have ignored the cultural and political consequences 
of modernism in different countries in an effort to generalize. 162 They have nonnatively 
classified all political and cultural reactions against modernization as conservative 
reaction(s). This conceptualization has ultimately ignored the modernizing effect of the 
Turkish traditionalist conservatism which was a modernist-secular claim to consolidate a 
peculiar vision of modernism. 
It is of crucial importance to note that Turkish traditionalist conservatism, as a 
modernist drive based on a modem-secular cosmology, has emerged concomitantly with 
the consolidation of nation-state structures. If its intellectual origins and modernist social 
and political vision are not fully analyzed, neither the peculiarity and the uniqueness of the 
consolidation of nation-state structures in the Turkish case, nor the consequences of the 
influx of traditionalist-conservative ideals into Kemalist modernism can be understood 
better. Traditionalist conservatism provided new conceptions of nation, state, religion and 
national identity through which traditional groups found new means to identify themselves 
with the ideals of Kemalist modernism. The traditionalist-conservative vision of modem 
society and state have far-reaching repercussions on the transfonnation of Islamic 
Weltanschauung towards a modem secular one. This philosophico-political stand was 
162 Conservatism, as pointed out by Mannheim, has to be treated as a ''social and historical phenomenon ... See Paul 
Kecskemeti eds, Karl Mannheim. Essays on Sociology and Social Sociology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1953), p. 95. 
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combined with Kemalist modernism to address the question as to how the structures of 
modernity, such as the capitalist system and nation-state, would be rooted in the bosom of 
the traditional Islamic society. The intellectuals under study formulated a grand strategy 
for modernization, which was exploited first by the bureaucratic elites and then the 
political elites who, by the end of the 1940s, based the Turkish economic, social, and 
political modernization on an alternative vision of development. 
The philosophico-political vocabulary of the traditionalist-conservative imagination 
came to the fore in numerous works of these intellectuals. In these literary works, among 
which Safa's Fatih Harb(w stood as the most exemplary case. The dichotomies and 
dilemmas that emerged in daily life during the long and gradual process of westernization 
were illustrated and their effects on individuals were elaborated. Karpat, referring to Safa's 
nationalist conviction has illustrated this as follows: 
In reality this extremist nationalism was a social and psychological crisis caused by the 
breakdomt of ancient concepts of organaation and loyalty. Indeed a series of reforms in 
language, the legal system and the economy, undertaken by the state, had undermined the old 
system and caused a crisis of identity. Peyami Safa's confused nationalist writings of the 
period clearly indicate the extent of this crisis, as well as the attempts to fit old loyalties and 
. " Id 163 concepts mto a new io 
Safa's conception of this crisis and other traditionalist-conservative figures' attempts to "fit the 
old loyalties and concepts into a new fold," in Karpat' s words, will provide fruitful insights 
about the emergence and development of traditionalist conservatism. This is also of crucial 
importance in understanding the uniqueness ofKemalist modernism since, in Karpat's words: 
the influx of a variety of religious and conservative ideas into Turkish nationalism between 
193 3 and 1945 helped to identify various groups in the countryside with the nation and the 
state. The population began to think itself as being Turkish, and although it was still loyal to 
Islam as a faith, its thoughts and aspirations were confined to the territorial boundaries of 
164 Turkey. 
Thus, based on Karpat' s above mentioned passage, it is also possible to raise the question 
of how Kemalist modernism was shaped by the traditionalist-conservative ideas. 
163 K Mod ·r k " -6-arpat, -- em ur cy, p. :i :i. 
164 Idem. 
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Although there are studies on the political history of the early Republican era or on 
the organized political platforms, such as political parties or interest groups, there is none 
which aims to provide a holistic approach to the nouveaux traditionalist-conservative 
orientations that found a comfortable niche in Kemalist modernism. Conservatism 
conceived as the inherent disposition of the descending social groups to conserve their 
privileges in a rapidly changing political, social and economic environment can not 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the nature of elite fragmentation within the 
modernist-secular intelligentsia. Neither does this outlook can account for the emergence 
of competing claims to conserve the structures of modernity within the Republican ruling 
stratum. Thus, this work intends to shed light on the nature and reasons for the emergence 
of a traditionalist-conservative strand in Kemalism as an alternative vision of modernism 
that has been exploited by the ruling elites at various stages of Turkish modernization. 
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CH4PTER2 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: OTTOM4N-TURKISH OUTLOOK TOWARDS 
:WO DERN/TY 
Tanzimat's Search/or Novelty in Retrospect 
The Ottoman State was in existence at the beginning of the twentieth century. Yet, 
following the World War I, the Ottoman political institutions began to collapse. After 
four years of the War of Independence ( 1919-19~3 ), Republican institutions were 
established. The nineteenth century ended with various attempts at refonn and 
restoration of the Ottoman system. Yet, long before the nineteenth century, Ottoman 
rulers had also begun to think about the reasons of the retreat of the Ottoman state 
against the West. 1 Besides some novelties introduced in the field of military, Ottoman 
rulers also made some changes for the establishment of a centralized modem 
administration. By the nineteenth century, refonnist policies were implemented in the 
fields of economy, politics and education to modernize the Ottoman State.:? 
The idea of refonn, which had been limited to the objective to rehabilitate the 
state's military organization in the seventeenth century gained a new impetus after the 
proclamation of the Imperial Edict in 1839. A new period known as Tanzimat- the 
Restoration- began. By the formal statement of the Sultan, the Ottoman state publicly 
disclosed the necessity to adopt modem state institutions and principles of 
administration. Thus, the Ottoman state promised to initiate many reforms in the legal, 
social, political and economic fields. 3 Historians and students of Turkish politics 
generally tend to record the Tanzimat period as the beginning of the reorganization of 
1 See Stanford Jay Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim ill, 1789-1809 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, 1971 ); Stanford J. Shaw and Ez.el.K. Shaw, Historv of The 
Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey Vol. II. Refonn. Revolution and Republic. The Rise of Modem Turkev 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 1-55. See also Walter F. Weiker, "Ottoman Bureaucracy: 
Modernization and Refonn, ., Administrative Science Quarterly. XIII ( 1968 ), pp. 4 51-70. 
" 
- Shaw and Shaw, History of The Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkev, pp. 55-172. 
3 . . . 
Ilber Ortayh, Imparatorlugun En Uzun Yilzylh (The Longest Century of the Empire), 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Hi! 
Y aymlan, 1987); A. Hourani, "Ottoman Refonn and Politics of Notables," in Beginnings of Modernization In the 
Middle East:The Nineteenth Centurv. W.Polk and R.L.Charnbers. eds_ (Chicago, London:The University of 
Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 41-68; Levy Avigdor, "The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of Sultan 
Mahmud II," Asian and African Studies, VII (1971 ), pp.13-39: See also, Roderic Davison, Refonn in the 
Ottoman Empire 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963 ). 
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the legislative and executive functions of the Ottoman administration according to 
western rules and practices.~ It was the time of establishing the superiority of law; a 
time of confirming the necessity to introduce a new public ethics and a new public 
philosophy of rights and duties originating from the notion of Ottomanism. 5 
The political cleavages that emerged around the questions of westernization 
during the Tan=imat period ( 1839-1876) were deepened and further intensified by the 
transformation of the sociological and intellectual configuration of the intellectuals in 
the succeeding Constitutional periods ( 1876-1878; 1908-1920).6 Ottoman intellectuals 
were confused by the questioning of the legitimacy and of the effectiveness of the 
traditional political and social institutions. Thus, the reorganization of state 
administration was the only reform objective before and during the Tan=imat era. The 
basic theme of the preceding reform acts was to imitate the end-products of Western 
countries to protect and to strengthen the existence and the efficiency of the Ottoman 
state. During the Tanzimat period, the deeply felt 'change' in socio-political life gained 
a sense of direction and purpose among the Westemist intellectuals of the time. From 
the Tanzimat onwards, 'change' essentially implied the transformation of the 
traditional religious cosmology to a modem secular one. It was concluded that the 
encouragement of a new mentality; a new life style; and a new conception on Man and 
society were necessary for the achievement of the promised reforms. 
During the Tanzimat period, a new stratum of intellectuals, who were seen as 
the bearer of the new westernized life style, began to emerge. 7 In the literary works of 
4 Bernard Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Review," Middle Eastern Studies. l 
( 1965), pp. 283-95. 
5 ~erifMardin, "Tanzimat ve Aydutlar," (The Tanzimat and the Intellectuals) Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet'e Tlirkive 
Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopedia of Turkey from the Tanzimat to the Republic), vol.VI (istanbul: neti~iin Yayutlan, 
1985 ), pp. 1698-170 I; R.H. Davison, "The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of the 
Ottoman Empire," in Beginnings ofModerni1.ation, Polk and Chambt:rs t.:ds., pp. 93-108. 
6 Hali! inalc1k, "Sened-i lttifak ve Giilhane Hatt-1 Hiimavmm,'' (Sened-i lttijak and Giilhane Hatt-1 Hiimavunu) 
Belleten. 28 ( 1964 ), pp. 603-22, "Tanzimatm Uygulanmas1 ve Sosyal Tepkileri," (Application of the Ta11zimat 
and its Social Effects) Belleten. 28 (1964), pp. 623-90. 
7 Kamuran Birand, Aydmlanma Devri Devlet Felsefesinin Tanzimata Tesirleri (Impacts of the State Philosophy 
in the Age of Enlightenment on Tanzimat) (Ankara:An.kara Universitesi naruyat Fakiiltesi, 1955); Taner Timur, 
Osmanh Kimligi (The Ottoman Identity) (Istanbul: Hi! Yaymlan, 1986): Mardin, "Tanzimat ve Aydmlar," pp 46-
54: T. Gokbilgin, ''Tanzimat Hareketinin Osmanh Miiesseselerine ve T1..~kilatma Etkileri," (Impacts of the 
Ta11zimat Movement on Ottoman Institutions and Organi?.ation) Belleten. 31 (1967), pp. 93-11 L Le"iis, "The 
Impact of French Revolution on Turkey," Journal of World Historv. I (1952), pp. 105-25. 
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the Tan=imat, this new stratum of intellectuals and the westernized life style, which 
they stood for, were sarcastically caricatured in the personality of 'Tan:imat Man.'8 
He was illustrated as having 'new' but 'alien' values to the Ottoman - Islamic 
community. 9 The values and life pnnciples of' T an:imat Man,' the first exemplar of the 
'westernized character: were indeed in great conflict with those values and principles 
that constituted the public identity of the common and traditional Ottoman Man. He 
was a hybrid identity who was neither totally westernized nor belonged to his original 
cultural geography. Yet, the 'Tan:imat Man' symbolized the private and individual 
expression of a new state of consciousness about the direction and purpose of 
'change.' This was a generation who deliberately manifested its distinctiveness both 
from the traditional Ottoman man and his ancestors. In short, the 'Tanzimat Man' was 
the symbol of a state of 'consciousness about change' and a 'state of being conscious 
about change.' 
Beginning by the renaissance, Western humanistic thought tried to understand 
and to explain the origins and reasons for differences of life-styles among generations. 
There emerged a firm belief about a value hidden in 'change.' Accordingly, 'change' 
meant 'progress,' i.e., to move from a less developed stage to a more developed and 
complex one. Consequently, Western thought asserted itself as the only systematized 
conception of 'change.' It exalted the Western experience of 'change' as the genuine 
form of social, economic and political dynamism and creativity. However, the rest of 
the world i.e., the East was delineated as the soil of obscurantism and stagnation. 10 
The Ottoman state met with the modernizing West long the before the 
Tanzimat era. However, the Tan=imat, with all its political, administrative interests and 
8 See Ahmet 0. Evin, Origins and Development of the Turkish Novel (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 
1983 ), pp. 79-128. 
9 See Ahmed Hamdi Tanpmar, XIX.Asrr Tilrk Edebivall Tarihi (History of the 19th C1.."!1tury Turkish Literature), 
2nd. ed. dstanbul: i. D. Yaymlan, 1956 ); Berna Moran, Turk Romaruna Elestirel Bir Balos (A Critical Glance at 
the Turkish Novel), vol. I, 4th ed. (lstanbul: lleti~im Yavmlan, 1991 ); Jale Parla, Babalar ve Qgullar. Tanzimat 
Romamrun Epistemolojik Temelleri (Fathers and Sons, The Epistemological Basis of the Tanzimat Novel) 
(btanbul: ileti~im Yaymlan, 1990); GiiZin Dino, Tilrk Romamnm Dogusu (Birth of the Turkish Novel) (lstanbul: 
Cem Yaymevi, 1978), Tanzimattan Sonra Edehivatta Gercekcilige Dogru (Towards Realism in Literature After 
the Tanzimat) (Ankara: AODTCF Yaymlan, 1954 ). 
10 See Edward Said, Orii..'lltalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). Also see Sait, The World The Text and 
the Critic (London: Vintage, 1991 ). 
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sooial concerns registered the emergence of a state of consciousness in Ottoman 
geography which sought to find out the origin of the 'new and modem.' Indeed, the 
'Tmdmat Man' was the representattve of this renovating mind which questioned his 
own history, culture and geography according to a ne\v conception of 'change.' The 
constitutive values of this new life style and/or new political principles of the Tmdmat 
- such as the theory of natural rights and duties. a constitutional government or theory 
of representation - provoked a widespread curiosity among the Ottoman intellectuals 
about the nature of 'new and modem.' Consequently, the Tan=imat became an era in 
which all that were assumed to be 'new or modem' and 'traditional' were put under 
close scrutiny. 11 
Relatedly, the term alafranga (that of belonging to the West) began to be used 
to refer to the new life style of the 'Tanzimat Man' who had customarily been a 
member of the secular wing of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Yet, the two worlds -
religious and secular; western or eastern; traditional or modem- and the people, who 
experienced the practices of those different worlds, continued to live together in the 
same sphere. Despite all its intellectual cultural brilliance, the political goal set by the 
reformist Tanzimat intellectuals, some of whom were known as the Young 
Ottomans, 12 was the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Intellectuals of the 
time, without exception, shared the same political concern and tried to answer the same 
question: 'How to save the state from breakdown?' 
Hence, all controversial currents of thought, being constituted by 'liberal,' 
'Islamic: 'Turkist' aspirations. were interfused and constituted the conceptual 
framework of the same intellectual without any thought to being in contradiction with 
each other. The most complicated intellectual questions of the time were raised about 
11 Mardin, "'Tanzi.mattan Sonra A~m Ballhl~a," (Excessive Westernization After the Tanzimat) in Tiirk 
Modemlesmesi (The Turkish Modernization), vol. 4, Miimtaz'er Tiirkone, Tuncay bnder, eds. (istanbul: Ileti~im 
Y aymlan, 199'.? ), pp . '.? l -81. 
12 Nivazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: Macgill University Press, 1964 ), pp. 
201-18: thsan Sungu, "Tanzirnat ve Yeni Osmanhlar," (The Tanzimat and the Young Onoman) Tanzimat I. 
(lstanbul: Maarif Matbaas1, 1940), pp. 777-857; Mardin, "Yeni Osmanhlar ve Siyasi Fikirleri," <The Yowtg 
Ottomans and 'Their Political ideas) Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet Tiirkiye AnsikJopedisi. vol.VI, pp. 1698-1701; 
Ortayh, "Bir Aydmlar Grubu: Yeni Osmanhlar," (A Group of Intellectuals: The Young Ottomans) Tanzimat'tan 
Cumhurivet Tilrkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol. VI, pp, 1702-03. 
60 
the cultural dichotomies emerging by the diffusion of 'modem-western' values to the 
traditional strata of the society. Thus, the dilemmas emerged from the diffusion of worldly 
ethics. such as the new individual morality and its materialistic aspirations, constituted the 
most complicated intellectual and practical issues among the Ottoman intellectuals 13 which 
would be inherited by the following Republican regime as part of the Ottoman problematic. 
During the Tan=imat, the major dispute, which was on the nature of change 
and on legitimate forms of social and political practices, was between the Westemist 
reformers and Islamic reactionaries. Another dispute was on the true essence of the 
western civilization and the future of the Ottoman institutions. As compared to the 
following Young Turk era, 14 the Tanzimat intellectuals still perceived western 
civilization essentially as Christian but not the same 'Christian world' traditionally 
known by the Ottomans. The historical conflict between the Christian and Islamic 
civilizations was not placed on the agenda of the Tanzimat intellectuals because of a 
lack of an alternative ideology at the time. It was solely a search for the differences 
between two civilizations~ namely the Eastern and the Western. Despite all the 
controversial views on the nature and essential values of the W estem and Eastern 
civilizations, the Ta11Zimat intellectuals did not conceive them as deeply-rooted, 
conflict-generating cultural differences. During the TG11Zimat, interest of Ottoman 
intellectuals was limited only to the distinct nature of the new and modem. For that 
reason alone, they began to search for the principles and values which secured the 
unique characteristics of the 'modem and new' on the Ottoman soil. Simultaneously, 
curiosity among the intellectuals of the time on Eastern civilizations was also 
intensified. 
13 ~ii.krO Hanioglu, "Osmanh Ayduu ve Bilim," (The Ottoman Intellectual an<l Science) Toplwn ve Bilim. 27 
(19lWL pp. 183-90. 
14 Berkes, The Development of Se.:ularism in Turkey. pp. 290-325; Tank later Tunaya, Tiirkive'de Siyasi 
Partiler 1859-1952 (Political Parties in Turkey) (1stanbul:lstanbul Dogan Karde~ A.~. Bas1mevi. 1952): Feroz 
Ahmed, The Young Turks:The Commitee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1969): Bernard Lewis, Emergence of Modem Turkey (London: Oxford University Press,1961), 
pp. 206-233; Alune<l Hedc!vi Kuran, Inkllab Tarihimiz vc Jon Tiirklt:r (Our History of Revolution and the Young 
Turks) (istanbul: Tan. 1945); Mardin. Continuitv and Change in the Ideas of the Young Turks, (lstanbul: Robert 
College, 1969); Ernest E. Ramsaur. The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957). 
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Despite its novelties, the Tmi=imat was an era of controversies. Westem-
Eastem, good-bad, advanced-undeveloped, all lived together. 15 Social, political and 
cultural changes were observed but a systematic political program, which aimed at 
intervening in society according to a comprehensive social and political project did not 
emerge. During this period, tradition [commonly understood as umma tradition] , its 
administrative principles, norms and values contended in the daily life of the Ottoman 
subject, and were all began to be challenged. Still, all values and administrative 
principles, including -modem and traditional, that were thought to be functional for the 
restoration of the state power, were articulated in a pragmatic political strategy. 
From Tanzimat's Pragmatic Universalism to the Ho/ism of Islamic Traditionalism 
and Particularism of Turkism 
Within three decades after the proclamation of the Imperial Edict in 1839, systematic 
political ideologies had begun to flourish. By that time, small intellectual circles also 
began to emerge by the further segmentation of the Ottoman intelligentsia. This was 
due to the fragmentation which emerged in the traditional power structure of the 
political center. Political power was fragmented between the Ottoman Palace and the 
newly emerged secular civil and military bureaucracy. Concomitantly, by the 1860s, 
there were three identifiable currents of thought. A secular-nationalist intellectual 
circle, headed by Sinasi, was countered by a modernist-Islamic circle, inspired from the 
writings of Nam1k Kemal. The last and the most hybrid current of though, namely 
Turkist Ottomanism, was developed around thoughts of Ali Suavi. However, there still 
did not emerge a coherent, severe nationalist-secular and Islamist rivalry in the political 
agenda which would become the locus of politics within the succeeding eighty years. 
Restoration of the distorted political and social tradition by creating a harmony 
among modem methods of administration and traditional rules and values of daily life 
became the primary objective of constitutional reformism after 1870. During the 
Constitutional reform period, Islamism gained a new impetus by enriching itself 
through new answers provided on the questions of participation, representation, rights 
15 Z.F. Fmdikoglu, "Tanzi.rnatta i~timai Hayat," (Social Life in the Tanzimat) Tanzimat I. p. 645. 
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and duties, sources of legitimacy of the political .authority, and public and private 
law. 16 The quest to develop an Islamic framework for political and social practices 
responsive to the umma traditionalism, which emerged under the tutelage of autocratic 
rule of Abdulhamid II ( 18 7 6-1908 ), aimed to shed light on the modernizing essence in 
Islam that would prevent the further decline of traditional religious order. 
With the rise of Islamism, "liberal' attempts of 'freeing from the restrictive 
context of orthodox Islamic tradition,' which had begun by the emergence of a new 
secular intellectual stratum during the Tanzimat period, were intensified. 17 
Concomitantly, new political manifestations such as Westernism, Turkism and 
Islamism appeared under the rule of Abdiilhamid II. The focal point of the debate 
among the Young Turks of the twentieth century, was around the question of western 
norms to be adopted and on the limits of political liberty. The main tenets of Young 
Turk thought were nationalism, centralism and protectionism against laissez-faire in the 
economy, decentralization and Ottomanism. Islamic traditionalism, being protected by 
and developed during the reign of Abdulhamid II, retreated in politics after the Young 
Turk revolution in 1908. 
It is during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1920) that Islamic 
traditionalism entered upon an extensive critique because of secularization of daily 
life. 18 For the traditional Ottoman subject, secularization meant the diffusion of 
materialist worldly ethics that eventually destroyed the symbolic political and cultural 
signs of Islam through which the individual constituted himself as a member of a 
religious collectivity. 19 In the period concerned, there emerged a clear cut disjunction 
16 
"·Religious tradition" in Islamic civilization and "Christian Western Civilization" were those concepts firstly 
refined by the missionary orientalists and later employed by Arap nationalists in their search for an identity and 
origin for the emerging Arap nations. Thus, Christian Western Civilization and Islamic Eastern civilization were 
invented by missionary orientalists of the nineteeth century. For a further elaboration, see Maxim Robinson 
"Western Image and Western studies oflslam," in The Legacy of Islam, J. Schact, C.E Bosworth, eds. (Oxford: 
University of Oxford Press.1979), pp. 9-39. 
17 Mardin, '"Libertarian Movements in the Ottoman Empire," Middle East Journal, XVI (1962), pp. 169-82. 
18 For Islamism and its development see Tunaya, lslamc1hk Akmu (The Trend of Islamism) (b;anbul: Simavi 
Yaymlan, 1991); Mardin, ··tslamc1hk;' (lslamism) Tanzimattan Cwnhurivete Tilrkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol.V, pp. 
1400-04. Also Mardin, "XIX. Yozy1lda ~iince Akunlan vc Osmanh Devleti," (Trend~ of Thought in the 
Nineteenth Century and the Ottoman State) in Tilrk Modernlesroesi vol. 4, TUrkOn.e and Tuncay eds., pp. 82-102. 
19 See Mardin, '"Religion and Secularism in Turkey," in Atat1irk: Founder of a Modern Turkev. Ali Ka7.anc1gil 
and Ergun Ozbudun, eds. (London: C. Hurst and Co. 1981), pp.191-219. 
63 
between Islamic traditionalists and the 'others' including, Turkists, Ottomanist, and 
Liberals. w The debate between Islamic traditionalism and the 'others' was basically on 
the different meanings attributed to the norm and value content of the Islamic tradition. 
Beginning by the middle of the First Constitutional Era, the proto-typical 
Islamic references which later were articulated as Islamic traditionalism, by converting 
'Tradition' to a value in itself, which awaited for re-consolidation in daily life, was 
structurally differentiated from other currents of thought and the religiously-inspired 
Ottomanism of the Tan=imat which limited its 'Islamic problematic' to the quest of 
finding out the 'living and creative essence' in the traditions. The Tan=imat thought 
and Islamic traditionalism, which developed during the Second Constitutional Era, 
were in severe conflict on the values to be reappreciated and to be thrown away in the 
course of saving the state from total breakdown. Unlike the traditionalism of Islamism 
of the Second Constitutional Era, tradition was not a 'value in itself in the Tanzimat 
thought. 21 For the Islamic traditionalism of the Second Constitutional Era, 'Islamic 
tradition' was more than a level of exposition of the 'social and individual experience' 
and was a value and aim in itself For this reason, degeneration of the umma tradition 
and moral decadence in the Islamic community, according to Islamic traditionalism, 
were due to the excessive secularization of the political and social life of the Islamic 
community which had been fostered by westemists and/or those, like Turkists, who 
reduced Islam to one of the many traditions that constituted the Ottoman identity. 22 
20 ismail Kara, "lslamctlar ve Tiirkc;Ul.er Arasmda bir Milliyetc;ilik Tart1~1," (A Nationalism Debate Between 
Islamists and Turkists) Tarih ve Toplwn. V, 28 (1986), pp. 240-47, "Osmanhc1lar ile Tilrkc;Oler Arasmda Bir 
Milliyetc;ilik Tart1~1," (A Nationalism Debate Between Ottomanists and Turkists) Tarih ve Toplwn. V, 30 
(1986 ), pp. 377-82. 
21 For the development of Islamic traditionalism in the Islamic world. see Atxlullah Laroui, Tarihselcilik ve 
Gelenek cThe Crisis of the Arab Intellectual - Traditionalism or Historicism?), trans. by Hasan Bacanh (Ankara: 
Vadi Yaymlari, 1993) . 
.,.., 
-- Tunaya, 1slamc1hk Cercvaru, pp. 25-90: David Farhi, "The ~at as a Political Slogan- the Incident of the 
3 \st March," The Middle Eastern Studies. 7 ( 1971 ), pp. 275-316; Berkes, Tilrk DosOncesinde Bau Sorunu (TI1e 
Western Question in the Turkish Thought) (Ankara: Bilgi Bas1mevi, 1975), pp: 38-85; Faik R~it Unat, "tkinci 
Me~Tiltiyet Dzerine BaZI ~iinceler," (Some Thoughts on the Second Constitutional Rule) Belleten, 23 (1959), 
pp. 267-85; Shaw and Shaw, Historv of the Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkev, pp. 304-5. Also see Ak~in 
Soner, ··s1rat-1 Milstakim: Islamic Modernist Thought in the Ottoman Empire;' Journal of Middle East Studies 
SocietY at Columbia Universitv, 1(1987), pp. 55-80; D.E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism,"' American 
Historical Review. XXXVIll ( 1942), pp. 278-87. 
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What constituted the most complex issue for Islamic traditionalism was the 
disjunction between the 'past experience of the universal community transmitted 
through tradition' and 'existing practices construed as the legitimate manifestations of 
the tradition.' Although the already experienced norm and ,·alue structure of the 
society was religious i.e. Islamic, according to the thesis of Islamic traditionalism, the 
existing ·Islamic tradition' was also in great conflict with the 'past experiences' of the 
Islamic community. Transition from the Islam-inspired thought of the Tatdmat, '.vhich 
aimed to shed light on the origin of the 'living tradition,' to Islamic traditionalism(s) of 
the Constitutional period, which strived to revive a series of abstract norms and a 
hierarchy of values from the Islamic Past, marked the structural change in Ottoman 
intellectual world. This structural transformation was inherited by the succeeding 
Republican Regime as part of the "Ottoman problematic." The attitude towards Islam 
and tradition also drew the demarcation line between the nouveaux conservative ideas 
of the early Republic and Islamic traditionalists from which the legitimacy of 
traditionalist-conservative ideas in the political game were drawn. 
During the Second Constitutional period, the origin of the political conflict 
among the actors of the political game, be them Turkists, Islamic traditionalists, 
Ottomanists or Westernists, was on the question of identity.23 They focused on the 
question of 'Why did Islam, Turkism and Ottomanism remained backward against the 
development of Western civilization?' By the transformation of tradition to a norm 
structure in Islamic traditionalism, the question of identity, that had formerly resolved 
in living tradition, became a conflict generating issue. The Westernists discarded 
Islamic practices and the Islamists rejected Western practices. Ottomanist and Turkists 
attempted to formulate middle ways on opposing to employ solely religious factors as 
constituents of the Ottoman identity. Islamic reference in the Tanzimat period was a 
search to find out those which 'belonged to them' and those which 'belonged to us.' 
By the rise of nationalism(s) in the beginning of the twentieth century, mistrust among 
the ruling Young Turk intelligentsia towards the universalism of Westernism and Islam 
23 Kara, "Islarnc1larla Tiirkij:iiler Arasmda Bir Milliyet'Yilik Tarll~mast," pp. 240-7. 
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had reached to a point of rejecting all 'universality' claims of both 'Westernism and 
Islamic traditionalism. ' 24 
This mistrust manifested itself through the emphasis made on the uniqueness of 
hars, namely culture. In the works of Ziya Gokalp, the prominent ideologist of the 
Union and Progress Party, it was discussed that though nations had common traits at 
the level of civilization, at the level of hars they were unique entities. 25 The great 
emphasis made on hars was a symptom of suspicion towards the universal models of 
ci"ilization, including the modem component of nationalism as a universal model to 
emulate. Accordingly, cultural authenticity had to be secured against the diffusion of 
the forms of identity of the universal civilization. The dichotomy created betweei:i 
'civilization' and 'hars' secured the legitimacy of the political practices of the Union 
and Progress Party. These political and cultural practices aimed to provide answers to 
questions of 'Which particular identity will be protected?' and 'Who are we?' At that 
instance, there were two obstacles on the road of formulating 'national' policies: the 
first one was the cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman state tradition and the second one 
was Islamic traditionalism with its heavy emphasis on the universality of the umma. 
However, under the socio-political restraints during the Young Turk era, the 
universality claims of Ottomanism and Islam, around which the most complicated 
problems were formulated till the Tanzimat era, lost most of their influence in politics. 
The fertility of the nineteenth century Ottoman political and intellectual thought 
stemmed from the attempts to find out the components of the 'living tradition.' Such a 
search increased the awareness of the Ottoman intellectual on the existing institutions, 
values and norms of the society. Beginning with Tanzimat, it was realized that the 
imperative was to know the origins of the tradition before changing it. During this 
period, all currents of thought, except those fed from the Islamic theology and 
24 David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908 (London: Frank Cass, 1977). 
25 See Ziya Gokalp, Hars ve Medeniyet (Culture and Civiliz.ation) (Ankara: t~ Matbaac1hk, 1972); Berkes eds., 
Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essavs of Ziva Gokalp (New York: Colwnbia University 
Press, 1959); Uriel Heyd, Fmmdntions of Turkish Nationalism: Ute Life anJ Teachings ofZiva Gokalp (London: 
Harvell Press, 1949); Turkish Nationalism and Western Civiliz.ation: Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp. trans. and 
ed. \\ith an introduction by Niya.zi Berkes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Berkes. "Ziya Gokalp: 
His Contribution to Turkish Nationalism,·· Middle East Journal, VIII ( 1954 ), pp. 375-90. 
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cosmology, had shown deliberate attempts to extract the national constituents of the 
tradition as such from its universal religious content. Furthermore, everything, from the 
method of westernization, to the origins of tradition or attitudes, values and norms of 
daily life. was put under examination. In this respect, the structural transformation that 
took place in the conceptual constellation of those currents of thought, from 
Abdulmecid's Young Ottomans to Abdtilhamid's Young Turks, and to Islamic 
traditionalists' pan-lslamism, marked the peculiarity of the Ottoman problematic for 
the succeeding Republican era. 
Turkish Revolution: Society on the Pendulum of Change and Continuity 
The war in Anatolia among the Rebellion Forces (Kuvay-z Bagiye) - a term employed 
by some anti-nationalist Istanbul governments to identify the nationalist forces led by 
Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia in the 1920s - Forces of Order (Kuvay-1 ln=zbatiye) of the 
istanbul government, Western powers including, France, Italy, Great Britain, and their 
allies, like Greece, ended by the end of 1922. The Lausanne Treaty was signed with the 
Allied countries in 1923. This treaty registered the national borders of the newly 
founded Turkish state. Beginning by the middle of the 1920s, the Republic initiated a 
radical modernization [read westernization] program. From politics to the economy, 
all spheres of life were re-organized along new rules and values that had been drawn in 
reference to a new secular-ethical cosmology expected to function as a legitimacy 
framework for Republican radicalism in politics. 
Radical Westernism of the Republic, which aimed to institutionalize a secular 
cosmology in politics and in daily life, also structured the new political allegiances and 
conflicts. On March 3, 1924, caliphate was abolished. The Ministry for Religious 
Affairs was abrogated; the ecclesiastical courts were abolished in 1924. This opened up 
the way to the complete secularization of the administration of justice and education. 
Religious tombs and dervish meeting places were closed down in 1925. Subsequently, 
new regulations were issued concerning the official attire and duties of the clergy aQ.d 
the Christian calendar replaced the Islamic one in 1925. In 1926, a new civil code, 
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penal and commercial codes were adopted. The first was the translation of the Swiss 
civil code, the second of the Italian Penal Code and the third was the mixture of the 
German and Italian codes. Then, on April 10, 1928, Islam ceased to be the established 
religion of the state. The adaptation of the Latin alphabet in 1928, like the introduction 
of European dress, had far-reaching effects in the daily life of the citizen. Other 
reforms of this kind followed, including the adoption of the metric system on March 
26, 1931, and of Sunday as the day of rest on May 27, 1935. Those were the most 
consequential steps for Kemalists' objective of modernizing [read westernizing] the 
Turkish daily life. 26 Thus, all political and intellectual groupings in the early Republican 
era were shaped under new political and social constraints manipulated by Kemalist 
modernizer state. Either the supporters of the former regime, i.e., those willing to preserve 
the Sultanate and/or caliphate in a constitutional monarchical system, or religious 
reactionaries, had to deal with the new political and philosophical challenge posed by 
Kemalism which was characterized by a radical secularist outlook in comprehending the 
nature of political power and the 'legitimate social and political actions' in this new era. 
Early Political Groupings within the Kemalist Political Establishment 
Kemalism as a nation and state-building ideology did constitute the political and 
intellectual framework, which ultimately defined the legitimate terms of the intellectual 
and political agenda of the time. Nonetheless, following the War of Independence and 
the establishment of the Republic in 1923, new political and intellectual groupings 
and/or old political alliances in new forms emerged both within the newly founded 
political and cultural institutions, namely, the parliament, universities and/or other 
related institutions, such as the Turkish Language Association ( 1932), the Turkish 
History Association ( 193 0). 27 
16 See Ccmil K0!Y3k, ""Siyasal Tarih, 1923 - 1950,'' (Political History, 19.23-1950) in Tilrkiye Tarihi - Cagda§ 
Tilrkive 1908-1980 (Turkey's History - Contemporary Turkey 1908-1950), vol.4, Sina ~in, ed. (istanbul: Cem 
Yaymevi, 1990), pp. 111-3, 85-177. 
27 Dankwart A. Rustow. ·· Atatilrk as Founder of a State," Daedalus. XCVJI ( 1968), pp. 793-828; Mohammad 
Sadiq, "'Mustafa Kemal Atatilrk: Revolutionary par Excellence," International Sudies. XLI (1954), pp. 179-89. 
St..-e also Frank Tachau, ··Language and Politics: Turkish Language Refonn," Review of Politics. XXVI (1964), 
pp. l 9 l-W4. For further elaboration, see Lewis, '·History-Making and National Revival in Turkey," Middle East 
Affairs. IV (1953), pp. 218-86. 
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Indeed, early political groupings were rooted on historical cleavages which 
were clearly brought to light during the War of Independence. The first National 
Assembly, which conducted the War of Independence. had a heterogeneous structure. 
It comprised of reactionary Islamists, Turkists, the l'nionist (former members of the 
Union and Progress Party), supporters of the Sultanate and Caliphate, and even the 
'liberals,' but not the traditionalist(s) or yet the nouveaux conservative figures of the 
Republic. :8 Conflicts and cleavages among competing political groupings tn the first 
National Assembly became visible by the establishment of the First Group on May l 0, 
1921. The First Group mostly consisted of the members of the high-ranked Ottoman 
bureaucracy who gathered around the nationalist ideals of Mustafa Kemal. It later 
became the first political party of the Republic namely, the Republican People's Party. 
Opposition to Mustafa Kemal in the First Assembly was three-sided. First, it 
included the personal enemies of Mustafa Kemal and his supporters; second, the ulema 
and traditionalist Islamists, who saw the Kemalists as the enemy of the Islamic 
tradition; third, former members of the Union and Progress Party with whom Mustafa 
Kemal's hostility dated back to his former membership in the Union and Progress 
Party. The first quasi-organized political opposition in the first Assembly was known as 
the Second Group and emerged after the establishment of the First Group in 1921. 29 
The Second Group had also supporters in Istanbul press. The daily Tan became the 
speaker of Second Group in the press. 30 Besides the two major groups, there were also 
some other minor political groups in the First Assembly, as the Society for Solidarity 
(Tesanilt Grobu), Society for Independence (istiklal Grobu), Society for Reform 
:?S Only, Agaoglu, the 'liberal' politician of the 1930s, was in the Parliament as a Republican deputy. 
Baltac1oglu was the chairman of the istanbul branch of the short-lived Free Republican Party in 1931. 
"'Traditionalist" Baltac10glu, or '·conservative" Safa were not deputies in the 1930s. Baltac1oglu was elected to 
the Assembly as a Republican deputy in 1942 and 1946 elections. See Aluned Agaoglu, Serbest Fuka Hatiralan 
(Free Party Memoirs), 3rd ed. (istanbul: ileti~im Yaymlan, 1994) p. 86. Safa, was also nominated as a 
Republican deputy from the province of Bursa in 1950 elections but he was not elected. Then. he became the 
spokesman of the Democratic Party in the 1954 election. Other members of the group. such as Tum; and Dlken, 
did not directly involve in politics but served in the cultural institutions of the Republic. 
~ Nur~n Mazic1, Atatilrk Doneminde Muhalefot 1919-1926 (Opposition in Atatii1"k"s Era 1919-1926) (istanbul: 
Dilmcn Yaymevi, 1984), pp. 56-62. Also see M. Finefrock, "The Second Group in the First Turkish National 
Assemblv," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. ill ( 1979), pp. 3-20. 
30 Mete Tunctay, Tilrkive'de Tek Parti Y<>nctiminin Kurulmas1. 1923- 1931 (Establishment of the Single Party 
Rule in Turkey 1923-1931) (Ankara: Yurt Yaymlan, 1981), p. 61. See also Mazic1, Atatilrk Doneminde 
Muhalefet 1919-19::?6, pp. ::?3-7. 
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(Islahat Gntbu), People's Group (Halk Ziimresi). 31 There were numerous other local 
groupings, like Society for Preservation of the Sacred Object (Muhqfa=a-i Mukaddesat 
Cemiyeti). which aimed to organize the local resistance against an enemy occupation. 
Society to Defense Rights of Anatolia and Thrace (Anadolu ve Rume/i 
Miidafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti) was the only broad-based movement where the 
nationalists were organized before the establishment of People's Party in 1923. The 
establishment of a new political party under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and his 
domination of the Party created discontent among the opponents in the Assembly 
mostly affiliated to the Second Group. The opposition began to question the legitimacy 
of the leadership of Mustafa Kemal since, in their view, the regime was moving 
towards a dictatorship.32 Still, the People's Party leadership could not exercise a strict 
control over the opposition which showed stiff resistance to the abolishment of 
caliphate and to the other anti-religious reforms in 1924. The power of the opponents 
in the Assembly mostly rested on their supporters in the army, and in their supporters 
in the istanbul press. Parliamentary opposition was figuratively headed by General 
Kaztm Karabekir, a prestigious army member, who first backed Mustafa Kemal when 
he moved to Anatolia to set up the War of Independence, and Rauf Bey (Orbay), a 
former high-ranked distinguished Ottoman naval officer of the War of Dardanelles in 
1915. Yet, there was not a strict group coherence among the opponents because of the 
heterogeneous structure of the group. For instance, some of the leading figures, 
including Kaztm Karabekir was a supporter of the Republican rule but was opposed 
Mustafa Kemal's personal rule, whereas, some others, like Silklii Hoca, the spokesman 
of mostly reactionary Islamists, had opposed the idea of a Republic completely.33 
Though most of the opponents of Mustafa Kemal and their supporters in the Istanbul 
31 Mahmut Gologlu, Cumhuriyete Dogru. 1921-1922 (Towards the Republic 1921-1922) (Ankara: Ba~nur 
Matbaas1, 1971), p. 159. 
32 Aluned Emin Yahnan, Yakut Tarihte Gordilklerim Ve Gecirdilderim (1922-1924) (Things I Have Witnessed 
and Experienced in the Recent History), vol. 3 (Istanbul: Rey, 1970), p. 74 
33 Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Sivasi Hattralar (Political Memoirs), vol.2 (lstanbul: Dogan Kar~, 1960), pp. 42-3. See 
also Manet, AtatUrk DOneminde Muhalefet 1919-1926, pp. 69-70, See also Alunad "The Progressive Republican 
Party," in Political Parties and Dermx,Tacy in Turkey. Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau, eds. (London, New 
York: I.B. Tauris &Co Ltd., 1991 ), pp. 65-82. 
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press were reconciled with the idea of abolishing the Sultanate, they were still willing 
to preserve the Caliph Abdulmecit, as head of state, in a constitutional monarchist 
system. By the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, they had realized that the last 
chance to keep the Caliphate was also lost. Consequently, the Kemalists abolished the 
Caliphate on .\-farch 3, 1924. 
In order to neutralize the opposition politicians-commanders in the army, the 
Kemalist Constitution, which had been enforced in 1924, prohibited the civil servants 
to become members of the Assembly without resigning from their respective posts. 
This article in the Constitution had further intensified the tensions between the 
Republican ruling elites and the rival politicians in the army. The Kemalists' harsh 
measures against the old religious hierarchy and the opposition leaders in the anny had 
resulted in the first elite fragmentation of the Republican power structure. His former 
supporters became the new political rivals of Mustafa Kemal. Rauf Bey, Ali Fuat P~ 
Refet P~a and Kaztm Karabekir P~a, all high-ranking members of the army, resigned 
from the RPP and fanned the first opposition party, namely the Progressive Republican 
Party (PRP) on November 17, 1924.34 
The founders of the Party had played crucial roles during the War of 
Independence. Kazim Karabekir- former inspector-general, became the party 
chainnan, Adnan Achvar and Rauf Orbay acted as deputy-presidents. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, 
the former inspector-general was appointed as general secretary of the party. A number 
of former members of the Union and Progress Party also participated in the newly 
founded PRP. 35 The new party had also had considerable support from the ranks of 
the army which prompted the ruling Kemalists to withdraw the military establishment 
from politics to break off the relations among ex-generals, PRP deputies and the army. 
Within a few days, 29 Republican members had joined in the newly established 
opposition party. The progressives came to articulate the former three-sided opposition 
34 See Erik Jan Zurkcher. Political Opposition in the Farh· Turkish Rt.=public (Leiden: E.J. Brill: 199 l ). 
35 Omiir Sezgin. Gencay ~ylan, '·Terakkiperver Cwnhuriyet Frrkast," (The Progressive Republican Party) in 
Cwnhurivct DOneini Tilrkiye Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopedia of Turkey in the Republican Era), vol. 8 (1stanbul: 
tleti!jim Yaymlan, 1984 ), pp. 2043-51. 
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to the Kemalist rule. The most distinctive characteristic of the party, according to its 
program, was its "liberalism" [the Turkish word is Hiirriyetperverlik which means love 
of freedom] both in politics and economy. The centralization of power and 
administration was rejected and local initiative was proposed. 36 The party adopted a 
reformist rather than a revolutionary program and this was the first symptom of elite 
fragmentation in the Republican era where the radical revolutionaries were countered 
by reformist-revisionists. As noted by Frederick Frey, the party supported "a 
constitutional monarchy with a strong legislature" and "a state in which religion 
maintained a position not much different from that which it had possessed before the 
war" and "a society in which the government granted a relatively important role to the 
localities. "37 The impact of the establishment of an opposition party in the Assembly 
with so-called "liberal" aims was the resignation of ismet inonu and appointment of 
Fethi Bey, who was known for his moderate liberal stand, as the new Prime Minister. 
The Sheik Sait insurrection, which broke out in 1925, marked the end of the 
first experiment with an opposition party. Hard-line Republicans forced the 
government to impose harsh measures against the rebels. 38 In their view, it was 
essentially a religious insurrection and had further been stimulated by the establishment 
of the Republican Progressive Party. The new party was accused of showing tolerance 
to the diffusion of reactionary Islamists to its ranks and of tolerating religious 
propaganda to gain support in society. Subsequently, the "liberal" government of 
Fethi Bey resigned as a result of growing opposition within the ranks of the ruling RPP 
and ismet inonu formed a new government. 39 
inonu's new government imposed the Law of Maintenance of Order. This was 
the last round of political confrontation between the Republicans and Progressives. 
Although the Progressives did not reject the government's willingness to impose 
martial law, they opposed the powers given to the Independence Tribunals. The new 
36 T um;m. TiirkiYe. Jc T ek Parti Yonetiminin Knrulmas1 ! 1923- 19 3 I). pp. 370-81. 
37 Frederick Frey, 'IlteTurkish Political Elite (Cambridge. MA: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 325-6. 
38 Ziirkcher. Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic, pp. 80-93. 
39 Tun~y, TUrkh·e·de Tek Parti Yonetiminin Kurulmas1. (1923- 1931), p.138. 
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law enforced the Tribunals to carry out death sentences without the consent of the 
Assembly. The g~>Vernment, referring the new law, closed down the spokesmen of the 
opposition in the istanbul press and started to exert pressure on the opposition party, 
accusing it of being involved in some reactionary incidents. Most branches of the party 
were closed down by the Independence Tribunals and the government on June 3, 1925 
enforced a decree ordering the closure of PRP. -«J 
Closure of the PRP marked the end of the first organized opposition against the 
Kemalist Republic. The Law on Maintenance of Order became a means of dissolving 
all kinds of opposition to the Kemalist Republic. The izmir Assassination - attempt on 
Mustafa Kemal - planned by Hur~it Bey, a member of Second Group and his 
supporters in 1926, raised the possibility of further smashing the opposition mainly by 
the former members ihe Union and Progress Party, Progressives, supported by 
reactionary Islamists. It was a turning-point for the Kemalist ruling elites since a more 
I 
homogeneous elite structure was maintained and further steps were taken to establish 
the one-party rule of the RPP. 
Consolidation of the Republican Rule: From Revolutionary Turbulence to the 
"Liberal" Free Party Episode 
Between 1923 and 1935, the RPP initiated its radical political, cultural, legal reforms 
and consolidated its single party rule in the country. By 1927, Kemalists gained a 
complete control of the Assembly and the government. The radical modernization 
[read westernization] program of the RPP that had begun subsequent to the elimination 
of organized oppositions was further been deepened and changed the tempo of daily 
life. The new radicalism symbolized the direct rule of modernist-secularists who viewed 
the nation-state as the motor of social change and the core of the polity. 
The party held its first convention on October 15, 1927. In this convention 
Mustafa Kemal had his famous speech, which was the first original Kemalist 
interpretation of the War of Independence, Ottoman Period and the politics of the early 
Republican period. Basic ideals, concepts and principles, which had been shaped and in 
40 See Kemal Karpat, --Republican People's Party 1923-1945," in Political Parties in Turkey, Heper and Landau 
eds., pp. 42-65. 
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tum enabled the Kemalists to manipulate the War of Independence, were elucidated in 
his speech. However, it is too early to talk about a well-structured Kemalist stand of politics 
in the 1920s. Still, the Republican People's Party in its Congress held in 1927 incorporated 
these concepts and ideals into its Regulations. Those concepts that had been adopted in 
Regulations to characterize the RPP as a republican, populist and nationalist political 
association also hinted about the nature of the new regime which would be consolidated. 41 
Until the 1930s, politics was dominated by the RPP, which further identified 
itself with the state. The party, as we noted beforehand, had enforced a series of radical 
reforms to ensure its westernization program. Yet, politically speaking. up until the 
early 1930s, neither the party nor its devoted intellectuals attempted to formulate a 
coherent systematic Republican ideology of social and political modernization. 
Although, the Kemalist objectives were designed to ensure reform and progress in the 
1927 Congress, a coherent program to achieve this end had not been formulated yet. 
Nevertheless, the will of the Mustafa Kemal and his charismatic authority shaped the 
objectives and means of revolutionary change. 42 
The Free Republican Party Episode 
On August 12, 1930, by the encouragement of Mustafa Kemal, the Free Republican 
Party (FRP) was founded by close friends, including Fethi Okyar, Nuri Conker and a 
Turkist 'liberal' figure, Ahmet Agaoglu. Agaoglu had also close relations with the 
"traditionalist" Baltac1oglu, who acted as the chairman of the istanbul branch of the 
party. The newly founded party's function has been delineated as to act as" ... an 
organization for securing the necessary government and societal integration ... ,"43 and 
as a check system of the implementation of governmental policies. 44 The party's basic 
41 Hikmet Bila, Sosval Demokrat Sllrec kinde CHP ve Sonrast (The RPP in the Social Democratic Process and 
Afterwards)(istanbul: Milliyet Yaymlart, 1987), pp. 69-72 . 
. e For Atatiirk's role in the moderni?.ation of Turkey, see Andrew Mango, .. Kemal Atatllrk: Father of the Turks." 
Turkish Review Quarterlv Digest. IV ( 1990), pp. 5-1; Rostow, .. AtatUrk as Founder of a State," pp. 793-828. For 
further information on early Republican era, see Salahi R. Sonyel, Atatork: The Founder of Modem Turkey, 
(Ankara: Tilrk Tarih Kurumu, 1989). Also Walter F. Weiker, "Atatork as a National Symbol," Turkish Studies 
Association Bulletin. VI ( 1982 ), pp. 1-6~ Muhammad, ·'Mustafa Kemal Atatork: Revolutionary par Excellence," 
~- 505-14. Geoffrey L. Le\\is, AtatUrk and His Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). 
4 Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Militarv Bureaucrats in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1977), p. 23; Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, p. 304. 
44 Trimberger, idem. Also see Frey, ibid,p. 304. 
74 
difference from the statist orientations of RPP in the 1930s was its liberal stand in 
economic policies. Private initiative was assumed to be the motor of national 
development and the state's economic interests were limited to undertake those 
economic activities which would not be realized by private initiative. The new party's 
so-called liberalism was within the confines of the principles set in the izmir Economic 
Congress in I 9'.23. 45 Kemal Karpat has characterized the politics in the early 
Republican era as " ... piecemeal combination of statism, liberalism and nationalism ... "46 
The state would promote industrialization and social prosperity, and thus would 
drastically challenge the traditional social, political and economic hierarchies of the 
society and would ultimately tum it to a self-sufficient unit. 47 
Municipal elections in the 1930s became a turning point in the history of the 
party. Swift opposition was raised against the party within the ranks of the RPP since 
the FRP was perceived to be a group of reactionaries, supported by Islamist opponents 
of the Regime who were willing to tum the Revolutionary order to a state of 
anarchy.48 Consequently, the party dissolved itself on November 17, 1930.49 Yet, the 
party has a special place in Turkish political life, because of its political and 
philosophical orientations, which were essentially provided by Turkist-oriented 
Agaoglu, the prominent "individualist" of the Republican era, who, as already 
mentioned, had close relations with "traditionalist" Baltactoglu, and "conservative" 
Safa, as well as other members of the traditionalist-conservative circle, with whom he 
shared common political and philosophical aspirations by the mid-l 930s which were 
first publicized by the appearance of Safa-initiated journal, Kultiir Haftas1. 50 
45 A Giindilz Okitiin ed., Tiirkive iktisat Kongresi 1923-lzmir: Haberler-Belgeler-Yorumlar (The Tlllkish 
Economic Congress 1923 - Izmir: News - Docwnents - Comments) (Ankara: Ankara Oniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler 
Fakiiltesi Yaymlan, 1981 ), pp. 257-66. 
46 Karpat, Turkey's Politics: ll1e Transition to Multi-Partv System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1959), p. 84. 
47 Ibid., pp. 85, 86-7. <;etin Yt:tkin, Serbest Cwnhurivet F1rkas1 Olayt (The Case of Free Republican Party) 
<istanbul: Karacan Yavmlan, 1982 ). 
48 . 
Agaoglu. Serbest Firka Hatnnlan, p. 48. 
49 Ibid .. pp. 69-123, 171-6, 216-7. See also Alunet Hamdi B~, Atatiirk'le Oc Ay ve 1930'dan Sonra Tiirkiye 
<Three Months withAtatiirk and Turkt:y After 1930) (Ankara: A.I.TI.A Basunevi, 1981), pp. 27-36. 
5° For tUrther elaboration on the significance of Free Republican Party, see Simten Co~. State and Intellectual 
in Turkey: From Liberal Ethos to the M\1h of Democracy, Ph.D. thesis in progress, (Ankara: Bilkent University). 
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The 1931 Congress of the RPP: From Charismatic Revo/utionarism to Dodrinaire 
Authoritarianism 
The 1931 Convention, which had been held a year later after the foundation of the 
FRP in 1930, was a turning point for the development of Kemalist ideology. The 
revolutionary era ended by the beginning of the 1930s. The party aimed to consolidate 
its radical reforms. In order to safeguard the support of the populace, it tended to 
recruit a new stratum of intellectuals to popularize its revolutionary program. Starting 
by 1930s, new intellectual sources were mobilized to formulate new vistas for its 
revolutionary program and to diffuse it among the larger segments of society. It was 
not accidental that the "traditionalist" journal of ismail Hakk1 Baltac1oglu, Yeni Adam, 
together with Kultur Haftas1, where the traditionalist-conservative figures who 
gathered around to counter the revolutionary Kemalism of the Kadro circle, were 
appeared in this period. The 1931 Congress registered that the Party was in search of a 
new doctrine of history, language and revolution and various intellectual groupings, 
including the traditionalist conservatives, started to respond to this. Seen from this 
perspective, the establishment of Turkish Language Association, Turkish History 
Association and People's Houses was not accidental. 51 Moreover, the University 
Reform in 1933 also showed Kemalist willingness to use the universities as institutions 
which would contribute to the formulation of a new Kemalism. As we will elaborate 
later, these first attempts of systemization of Kemalism through intellectuals, which 
resulted in the emergence of the Kadro movement, became a stimulus for the 
refinement of the nouveaux "traditionalist," and "conservative" ideals. 
In the 193 l Congress. the Party adopted a program where Kemalist principles 
had further been elaborated. The Party adopted the Six arrows as its emblem and these 
six principles were incorporated into the party program and into the constitution of the 
Republic. 52 After the dissolution of the "liberal" FRP, adaptation of etatism was one of 
the important outcomes of the 1931 Congress since it publicly announced state 
51 Lewis. ·'History-Making and National Revival in Turkey," pp. 218-86. 
52 ilhan Tekeli, Selim llkin, 1929 Dilnm Buhramnda Tiirkiye'nin iktisadi Politika Arav1slan (Turkey's Searches 
for Econolnic Policy During the 1929 World Depression), 2nd ed. (Ankara: ODTIJ ldari Bilimler Fakiiltesi 
Yaymlan,1983), p. 204. 
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dominance in economics as well as in social affairs. 53 It meant that state would 
promote industrial development and economic policies would be implemented through 
these lines. 54 This principle and the role attributed to the state in regulating the 
economy were one of the legitimate conflict-generating issues between the statists of 
the RPP and the so-called liberals of the FRP in the early 1930s. Yet, it was a question 
of political strategy more than a model of a new economic organization since both of 
them, i.e. bureaucratic cadres and the so-called liberals shared a capitalism-centered 
world view where the private property and individual initiative were the pillars of 
economic organization. There was only a varying emphasis on state's role in the 
economy but not of the questioning of the right to private property. 55 
The 1935 Congress of the RPP 
"Kemalism" as a prescriptive policy framework of the Party was adopted in the 193 5 
Congress. It was in this Congress that Kemalism, as a corpus of the principles, 
concepts and ideals, was incorporated into the Party Program and gained an official 
recognition. The RPP was seeking to maintain an ideological coherence through well-
defined principles and appreciated norms and values that would also serve to identify 
the legitimate and/or illegitimate actors of the political game in the succeeding decades. 
Insiders and outsiders of the political game in the 1930s and 1940s were delineated in 
reference to their closeness or distance from these principles, ideals and concepts. The 
Kemalist rulers seemed to be confident that they· were the builders of a "new country" 
and a "new society."56 They tended to see the RPP and its official Kemalist principles 
as the guidelines which would shape the future of this new society. The Kemalist rulers 
53 By the mid- I 920s, a series of laws were passed to encourage the private enterprise. i~ Bankasi and Sanayi ve 
Maden Bankasi were established to support the newly emerging entrepreneurs of the regime. However, by 1930 
onwards the government abondoned its former ·liberal' policies \\foch aimed to raise direct support to private 
enterprise. 
54 A Five Year Plan aiming at increasing the production of consumer goods was launched in 1932. In 1937 a 
Three Years Plan was also launched to support heavv industries. See 11han tekeli, Selim tlkin. Uvgulamava 
Qecerken Tiirkiye'de DevletciliW Olusumu (Formation of Etatism in Turkey During its hnplementational 
Stage), vol. 3 (Ankara: Ortadogu Teknik Oniversitesi, 1982), pp. 97-106, 134-208. For 1931 For the newly 
emerging liberal cleavage within the ranks of the Republican People's Party, see Bila, Sosyal Demokrat Siirec 
ki.n<le CHP ve Sonras1, pp. 75-90. 
~~ . 
-- Atet Inan. A Histon· of the Turkish Revolution and Turkish Republic. trans. by Ahmet E Uysal (Ankara: Pars 
Matbaas1, 1981 ), p. 166. 
56 CHP 06r<lilncil Bilyuk Kurultaymda Gene! Baskan Mustafa Kemal Atatilrk'iln Soylevi (Chairman Mustafa 
Kemal Atattl.rk's Speech Delivered at the 4th Grand Congress of the RPP) (Ankara: Ulus Baslmevi, 1935), P- 3. 
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were now willing to further deepen the Revolution and to tum it to be a cause of a 
cultural reformation. In order to tum the political revolution to a cultural revolution, 
Kemalists had already established new social institutions, such as the People's Houses, 
(Halk Evleri) in 1932. 57 As noted by Karpat, Kemalists tended to use these social 
institutions" to broaden the base of support to the Regime and to mobilize the masses 
for the realization of the political and cultural ideals of the Revolution. "58 Recep Peker, 
the head of hard-liner Republicans, who were responsible for the formulation of a 
bureaucratic and authoritarian conception of Kemalism, had started to enjoy further 
authority in the Party. 59 Besides those ideological shifts, new measures were also taken 
to further consolidate party's control over the state.60 
From 1936 onwards, until his death in 1938, Atatiirk tried to neutralize the 
tough-liners in the Party. inonii, who was not affiliated to the authoritarian Republican 
clique, but known for his bureaucratic patterns of government that had been identified 
with etatism, was replaced by Celal Bayar, an economist committed to 'liberal' 
economic policies. 61 Despite his two years of political isolation, following the death of 
Atatiirk in 1938, ismet inonii was elected as the President of the Republic. In the 
extraordinary Congress of the Party held in 193 8 he was nominated as the life-long 
Chairman of the RPP and the National Chief era started in Turkish politics. 
The Turkish revolution was an amalgam of ideas historically inherited from the 
Ottoman past and concurrently developed in the Revolutionary era. One of the basic 
aims of the Revolution was to create a new civic order based on the idea of citizenship 
of the nation state. What the early Republican Regime sought was to institutionalize a 
kind of disciplined freedom. This demanded the establishment and consolidation of 
new institutions and values that would generate new bonds of loyalties to the new 
57 Karpat, "The People· s Houses in Turkey: Establishment and Growth," Middle East Journal. XVII ( l 963 ), pp. 
55...()7. See also Yusuf Sannay, TOrk Milliyetciliginin Tarihi Gelisirni ve TOrk Ocaklan 1912-1931 (Historical 
Development ofTurkish Nationalism and the Turkish Hearths 1912 -1931) (1stanbul: Otiiken Yaymlan, 1994). 
~8 
· See Karpat, '"Republican People's Party.'' pp. 42...()5. 
59 See Recep Peker, Inktlap Dersleri (Lessons on the Revolution) (lstanbul tleti~im Yaymevi, 1984 [1935 )). 
60 Karpat ""Republican People's Party," pp. 42-65. 
61 Korkut Boratav, TOrkiye'de Devlctcilik (Etatism in Turkey) (1stanbul: Ger~k Yaymevi, 1974), p.148. 
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secular symbols of the nation state. With the reign of inonu in 193 8, after the death of 
Atarurk, the RPP tried to implement reforms and to further consolidate a Republican 
system through a vision of modernization imposed from above and supplemented with 
an optimism for the future of the newly founded state. 
Theorizing on Kemalism: Revolutionary Principles 
Republican governments initiated many great changes m the political, cultural and 
economic fields. 62 A modem nation-state with its secular political and cultural 
institutions was established on the basis of a capitalist economy. The modem state 
stimulated industrialization and put its basic policy objective as the maintenance of 
social prosperity. A new political system was initiated and modem political institutions, 
secular symbols, values and norms were consolidated. In social and cultural spheres, 
the former religious-community structure of the Ottoman system was further 
transformed from religious Weltanshauung to a secular cosmology shaped by the 
cultural traditions of the new self-sufficient unit, namely the nation. 63 Secularism and 
nationalism were the two principles which reflected its revolutionary spirit. 64 Thus, 
after the National War of Independence, Turks, as late comers in nationalism, rejected 
the legacy of Ottoman-Islamic state, and founded a new modem secular national state. 
Though radical revolutionaries may favour a rupture in history, at least at the level of 
social and cultural practices and traditions there is a continuity in history. Thus, despite 
these radical Kemalist claims of rupture from a corrupted past, the Ottoman heritage 
shaped the political and cultural assets of its Republican heir. 
62 For some pominent students of Turkish politics, K\!malist mm·cment had its roots in a process that lasted for 
centuries and resulted from a number of external and internal stimuli. For the thesis of continuity, see Ali 
Kaz.anc1gil, "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism," in Atatilrk Founder of a Modern State, Kaz.anc1gil and 
Ozbudun eds., pp. 37-8. Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington, U.K.: The Eothen Press, 
1985). 
63 Between 1923-1933, changes in the political sphere were also accompanied with changes in habits, customs 
and traditions. For the first time. artists of the new Republic began to sing jazz music in public places. Turkey 
participated in the world beauty contest in 1932. Throughout the 1930s. most favorable dance mtL<>ics were 
charleston, tango and rumba. The tenn asri, (modem), had widely been used for naming the public and private 
places. Names of shops, patisseries and butchers were like this: "Asri Bakkal(ve" (Modern Grocery), "Asri 
K.asap" (Modem Butchery), and "Asri Pastahane" (Modern Patisserie). Public toilets and baths were also named 
"Asrl He/a" (Modem WC) and "Asri Hamam" (Modern Turkish Bath). 
64 For Atatilrk's point on the question of continuity and rupture, see AtatUrk'iln SOylev ve Demecleri (The 
Speeches and Statements of Atatilrk), vol. l (Ankara: Ttirk Inktlap Tarihi Enstitusii Yaymlan, 1954) pp. 198-9. 
See also Heper, ·'Patrimonialism in the Ottoman-Turkish Public Bureaucracy," Asian and African Studies, XIlI 
( 1979), pp. 3-21. 
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9till, the Kemalist claim of historical ruprure from the past was symbolically 
represented by the rationale behind the Kemalist practices. Thus, the term Kemalism was 
denoted the revolutionary radical rationale which characterized the Republican state's 
modernization policies. With the consolidation of the Revolution by the mid of 1930s, 
Kemalism came to refer to a pattern of thought and action based on positivist aspirations 
presented itself as the remedy for cultural and political maladies caused by superstitions 
which were supposed to emanate from Islamic cosmology. Kemalist We/tanshauung 
presented itself as a counter-reaction to Islamic traditionalism and to the obscurantism of 
the religious tradition. It was thought to be a symbolic expression of the national culture 
that had to be implanted into the soil of the Ottoman-Islamic tradition. It stood for the 
progressive forces which would eliminate the backwardness of Turkish society. 
From Political to Cultural Revolution: Positivist Radicalism in Politics 
With the aim of describing the scope and specificities of societal change, many students 
of Turkish politics have pointed out the Kemalist objective to shape the traditional 
cultural practices so as to create a modem Turkey.65 Accordingly, the Kemalists aimed 
at complementing an administrative revolution with a cultural revolution. A new spirit 
being armored by the iron sword of positive sciences would transform the life and mentality 
of the people. The Kemalist Revolution aimed at encouraging the diffusion of modem life 
and rationale to the traditional religious-bound Turkish society. It was expected that legal 
revolutions would create a political and cultural :framework necessary for practicing modem 
experience. Besides the radical changes in the fields of production, law, administration, a 
new social ethics would be fostered as the behavioral framework to secure the 'existence' 
of a new republican 'citizen.' Republican laws would be a shield for the modem daily 
practices. It was the beginning of a process in which the modem nation-state's autonomy 
was guaranteed through new secular practices. The new Republican state could only 
65 Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective," The Middle East Journal. 3 
(1981), pp. 345-03; Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," in Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization. Gustave E. 
Von Grunebawn, eds. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955); Mardin, "Religion in Modern Turkey," 
International Social Science Journal, 24 (1977), pp. 279-97; Hemy E. Allen "The Outlook for Islam in Turkey," 
The Muslim World. 24 (1934), pp. 117-27. See also Paul Stirling, "Religious Change in Republican Turkey," 
The Middle East Journal, 12 (l 958), pp. 395-408; David Kushner, "Turkish Secularists and Islam," Jerusalem 
Quarterly. 38 (1986), pp. 89-106. 
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acquire its livelihood if and only if the citizens would have an existence in daily experience. 
The state had to protect its citizens, to armor them with a secular and rational outlook to 
find a solid realm for the realization of their rights and obligations. 
Serif Mardin noted that transition from the 'present society' to a 'future 
society' necessitated a 'social project' which ultimately viewed the society as a human 
artifice subject to conscious political control and manipulation.66 The Kemalists' 
utilization of the term 'modernization' synonymously with 'westernization' referred to 
the aim of achieving a society to be established in the future. 67 The idea of 'progress' 
designated a purpose in the process of 'change' experienced by the society.68 
Legitimacy and the relevance of cultural, social and political demands of the society 
were defined through their conformity and congruity with the objectives of progressive 
rationale of the revolutionary ideal. In the Kemalist revolutionary program, social 
progress ultimately implied the separation of religion from politics. Only then, the 
society would be modeled after a vision of modem scientific civilization. 
Kemalist Culturalism: Politics of Future-Oriented Radicalism 
Reactionaries to the Kemalists' design of political and social development found fertile 
ground to develop their counter arguments about the 'moral decadence' in society. 
The cause of 'decadence' for every political opposition and/or resistance was the 
intervention of extra-societal forces on the social, political and economic structure of 
the society. Indeed, the Kemalist westernization project involved the penetration of the 
state into political, cultural and economic fields. The objective of the state's extended 
tutelage over society was to convert the Ottoman-Turkish community, shaped by 
collective Islamic and institutional values, to a Turkish nation.69 Positivist scienticism 
66 Mardin, "Yenil~e Dinamiginin Temelleri ve Atatiirk," (Bases of the Dynamics of Modemiz.ation and 
Atattirk) in <;agdil§ Dilsiincenin Is1gmda Atatiirk (Atatiirk in the Light of Contemporary Thought) (istanbul: Nejat 
Ecz.ac1~1 Vakf1, 1983), pp.23-47. 
67 Macit GOkberk, ·'Aydmlaruna Felsefesi, Devrimler ve Atatiirk," (Enlightenment Philosophy, Revolutions and 
Atattirk) in <;agdas DOsiincenin Is1gmda Ataturk, pp. 281-332. 
68 Mardin, --Yenil~e Dinamiginin Temelleri ve Ataturk." p. 36. 
69 M. Saffet Engin, Kemalist Inkllabm Prensipleri (The Principles of the Kemalist Revolution), three volumes 
(istanbul: Cumhuriyet B., 1938), Sadri Ethem (Erdem), Tiirk Inkdabmm Karakteri (The Nature of the Turkish 
Revolution) (lstanbul: Devlet Matbaas1, 1933); Recep Peker, Inkllap Dersleri: Richard D. Robinson, The First 
Turkish Republic in National Development (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
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became the means for the institutionalization of the national political, cultural and 
economic structures and for the dissolution of the heterogeneous community structure, 
historically shaped by religion. 70 
S.N. Eisenstadt pointed out that the institutionalization of new national 
political, cultural and economic structures took place in a uniquely characteristic 
way. 71 Revolutionary state policies and strategies, which caused drastic changes in the 
organizational structure of the intelligentsia and the symbolic world of the society have 
rested on three principles~ namely nationalism, secularism and industrialism. Attempts 
to foster the development of a modem capitalist economy resulted in the emergence of 
a new structural differentiation and division of labour in society. The traditional 
hierarchy of the community was weakened and replaced by the hierarchies of the 
capitalist system which functioned to structure the modem social and political 
hierarchies. 72 Moreover, religious symbols of legitimation for state power had totally 
been rejected. This shift, to which Eisenstadt referred, was coupled with the removal of 
the old ruling elites -especially of the ulema - by the members of bureaucratic and 
cultural elites, including the prominent traditionalist-conservative figures. 73 
Eisenstadt had further maintained that "shifts in the principles of legitimation, 
the symbols and the boundaries of traditional community, together with a change in the 
ruling elites class, were connected with the ideological restructuring of the new center-
periphery relations towards modemity."74 Kemalism, the new scientific 
We/tanshauung of the Republic, fixed the nation-state as the cardinal component of the 
Ottoman-Turkish polity. The Kemalist state's mission to transform the religious-based 
community structure to a nation was in severe contradiction with the traditional 
70 For an assessment on positivist scienticism of the Republic, see Levent Koker, Modemlesme Kemalizm ve 
Demokrasi (Modernization, Kemalism and Democracy) (istanbul: Ileti~im Yaymlan. 1990), pp. 114-5. 
71 S.N. Eisenstadt, "The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Prespective," in Atatilrk: Founder of a Modem 
State, Kazanc1gil and Ozbudun eds., p. 135. 
72 Eisenstadt, idem. M. Esat Bo7.lrurt AtatOrk lhtilali (The AtatOrk Revolution) (istanbul: Burhaneddin 
Matbaas1, 1940). Also see Mardin Tiirkiye'de lktisadi Doso.ncenin Gelismesi (Development of the Economic 
Thought in Turkey)(Ankara: S.B.F., 1962), 
73 For the changing structure of the ruling elites see Frey, The Turkish Political Elite. 
74 Eisenstadt, "The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Prespective," pp.135~. 
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Ottoman state's mission of keeping up the status quo. Against the traditional Ottoman 
conception of power resting solely in the Palace, Kemalism institutionalized, 
homogenized and unified the power through the representative institutions of the new 
nation-state. In this respect, traditionalist-conservative ideals flourished and were 
conditioned by the imperatives for institutionalization of the nation state. Thus, 
Kemalism and the modem opposition [read traditionalist conservatism] took their 
inspirations from the same intellectual source, namely the nation-state. 
leitmotif of Kema/ist Modernism: "Scientific Nation-State" 
Some srudents of nationalism 75 have asserted that in the Dutch, English, French, Scottish, 
Portuguese, Danish, Polish cases, nations emerged before the establishment of the nation-
state. In those countries national identity set itself apart from the formation of the nation-
state. The nation-state was not established concurrently with the nation as a definite cultural 
and political entity. Thus, the specificity of the Turkish Revolution stemmed from the fact 
that the nation-state and the nation were established concomitantly. Nation, its tradition and 
its state were all designed to secure the institutional basis of Kemalist modernism. 
During the first decade of the Republic, the Kemalist state's 'subject' was only a 
legally defined subject but not a socially existent one. Thus, the task set for the Kemalist 
administration was to prevent the social alienation of its citiz.en in a Muslim community still 
bounded to the religious cosmology. 76 The legally defined subject in society was expected 
to secure the acceptance of state norms and values which were alien to the Muslim 
community. The nation-state could penetrate the institutional fabric of the society and could 
assure itself of a 'people's state' only through the existence of its citizens experiencing the 
national symbols in their daily practices. 77 Thus, the state, which belonged to the nation, 
had to manipulate the secluded creative es.5ence of the society. It had to remove all 
obstacles in its evolutionary path of development. The State had to promote the creation of 
75 Hugh-Seton Watwn, Nations and States. an lnguin· into the Origins of Nations and The Politics of 
Nationalism. (London: Methuen, 1977). See also Watson, "Milliye~ilik ve <;ok-Milletli lmparatorluklar," 
(Nationalism and Multi-National Empires) trans. by Y.T. Kurat, Belleten. 28 (l 964 ), pp. 525-42; W. Connor 
'"Nation-Building or Nation Destroying?" World Politics. 24 ( 1972), pp. 319-55. 
76 Norton E. Long, "The Citizenship: Local, State and National," Urban Affairs Quarterly. 23/1 (1987), pp. 4-14. 
77 Heper, "Atatiirk'te Devlet ~uncesi," (Idea of State in Atat\llk) CaMas Di1sUncenin Is1wda Atatiirk. pp. 
203-43. 
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a civic ideology, a prescribed set of common understanding and aspirations, sentiments and 
ideas that would re-traditionalize the society as a homogeneous nation. 
Politically, the mission to inspirit national identity functioned as the means of 
legitimation of the state fostered values. Kemalism created a disjunction between the 
hypothetical nation and the actual 'society.' The objective was to invent a 'nation' from a 
Muslim community. 78 Within this framework, the objective of creating the nation laid 
down the necessity for the state to dictate the terms of a new social contract between the 
citizen and itself The new tenns of the contract, a certified will to moderniz.ation, would 
naturally represent 'modern' political and economic cleavages and would seek to find a 
balance among the newly emerging social groups. 
Ali Kazanc1gil has pointed out that the ideas of progress, laicism, nationalism, 
solidarism and Comtian positivism, Enlightenment radicalism, French revolutionary ideals, 
revolutionary political thoughts of J.J. RollS.5eall and the nineteenth century scienticism had 
influenced the Kemalist rulers and, to a considerable extent, shaped their vision of 
modemity.79 In this respect, Kemalist westemist-modernist elites fostered the 
institutionalization of a number of alien nonns and values in a Muslim society. And for the 
first time in history, a 'westernizing elite' had found the possibility of direct and unlimited 
rule to institutionalize its own vision of modernism. 
As noted, the beginning of the 'modernization' attempts of the Ottoman state could 
be traced back to the eighteenth century. Throughout Tan.."'1mat and the following Young 
Turk periods of constitutional refonnism, structural dichotomies and dualities emerged in 
the institutional structure of the state and in the daily experiences of the Muslim community. 
New values and institutions began to live together with the old ones. The nouveaux 
conservatives of the Republic characterized the pre-Kemalist refonnation period as "the 
half-steps of half men" since the dualities were further intensified by deepening the 
78 For nation-making thesis, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Commllllities. Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London, New York: Verso, 1991). 
79 Kaz.anc1gil,"The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism," p. 37. Also see Gokberk., "Aydmlarna Felsefesi, 
Devrimler ve Atatllrk," pp. 281-332; Mardin, "Yenil~e Dinamiginin Temelleri ve Atatiirk," pp. 21-46, 
"Atatllrk ve PozitifW~ce," (AtatUrk and the Positive Thought) in Ataturk ve Cumhuriyet DOOemi Tllrkiyesi 
(Atatiirk Turkey in the Republican Era) (Istanbul: Tilrkiye Ticaret Odalan, Sanayi Odalan ve Ticaret Borsalan 
Birligi Yaymlan, 1981 ). 
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structures of modernity without eliminating the old and dead traditions and customs. 80 
Thus, the Kemalist objective of abolishing the dualities in daily life and in the instirutional 
structure of the state found strong support within the ranks of the modernist intelligentsia, 
including the traditionalist conservatives. Despite the reactions raised from the traditional 
religious strarum in society, reforms were firmly implemented. Yet, the Republican regime 
fell into the dilemma of 'repression and reaction:' by way of explanation, all opposing and 
resisting forces were called as 'reactionary forces or conservative.' 
The Kemalist Principles of the Revolution 
Kemalism defined the patterns of social change with an emphasis on secularism and 
nationalism which were grounded in a rationalist outlook. 81 Among the six principles of 
Kemalism, only secularism and nationalism had a consolidating effect during the 
institutionalization of the values and norms of the modern nation state. 82 Once the nation 
state was regarded as the highest form of social and political organization, then religion was 
deprived of its former influence on public and private life. For the ruling instirutions of the 
state, faithful citizens of the Republic had priority over the devoted Muslims. Though 
secularism implied far-reaching restrictions on religion in public life, it did not mean the 
banishment of Islam from the private life as rationalism and enlightenment implied for 
Christianity in the West.83 According to the Kemalists, Islam was essentially a 'rational 
religion' demanding no intermediary clergy but only faith, reason, and the exercise of 
virtue. 84 Yet, Islam as a normative system could not satisfy the ethical-normative dimension 
of the new citizen ethos of humanistic-rationalist premises of modernity. However, the 
Kemalists' rationalist interpretation of Islam felt short of appealing to the traditional Islamic 
80 Peyami Safa, Ttirk lnk.Ilabma Balaslar (Glances at the Turkish Revolution) (istanbul: Otuken Ne~yat A.~., 
1993 (1938]), pp. 98-102. For Safa's positive remarks on Kemalist Revolution. see Onder GQlrgfin, "Peyami 
Safa'nm Kaleminden: Atatork ve Inktlaplan," (Atatork and Revolutions: From the Pen of Peyami Safa) Edebivat 
Dfinyas1 ve Atatork (World of Literature and Atatiirk) (Ankara: AtaturkKoJ.tilr Merlcezi Yayuu, 1995), pp. 221-35. 
81 S Kil. K 1· ee i, ema ism. 
82 For an account of Six Arrows, see Taha Parla, Ttirkiye\le Siyasal Kiiltorfin Resmi Kaynaklan. Kemalist Tek 
Parti ideolojisi ve CHP'nin Alti Ok'u (Official Sources of the Political Culture in Turkey, Kemalist Single Party 
Ideology and RPP's Six Arrows), vol 3 (istanbul: Ileti~im Yaymlan, 1992). See also Tuncay, Tilrkiye'de Tek 
Parti Yonelimi'nin Kurulmas1. 1923-1931. 
83 See Pierre Gaxotte, Fransiz lhtilali Tarihi (History of the French Revolution), trans. by Semih Tiryakioglu 
(istanbul: Varhk Yaymevi, 1962). 
84 Berkes, The Develooment of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 483-503. 
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intelligentsia. 85 Despite this, the tasks of emancipating and secularizing the organization of 
the state, administration and education -previously subordinated to religious authority- were 
fully achieved. 
Secularization and nationalization of religion went hand in hand. 86 The religious 
culture which was considered to rest on Arabian and Persian foundations, was abandoned 
in favour of the humanistic essence of the national culture. In 1929, instruction in Arabic 
and Persian languages were abolished in higher schools. At the same time, the Turkish 
Linguistic Council was established for the sake of purifying the Turkish language. On 
January 22, 1932, suras from Koran, the Holy Book of Muslims, that was originally written 
in Arabic and had already been translated into Turkish, were for the first time recited from a 
Turkish translation in public prayers. All those changes, which aimed to challenge all the 
Ottoman past, were the manifestation of a great social transformation experienced in a 
relatively short time. 87 
Kemalism envisaged the nation as a political and cultural community with a 
secluded quality. 88 Quoting from Atatiirk, Afet inan defined the nation as "a social and 
political formation comprising citizens linked by the communality of language, culture and 
ideal.''89 Nationalism and the populist themes of organic society were twin brothers which 
were exploited to broaden the support raised for the new state.90 The objective of Turkish 
85 Refom and change in Islamic thought is not an issue specific to the Republican era For reformation attempts in 
Islam, see Mardin "XIX. YOZytlda ~ AkDnlan ve Osmanh Devleti" Tmmmattan Cumhurivete TUrkive 
Ansiklopedisi. vol. I ( 1985), pp. 342-5 l. For question of refonnism and Islamic philosophy, see Hilma Ziyci Olken, islam 
Felsefesi Kawak1an ve Etkileri (Origins and Impacts of the Islamic Philosophy), 4th ed. (lstanbul: Cem Yaymevi, 1993 ). 
86 See Safa, TOrk Inlalabma Bakislar. pp. 90-7. 
87 For Atatark's criticism of Ottoman Past, see Atat!lrk'fin SOylev ve Demecleri (The Speeches and Statements 
of Atatark), vol. 2 (Ankara: TUrk lnktlap Tarihi Enstiti1su Yaymlan, 1959), p. 163. 
88 For general evaluations on territorial and political nationalism, see Amatzi.a Baraw, "Territorial Nationalism 
in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Studies. 16, 4 (October, 1990), pp. 425-48. For political definition of the 
nation, Elie Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa (New York, Cleveland: The World Pub. Company, 1970). 
89 hum, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatorlc'un El Yazilan (Civil Imtructions and the Handwritings of Mustafa 
Kemal Atatorlc) (Ankara: Tilrk Tarih Kurumu, I %9), p. 18. Also see Tunaya, Turlciye'de Siya.'!al Partiler, p. 585. 
90 For populism and organic theory of society, see. G. Ionescu and E. Gellner, eds., Populism. Its Meaning and 
National Characteristics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969); tihan Tekeli and Gencay ~ylan, 
"TOrkiye'de Halkir1hk ideolojisinin Evrimi," (Evolution of the Populist Ideology in Turkey) Toplum ve Bilim. 5-6 
(Swruner -Fall), pp. 44-1 IO; Zafor Toprak, "Osmanh Devletinde lnusl~ Toplumsal Boyutu: Solidarizm," 
(Social Dimesion of Nation-Building in the Ottoman State: Solidarism) Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete TUrkiye 
Ansiklopedisi. vol.2 (1985), pp.371-81. Also see Toprak, "Halkir1hk tdeolojisinin Ol~umu," (Formation of the 
Populist Ideology) Atat!lrk DOneminin Ekonomik ve Toplwnsal Tarihi ile tlgili Sonmlar Sempozywnu 
(Symposium on Problems Related to the Economic and Social History of Atatark's Era) (lstanbul: Istanbul 
Ytlksek tktisad ve Ticaret Mektebi Memnlan Demegi Yay.1977), pp.13-38. 
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nationalism was fonnulated as to put the national interest [read public interest] before the 
interests of the individuals, and/or classes [read particular]. The new Republican regime 
aimed to provide secular bonds and solidarity within the enlightened citizen. 
Kemalist nationalism, which manifested itself as the T urkification of religion 
and language, aimed to dissolve communal religious loyalties. 91 In this respect, there 
was a close relationship between nationalism and secularism. Besides these, populism 
which meant that the strength and sovereignty of the state were derived from the 
people, defined as an undifferentiated entity, served as a new kind of legitimation for the 
Kemalist state. However, populist legitimation, which was based on the notion of the 
nation, posed that there was not a unity and/or equivalence between 'nation,' and 'society.' 
'Society' represented an archaic fonn. Then, nation emerged only when a particular human 
society realized its own authenticity and its common symbolic cultural forms. 
Republicanism was necessary if the political institutional manifestations of secularism were 
to be maintained on the political arena, like new political parties and representative 
institutions that derived their legitimacy from the nation. Etatism was originally invented as 
a means of state's control of the economic resources.92 Revolutionism, referred to the 
Kemalists' methods of implementing their vision of modernity. 
The Kemalist refonns were directed at creating a westernized man as a model 
of Republican citizen. Thus, Mustafa Kemal stated that "the goal of the revolution was 
to attain a civilized, western type social life, with all its meanings and fonns. This is the 
main principle of our refonns. "93 According to the Kemalists' civilizing mission, 
'progress' would be achieved only through the secularization of the daily life and by 
91 See Uriel Heyd, Tilrk Ulug:ulugunun Temelleri (Foundations of Turkish Nationalism), trans. by K Gilitday 
(Ankara: Kiiltilr Bakanbgi Yay1nt, 1979). See aslo Ziya Gokalp, TUrk£Ul!l@n Esaslan (The Principles of 
Turkism), 10th. ed. (1stanbul: Varbk Yaymevi, 1973), Tilrklesmek. 1slamlasma1c. Muastrlasmak (Turkification, 
Islamiz.ation and Modemiz.ation), i. Kutluk, ed. (Ankara: Devlet Kitaplan, 1976); Ercilmend Kuran, "The Impact 
of Nationalism on the Turkish Elite in the Nineteenth Century" in Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle 
East the Nineteenth Centwy. pp. 354-89. See also Mardin, Jon Tilrklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908 .(Political 
Ideas of the Young Turks 1895-1908) (istanbul: neti~im Yaymlan, 1983); Ahmad, lttihatc1bktan Kemali.zme. 
(From Unionism to Kemalism), trans. by Fatmagiil Berktay (lstanbul Kaynak Yaymlan, 1985). 
92 1smet inonu. "Firkanuzm Devletc;ilik Vasfi," (Etatist Feature of Our Party) Kadro. 22 (October, 1933) pp. 4-6. 
Z. Y. Herslag, "Atattirk's Etatism," in Atatilrk and the Modernization of Turkey. J.M. Landau, eds. (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984 ), pp.171-80. For etatist policies, see 1lhan Tekeli and Selim tlkin, Uygularnaya 
Qecerken TOrkiye'de Devletciligin Olusumu. 
93 Atat\lrk'Qn Soylev ve Demederi. vol.2, p. 217. 
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the replacement of the God-centered perspective of Islam with a secular view of Man 
and society. The state and nation attained a mystical character before the society 
which, at that moment, was separated from the modem institutions by the barrier of 
religion. Because of their self dictated mission of safeguarding the secular foundations 
of the Republic, secularism became an axis for defining dichotomies i.e. progressive 
against conservative, modem against traditional, enlightened against obscurantist and 
revolutionary against reactionary. 
Though secularism was the symbol of the Kemalist revolutionary spirit, Islam, 
especially its folk variant, remained as a significant framework of meaning in the social 
and political life of the citizen. Furthermore, as pointed out by Mardin, it had always 
been an important agent in the formation of primary group norms and values in 
Turkish society.94 As such, it especially served as an integrating agent for the 
individual in his primary relations. Therefore, Islam functioned much like any other 
religion in terms of proving meaning to human existence. 
Bernard Lewis maintained that the Kemalist ruling elites answered the question 
of "On what grounds the new national ideology would be built?" in order to 
restructure the ethical-normative system of the nation. The answer, as depicted by 
Lewis, was on science, history, and the customs of the nation. Throughout the 1930s, 
the Turkish History Thesis and Sun-Language Theory were formulated to shed light on 
the historical origins of the nation.95 As displayed by Lewis, the Turkish political 
leadership was searching for a sense of belonging for the nation and they used the 
94 Mard.in, "Religion and Politics in Modem Turkey" in Islam in the Political Process. James P. Piscaton, ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 138-59. Binnaz Sayan (Toprak), Islam and Political 
Development in Turkey (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981 ). 
95 Historians of the early Republic devoted themselves to shed light on the past experiences of the nation, see 
Afet inan, M. Tevfik, S. R.tfat, Y. Akirura, et. al., Tilrk Tarihinin Ana Hatlan. Methal KlSIIU (Basic Contours of 
Turkish History: Introduction) (lstanbul: Maarif Vekaleti Ya)UU, 1931). For debates in the First History 
Congress see, Birinci Tilrk Tarih Kongresi (The First Turkish History Congress) {tstanbul: Maarif Vekaleti 
Yayllll, 1932); Also see inan, Tarih Ozerine inccleme ve Makaleler (Research and Articles on History) (Ankara: 
Akm Matbaast, 1%0), Tilrk Halktrun Antropolojik Karakteri ve Tilrkiye Tarihi (The Antropological 
Characteristic of the Turkish People and Turkey's History) (Ankara:TTK Basunevi, 1947), "Atatilrk ve Tarih 
Tezi," (Atatilrk and the History Thesis) Belleten. III, 10 (1939), pp. 243-46; Ahmed Cevad Emre, Atatilrk'iin 
Inla.Jap Hedefi ve Tork Tarih Tt!'Zi (Revolutionary Goal of Atatilrk and the Turkish History Thesis) (lstanbul: 
Ekin Baslillevi, 1956). ~emsettin GOnaltay, H.R~it Tankut, Dil ve Tarih Tezlerimiz O:zerine Gerekli B8Z1 !zahlar 
(Some Necessary Explanations on Our Language and History Theses) (lstanbul: Devlet Basunevi, 1938). See 
also J.R. Perry, "Language Reform in Turkey and Iran," International Journal Of Middle East Studies, 17 ( 1985), 
pp. 295-311. 
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historians and their craft as an instrument of the national government. 96 A detailed 
analysis of those history studies would show that the Turkish nation was established at 
four levels of action: first, through the creation of a historic territory; second, of 
common myths and a common past for maintaining the tradition of the newly 
established nation; third, a common citizen ethics; fourth, the common economy on the 
territorial mobility of the nation. Then, history became the most correct guide to 
understand the talents and capabilities of the nation. It served as a hypothetical 
criterion for delineating the dead tradition from the living national tradition. History 
laid down the premises of a historical synthesis between a rational, modem and 
scientific approach and the national tradition. 
Science: The Sword of the Revolution over Society 
The terms science and scientific spirit were employed by Kemalism to refer to ultimate 
policy criteria of the administrative practices.97 Accordingly, science with its ultimate 
values employed for the revolutionary spirit, would bring an end to the dichotomies 
still surviving in society and in the minds of the people. Science had to be in the service 
of the revolutionary spirit in its search for the particular qualities of the nation. Science 
also laid down the ultimate truths about man and society. 
In Kemalist perspective, reason and science were the only means of bringing 
the nation to the level of contemporary civilization. As revealed by Mustafa Kemal in 
stating the famous motto of the Revolution, 
the surest guide is science. To use the reason in all matters without being chained to old-
fashioned ways ... To subject everything to close and critical scrutiny. carried out rationally 
and consciously in the light of the positive sciences. 98 
The Turkish revolution marked the state's deliberate attempts to achieve a rich 
synthesis between the authentic Turkish culture and western civilization. Contrary to 
the preceding reform movements, Kemalists were convinced that the true essence of 
the western civilization was science and the scientific spirit. The universality of 
scientific rationale could save the revolution from becoming a static model. Thus, the 
96 See Lewis," History-Writing and National Revival in Turkey," pp. 218-24. 
97 Atatlli"k'iln SOylev ve Demecleri. vol.2, p.197. 
98 Idem. 
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universality of revolutionary principles would be secured by the universality of the 
scientific rationale. 
The distinguishing social characteristic of contemporary civilization was not 
adherence to one religion or another; but it was the freedom of thought, the 
importance given to the individual and to human reason, scientific and technological 
progress and the rule oflaw. For the Ottoman rulers and for the Republican elite 'modem' 
signified the West. The West meant 'technology', 'science' and 'progress' for the 
Republicans. In his speech to the teachers of Bursa on 27 October 1922 Atati.irk stated that 
we shall live as an advanced and civilized nation in the midst of contemporary 
civilization. And this can only be achieved through knowledge and technology. We shall 
take technology and knowledge from wherever they may be. and shall place them into the 
heads of each individual in this nation. For knowledge and technology, there is no 
solution. 99 
Kemalism gave a new understanding and meamng to the emergence of modem 
institutions; to new technology, to education, to ethics as well as to the new faith and 
work-life. It gave a new public meaning to the unique cultural products of the nation. 
The rationale of the modem scientific civilization was an absolute model, and as such, 
had to be implanted to the traditional Islamic society. 
Kemalist consciousness corresponded to a new society which had to be 
planned systematically on scientific premises which guided the general lines of 
evolution and societal change. 'Change' would, first of all, be secured by selection and 
by curing the 'pathologies' in society which formed obstacles to the goal of 'catching 
up with contemporary civilization.' Mustafa Kemal stated this point as such 
Do you know the secret of our victory against the enemies who despoiled the most well-
tended. pleasant and beautiful parts of our country for three and one-half years? The 
secret lay in the fact that our armies were led by scientific principles ... Yes. in the political 
and social life as well as in the intellectual development of our people science and 
learning shall be our leader..... The point we have reached today is not the real 
liberation... Real liberation will be achieved through the diagnosis and cure of the disease 
which afflicts society. lf the treatment is carried out scientifically, the -patient will 
survive. Otherwise the disease will become chronic and treatment rendered impossible. 
If ideas are permeated with meaningless. illogical nonsense, those ideas are sick ideas. 
Similarly, if social life is permeated with a mass of irrational, illogical. dangerous beliefs 
and customs. a society will be paralyzed. Virtuousness, good intentions and self-sacrifice 
are unquestionable characteristics of the utmost necessity to those who want to save our 
land and its people. However. these qualities are not sufficient to enable one to diagnose 
99 AtatilJ"k"iln Soylevleri (The Speeches of Atatiirk) (Ankara: Tilrk Dil Kurumu, I %8), p. 87. 
and treat the disease of a society. thereby allowing that society to advance in accordance 
with the demands of the century. Alongside of these qualities. science and learning are 
100 
necessary ... 
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Kemalism referred to a new understanding of the organizing power of reason over the 
traditional society. Moreover, Kemalism introduced a national conception of ethics in 
building up a new society consciously and deliberately. Secularization and 
nationalization of tradition and Islam and the institutionalization of the 'modem' 
introduced a new conception of ethics, which was closely related to the questions of 
'autonomy of the individual' and 'liberation from' the social restrictions of the Islamic 
tradition. As stated by Mustafa Kemal, 
Just as our people are obliged to fight with their weapons. so must they fight with their 
minds. I have no doubt whatsoever that they will show the same strength in the latter 
struggle that they have shown in the former. Our people have a pure moral character and 
b'l' 101 great a 11ty. 
Accordingly, ethics belonged to the nation and the state would act as the sole creator 
of the nation. This national conception of ethics was employed to safeguard the belief 
in the superiority of the state over the individual, since individuality was conceived to 
be determined by national culture which would be revived by the modernizer state. The 
newly fostered national citizen ethics fulfilled an intrinsic integrative function for the 
'individual' in his relations with modem political institutions. When the state was 
organized along scientific-technical lines, then the mind and conscience of the people 
could be cleared of old-fashioned convictions. 102 
The most manifest form of homogenization of the society was the socialization 
of the members as 'citizens.' The Kemalists tried to realize this deal through 
compulsory, standardized public education. 103 The state, armored with scientific 
rationale, aimed to inject a peculiar homogeneous national culture through reforms in 
the educational sphere. Cultural authenticity and unity were the basic themes of 
national homogenization. The development of the new societal ethics in accordance 
100 Atatiirk'iin Sovlev ve Demecleri, vol.2, pp. 42-4. 
lOl Ibid., p. 18 
102 Ibid .. p. 1 81. 
103 See Tekeli, Toplumsal DonOstim ve Egitim Tanhi Ozerine Konusmalar (Discources on Social 
Transfonnation and the History of Education) (Ankara: Mirnarlar Od.as1Yaymlan, 1980). See also Cavit 
Binb~mglu, Egitim Dtistincesi Tarihi (History of the Educational Thought) (Ankara: Kachoglu Matbaas1, 1982), 
pp. 140-174. 
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with the development of a humanist perspective was another feature of the Turkish 
revolution. 
In this respect, the Kemalist state fulfilled the functions of what Anthony Smith 
called a "scientific state. " 10°' The Kemalist "scientific state" as the sole carrier of the 
scientific rationale represented a new kind of relationship between the state and society. 
The tendency to employ the bureaucratic instrument of the state to homogenize the 
population at the same time implied the diffusion of the state's technical instrumentality 
to society. Besides the objective of eradicating ignorance and superstition, the state 
made efforts to educate the people and to unify them around the modem national 
terms of identity. 
Based on a modem-secular law, unified under a centralized government, tying 
the diverse religious groups into a firm solidarity unit called the nation, and having 
absolute sovereignty over the territory through its representative institutions, the 
Kemalist state represented the rational mode of conducting public affairs. The 
intervention of the scientific state on society had profound effects on the legitimacy of 
the Islamic Weltanshauung. The society experienced a 'problem of meaning' which 
was firstly and mostly felt by the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals. The religious 
idea of a divine cosmos over Man that explained and justified the experiences in daily 
existence was undermined by the Kemalist revolutionary practices. During the 
revolutionary era, a new vision of the total Order of universe was re-built In this 
process the Kemalist ruling elites had mobilized a variety of groups, including the 
traditionalist conservatives. At the first instance, the nouveaux traditionalist 
conservatism was a response to the identity crisis felt at the historical moment of the 
consolidation of the nation state, its political and cultural institutions. In this respect, 
the nouveaux traditionalist conservatives of the Republic set themselves the goal of 
being the moral innovators of the nation in the age of modernity. 105 
104 See Anthony Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983), pp. 231-45. 
105 See Safa, ''Program,"(The Program) TOrk POsUncesi. 1,1(December1, 1953), pp. 1-3. 
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CHAPTERJ 
TOWARDS A TOPOGRAPHY OF TRADITIONALIST CONSERVATISM 
.4 New Line of Elite Fragmentation: The Question of Traditionalist Consen,atism 
in the Early Republican Era 
Widening of the gap among traditionalist conservatism, liberalism(s), Kemalism(s), 
Islamic reactionism(s) and/or Islamic modernism in the late 19'.!0s and early 1930s and 
conservatism's subsequent course of intellectual development as a recognizable 
political and philosophical stand were due to its modernist impetus which paradoxically 
derived from its pre-Republican Bergsonian convictions. In the heyday of the 
revolutionary era, traditionalist-conservative ideals and perspective were articulated 
through loose intellectual groupings formed on a temporary basis against Islamic 
reactionism/modernism, liberalism( s) and positivist Kemalism of the 1930s. Yet, 
intellectual groupings among the traditionalist, conservative and Bergsonian 
intellectuals in the 1930s were not always clear and definite. Politically speaking, there 
were 'liberals,' 'Islamists,' 'racist-nationalists,' 'socialists', 'Marxists,' and those who 
were accused of being "the servants of the former Ottoman regime,' but not definitely 
a well organized 'traditionalist-conservative circle.' Still, 'traditionalist' and/or 
'conservative' ideals and aspirations essentially appeared in the works of ismail Haklo 
Baltac1oglu and Peyami Safa These appeared in reference to the Bergsonian 
philosophical philosophy advocated by Mustafa Sekip Tun9. Tunr; was also responsible 
for grounding the common philosophical aspirations of Ahmet Agaoglu' s so-called 
"liberalism," Baltac1oglu's "traditionalism," Safa's "conservatism."1 Dlken's 
"Anatolism," which revealed itself as a culturalist perspective, shared the same anti-
1 Mustafa ~ekip Tun~ made positive comments on Peyami Safa's well-known book Turk Devrimine Bakz#ar. 
(Glances at the Turkish Revolution). lsmail Hakkt Baltac10glu and Safa were well-known nationalist figures. 
Despite nuances, various articles of Safa appeared in Baltac10glu's journal, Yeni Adam. For Baltac1oglu·s 
positive remarks on Safa's return to the journal, Kultur Haftasi see, "Peyami Safa" Yeni Adam. 108 (January 23, 
1936), p.3. For Baltac1oglu's favorable comments on Safa's conception of novel. see Baltac1ogl.u, ''Mllrteci 
Roman," (Reactionary Novel) Yeni Adam. 175 tMay 6, 1937), p.3. For Safa's point on the mission set for 
Baltac1oglu's Yeni Adam, see Safa, "tsmail Hakkt Baltac1oglu ve Gaz.etesi," (lsmail HakkI Baltac1oglu and His 
Daily) Yeni Adam. 315 (January 9, 1941 ), p. 6. 
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scienticist, anti-intellectualist philosophical aspirations with the above mentioned group 
of intellectuals with an heavy emphasis on the necessity to formulate a new secular 
metaphysics which would be derived from the Turkish experience of mysticism.'.! The 
realist political philosophy was also a common point of orientation. 3 Loose intellectual 
groupings gained a visible political aspect on issue-based politics in the Reform period 
especially on the questions of Turkification of language and religion, and on the new 
functions attributed to the new cultural and political institutions of the Republic. 
Bernard Lewis argued that historiography of Kemalism since the 1930s has 
generally reflected changing emphasis in the research and writing of Turkish history. 4 In 
this respect, historians of the Republic emphasized Kemalism's nation-state building 
features and its contribution to the emergence of the Turkish nation as a cultural entity. 
By the 1930s, reactionary Islamists and/or any other intellectual -political groupings, 
which anyhow referred to the old religious cosmology as a legitimacy framework for 
political and social action, had been neutralized, if not totally routed. New elite 
cleavages within the ruling Kemalist coalition have also begun to emerge. Tough-liner 
authoritarian Republicanism, which stood for radicalism and centralism in politics, was 
countered by soft-liner Republicanism which emphasized de-centralization, private 
initiative and evolutionism. Still and all, conflict and tensions in politics mainly 
originated from and were characterized by elite competition between tough and soft 
liner Republicans . 
.., 
- See Olken, Yirminci Asrr Filozoflan (The Twentieth Century Philosophers) (lstanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1936), 
pp. V-VIII. See also thken, Ask Ahlakt (Piety Ethics) (lstanbul Ekpress Matbaast, 1931), Tiirk Tefekkiir Tarihi 
(History of Turkish Thought), 1 volwnes (lstanbul: Ebil'z Ziya Matbaast, 1932; 1933), TUrk Mistizminin 
Tetkikine Giris (Introduction to the Study ofTurkish Mysticism) (lstanbul: Alcyun Matbaast, 1935). 
3 For Baltac10glu's short note on realism see, Baltactoglu, "Ni~in Realistim." (Why I am Realist?) Yeni Adam. 
76 dune 13, 1935), p. 3. Baltac1oglu characterized the Republican era as a Realist era. See Baltac1oglu, '"Koy, 
Egitmen ve Ogretmenleri," (Village, Instructor and Teachers) Yeni Adam. 240 (Augw.1 3, 1939), pp. 16-7. For 
Tun~·s remarks on Safa's positive realism, see Tuni,;, "Peyami Safa ve Tork Inkdabma Bakt~lar," (Peyami Safa 
and Glances at the Turkish Revolution) TUrk Inktlabma Baktslar (lstanbul Otuken Yaymlan, 1990 [1938)), p. 
16. For Ulken's "critical realism," see thken, Yirminci Asrr Filozoflan. p. VI. For Tun~·s stand on realism, see 
Tun~. ''BugilnkU Hayatmuzm Akt~lan," (The Flows of Our Life Today) Hayat. l,136 (July 19:29) in Atatilrk 
De'1i Fikir Hayatt I (Intellectual Life in Atatilrk's Era I), Melunet Kaplan, lnci Enginfin et. al., eds., (Ankara: 
Kultilr Bakanhgi Yaymlan, 1992), pp. 331-4. 
4 Bernard Lewis, ''History-Writing and National Revival in Turkey;' Middle Eastern Studies. IV (1953), pp. 218-86. 
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Deepening elite fragmentation within the Kemalist coalition stimulated the 
circulation of various interpretations of Kemalism. In the 1920s, consequences of 
transition from the religious Weltanshauung to the secular one and dissolution of the 
traditional political and social institutions of the Ottoman regime had occupied a 
central place in the political and intellectual agenda of the intellectual. However, the 
1930s was a decade of competition among intellectuals to formulate a legitimate 
understanding of Kemalism. Within this context, the years 1932 and 1933, - the 
publication of the journal Kadro. by a group of ex-Marxist intellectuals in 1932, and 
the University Reform of 1933 - continued to be turning points for the rise of a 
traditionalist-conservative resistance . against the materialist, positivist outlook of the 
Republic and its imitative westernization models. The first signs of this resistance can 
be traced to traditionalist-conservative activities in the Turkish Philosophy and 
Sociology Association in 1927, which had been revived and renamed the Turkish 
Philosophy Association by Olken in 1931. 
The rise of a traditionalist-conservative challenge against the materialist-
scienticist basis of the Kemalist state was associated, first, with the changing functions 
of the Kemalist state in society's transformation from the Islamic-framed 
Weltanshauung to a secular modern one. Secondly, it was associated with the changes 
in elite composition within the ruling Kemalist coalition. Still, the "traditionalism" of 
Baltac1oglu or "conservatism" of Safa or "Bergsonism" of Tun~, as well as the 
"culturalism" of Olken or "personalism" of Agaoglu, had never modeled their 
opposition on an intensive critique of the Kemalist paradigm. 5 However, they had 
~ 
· See Baltac1oglu, "Nii,:in Gazete <;ikanyorum," (Why I am Publishing Daily?) Yeni Adam. l (January l, 1934), 
p.I, ''Inlalabm Mektebi" (The School of the Revolution) Yeni Adam. 7 (February 12, 1934), p. 5, "Inktlab 
Edebiyatl Ne OlabilirT (What Can the Literature of the Revolution Be?) Yeni Adam. 6 (February 5, 1934), p. 7, 
"Atatilrk Ne Demektir,'' (What Does Atatilrk Mean?) Yeni Adam. 96 (October 31, 1935), p.3, "'Mllrteci 
Kimdir?" (Who is Reactionary?) Yeni Adam. 97 (November 7, 1935). p.3, ''Milrteci hni~im!" <I was Said to Be a 
Reactionary!) Yeni Adam. 139 (August 37, 1936), p. 2, "Tiirk Inkllab1," (The Turkish Revolution) Yeni Adam 
146 (October 17, 1936), p. 3, See also Safa, ''Inlalaburuz.da CHP Frrkasmm BUytik RolU," (The Ma_jor Role of 
the RRP in Our Revolution) Cumhuriyet. (October 29, 1933), "Kemalist Inlalabm Hakiki Hedefi," (Real Target 
of the Kemalist Revolution) Cumhuriyet, (December 4, 1932), "Yilriiyen Inlalabm 1ki Merhalesi,'' (Two Stages 
of the Revolution in Progress) Cumhuriyet. November 29, 1933), ·'KilltUr Mticadelesi," (The Cultural Struggle) 
Cumhuriyet. (May 12, 1933), "Inkllabumzm ideolojisi," (The Ideology of Our Revolution) Cumhuriyet, (July 29, 
1933), "Statikten Dinamige," (From Static to Dynamic) Cumhuriyet. (July 31, 1933). 
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always been inflexible towards materialism, communism, and Islamic reactionism and 
even to Islamic modernism. Tuner's Bergsonian philosophical aspirations that had been 
exploited by Safa and Baltac1oglu prevented them from sticking to the politics of 
nostalgia to revive the ideals and values of the past since they were heavily influenced 
by the Bergsonian idea of the irreversibility of time. 6 Yet, they had always been critical 
about the deterioration of the national tradition as a result of the diffusion of the 
universalistic-abstractionist ideals of' cosmopolitanism,' 'liberalism' or 'Islamism.' The 
idea of moral regeneration of the nation invoked the spirit of creative evolution and 
provoked traditionalist-conservative attacks on the 'extremists' among the secular-
modemists and religious-reactionaries who in their view modeled the revolution on a 
positivist vision of the 'West' or who stood against the historical movement of the 
nation and tried to reverse its course of creative evolution. 7 
Except for Safa and Tune;, some traditionalist conservatives, like Baltac10glu, 
Agaoglu and Ulken, were reluctant to label themselves 'conservative' but tended to see 
their particular stands as alternative interpretations of Kemalism. As noted beforehand, 
the rise and development of traditionalist-conservative ideals and aspirations were 
strictly related to the nature of the institutionalization of the political power in the 
nation-state. It would not be so misleading to assert that traditionalist conservatism had 
originated as a unique intellectual resistance to a radical experience of modernity in a 
Muslim setting. Thus, it had had political tones highly sensitive to the changing balance 
of power between the ruling secular-modernist Republican elites. Even though 
traditionalist conservatism was based on alternative conceptions on the nature of the 
6 For Baltac1oglu's elaborations on the new world created by Kemalism, see Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat 
(Democracy and Art) (lstanbul: Sanayi-i Nefise Baslffievi, 1931 ). See also Baltac1oglu, "Laik Terbiyenin Kendini 
lstiyoruz," (We Demand the Secular Education Itselt) Yeni Adam. 68 (April 18, 1935), p. 1. For Olken's 
characterization ofBaltac1oglu's Bergsonism, see Olken, "ismail Hakkt Baltac1oglu'nun Felsefe Kitabt," (ismail 
Hakk1 Baltac1oglu's Book on Philosophy) lnsan. I, 7 (December L 1938), pp. 403-4. Articles on Bergson and his 
philosophy were frequently appeared in the journal Yeni Adam. See Lacombe "'La Psychologie Bergsoniene," 
trans. by Hatemi Senik, Y eni Adam. 4 (January 22, 1934 ), p. 5. For Safa· s characterization of Kemalism as a 
revolution which modelled itself to the lluidities and possibilities of life, see Safa, Ttlrk Inkdabma Bak1slar, pp. 
190-3. For Safa's Bergsonism, see Safa, "Bergson ve Zamamnuz," (Bergson and Our Age) Cumhuriyet. 
(September 16, 1937). 
7 s~-e Safa '"Milli Edebiyat ve Ink1lap Edcbiyati," tNational Literature and the Literature of the Revolution) 
Cumhurivet, (September 20, 1933 ). Also see Safa, Tilrk lnktlabma Baktslar, pp. 208-12. Baltac1oglu, "Milrteci 
Kimdir," p. 3. 
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modem state's legitimacy and its relations to the society, it always remained within the 
confines Kemalist practices. Emphasis made upon the primacy of national revival and 
on the new cultural history of the nation, its linguistic authenticity and the role of the 
culture in the constitution of social and political reality determined the privileged 
position of the traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia in the Kemalist power structure. 
Early Traditionalist-Conservative Texts, Themes and Stimuli for Growing 
Consciousness 
Apart from Kemalism, well-structured currents of thoughts, which would create a 
sense of self-consciousness and loyalty among the Republican intellectuals, were not 
fully articulated in the early 1930s. It was a more complicated issue if compared to the 
preceding decades since Kemalism claimed to manipulate the radical rupture from the 
Ottoman intellectual and political heritage. Besides those state manipulated attempts to 
establish 'legal political opposition(s),' political life did not involve self-motivated and 
organized political parties and powerful interest groups. Thus, in arriving at 
generalizations about the rise of traditionalist conservatism, political interactions 
among organized groups can not be taken as an indication of a well-grounded position. 
Moreover, even though they were responsible for the formulation of an alternative vision 
of modernity that had been exploited by the relevant actors of the political game in the 
1930s and by the mid-1940s, traditionalist-conservative thinkers of the 1930s, such as Tun~, 
Baltac1oglu, Safa and Ulken, except Agaoglu, did not have a significant political role. 
They were mostly well-known and influential academicians and men of letters. 
Tun~, by the 1920s onwards became well-known for his Bergsonian philosophy, 
particularly for his Bergson translations. Agaoglu, the Turkist writer of the Second 
Constitutional period of the Ottoman era, was a well-known "Turkist-liberal' politician 
of the Republican period. Baltac1oglu was famous of his 'personalist educational 
philosophy' through which he aimed to lay down the new educational standards of the 
Republic. 8 Olken was a young scholar in the 1930s, and grounded his political 
8 Baltac1oglu, ictimai Mektep Nazariyesi ve Prensipleri (The Theory of Social School and its Principles) 
(lstanbul: Tecelli Matbaas1, 1932). See also Baltac10glu, Terbiye'nin Ktvmetleri ve Vas1talan (The Values and 
Means of Education) (tzmit: Ahmet Fevzi Bas1mevi, 1933). Also Baltac1oglu, "Halk Oniversitesi, Toplu Tedris 
Ozerine," (People's University, On Mass Education) Yeni Adam. 55 (January 17, 1934), p. 16, ··tstedigimiz 
Terbiye Nedir?" (What Kind ofEducation We Demand?) Yeni Adam. 58 (February 7, 1935), p. 2, "Toplu Tedris 
Teknigi," (Technique of Mass Education) Yeni Adam. 65 (March 28, 1935), p.5. 
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commitments on an Anatolist-nationalist stand. Following the publication of his 
Umumi iftimaiyat (General Sociology) in 1931 and two volumes of Tiirk Tefekkiir 
Tarihi (History of Turkish Thought) in 1932 and 1933, he was sent to Germany to do 
research on behalf of the Ministry of Education. 9 When he returned, he was appointed 
to Darii/fiimm to teach the history of Turkish intellectual thought. He became a well-
known scholar of Turkish thought and wrote numerous books in the fields of 
philosophy, Islamic philosophy, sociology, and ethics, as well as some novels, such as 
Posta Yolu (Postal Road) and Yanm Adam (The HalfMan). 10 His monist philosophical 
aspirations slowly moved to a pluralist stand, and he adopted a humanist-moralist 
approach, which ultimately served to enrich unique conservative political and cultural 
aims. Agaoglu and Baltac1oglu also worked in the Dariilfanun until 1933. In that year 
both of them were dismissed from their posts in Darii/fanun when it was abolished and 
replaced by the Istanbul University. 11 
Among these figures only Safa did not occupy a state post. He was a famous 
man of letters. In the 1930s, he wrote numerous articles in the journals Yedi Gun, 
Yanmay, Yirminci Aszr, <;maraltz but the journal Kiiltiir Haftasz (1933-1937) became 
a symbol of resistance and common platform for Tunir, Olken and other members of 
the traditionalist-conservative circle. 12 He actively participated in the seminars held by 
the Turkish Philosophy Association in the early 1930s. He provided the first pieces of 
psychological and personalist novels through which his conservative convictions were 
articulated as a distinct style in literature. He adopted a Bergsonian-personalist 
9 Olken, Umumi ictimaiyat (General Sociology) (tstanbul: Ebil'z Ziya Matbaas1, 1931 ). 
10 Dlken, Posta Yolu (Postal Road) (istanbul: ~irket-i Mil.rettibiye Yolu, 1941), Yanm Adam (The Half Man) 
(!stanbul: ~irket-i Miirettibiye Yolu, 1941 ). 
11 For further information, see Mete Tuncay, Haldun Ozen, "1933 Darulfunun Tasviyesi veya Bir Tek Parti 
Politikac1smm Onlenemez Yiikseli~i ve ~ti," (The 1933 Purge of Darulfiinun or an Unavoidable Rise and 
Fall of a Single Party Politician) Tarih ve Toplwn. (October 1984), pp. 222-36. See also istanbul Universitesi. 
Kwulus. Tarihce. Teskilat ve Ogretim Uyeleri. 1453-1981 (The Establishment, History and Staff of Istanbul 
University 1453-1981) (!stanbul: !stanbul Dniversitesi Yaymlan, 1983), pp. 9-25. 
12 Tun-rand Olken participated in the discussions held by Safa's journal Ku/tar Haftas1 in 1936. For Discussion 
notes appeared in the jownal concerned, see "Fikir Hayatmda Vahdet," (Unity in Intellectual Life) Kiiltiir 
Haftas1. 10 (March 18, 1936), p. 181: '"Koy Hayatma Dair;' (About Village Life) Kultiir Haftas1. 6 (February 19, 
1936), p.102: "Edebiyat11Il1Z1Il Fikirsizligi," (The Thoughtlessness of Our Literature) KOltiir Haftas1. 7, (February 
21, 1936),pp.121-2; ·'NazunFikirler,"(Dominantldeas)KilltiirHaftas1. 11(March25,1936),pp201-2~ "Ruhun 
Bekas1," (The Survival of the Spirit) Kiiltiir Haftas1. 12 (April 1, 1936), pp. 221-2; ·'Hendesi ve Mistik 
Dii!?iince," (Geometrical and Mystical Thought) Kiiltiir Haftas1. 13 (April 8, 1936), pp. 241-2: "Kiiltiir ve 
Makine," (Culture and Machine) Kiiltiir Hatlas1. 15 (April 23, 1936), pp. 281-2; "Ahlak ve Killtiir," (Morality 
and Culture) Killtiir Haftas1. 16 (April 29, 1936), pp. 301-2; ·'Dtinya Go~leri," (Worldviews) Killtiir Haftas1. 
17(May6, 1936),pp. 321-2. 
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approach, where the grand cultural dualities which had been experienced by society in 
transition to modernity, were literally illustrated to answer the question of 'what to 
conserve' in the age of modernity. Moreover. Safa's polemic with Naztm Hikrnet, the 
famous Marxist poet of the time, also strengthened his public popularity among non-
Marxist nationalist circles. 
Besides the re-establishment of the Turkish Philosophy Association in 1931, 
which served to popularize Bergsonian conservative ideals, publication of the journal 
Kadro (1932-1935), as noted, and its severe attacks to the individual thinkers of the 
traditionalist-conservative group was also a stimuli for the emergence of a sense of self 
consciousness among the intellectuals concerned. The journal, Kiiltiir Haftasz, and 
various other journals, which had been published by individual members of the 
traditionalist-conservative circle, such as Baltac1oglu's Yeni Adam, also served as 
common platforms to counter Kadro's interpretation of Kemalism as a revolutionary 
ideology. The significance of these journals for the development of traditionalist-
conservative aspirations was due to the fact that they had served as common platforms 
to formulate distinct approaches to Kemalist reality, since competing interpretations of 
Kemalism had claimed to be the valid interpretation of Revolutionary practices. In this 
respect, the consequences of the revolution, its future course of development and 
legitimacy of the revolutionary methods employed by the Kemalist state elites were 
placed on the agenda of these journals and intellectual life in the 1930s. Traditionalist-
conservative figures also wrote numerous books and articles on the issue throughout 
the 1930s which had a major importance in understanding traditionalist-conservative 
characterization of the Revolutionary period. Baltac1oglu's Demokrasi ve Sanat, 
(Democracy and Art), i<;timai Mektep Na=ariyesi ve Prensipleri (The Theory and 
Principles of Social School), Terbiye'nin K1ymetleri ve Vasztalarz (The Means and 
Values of Education) i<;timai Mektep Prensipleri, (The Principles of Social School), 
Tarih ve Terbiye (History and Education), Toplu Tedris (Mass Education), Sosyoloji 
(Sociolob>y), Olken's A~k Ahlak1, (Piety Ethics), insani Vatanperverlik, (Humanist 
Patriotism), Tiirk Fey/o=oflari Antolojisi (The Anthology of Turkish Philosophers), 
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Tiirk Mistisizminin Tetkikine Giri~ (Introduction to the Study of Turkish Mysticism) 
Yirminci As1r Filo:ojlan (The Twentieth Century Philosophers), Ziya Gokalp, 
Agaoglu's Dev/et ve Ferd, (The State and Individual), Serbest insanlar Olkesinde (In 
the Land of Free Men), Ben Neyim (Who am I?) Tunr;'s Bergson ve Manevi Kudret'e 
Dair Birk.a<; Konfera11s1 (Several Conferences on Bergson and the Spiritual Will), 
Safa's Turk Devrimine Bak~lar (Glances at the Turkish Revolution), Felsefi Buhran 
(The Philosophical Crisis) were those important texts through which the traditional 
conservative interests, sentiments, inspirations, ideals and aspirations were articulated 
throughout the 1930s. 
Through a thematic reading of this traditionalist-conservative corpus of 
writings, we can arrive at some conclusions about their "conservative" "traditionalist" 
"personalist" and Bergsonian" convictions without assuming any relationship between 
the individual ideas and formulations of the intellectuals concerned. Some of these 
figures, such as Baltac1oglu, though he labeled his position as "traditionalism," may be 
considered 'conservative' in the purely descriptive sense of term 'conservative' 
because of his deference of 'tradition' and 'Kemalist status quo' against any radical 
claims, be them either Kadro's interpretation of Kemalism in the 1930s or Islamic 
traditionalists and/or other socialist/Marxists groups who aimed to break down the 
'Kemalist political and economic status quo. ' 13 In both cases, traditionalist-
13 See Baltac1oglu, Turke Dogru (Towards the Turk), 3rd ed. (Ankara Atatiirk: Killtilr Merkez:i Yaymlan, 1994.) 
pp. 57-61. First published by the Ministry of Culture in 1942. See also Baltac1oglu, "Hukukta Tiirke Dogru, ·• 
(Towards the Turk in Law) in ibid., pp. 61-4, ·'M~tte Turke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in Etiquette), in 
ibid., pp. 65-9, "Dilde Tiirke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in Language), in ibid., pp. 69-75, "Mimikte Tiirke 
Dogru" (Towards the Turk in Mimic), in ibid., pp. 75-81, "Edebiyatta Tilrke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in 
Literature), in ibid., pp. 81-7, "Romanda Tiirke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in Novel), in ibid., pp. 87-91, 
·'Mimaride Turke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in Architecture), in ibid., pp.111-5, "Evde Tilrke Dogru" (Towards 
the Turk in Dwelling), ibid., pp. 119-23, "Bah\:C(le Tilrke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in Garden), in ibid., 
pp.123-7, "Mobilyada Tilrke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in Furniture), in ibid., pp. 127-33, "Resimde Tiirke 
Dogru'' (Towards the Turk in Painting), in ibid., pp.133-7, ··Dekorda Tllrke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in 
Decoration), in ibid., pp. 137-43,''~ehircilikte Tilrke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in City Planing), in ibid., pp. 
143-7, "Heykelde Tilrke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in Sculpture), in ibid., pp.153-7, ·'Modada Tilrke Dogru" 
(Towards the Turk in Fashion), in ibid., pp. 157-61, "Musikide Turke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in Music), in 
ibid., pp. 165-9, '"Dansta Tilrke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in Dance), in ibid., pp. 169-75, "Teknil'te Tilrke 
Dogru" (Towards the Turk in Technique), in ibid., pp.175-9, "Felsefede TOrke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in 
Philosophy), in ibid., pp.185-9, ·'Devlette Tilrke Dogru" (Towards the Turk in State), in ibid., 199-203, 
·'Terbiyede Tiirke 0ogru·· (Towards the Turk in Training), in ibid., pp. 207, 213, "Pedagojide Tilrke DognC 
(Towards the Turk in Pedagogy), in ibid., pp. 213-7, "Maaritle Tilrke Dogru'' (Towards the Turk in Education), 
in ibid., pp.217-21. 
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conservative discourse became part of the Kemalist resistance to any claims of change 
to the status quo. However, the question needs further elaboration since these 
individual figures, in fact, sought to lay down a new kind of "traditionalism" as in the 
case of Baltac1oglu, with radical political and cultural aims of breaking down the 
Islamic tradition, or a kind of "Bergsonian conservatism," as in the case of Safa and 
Turn~, which had resulted in the glorification of the new and present that moves to an 
undefined future. 
Bergsonism was on the agenda of the late Ottoman intellectuals before the 
Kemalist revolution. However, radical Kemalist modernism forced the Republican 
traditionalist conservatives to answer new political and cultural questions emerging 
after the institutionalization of the political institutions of Kemalist modernism. As 
already noted beforehand, during this revolutionary period the term 'conservative' was 
essentially used to denote 'Islamic reactionaries' and/or the 'savants of the old 
Ottoman Regime.' Those who aimed to preserve the old Ottoman political institutions, 
such as the Sultanate or Caliphate, were labeled 'conservatives.' Thus, traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals had employed some alternative concepts to define and 
distinguish their relatively modem creed to conserve. In this r~ BaltacJ.oglu's case is 
an example. He defined his intellectual stand as 'traditionalist,' and employed the term 
'conservative' in the above mentioned sense. Interestingly, it is sufficient to quote from 
Baltac1oglu to show their timidness towards the concept of' conservatism.' Accordingly, 
conservatism and traditionalism are not those ordinary, simple words that can be used by 
everyone else. These are sociological concepts which correspond to varying social 
realities... Traditionalism and conservatism name distinct realities which have no 
relationship with each other .... Traditionalism and Conservatism: It is a must to isolate 
these two realities. Otherwise. we can not understand nation and nationality ..... It is 
impossible not to be ·'traditionalist." in the sense I have attributed to the word. In this 
understanding, nation without a tradition is not a nation at all. In this understanding 
··traditionalism.'' has no relationship with "'conservatism." Because ''tradition." means to 
know the permanent. adaptive customs that stay vivid and vigorous in all times. Whereas 
conservatism means devotion to the apathetic customs which have been destined to 
change. We have introduced many changes in language. However. we have not attempted 
to change the structure and rationale of our language. Such an attempt would be nothing 
tha d . 14 more n egenerauon. 
14 Baltac1oglu, "Ananecilik ve Muhafazakarhk," (Traditionalism and Conservatism) Yeni Adam. 370 (December 
1942 ), p.2. For traditionalism, conservatism and reactionarism, see Baltac1oglu, "MUrteci Kimditt' p.3. 
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Baltac10glu put much emphasis on national tradition as a new vivid value system 
through which the universally sanctioned political institutions of modernity, such as the 
nation-state and/or other political institutions, such as the parliament, or the political 
parties, would be re-traditionalized to consolidate a unique Turkish vision of modernity 
whose ideals would be derived from the history and culture of the nation. Thus, 
scientific research in general, and sociological research in particular, provided safety 
and protection to the traditionalist-conservative academician who sought to re-assert 
Tradition as a value framework to identify those aspects worth conserving in the age of 
Kemalist modernism. 15 Nevertheless, the Kemalists' harsh measures against any creed 
to conserve, deterred them from labeling themselves 'conservative.' 16 However, within 
two decades, Safa illustrated this complex temperament, as follows: 
Even during those times when I was skeptic. I was still a nationalist and a humanist. 
Even in those times when I had doubts about the existence of God. I did not deny the 
possibility of its existence. Within my limits of thought I am a kind of socialist without 
being a Marxist. Almost in all my books there are my thoughts. I have not changed in 
essence . I have always tried to improve myself and still I do. Change of the human being 
on the condition of still being himself is a necessity comprising to Object. Because of this 
I am a conservative besides being a revolutionist. 11 (emphases are mine) 
Conservatism and/or traditionalism was a complex of confused ideas in the 
early Republican era. It was because of the fact that these intellectuals were not fully 
self-conscious and organized in the early 1930s. Even though some of them, like 
Agaoglu and Baltac1oglu, were active within the Republican ranks, party affiliation can 
not be taken as a reliable criterion for understanding the motivations behind collective 
political attempts during a single party rule. After all the lack of durable institutional 
basis for the circulation of traditional-conservative ideals did not mean that there were 
15 For an emphasis on tradition, see Agaoglu, ingiltere ve Hindistan (Britain and India) (1stanbul: Cumhuriyet 
Bas1mevi, 1929). See also Olken, Veraset ve Cemivet (Inheritance and Society) (istanbul: Kutulm~ Matbaas1, 
1957 [l 924 ]). 
16 Agaoglu also used the tenn 'conservative' for religious reactionaries willing to preserve the old Ottoman 
political institutions such as the Caliphate and Sultanate. See Agaoglu, ··~ ve Garp,'' (East and West) Vatan. 
158, (September 1923) in Atat1lrk DOnemi Fikir Havatt. vol I, pp. 83-5. In his book ingiltere ve Hindistan 
( 1929), Agaoglu argued that traditions are responsible for maintaining social order. In ihtilal mi? lnkilap mi? (ls 
it Rebellion or Revolution'!), published in 1939, this stand became more apparent. For Tun-r's evaluations on 
conservatism in later decades, see Tun-r, "Muhafazakarhk ve Liberallik," (Conservatism and Liberalism) Tilrk 
DUsilncesi. 2 (January 1,1954) pp. 88-9. See also Tun-r, "Liberallik ve ~uurlu Muhafazakarhk," (Liberalism and 
ConS4:ious Conservatism) TUrk Yurdu. 258 (July, 1956), pp.1-4. It w.ss not accidental that by the begining of 1950s 
various articles ofOlken, Baltaooglu and Tlllllj: were appeared in Safa 's conservative joumaL Tark Dfqancesi. 
17 
"Peyami Safa ile Soyl~i," (Interview with Peyami Safa) Hayat. (September 6, 1959), p. 14. 
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not significant parallelisms and contrasts between individual perspectives of the 
intellectuals concerned, which can be characterized as a distinct approach towards the 
novelties brought up by the Revolution. These traditionalist-conservative ideals and 
sentiments revealed themselves through a common critical stand against common 
objects of reaction. These common objects of reaction, such as materialism, positivism, 
scienticism, rationalism, reactionary Islamism, Marxism, cosmopolitanism, formalism 
were responsible for the emergence of common philosophico-political grounds among 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals. 
Traditionalist-conservative groupings in the early Republican era were largely 
based on loose intellectual groupings formed on shared ideals and through the writings 
in the same journals. As in the case of the re-establishment of the Turkish Philosophy 
and Sociology Association, they worked in the same associations and/or published 
articles in the same journals, like Safa's Kultiir Haftasi, Baltac1oglu's Yeni Adam and 
Ulken' s jnsan. Various seminars on language, religion and culture were also held in 
the Turkish Philosophy Association in the early 1930s, where Safa and Baltac1oglu had 
regularly participated in the discussions and delivered seminars on many topics, 
including language and history policies of the Republic, the place of religion in the 
Turkish society and the new functions and nature of Republican metaphysics. 
After all the traditionalist-conservative ideals widely started to circulate m 
Turkish political life by the mid-of 1930s. In 1935 the government closed down the 
Kadro journal. In opposition to the growing authoritarianism of the RPP, by the mid-
l 930s, the ideals of freedom, individualism, self-realization and order, responsibility 
and self-devotion were articulated in a unique traditionalist-conservative rationale. 
Thus, when the main actor of the political game, namely the RPP, had decided to shift 
from a revolutionary-authoritarian political line to an evolutionary-democratic one by 
the mid- 1940s, unique traditionalist-conservative ideals were already elaborated and 
awaited for adoption. 
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Some Tentative Notes on the Shared Traditionalist-Conservative Aspirations and 
Ideals 
Whatever the differences which characterized divergencies among 'traditionalist,' 
'conservative' and 'personalist-individualist' ideas of traditional conservative 
intellectuals, a distinct approach to Kemalist reality created a common stand. 
Accordingly, society, contrary to the dominant positivist-materialist reading of the 
Kemalists, could not be manipulated through rational lines. 18 Society was the solid 
realm where the normative order of the nation could be built upon. 19 Parallel to the 
search for timeless and permanent social institutions, which constitute the nation as a 
unique cultural order, history also gained its likely importance in traditionalist -
conservative vocabulary. As maintained by Baltac1oglu in Tarih ve Terbiye, history 
provided the refined and permanent forms of values and norms that shaped unique 
national conceptions of art, ethics, politics, customs and education. 20 In a similar vein, 
for Safa and Ulken, history had a legacy as the realm of authentic values and customs, 
which would strengthen the modem sense of belonging to a nation.21 Safa stressed this 
point with clarity, in that even though everything was destined to change, the question 
was not to stimulate the forces of change, but to prevent the breakdown of historical 
structures, such as language and religion which were the constituents of the national 
tradition?2 It is not so misleading to say that Tuny's Bergsonian conception of time 
had a profound influence on especially Safa's conception of history and the past as the 
nation's subjective experience. In a similar vein, history, for Baltac1ogtu, remained as a 
realm where society derived its authentic values and norms to maintain its continuity.~ 
18 Baltactoglu, ictimai Mektep Prensipleri (The Principles ofSocial School) (lstanbul: Tecelli Matbaast, 1935), pp. 6-7; 
01ken, "insani Vatancthk," (Humanist Patriotism) Millkiye. 1-9 (December 1931), pp. 6-7. For criticism of Cartesian 
rationalism, see Safa, '"Hayat ~ Sistemlerimiz," (Our Systems vis-a-vis Life) Cwnhuriyet. (July 11. 1933). For 
emphasis on tradition, see Agaoglu "Dogu ve Batt," (East and West) Yeni Adam, 90(September19, 1935), p. 5. 
19 - , • See Ulken, Ask Ahia.la, pp. LJ-.,o. 
'.?O Baltac10glu, Tarih ve Terbiye pp. 53-7. See also Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, pp.139~5. 
21 Safu, "Uc; iddiarun Kl)meti," (The Value of Three Claims) Cwnhuriyet (July IO, 1933); Olk.en, "Killtiir Birligi," 
(The Cultural Unity) Millet ve Tarih Suwu (Nation and the Consciousness ofHistory) (!st.:, Pulhan MatbaasJ., 1948), pp. 
7-11. The book concerned was compiled from Dlken's articles published in various journals between 1923 and 1948. 
'.?:? Safa, "Uc; 1ddiarun Klyrneti." 
:?J Quoting from TW}\:'s article Yine Tarih Ka~mda. Baltactoglu, in line with T~. asserted that the consciousness of 
history hinted at individual's need to maintain his social exil.ience in Present. See T~, "Yme Tarih ~"(Once 
Again Before the History) Havat 11 (February 10, 1927) quoted inBaltactoglu, Tarih ve Terbiye, pp. 50-1. 
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Despite their emphasis on history, culture and society, resistance to Gokalp's 
societalist political philosophy, which could be dated back to the publication of the 
journal Dergah by the beginning of the 1920s, was also responsible for traditionalist-
conservative distance from Kemalist ideals on nation, individual and social order which 
derived from Gokalp's societalist themes. Turn;, the prominent figure of Bergsonism, 
interpreted Gokalp's conception of freedom as a philosophy of subordination that 
deteriorates individual creativity.'.!4 Against the determinist-societalist political 
philosophy, which revealed itself in Gokalp's motto of "no individual but society, no 
right but duty," Tun9, with other traditionalist conservatives, such as Baltactoglu, or 
Agaoglu, advocated a personalist perspective. This personalist approach to individual 
displayed itself as a literary occupation in Safa's conservative literature and as an 
underlying theme of Olken' s moral humanism in A~k Ahlakz. It is also noteworthy that 
'liberal ideals,' which carved out a niche in politics through the Free Republican Party 
(FRP) experience in 1931 and by the rise of 'liberal' Democratic challenge in the mid-
l 940s, were based on this 'personalist,' but not necessarily on "rationalist individualist" 
emphasis on freedom, society, state, religion and ethics. In this respect, the Bergsonian 
substratum of 'liberal thinking' formed the general philosophico-political orientations 
both of the so-called 'liberalism' of Agaoglu, one of the founding figures FRP, and 
'traditionalism' ofBaltac1oglu, the chairman of the Istanbul branch of the party. 
The concept of individual, which gained its likely emphasis in the political 
vocabulary of traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, did not correspond to the 
fundamental "rational man assumption" in the W estem liberal tradition. The individual, 
which had been envisioned in traditionalist-conservative vocabulary, was a totality of 
'.!4 See Tww, Bergson ve Manevi Kudret"e Dair Birkac Konferans (Several Conferences on Bergson and the 
Spritual Will) (Istanbul: A. Halit Basrmevi, 1933). Also Tun~, "~ahsiyet," (Personality) Millkive. 37 (April 
1934), pp. 4-6, ''Bergson'a Gore Claude Bemard'm Felsefesi," (Philosophy of Claude Bernard According to 
Bergson) Mtllkive. 42 (September 1934), pp.l-6. See also Baltac1oglu, "Cemiyet mi Ferd mi?" (Society or 
Individual?) Y eni Adam. 23 (June 4, 1934 ), p. 8. In his reply to Kadro, Baltac1oglu drew a clear demarcation line 
between Gokalp's societalist (cem(vetfi) and his personalist (~ahsiyetfi) approach. See Baltac1oglu, "Kadro'ya 
Gore Yeni Adam, Yeni Adam'a Gore Kadro," (Yeni Adam for Kadro, Kadro for Yeni Adam) Yeni Adam, 17 
(April 23, 1934). p. 11. See also Olken "Ferd ve Cemiyet," (Individual and Society)~ 1,1(April15, 1938), 
pp. 57-65. For Dlken's criticism ofGokalp, see Dlken, Ziya Gokalp (lstanbul: Aluned Sait Matbaas1, 1942). 
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irrationality, passions and will which could not be employed to derive a model for the 
recreation of a rational world. 25 From Ulken's call for 'humanist moralism' in A~k 
Ahlak1, to Agaoglu and Baltac1oglu's respective 'individualisms' [read personalisms], 
traditionalist conservatism could be considered 'individualist,' if individualism was 
interpreted as a concern with concrete man, existential Man, historical Man that 
actually exists in definite space and time. 26 Against the universally sanctioned rational-
man model of classical liberalism, traditionalist-conservative intellectuals emphasized 
the authenticity of Turkish man in Turkish society. This search for the authenticity of 
Turkish Man and society, uniqueness of the Turkish state, Kemalism and Revolution 
was also responsible for their privileged stand in the Kemalist power structure. 27 
Standing on the edge of the Kemalist power structure, critical remarks were 
also made of the new cultural policies, educational standards and on the dominant 
rationalist-nominalist reading of Kemalist principles. The debate, as displayed by 
Baltac1oglu in Cumlmriyetin Kiiltiir Siyaseti (The Cultural Policy of the Republic), was 
on the question on which values and institutions the Republican cultural policies would 
lean. 28 The passage quoted below from Olken illustrated the temper of traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals in the early 193 Os. In Ulken' s words: 
Is it necessary to eradicate the old to establish the new? Would it be reached to the 
progress of humanity only through revolutions and turmoils? Is it necessary to ... clean out 
everything. every idea and every memory that remain from the past? ... Revolutionary will 
answers: "Yes, it should be in this way!" to all these questions. Because (for the 
revolutionary) to wait is to stay aloof forever. Society is at most a totality; to conserve the 
dead elements is to leave it in inertia. Because the (revolutionary) principle is: Either all 
or nothing .... There is no third way between these two ..... Revolution is to overthrow an 
25 For further elaboration on this conception of individual, as a S}llthesis of rational and irrational, see 
Baltac1oglu, Umumi Pedagoji (General Pedagogy) (istanbul: Milliyet Basunevi, 1930). Also, Olken, insani 
Vatanperverlik (Humanist Patriotism) (istanbul: Giine~ Basunevi, 1933). 
26 See Baltac1oglu, ktimai Mektep Nazarivesi ve Prensipleri. Also Baltac1oglu, "Demokrasi de Terbiye," 
(Education in Democracy) Yeni Adam. 4 (January 22, 1934), p.2, ""Liseler Nasil Islah Edilmelidir?" (How 
Should the High Schools Be Reformed?) Yeni Adam. 5 (January 29, 1934), p.2. Olken ··Maksad," (The 
Objective)insan, I, 1(April15, 1938),pp. 1-2. 
27 See Safa "Inkilabim1Z1Il ideolojisi," "Gaye ve Usu!," (The Aim and the Method) Cumhurivet. (July 29, 1933), 
"A~lk Mektup: M. Loon Pierre Quinte," (Open Letter: M. Loon Pierre Quinte) Cumhuriyet. (August 28, 1933), 
"Milliyet' e Cevap" (Reply to Milliyet) Cumhuriyet. <July 2. 1933 ), ''Bir M~ Sonu, ·• (End of a Debate) 
Cumhuriyet. (August 2, 1933), "lnkllabunu.da CH Flrkasi"run Rolu." 
28 Baltac1oglu, ·-Cumhuriyetin Ktiltiir Siyaseti,"' (The Cultural Policy of the Republic) Yeni Adam. 18 (April 30, 
1934), p. 9. 
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era to eradicate a structure which would be a foundation for future structure. Revolution 
is to cut the root of the tree and then to \\'ait for its blooming.:!9 (emphases are mine) 
Despite their timidness towards positivist radicalism, they were devoted to the idea of 
'progress. ' 3° For Tun~, the question was more than the existence of progress in nature 
and human world, but was on the nature of the social progress. For the members of the 
traditionalist-conservative circle, institutionalization of the modem nation-state 
structures; expansion of the capitalist market and corresponding new division of labour 
in society were responsible for "the great historical progress," and were responsible for 
the emergence of new political, social and economic convictions in modem ages.31 
Another characteristic of traditionalist-conservative circle, which mostly 
revealed itself in the works of Safa, and Baltac1oglu was their statist orientations. 32 
Even Agaoglu, the so-called liberal figure of the group, in his Dev/et ve Ferd revealed 
that he was a "Kemalist," "revolutionist" and "statist" in a different sense from than 
conceived by Kadro intellectuals. 33 The idea of state as the guarantor of the national 
29 .. 
Ulken, Ask Ahlakt, pp. 173-4. 
30 See Tww, Bergson ve Manevi Kudrete Dair Birkac Konferans. See also Baltac1oglu, Tarih ve Terbiye 
(History and Education) (1stanbul Semih Lutfi Suhulet Matbaast, 1933), pp. 64-6. Despite his different 
conception of progress, based on his monist philosophy in the 1930s, Olken also viewed the universe in a 
constant state of change, see Dlken, Ask Ahlakt, p. 56. For a later assessments, see Olken, Veraset ve Cemivet. 
pp. 6-&l, "Vatan ve Demokrasi," (The Fatherland and Democracy) Millet ve Tarih Suuru, pp. 5~3, "Bir Tarih 
Felsefesi MtlmkUn Mtidtl.r?" (Is a Philosophy of History Possible?) Millet ve Tarih Suuru. pp. 243-63, 
"lmparatorlugun TekamO.lil l," (The Evolution of the Empire 1) tnsan 1, 3 (June 15, 1938), pp. 241-59. See also 
Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferd. pp. 40-1, "Tarihte Sosyal Ink!¢' l," (Social Evolution in History l) Ktlltilr Haftasi. 17 
(May 6, 1936), pp. 324-5, "Tarihte Sosyal Ink!¢' 2," (Social Evolution in History 2) Ko.Itur Haftasl. 18 (May 
13, 1936), p. 327, "Hukukta Tekamo.I Devirleri," (Stages of Evolution in Law)~ l,2 (May 15, 1938), pp. 
117-23, "Basitten Miirekkebe, !;)ekilsizlikten !;)ekill~eye Dogru," (From Simple to Complex, From Formless to 
Formation) insan. 1, 3 (June 15, 1938), pp. 204-8. See Safa, Tiirk Inlo..labma Baktslar, pp. 171-90. 
31 Tum;, Bergson ve Manevi Kudrete Dair Birkac Konferans. See Baltac1oglu, '"Demokrasi de Terbiye," p.2, 
"lstedigimiz Terbiye Nedir?" p.2, "Halk Partisinin Prograrru Uzerine," (On the Program of the Republican Party) 
Yeni Adam. 72 (May 16, 1935), p. 2. See also Olken, "Zit Kuvvetlerin Yaradi~1," (The Creation of the Antipodal 
Forces) Mulkiye, 12 (May 1931), pp. 1-7, Safa, "~ark-Garp M~ma Bir Bakt~ l," (A Glance at the F.ast 
and West Dispute l) Kultiir Haftas1, J (January 29, 1936), pp. 51-2, "~k - Garp MOnaka~sma Bir Bala~ 2," 
(A Glance at the East and West Dispute 2) KO.ltiir Haftas1. 4 (February 5, 1936), pp. 65-6, "~ - Garp 
Mo.naka~sma Bir Bala~ 3," (A Glance at the East and West Dispute 3) Ko.Itilr Haftas1. 5 (February 12, 1936), p. 
85, "~ark - Garp MtinakWj<lsma Bir Bakt~ 4," (A Glance at the East and West Dispute 4) Ktiltiir Haftast. 7 
(February 26, 1936), p. 123. See also Safa Tilrk Inlalabma Baktslar, pp. 181-5. In his Devlet ve Ferd. Agaoglu 
tried to show that the emergence of capitalism and the corresponding division of labour in modem society were 
the outcomes of the cn .. "ative evolution in history. See Agaoglu, ··Tarihte Sosyal Inla¢' 3" p. 337, "4tiraki;ilikten 
Ferdi Mesayiye ve MO.lkiyete Dogru," pp. 290-5, "Dinde Mani2IIle li;timai Hayatta da SlIUtlara ve Bil~iik 
Malikanelere Dogru," (Towards Manichaeism in Religion and Towards the Classes and Larges Estates in Social 
Life)lnsan. l,7(December l, 1938),pp. 357-60. 
"') 
"'- Safa argued that after the Great Depression in l 929 Western liberal societies adapted etatist policies and 
state· s control over political and economic lifo was expanded. See Safa, "Statikten Dinamige." See also Agaoglu, 
Devlet ve Ferd, pp. 41-68. 
33 Agaoglu, ibid. pp. 56-7. 
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order had appealed to traditionalist-conservative intellectuals. Despite their 
"individualist and "hiirriyetperver [read liberal] aspirations.' the state was the only 
sacred entity which would maintain the necessary conditions for the free expression of 
the individual will and the social order. 34 
Various themes and motives in differing emphases were articulated by 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals in response to the varying political, economic 
and cultural concerns of the ruling statist elites in the early Republican era. Kemalism, 
the state-building ideology, was eventually the omnipresent perspective. Kemalist ideals 
of political citizenship, political sovereignty of the nation, national liberation emerged 
as the historical certainties for surrounding political philosophies, including 
traditionalist conservatism. Therefore, emerging traditionalist-conservative ideals and 
aspirations came to claim adherence to Kemalism. Still, those "personalist,' "anti-
rationalist,' "'anti-intellectualist' and 'anti-scienticist' motives, peculiar to traditionalist-
conservative vocabulary, were articulated to form an alternative, but not necessarily a 
challenging politico-philosophical perspective to that ofKemalist modernism. 
Nationalist Romanticism and the Cult of Heroism as an Instrument for 
Legitimation for Traditionalist Conservatism 
At times, traditionalist conservatives sounded as if they had paradoxically given up the 
idea of the historical continuity of social structures in order to distinguish themselves 
from the so-called "conservatives," namely Islamic reactionaries of their time who, for 
them, resisted Kemalist attempts to break the traditional Ottoman system. They were 
strictly committed to the modification of the social structures in order to preserve them 
in the age of modernity. This was a kind of nationalist romanticism, which manifested 
itself as varying tones of culturalism, and served as a means of legitimation for the 
Kemalist state elites' rule over society which ultimately was supposed to stimulate the 
revival of the national tradition that had been discarded by the cosmopolitan and 
universalist religious supporters of the umma tradition. What they tried to do was not 
34 
'"Hiirriyetperver"' (freedom lover) is a tenn employed by some members of the traditionalist-conservative 
circle to draw a demarcation line with the ·'liberals"' of their time. See Safa, ''Statikten Dinamige." 
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to revtve the ideals of religious tradition, but the living tradition in Anatolia. 
Traditionalist conservatives of the young Republic defended not re-discovering the old 
religious truths of past times and institutions, but reviving the living tradition and 
culture which would serve as legitimation for the institutionalization of the Kemalist 
politics and economic structure. 35 
Legitimacy, in this sense, was the traditionalist-conservative tendency to defend 
the uniqueness of the national Republican institutions. In this context, the defense of 
the Republic ultimately came to mean the defense of worldly politics against 
reactionary Islamism, which resisted secularization of politics and daily life since the 
First Constitutional period (1876-1877). For Baltac1oglu, modem society was 
essentially democratic. The fundamental principles and processes of a democratic 
order, Baltactoglu argued, were rationalization, industrialization, homogenization, 
secularization and the establishment of modem state (devletle~mek). Thus, the highest 
good of modem society differed from the highest "good" of the traditional religious 
society. The highest good in the modem world was drawn by the secularization of the 
We/tanshauungs which came to mean the demystification of daily life. In a similar vein, 
the reasons for the mobility and dynamism of the W estem culture, for Agaoglu, was 
the grand attempt to demystify culture. Islamic and Brahmanian cultures were static 
and immobile since the highest good in culture was drawn from holy eternal sources. 36 
In this respect, Republican politics, to which the traditionalist conservatives were 
devoted, was in severe contradiction with the Islamic principle which transfers all 
worldly powers to God, in theory, and to his sword on earth, namely the Caliph/Sultan, 
35 Baltac1oglu, Tarih ve Terbive, pp. 59-65. For culturalism, see Olk.en, Veraset ve Cemivet, pp. 197-204. Safa, 
"·Kultiir ve Edebiyat," (Culture and Literature) Kiiltilr Halla<>t. I (December 15, 1936), p. 8, Tfirk Inktlabma 
Baktslar, pp. 202-7. Also Dlken Tiirk Kozmolojisi. TOrk Mitolojisi. Tiirk Hikmeti. Teknik Tefokkiir (Turkish 
Cosmology, Turkish Mythology, Turkish Wisdom, Teclmical Thinking) (Ankara: ~vekalet Mudevvanat 
Bas1mevi, 1935). Agaoglu, "Bir Kiiltiirden Otekine," (From One Culture to the Other) KOltOr Haftas1. 2 (January 
22, 1936 ), pp. 22, 38. 
36 Baltac10glu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, pp. 7. Also see Baltac1oglu, "Inktlab EdebiyatI Ne Olabilil'?" p. 7. Also 
Dlken, Ask Ahlala, pp. 123-30. See Agaoglu, ·'(Jv KUlto.r," (Three Cultures) Killtiir Haftas1. I (January 15, 
1936), p. 5. Safa, To.rk Devrimine Balaslar, pp. 107-10. 
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in practice. The new Republic, whose national uniqueness was praised, represented the 
ideal of the new political order which was in need of protection and conservation. 
In the 1930s, it was very difficult to differentiate traditionalist-conservative 
romantic nationalism from Republican nationalism. Traditionalist-conservative theme 
of political uniqueness had been praised by the ruling intelligentsia during the 
revolutionary period. This revolutionary era was also characterized as an age of 
heroism, politically relying on the charismatic power structure established by Mustafa 
Kemal, the national hero and the founder of the Republic. Following Atatiirk's death in 
1938, the rule of Republican People's Party, based on charisma, moved towards the 
rule of bureaucracy in an attempt to create a National Chief as a new cult of heroism 
and to maintain continuity in power structure. The transformation of the charisma to 
the bureaucratic rule of the Party in the 1940s did not lessen traditionalist-conservative 
support raised to the Kemalist power circle, but created a distance from one-party 
authoritarianism.37 Traditionalist-conservative support was raised to strong 
leadership and power based on charisma during Ataturk's rule. Charismatic power 
structure, was praised as a model of self-sacrifice and heroism in the age of 
collective creationism. In this sense, there was a straight relationship between 
traditionalist conservatism and Revolutionary rationale. Traditionalist conservatives 
openly praised Kemalism as a form of new humanism and heroism which relied on 
the charismatic rule of the founder of the Republic. 38 Thus, both movements could 
be placed in the same political and philosophical context that showed an 
exceedingly high esteem for the newly founded Republic. Likewise, the power of 
the nation-state was praised and Islamic theology was sharply criticized. Faith in 
the representative institutions of the parliamentary democracy was also coupled 
37 For an analysis of the ·'rule through charisma,"' see Metin Heper, ··Transformation of Charisma into a Political 
Paradigm: Atatiirkism in Turkey, .. Journal of American Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern Civilization, I 
( 1980-198 l ), pp. 65-82. Also see Heper, ~A Weltanshauwig-Turned-Partial Ideology and Nonnative Ethics: 
·Atatiirkism' in Turkey," Orient. (Hamburg) XXV (1984), pp. 83-94. 
38 See Baltac1oglu, "Inkdabm Mektebi,"' p. 5. lhken's moralist perspective, which revealed itself in his ~k 
Ah/ala, aimed to reflect man· s desire to become part of a spiritual th;gn in a total devotion to the cult of self-sacrifice. 
Traditionalil>1~tive criticism of egoism and selfishness of the civil society paved way to the development of an 
ethics of heroism and self-sacrifice. 
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with deep belief in the homogenizing effect of the national culture which would 
eliminate traditional parochialism. However, the rule of bureaucracy, which had 
gradually developed after the death of Ataturk in 1938, was more intensively 
challenged since it was suspected to hinder the creative evolution of the society. 
Turkish traditionalist conservatism with its heavy emphasis on nationalist-
romantic sentiments envisioned a new "national community" and a new state, 
typically Turkish, with special historical roots in the living culture of the "Turkish 
society." The questions foremost in mind for the traditionalist conservatives of the 
1930s were political independence, cultural uniqueness, and respect for the living 
national tradition. The Kemalist political victory resulted in the emergence of a 
modem nation state and later attempts to substitute modem secular cosmology in 
place of the old religious one could only be possible with the support of the traditionalist-
conservative intelligentsia who were strictly devoted to a vision of modernity. 39 
As noted by a prominent student of Turkish politics, the nation state-builder 
Republican People's Party represented a broad coalition of intelligentsia, civilian and 
military bureaucracy and local land owners. 40 Therefore the traditionalist-conservative 
political eclecticism was shaped by a set of polarities between state protection against 
individual initiative, individualism against societalism, liberty against order, 
traditionalism against modernism which served as a cement to hold this broad coalition 
on the side of the revolutionary ideals. In this respect. traditionalist-conservative ideals 
stood for a harmony between liberty and order, equality and hierarchy, individualism and 
societalism, secularism and religion, mobility and stability, authenticity and universalism. 
39 For a short note on reactionarism, see Baltac1oglu, "lrtica," (Reaction) Yeni Adam. 5 (January 29, 1934), p. 1, 
··Ink.ilabm Mektebi," p. 5, "Cwnhuriyetin Kiiltiir Siyaset," p.9, ·'Miirteci Kimdit?" p.3. See also Safa, Tiirk 
Inkilabma Bak1slar, pp. 208-12, 85-97. Dlken argued that Aga<>glu had sho\\'ll that it was language but not 
religion which carried the historical legacy of the national culture. See Dlken, Tiirkive'de CaMas Diislince Tarihi 
(History of Contemporary Thought in Turkey), 3rd ed. (istanbul: Olken Yaymlan, 1992), pp. 410-1. Agaoglu's 
emphasis on language served to counter the claims of Islamic reactionaries. He asserted that it was not the 
religious tradition but language through which values and the norm structure of the society were transmitted in 
history. In this context, Ulken's books, A-1k Ahia/a and insani Vatanperverlik, were examples of his search for a 
value system which would neither lay aside subjective experience of religion, as a set of moral sentiments, nor 
would transform religious sentiments to social and political imperatives. 
40 See Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambri~e:MA: MIT Press, 1965). 
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Although there emerged divergencies in policy prescriptions, traditionalist 
conservatism was not politically distinct from Kemalism in the 193Os.41 Turkish 
traditionalist conservatism supported the consolidation of the Kemalist revolutionary 
order and modem secular cosmology. Turkish traditionalist conservatism, as opposed 
to its continental counterparts, was not the political voice of descending classes and 
social groups, which lost status and power during the course of a grand bourgeois 
revolution, as in the case of France. On the contrary, it stood for the ascending 
Republican intelligentsia's creed to conserve the structures of modernity, namely the 
nations state, its political institutions and acculturation patterns together with support 
for the new secular ethics ultimately to replace Islamic theology. For that reason, 
disjunction between reactionary Islam and the nouveuax traditionalist conservatism of 
the Republic became more apparent when the Kemalist nation state had smashed the 
former. Traditionalist conservatism did not suffer from total political defeat and its 
ideals continued to circulate within the Republican intelligentsia through the activities 
of its founding figures mostly employed in the most prestigious cultural institutions of 
the Republic. Meanwhile, Islamic reactionism and its protagonists were dismissed from 
political life. 
The Cultural Construction of the Individual 
From the proclamation of the Republic to the mid-1940s, nationalist romantic themes 
dominated the traditionalist-conservative vocabulary. In this era, the Kemalist 
"scientific state" ultimately sought to create the nation as a cultural-political entity. This 
romantic search of a nation was also a symptom of Kemalist culturalism, which had 
been refined in the Turkish History Thesis and Sun-Language Theory in the early 
41 Baltac1oglu's political stand was more statist, as compared to Agaoglu's liberalism. Safa stood with a distance 
both to the liberalism of the latter and the etatism of the former. Safa did not have a faith both on etatism and 
liberalism, since the former, for him, curbed do\\on the individual freedom and the latter caused anarchy. See 
Safa, "Dtlnyarun Muh~ Oldugu Nizam,"' (The Order Which the World is in Need of) Cumhuriyet, (October 11, 
1939). Tun!f, in his articles published in the daily Cumhuriyet, saw the state as the pillar of the social order and 
attributed the role of an arbitrator of contlicting political and economic interests. What was common to all, even 
to Agaoglu' s liberalism as revealed in his book Dev/et ve Ferd, was their criticism of the self-pursuit egoism of 
the civil society. For Tun1t's l-Titicism of egoism, see Tun!f, "Zamane Adami," (Contemporary Man) Cumhuriyet. 
(November, 13, 1940). For elaborations on state, see Tun!f, "Oevlet ve Millet," (State and Nation) Cumhuriyet. 
(October 8, 1942), "Oevlet ve Terbiye,'' (State and Education) Cumhuriyet. (November 11, 1942). 
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1930s. Kemalist rulers and traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia were a1mmg to 
provide a historical dimension to the already existing cultural practices. Culturalism of 
the ruling center ultimately aimed to revive cultural and historical research to 
reconstitute the Turkish past and Turkish personality. Thus, cultural reforms of the 
Kemalist state provoked the development of a culturalist nationalist awakening among 
the Kemalist intelligentsia.42 Culturalism was further intensified by Turkification of the 
language and Islam. Yet, Kemalist culturalism was further supplemented with the 
romantic traditionalist-conservative creed, which aimed to find out the creative essence 
in national tradition which would further be employed to re-traditionalize the 
universally sanctioned institutions of Kemalist modernism. 43 Those attempts to revive 
the historical awareness of tradition and culture, and the ardent traditionalist-
conservative support for it, aimed to show that an authentic nation, a sense of 
Turkishness, and personality were historically determined. 44 
There was a fundamental political theme behind this emphasis on culture as a 
qualifying component of the collective and individual subconscious. The creation of a 
more secure and balanced individual as an authentic personality would, in the final 
analysis, strengthen the fabric of the new nation. This conception of culture, which 
disclosed itself as a realm of irrationality, overlapped with traditionalist-conservative 
conception of the individual, as a product of peculiar culture and as a unique self which 
was a yield of rational and irrational sides of his authentic personality. Culture was the 
lacuna where the irrational essence of the individual derived his basic inspirations and 
realized himself as a living, acting and concrete agent. 45 This irrational essence of 
42 Ulken's Anatolianism was an example of his romantic nationalism which aimed to give an answer to the 
question on the historical origin of the national culture. Culture occupied a central place in the traditionalist-
conservative agenda. For an emphasis on the significance of culture and cultural issues, see "Kiiltilr Nedir''" 
(Wbat is Culture'?) Kiiltiir Ha!las1. l (December 15, 1936 ), p. l. 
43 See Baltac1oglu, Tarih ve Terbiye, pp, 53-61. 
44 Baltac1oglu, ibid., For a later a-;sessment, see Baltac1oglu, "Ahlakta TOrke Dogru," pp. 57-61. 
45 .. . . .. 
See Ulken, "Insaru Vatanc1hk," pp. 4- 13. Sarne themes were elaborated in Ulken's book A.yk Ahia/a. 
Baltac10glu revealed that it was impossible to create a man in the laboratory. See Baltac1oglu, "En Biiyuk Devlet 
Siyaseli Nedir? (What is the Greatest State Policy?) Yeni Adam, 17 (April .'!3, 1934), p. 8. In his iftimai Mektep 
Prensiplen·, Baltac10glu pointed out that the task of the Revolution was not to create a model of revolutionary 
man but to educate the citizen as such. See also Baltac1oglu, ktimai Mektep Prensipleri, p. 7 
113 
culture and personality were unique and could not be grasped through logic, reason 
and science. This irrational cultural core, which was also responsible for the uniqueness 
and authenticity of the Turkish culture and personality, had to be protected from the 
manipulative policies of the bureaucratic scientific state. The solidarist ethics of Gokalp 
was also challenged on this peculiar conception of the personality.~ Dichotomies 
between individual and society; matter and soul were seen as the artifacts of the 
mechanist-positivist views on society which were inspired by a rationalist philosophy.47 
For the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, the Kemalist revolution symbolized the 
liberation of culture [read irrationality], where the creative individual will would further 
free itself from the constraints of liberal cosmopolitanism and religious universalism. 48 
As revealed by Safa in Ti.irk Devrimine Bala~lar it was also an attempt to abolish the 
cultural dualities that manifested themselves as a schizophrenic individual attitude 
• 
towards life since the Ottoman Reformist era of the nineteenth century. 49 
This schizophrenic individual attitude towards life implies the degenerative 
effects of the former modernization [read westernization] attempts on authentic 
national culture since the individual, for traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, was the 
product of a particular history and tradition, and gained his value as a member of a 
particular nation. 50 This conception of the individual, as the carrier of an irrationality, 
when coupled with the critics of mimetic westernization models has revealed two 
things. First, their rejection of liberal rational man assumption to which classical 
liberalism adhered; second, the rejection of the idea of unilinear progress in history 
which implies that all societies will at the end of a gradual evolution will be modernized 
46 For Baltac1oglu, education was an empirical process of learning, see Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, p, 5 l, 
ktimai Mektep Prensipleri, pp. 5-11. Olken ''Ziya G<ikalp"m Ele~tirisi," (Critique of Ziya G<ikalp) Qgg: 
Mecmuas1 7, 81, (1939), pp. 141-2. See also Olken, Ziva Gokalp. pp. 21-30. 
47 See Baltac1oglu, "Kadro'ya G<ire Yeni Adam, Yeni Adarn'a Gore Kadro,"' p. 11. For criticism of 
individualism and societalism, see Ulken, Ask Ahlala, pp. V-VII. Also Dlken, ·-zit Kuvvetlerin Y aradi~, ·· pp. 1-7. 
48 See Safa, "istenilen Bir Edebiyat;· (A Desirable Literature) Cumhurivet. (June 19, 1933). Safa argued that 
the real revolutionary aim was to smash the universalist Islamic scholastics which reduced Man merely to a 
category of subject before the God. 
49 Safa, Tiirk Devrimine Balaslar. pp. 90-7. 
50 Dlken, Ask Ahlaki. p. 167. Baltac1oglu, lctimai Mektep Prensipleri, p. 6. Safa, "Tiirk Miinevverini 
Tilrkle~tirmek," (To Turkify the Turkish Intellectual) Cumhurivet. (April 24, 1932). For a later assessment see 
Safa, "Diinya da insan Var Mi?" (Is There Man in the World?) Yeni Mecmua. (July 18, 1941 ), p. 4. 
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and/or westernized. As noted by Baltac10glu, in reference to the function of art in 
modem society in his Inkzlap Edebiyau Nasif Olahilir? (How Can the Literature of the 
Revolution Be?) liberal society was the source of all individual isolation and alienation 
in modem times. 51 The sense of belonging to the Turkish nation, the safety and 
immunity stemming from this sense of belonging and the concreteness of the national 
tradition would counterbalance the isolation, selfishness and abstractionism of the ideal 
of liberal rational individual premise. While Kemalists set the new principles of the 
rules of political game, traditional traditionalist conservatives presented themselves as 
the moral innovators of the new Turkish personality. 
State Paternalism and the "Papa State" 
Traditionalist-conservative personalism and culturalism were in conformity both with 
their vision of the Kemalist nation state as a paternalist and Papa state over society. In 
their view, devotion to the liberal individualism would turn the new national order to 
an anarchy. 52 Nation-state, as noted by Agaoglu, was an indispensable part of the 
national order,53 since according to Agaoglu "state is statist in essence."54 Thus, it was 
natural that the state, as the constituent of the national order, would promote the 
welfare of its citizens. Still, traditionalist conservatives tried to specify the legitimate 
limits of state interference in society. And, as revealed in Agaoglu's Dev/et ve Ferd, 
this had been maintained by a smooth distinction made between government and the 
state. This distinction provided a secure position to traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals since opposition to governmental policies did not come to mean an 
opposition to the Kemalist state. 
51 Baltac10glu, ·'Inlalap Edebiyall Nasti OlabilirT p. 7. 
'j") .• 
-- See Ulken, A>k Ahlakl, p. VII. For Safa liberal political philosophy never lost its emphasis on freedom 
(hurriyet) in the twentieth century but it gave up its original anti-statist mission. See Safa ··Demokrasi ve 
Liberalizm," (Democracy and Liberalism) Cumhurivet, (July 23, 1933). The task set by Safa for the Republican 
ruler was to find a middle way between freedom and order, individual will and social obligations. Baltac1oglu 
also argued that he arrived at a conception of evolution which recognized both social determination and 
individual freedom. See Baltac1oglu, ··Kadro·ya Gore Yeni Adam, Yeni Adam'a Gore Kadro," p. 1 l. 
53 Agaoglu Devlet ve Ferd, pp. 60, 40-1. 
54 Ibid., p. 6 l. 
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The functions of nation-state structures were different from than that of the old 
Ottoman state. Indeed, the modem nation state was the real form of the Papa state 
which assumed responsibility to promote the welfare and morality of its subjects. The 
Ottoman state did not have such a mission. On the contrary, Ottoman public philosophy 
was based on keeping up the societal order (nizam) and status quo. Traditionalist 
conservatives were cautious about the revolutionary transcendentalism of the Kemalist 
state. However, it was supported in as much as it put its mission to liberate the national 
culture and tradition from cosmopolitanism and abstract formalism of Islamism and former 
Ottomanism. Therefore, traditionalist conservatives supported the development of an 
authentic Turkish personality in its concreteness, which became the basic contention of 
Baltac1oglu's educational philosophy. New paternalism was welcomed as the symptom of 
the awakening of the national forces. This paternalism did not contradict the traditionalist-
conservative emphasis on the society and individual. On the contrary, through its natural 
and historical paternalism over the society, the state was held responsible for creating the 
political network necessary for the free expression of the creative essence of the individual 
and society. The state, for Baltacioglu, was also responsible to maintain the necessary 
social, political and cultural conditions for the self-realiz.ation of its citizens. 5 5 
Nationalist romanticism, which manifested itself as the adaptation of Kemalist 
culturalism in varying tones, was also responsible for the ardent traditionalist-
conservative support for state paternalism. The foremost feature of their understanding 
of cultural romanticism as complementing state paternalism was originally based on a 
positive meaning attributed to romanticism in constituting a national public order. For 
Baltac1glu the task of the revolution was to maintain industrialization, consolidation of 
democracy and demystification of daily life. In a similar vein, for Safa modernization 
was based on two interacting processes, namely, urbanization (sitelef111ek) and 
rationalization (riya=ile~mek). 56 New public realm would be the design of the ruling 
55 For public education, see Baltac1oglu, Toplu Tedris. 
56 See Baltac1oglu, "Inkdab Edebiyah Ne Olabilir?" p. 7. See Safa, Tilrk Inkdabma Bakislar, pp. 181-5; Olken, 
--zitKuvvetlerin Yarad1~1,"pp. l-7. 
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Kemalist state elites and would be based on the principles of the equality of the citizens 
and sovereignty of the people. On the traditionalist-conservative side, there was no 
creed for withering away of the state from the communal life of the nation. On the 
contrary, by creating an amalgam of national tradition, nation state, nation and History, 
guarding the self realization of individuals and the free manifestation of culture became 
the new functions of the Kemalist state. Romantic nationalism, when coupled with 
state paternalism, had resulted in a devotion to the public power which had be to 
protected from the degenerative effects of individualism. The ideal of nation as a 
cultural entity limited the meaning of liberalism to the specific boundaries of the 
individual will. 'Liberal' as in the cases of Safa and Baltac1oglu, solely came to denote 
an emphasis made on the free choice of the individual. 57 
In this new age of the re-traditionalization of the society towards national 
forms, traditional conservative reaction to liberalism in the 1930s, as a philosophy of 
anarchy, had overwhelming consequences in setting the tone of their relations with the 
ruling Kemalist state elites, and for shaping basic liberal aspirations since the dominant 
figures of traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia had played crucial roles in the 
formation of "liberal parties" of their time. When lack of trust to liberalism was 
coupled with a praise for national tradition, traditionalist conservatives took a further 
step in finding a place in the Kemalist power structure. In this respect, traditionalist-
conservative amalgam of culture, nation, tradition and individual was never a coherent 
articulation of resistance to Kemalism. On the contrary, traditionalist-conservative 
ideals and aspirations served as power valves for manipulating group politics for the 
ruling Kemalists state elites: traditionalist conservatism sui generis secured the 
diffusion of the 'modernizing ethos' of Kemalism to the competing intellectual and/ or 
political groups which emerged by further fragmentation of the Kemalist power 
structure in the course expanding capitalist market relations. 
57 See Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, p. 125; Safa, ""Hayat Kar~1s1mla Sistemlerimiz." Also Safa, "Demokrasi 
ve Liberalizm .. , 
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Traditionalist Conservatism as an Alternative Political Reading of Kemalist Practices 
Traditionalist-conservative strategies and ideas became part of the process of moderniz.ation 
manipulated by the Kemalist state. Traditionalist conservatives together with Kemalists were 
the defenders of formal political liberties brought about to the nation by the establishment of 
the Republican regime. Their agenda included equality before the law, freedom of property, 
freedom of press, tolerance to religious beliefa Nevertheless, the development and 
circulation of traditionalist-conservative ideals and aspiration in the early Republican era, 
which developed in contrast to the positivist scienticist spirit ofKemalism, in fact, registered 
the existence of not a coherent comprehensive Kemalism, but rivaling Kemalisms, all of 
which claimed to have the legacy ofKemalist modernism. 
In practice, this traditionalist-conservative reading of Kemalism of the 1930s was 
not about the constitutive principles of the Kemalist state. It was mostly focused on the 
objectives and boundaries of government. 58 Republicanism of the new state, which implied 
that there should be popular participation of the people through its elected representatives, 
was not questioned. A limited role was granted to the government in managing the 
economic life of the nation. 59 Traditionalist conservatives in the 1930s did not persistently 
adhere to a specific economic program or doctrine. They did not attempt to elaborate a 
specific economic policy for the Republican governments different from those declared in 
the izmir Economic Congress, convened by the encouragement of Ga.zi Mustafa Kemal in 
1923. As revealed in Baltacioglu's Sosyoloji, Olk.en's A§k Ahlakz, Sosyo/ojiye Giri§ 
(Introduction to Sociology) or Sosyoloji, the new society would be based on a new division 
of labour that emerged under the constraints of modern capitalist economy.60 Still, 
liberalism with an ethical content, was an alien concept to the traditionalist-conservative 
circle. In this respect, it is difficult to see them as the spokespersons of particular interests of 
specific classes and/or groups. 
Following the Great Depression m 1929, not only the limits of government 
regulation over economic matters but also state's functions in the economy had expanded 
58 Agaoglu in his discussion with the Kadro intellectuals tried to draw the limits of government interference in 
society. See Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferd, pp. 41-68. 
59 See Safa "Statikten Dinamige." Those themes elaborated by Agaoglu in his Dev/et ve Ferd were also based on 
this contention. 0iken' s conception of work as a means of self-realization was responsible for his distance to the 
idea of excessive state control over the society. See Dlken, "Zit Kuvvetlerin Yarad!.~1," pp. 3-4. 
60 Baltac1oglu, S<v..yoloji (Sociology)(istanbul: Sebat Basunevi, 1939), pp. 198-233. Olken, Ask Ahlalo., pp.131, 
162-3, 165, 178-9, 183, 271, 379-80. Also, Dlken, Sosvoloji (Sociology), 2nd ed. (lstanbul: Remzi K.itabevi, 
1943), pp. 197-8, Sosvolojiye Giris (Introduction to Sociology) (lstanbul: Oiyler Matbaas1, 1947), pp. 19-25, 47-8. 
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all over the world. It expanded in the form of public ownership or share-holding in some 
sectors of the economy. Safa, in his Milli idealimiz Apartman Yaptumak Muiu? (Is Our 
National Ideal to Build Apartments?), saw investments made on private civil works as 
examples of unfair rent income and waste of national resources. 61 Baltac1oglu in his 
Demokrasi ve Sanat also held similar views. For Safa and Baltac10glu, these were the 
• 
symptoms of implicit egoism and selfishn~. In his literary works, Safa characterized the 
westernized rational ego as a case for the corrupted personality who selfishly defends his 
particular interests against common interests. In sum, liberal individualist ethics and its 
demands for creating and accumulating wealth against the national public good were 
rejected as the main causes of the deterioration of the new national moral order. In this 
respect, the personalist ideals of the early traditionalist conservatives were at odds with any 
kind of middle class ideology. 
Tradi.tionalist-Conservative and Radical Kemalist Visions of Modernity: Emergence 
of Capitalism-Centered World Views 
Kemalism, for the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals marked the radical 
transformation of the Ottoman-Islamic religious cosmology.62 Traditionalist-
61 Safa, "Milli ldealimiz Apartman Yaptumak Mtdir?" (ls Our National Ideal to Build Apartments) Tasvir'i 
Efkar quoted in 8ecmeler (Selections), Faruk K. Tim~, ed. (Ankara: Devlet Kitaplan, 1970), pp. 36-40. 
62 01ken, "Mak.sad," p.l. See also Oiken, "Torlciye'de ldealizm Temayiilil," (The Trendofldealism in Turkey) DI. 2, 
12 (May 8, 1942), pp. 929-38, "Sanat ve Cemiyet," (Art and Society)~ 3, 1-13 (April 1, 1941), pp. 26-9. Also 
Balt&,"toglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat pp. 54-5. Baltacioglu pointed out that the basic contention of the late OttOOlaD. 
intellectuals was to show that Islam was not a religion which hindered the social development Thus, they tried to find 
out new means to conserve the religious tradition This era, for Baltactolu, was characterized by eccentricism and 
dualisms. See Baltactoglu, "Hayatun," (My Life) Yeni Adam. 188 (August 5, 1937), p. 18. Baltactoglu in his article 
r lcdan Hurriyeti ve Laiklik commented on secularization policies of the Republic em and emphafil:zJ:d on the new place 
granted to religion in the Republican era Accordingly, "each Turlcish citizen can choose the religion of whatever be likes 
or may even commit to atheism It is his fundamental right of citiienship and Turlcishness." See Baltactoglu, ·'Vtaian 
Hiirriyeti ve Laiklik," (Freedom of Conscience and Laicism) Yeni Adam 109, (January 30, 1936), p. 3. For the 
illustration of Eastern personality, see also Baltacioglu, ·~" (The Oriental Man) Y eni Adam, 236 (July 6, 1939), p.3. 
For Baltactoglu, Republic represented more than a policy shift. In a short note appeared in his editorial cohmm, 
Baltactoglu stated as follows:"Is Republic a political regime? Yes. But is it all? No. We have to understand that Republic 
is not simply an insipid shift in politics but it was a moral will which emerged from the crisis of hwnanity. Turlcish 
Republic is not only a shift in the jOmi of the state but is itself an emerging culture and creative evolution." (emphases 
are mine) See Baltactoglu, ·-Cumhuriyetin XVinci Yth," (15th Year of the Republic) 201 Yeni Adam. (October, 17, 
1937), p.3. In his article entitled Eski ve Yeni Diinya Gm;qlerimiz, Tlllll( compared the God«ntric cosmology with the 
world-rentric secular cosmology and characterizfld the basic difference between them and their different senses of cosmic 
Order. Acwrding to him, God-«ntric co:-.mology saw the world order as an t-'Piphenomenon of the divine order "'hereas 
the latter was characteriz.ed by a new kind of materialism. Tlllll(, "Eski ve Y eni Thinya ~lerimiz., ., (Our Old and New 
Worldviews) Cumhuriyel (October 11, 1942). For characteriiation of modem society, see Tlllll(, "'tstikbal iirifi Aranan 
Yeni Ufuklar,'' (New Horizons for the Future) Cumhuriyet (June 6, 1943). Also Tlllll(, "'Milliyet ldeali ve Tq>yekun 
T erbiye," (The Ideal of Nationality and National Education in All) Cumhurivet (April 5, 1943), "BugOnlcti Milletler ve 
Rubi Haletleri" (Today's Nations and Their Spiritual States) Cumhurivet (July 27, 1941 ). See also Tw~. "Bugilnkil 
HayatnlllZIIl Akl~lan, ·• (The Flows of Our Life Today) in Atatilrk Devri Fikir HayaU II (Intellectual Lite in Atatiirlc' s Era 
II), Mehmet Kaplan, tnci Engimm, et al., eds. (Ankara: Kllltur BakanhgJ. Yay., 1992), pp. 331-4; 01ken, ''M~yetin 
Tereddild Devri;' (The Period ofHesitation in theComtitutional Era)~ 1,10 (Man:h 10, 1939), pp. 769-78. 
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conservative circle of the early Republic witnessed the emergence of modem social and 
civil practices, and consolidation of new political relations between state and society. 
They were aware of the fact that the religious Weltanshauung was dissolving and 
modem political forms were emerging. Baltac1oglu characterized the transition to the 
world of Kemalist modernism as follows: 
For us. the origins of new culture is (our) new life. The \ital questions of the Turkish 
Revolution reflect the essential values of Turkish culture. Let me give some examples. 
Science. technique and experience can hold sway over war. economy. law and education. 
God. Prophet, Islam or Christianity have nothing to do \\ith these things. The enemy of 
(our) new life is not only religious beliefs but also the mystique mentality. 63 
Olken in Sanat ve Cemiyet (Art and Society) and Me~miyetin Tereddiit Devri (The 
Period of Hesitation in the Constitutional Era) pointed out the emergence of a new 
political, social and economic system through the breakdown of the preceding 
theocratic system.64 The history of Turkish modernization, for Olken could be dated 
back to two hundred years ago. Yet, it was the Turkish Revolution which had carried 
the previous modernization efforts to their logical consequences. The Kemalist 
Revolution represented the beginning of new Turkish renaissance.65 This modem 
society was characterized by the expansion of capitalism and emergence of a new 
humanism.66 Thus, Tun~, in Kader ve Kanun (Faith and Law), illustrated the 
collapsing order as follows: 
In the Middle Ages the term "adetullah", meant that all incidents in the world depended 
on God's Will. These were the times when it was believed that without the notice of the 
God nothing would happen. Thus, people believed in an established and indestructtbl.e order 
encomplSSing all beings. They were ready to respect and obey the customs and traditions and 
the decisions and will of the gm-ernments with whose legitimacy they m!re content. 67 
Baltac10glu also reinstated the basic features of the traditional religious system and 
noted that the rupture of the social and political dualisms of the religious order was due 
to the emergence of a secular Order. The Kemalist era, for him, also represented the 
63 Baltac1oglu., "Kiiltiirtimiizti Kurtarmak Lazun," (It is Necessary to Save Our Culture) Yeni Adam. 137 
(Augm;t 13. 1939). p. 2. 
64 Olken, --sanat ve Cemiyet;· pp. 26-9. ··Me~ruiyetin Tereddut Dcvri;· pp. 769-78. Baltac1oglu., ·'Yeni Ahlak 
Yeni Fikirde Degil, Yeni Sosyetededir," (New Morality Lies not in New Idea but in New Society) Yeni Adam. 
118 (April 2, 1936), p.2. 
65 See Olken, "Maksad," p. l. Tun~, "'Milliyet~ilik," (Nationalism) Cwnhuriyet. (March 21, 1943 ). 
66 See Olken, ''Tanzi.mat ve Homanizma," (The Tanzimar and Humanism) ~ 1, 9 (February 1, 1939), pp. 691-2. 
67 Tun~, ''Kader ve Kamm," (Faith and Law) Cwnhuriyel (April 26, 1942). See also Safa, TOrk Inkilabma 
Bakislar, pp. 27-75. 
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beginning of a new epoch which was based on new conceptions of nature, man and 
society. Accordingly, 
There are three momentous periods of development in our history of culture and school. 
l. Theocratic Period 2. Restoration Period 3. Period of Realism ... Each one of these 
periods ponrays a respective social structure. social ideal. and a social conception of life. 
Each period reflects an idealized social mentality. Scient~fical~v. each period is 
contextual~v normal. IVhat is abnormal is to try to revitali=e the old ... In the theocratic 
period. social life was grounded on a celestial religion. A holy book provided the basis for 
law. ethics and even an. The social ideal of this period was heaven. the holy realm. The 
school model of this period was madrasah. The only theme of education was reading and 
writing of the holy book. The only method of education was inculcation. The only 
disciplinary instrument was pressure and beating. Like the European renaissance 
Tanzimat Period was an advance of secularism and renovation. In this period antagonistic 
institutions coexisted: World and the other world. law and fetwa.. school and madrasah. 
science and faith. One can observe the same antagonisms also in the Constitutional 
Period: Religion and science, scholasticism and experience. school and madrasah.68 
(Emphases are mine) 
It was the social, moral, and political ambivalence which was held responsible for the 
emergence of a traditionalist-conservative search of a new Order.69 Indeed, for 
Baltac1oglu, those who experienced rapid modernization had to handle the dualities 
and ambivalence in cultural, political and economic structures. He pointed out that they 
were a generation of adaptation who were squeezed between the new and the old. 70 
Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals were sensitive to the all-embracing crises of 
transition to modernity. 71 
Traditionalist Conservatism, Kemalism and Radical Modernism 
Traditionalist-conservative circle stood for the consolidation of a new sense of 
belonging and Order since religious conceptions of society and politics could not carry 
the nation to the future. 72 Safa in his Anahtar Arayan Diinya (The World in Search for 
68 Baltac10glu, "Koy, Egitmen ve Ogretmenleri," p. 16. See Baltac10glu, "Din ZorbaliiJ,'' (Religious Despotism) 
Yeni Adam. 627 (December 3, 1949), p.l. For a similar point of view, see Tun<;, "Eski Ve Yeni Dilnya 
Gofil:?lerimiz." See also 01ken, "Tii.rkiye D1~mda Tii.rk<;iililk -Realist ve tlmi Tii.rk<;iililk," (Turk.ism Outside 
Turkey - Realist and Scientific Turkism) tstanbul. (March I, 1946), pp. 6-7, ·'Hayali-Siyasi ve Hakiki 
Tii.rk<;iiliik," (Imaginery-Political and GenuineTurkism) lstanbul. (March 15, 1946), pp. 2-3. According to 01ken, 
distinctive characteristic of genuine Turkish philosophers, such as Ibn Heysen (Alhazen) and Ibn Sina (Avicenna) 
was their realist philsophies. See 01ken, "'Tii.rkiye'de Idealizm Temayiilii," p. 930. 
69 -· Ulken, Ask Ahlala, p. 164. 
70 Baltac1oglu, ·'Inti.kal Devrinde Y~yan Adam," (Man Living in the Age of Adaptation) Yeni Adam. 136 
(August 13, 1936), p. 3. Also 01ken, "Tanzimat ve Hiimanizma," pp. 689-94. 
71 Tun<;, "'Gen<;lik Nereye Gidiyor?" (Where is the Youth Heading?) Cwnhuriyct. (June 7, 194:!). 
n Twi<;, "'Milliyet ideali ve Topyekun Terbiye." Also see 01ken, "Millet Nedir, Ne Degildir'?" (What is or is not 
Nation?) Millet ve Tarih Suuru, p. 178. 
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a Guide) affirmed that the contemporary world was in a crisis and it revealed itself as 
an existential ambivalence. According to Safa, a new sense of order had to be 
consolidated. 73 Comparing the tempo of life in the Ottoman era with the Republican 
one, Baltac1oglu also bespoke of the modem crisis: 
We were all educated in the period of Abdulhamid II. This period had many 
shortcomings. Nevertheless there was not a disorder in the schools of this period. The 
reason for that was not absolute rule. but the absence of "value crisis" in the society ... 
Republican regime introduced a grand revolution. For ages we were trying to Europeanize 
through ages. The Republican regime fulfilled this task at once. However. the tremor was 
tremendous since we e:\-perienced a twcrsided change: On the one hand. we broke out the 
ties \lith the Islamic civilization. and on the other. we faced \\ith the threat of 
assimilating into the national cultures of the Western countries. 74 
Although the social, economic and political crises m Ottoman-Turkish 
polity emerged due to the confrontation between the modern and traditional and 
became salient by the beginning of the Tanzimat era, they had not been resolved 
until the establishment of the Republican regime in 1923. 75 For the traditionalist-
conservative circle, those political and social crises were modern phenomena. 
Indeed, the Turkish vision of modernity and the main social and political forces 
which shaped, it had begun to weigh in politics by the beginning of the twentieth 
century in the turbulent atmosphere of the Second Constitutional era (1908-1920). 
In contemporary social and political theory, the term modernity has widely 
been used to imply a new state of consciousness in rupture from the religiously-
oriented Weltanshauung of the traditional society. 76 In the Turkish case, Kemalism 
signifies this modern scientific and philosophical consciousness which broke with 
73 Safa, "Anahtar Arayan Diinya," (The World in Search for a Guide) Cumhuriyet. (July 7, 1939). 
74 Baltac1oglu, ·'Deger Buhram," (The Value Crisis) Yeni Adam, 373 (February 19, 1942), p.2. See Baltac1oglu, 
'·Tezat," (The Contradiction) Yeni Adam. 3 (January 15, 1934), p.l, "Demokraside Terbiye," (Education in 
Democracy) Yeni Adam, 4 (January 15, 1934), p . .2, ·'Jnlalab Edebiyatt Ne Olabilir?" p.7. For Baltaetoglu one of 
the impacts of modernity on intellectual stratum was alienation. See Baltac1oglu, '·Halk ve Aydmlar;· (People 
and Intellectuals) Yeni Adam. 582 (February 21, 46), pp. 2. l l. For a similar point of view, see Safa. "T\irk 
Munevverlerini Tilrld~tirmek." For the alienation of intellectuals, see Olken, Ask Ahlala., p. V. See also Twt~, 
··oevlet ve Millet," "Eski ve Yeni Dtinya Go~lerimiz, ,. ··Milli yet ideali ve Topyekun Milli T erbiye .. , 
75 Baltac1oglu, "Kill.tiirii Kurtarmak Lazun," p . .2, See also Baltac1oglu, "T\irk Nedir?" (What is Turk?) Yeni 
Adam. 364 (December 18, 194 l ), p. 2. For Baltac1oglu's characterization of the traditional religious order, see 
Baltac1oglu, "Koy, Egitmen ve Ogretmenleri," pp. 16-7. Dlken. "Bizde Tilrk~ultik, Geciktiren Sebepler - Dog~ 
- Bilyii~fi," <Our Turkism, Reasons for its Be~ -Its Birth- Development) lstanbul. (February I, 1946), p. 3. 
76 See Anthony Giddens, The Conseguences of Modemitv (Stanford: CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 
Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modem Age (Stanford: CA: Stanford University Press, 
199 l ); M. Featherstone ed., Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity (London: Sage, 1990). 
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the older religious tradition. As depicted by one of the founding figures of the 
traditionalist conservatism, 
if we try to explain Kemalism insofar as to its original sources. we will find an 
original life conception absent in any other political and social regimes: more than 
that we \\ill sui generis find a conception of universe. We can characterize this 
conception as ·creativity· but not as ·novelty" as understood by some others. 77 
For the traditionalist-conservative circle, Kemalism, as illustrated by Baltac1oglu 
and detailed by Safa in Turk Devrimine Bak1§lar, represented a new cosmology 
which was based on creativity rather than symbolizing a novelty. In a similar vein, 
Olken, in The Medeniyetin Yiiriiyii§ii (The March of Civilization) characterized 
revolutions as historical moments that linked the past utopia of a civilization to a 
future hope. In his words: 
Most parts of the old are assimilated into the New. while most are eliminated. These 
transformations in the ernlution of the civilization should be viewed not as 
destruction. but as revolution. It is not like that an organ dies and gives birth to the 
other. But. everything progresses through revolutions. 78 
Traditionalist conservatives were looking for some reason to believe that 
Kemalism, which represented creativity rather than novelty, had a history behind it. 
They were trying to show that Kemalist radicalism emerged due to the deepening 
of the cultural dualities caused by the previous reform acts. What they had tried to 
maintain was that Kemalist creationist modernism was an historical attempt to 
make a synthesis between vivid and living cultural and historical constants with a 
vision of a future modem society. 
Modernism and Traditionalist Conservatism 
Though the first modernist drives in Ottoman-Turkish polity emerged by the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, their unwholesome influence on the cultural 
and political system did not appear until the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
As we have already depicted in the previous chapters, modern [read westernized] 
social and political forms gradually penetrated into the fabric of the traditional 
77 Baltac10glu., "Halkevleri," (People's Houses) Yeni Adam. 2f8 (March 9, 1938), p.2. 
78 Olken, ·'Medeniyetin YOrU~" p. 90. 
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Ottoman society and by the nineteenth century, they were revealed by the 
intelligentsia located especially in cosmopolitan urban areas of the Ottoman 
Empire, in various forms. It was first within the ranks of civil and military 
bureaucracy and in the most urbanized, non-Muslim populated regions of the 
former Empire that the revisionist demands for grand Islamic tradition had 
emerged. Various currents of thought had tended to provide answers for the 
reasons of the emergence of new social relations and political relations. New 
answers on the nature of universe, society, and on the function of positive sciences 
in daily life were formulated and all had displayed the impacts of modernity on 
traditional Ottoman-Turkish polity. According to Olken, new political ideologies, 
such as Neo-Ottomanism, Turkism or even Islamism, had emerged with the claim 
to provide novel answers to the problems of social and political instability. 79 
These social and political constraints had resulted in the emergence of new 
vision of the world among the Ottoman intelligentsia which appraised the role of 
human subject in creating a new world. Seen from this perspective, the movement 
of constitutionalism, which started by the end of nineteenth century, and which 
undermined the authority structure of the Ottoman Empire, can be regarded as 
civil and/or military bureaucracy's demand for a rational transformation of the 
traditional political system. Indeed, whether revolutionary or reformist, such 
political demands had undermined the traditional Ottoman political system which 
was based on hierarchy, military power and absolutism of the Sultanate and divine 
powers of Caliphate. For Olken, modernization [read westernization], which has 
been characterized by deepening crises in politics and social life, also implied 
society's evolution from a closed to an open system. 80 Moreover, one of the most 
significant features of modernization was the transformation of relations in the 
79 See Olken., "Biz.de Tiirkyilliigil Geciktiren Sebepler - Dogu~u - Buyu~u.,·· p. 3; Tuny, '"Yeni Tilrk Kadlm ve 
Ruhi Miinasebetleri Meselesi, ·• (The New Turkish Woman and the Problem of Her Psychological Relations) inlBm, 1, 
2 (May, 15, 1938), p. 154; Safa," Fikir Hiirriyeti," (The Freedom of Thought) Cmaralu, 8 (September 27, 1941), p. 5. 
80 .. 
See Ulken, ··Dogu ve Bat1," (East and West) Millet ve Tarih SuYm, pp. 99-102. 
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economic realm. 81 In sum, in line with what Olken had illustrated, it can be said that 
diffusion of the capitalist system and the creation of new demands for the revision of 
the traditional system had imposed certain social, economic and political constraints on 
the Ottoman-Turkish polity. 82 
For Anthony Giddens, who strictly emphasizes the question of discontinuity in 
transition to modernity, the basic characteristics of this rupture from the traditional 
system are shaped by the dynamics of capitalism, industrialism, and the nation state. 
For Giddens, modem society emerged in the bosom of the traditional society through 
an interaction among these structures. 83 The main characteristic of this transition to 
modernity, has been delineated by Giddens, as the experience of a generalized sense of 
discontinuity,84 which were manifested in the literary, philosophical and political 
domains. 
In this respect, Kemalism was the political manifestation of this historical 
consciousness of discontinuity. It also provided a refined ideological terminology on 
the nature and functions of the nation state structures, and the transformation of the 
traditional society to a modem capitalist one. Disjunctions and discontinuities of 
modernity, on which Kemalism built up its political and social vocabulary, also paved 
way to the emergence of new political discourses, such as traditional conservatism, 
new social groupings, new hopes and fears within the framework drawn by the 
modernizing state. 
81 Baltac1oglu, ~Milliyet Terbiyesi V," (Education of Nationality V) Yeni Adam. 227 (May 4, 1939) p. 14. For 
Tunv's point on transition from the traditional closed peasant society to open modem urban one, see Tuny, 
"Istikbal ivin Aranan Yeni Ufuklar," Also Tuny, "Para Hirs1 Kar~1smda Millet ve Devlet," (Nation and State 
Against the Ambition for Money) Cumhuriyet. (November 15, 1942), "Bugtinkii Amerikan ~cesi ve Dilnya 
Kurtul~ Tasavvuru,'' (Contemporary American Thought and the Imagination for the Liberation of the World) 
Cumhuriyet. (April 18, 1943), "Devlet ve Millet." For impacts of capitalist system on traditional Ottoman 
structure, see Dogu Ergil and Robert Rhodes, "The Impact of World Capitalist System on Ottoman Society," 
Islamic Culture, XL VIII (1974), pp. 77-91. For further elaboration on Ottoman system in the classical era. see 
Huri Cihan lslamoglu, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economv (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987). Also see Bruce McGowan, "The Study of Land and Agriculture in the Ottoman Empire within the Con text 
of an Expanding World Economy in the 17th and 18th Centuries," International Journal of Turkish Studies, 11 
(1981), pp. 57-63. 
82 Olken ,"M~tiyetin TereddUt Devri," pp. 769-78. 
83 Giddens, The Nation State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 64. 
84 See Baltac1oglu, ~Milliyet Terbiyesi V," p. 14. 
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A radical transformation in the social, political and economic organization of 
the parochial traditional religiously-framed society took place in the first decade of the 
Republic when the Kemalists fostered industrialism to promote the welfare of the 
citizens. Baltac1oglu, like Giddens, maintained that the modem state of consciousness 
on new social, political and economic practices developed by the emergence of modem 
nation state, capitalism and industrialism. 85 For Baltac1oglu, nation and national 
consciousness implied the historical disjunction between the religious and secular 
cosmologies. In his definition of a nation, it was a society which was based on a new 
functional and professional division of labour among the groups who, with a sense of 
solidarity, come together around common tastes, religion, language and morality. 86 
For Baltac10glu a nation was not only a religious or political unit. A nation was an 
economic organization based on specialized economic groups and characterized by 
secularism, rationalism and industrialism. The dynamism of the nation-system was 
grounded in urban centers since these centers were not territorial but economic units. 
In urban centers citizens were organized along a professional-associational basis. 87 As 
revealed by Tun~, new sources of wealth and power were also created in urban 
centers. 88 Thus, focusing on the changing functions of the state in maintaining stability 
and order in modem society, Thus stated: 
Like all the beings the state and nation have been subjected to organiz.ational and 
functional changes. We have to free ourselves from the weakness of imagining absolute 
and never-changing state and nation. It is only in this way that we can be realistic about 
the facts in their contexts ... Today, liberalism and socialism are on the agenda with 
respect to the state and nation... In our time, states are accorded with such significant 
responsibilities as providing the division of labour and harmonization of the clashing 
interests of classes and different social segments. 89 
Changing political, economic and social relations in modem society had also 
altered the place of intelligentsia, especially of its westemist stratum in the power 
85 Baltac1oglu. "Tezat," p. l, "Demokraside Terbiye," p.2 
86 Baltac10glu, "Milliyet Terbiyesi VI;· <Education of Nationality VI) Yeni A<lam, 228 (May 11, 1939), p. 14. 
For Baltac1oglu's critical evaluations on Gokalp and Renan's conceptions of nation, see Baltac1oglu, "Ananecilik 
ve Muhafazakarhk," p.2. 
87 See Baltac1oglu, "Milliyet Terbiyesi v;• p. 14. 
88 For economic constraints on modem state, see Tuner, "Para Hxrs1 Kar~1smda Millet ve Devlet. ., 
89 Tuner, '"Devlet ve Millet." Also 01ken, ·'Zit Kuvvetlerin Yarad1~1;· pp. 1-7, ·'Hiirliik ve MesullUk," (Freedom 
and Responsibility) istanbul, (October I, 1946), pp. 24 
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structure and provided new roles for them.9() Traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia 
was placed on this new politicaL economic and social cleavages in modem society and 
formulated a philosophico-political perspective with reference to the structuration of 
the "modem" nation-state over society. Those gradual processes of change 
manipulated by the modem state became stimuli for the emergence, development and 
circulation of traditionalist ideals and aspirations, seeking to provide new answers for 
the nature of the social order and new means of maintaining stability, order and 
continuitv. Traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia aimed at providing a novel 
philosophico-political position which would foster both the potentials of change and 
would deal with its disruptions, without abandoning the creative spirit of modernity. In 
this respect, nation state and capitalism were central to Kemalist and traditionalist-
conservative visions of modernity which meant that both shared capitalist world-views. 
Ulken tried to show that prior to the Kemalist Revolution, social groups were 
faced with the pathologies of transition to a modem society.91 Former political visions 
of modernism, which were articulated by the Turkish middle classes, aimed to ensure 
'freedom' in philosophy, 'liberalism' in economy and 'constitutionalism' in politics.92 
Yet, those former political visions of modernism were squeezed between conflicting 
philosophico-political claims. They were both "modem," in essence, since they aimed 
to overthrow the traditional political institutions; nationalist, due to the claim to revive 
policies that would protect newly emerging middle classes; Islamist, since their 
objective was to consolidate the powers of caliphate; and lastly, constitutionalist and 
liberal under western influence.93 For Safa, the pre-revolutionary era was also 
characterized by the crises and dualities that emerged due to the co-existence of the 
modem and traditional.94 The prevailing pre-capitalist and parochial structure of the 
90 For an elaboration on changing roles of intellectuals, see Zygmund Bawnann, Legislators and Interpreters: On 
Modernitv. Postmodernitv and Intellectuals (Ithaca, N. Y.:Comell University Press, 1987). 
91 Dlken, "Me~ruiyetin Tereddfid Devri," pp. 769-78; Safa, Tilrk Inlulabma Bakl~lar, pp. 27-74. 
92 .. . . Ulken, 1b1d., p 770. 
93 Ibid., p. 771. 
94 See Safa, Tilrk Inlulabma Baki~lar, pp. 27-97. 
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Ottoman Empire were held responsible for the philosophico-political dualisms and 
contradictory political claims articulated by prior rhetorics of modernization 
(muasrrl~ma) and westernization. 
Even though Kemalism was not the only political formulation of modernism. it 
was the only one which seized state power to consolidate its peculiar vision of 
modernism. 95 Olken had placed anarchism, disorder and alienation as the dangerous 
possibilities at the center of transition to a new sense of modern morality. 96 Thus, the 
Kemalist vision of modernism which transmuted the isolated Ottoman subject to a 
citizen with a new autonomy and sense of public belonging to the newly created 
secular national identity, had been praised for avoiding these dangers. 97 
Institutionalization and circulation of traditionalist-conservative ideas during the 
Kemalist era ironically characterized Kemalism as the unique revolutionary attempt in a 
Muslim world which successfully secularized politics and daily life. Traditionalist 
conservatism together with Kemalism tended to postulate the most distinctive features 
of "modem" political and economic life, namely the modem-nation state, capitalist 
market, and citizenship. Kemalism and traditionalist conservatism fostered the growth 
of wealth, expansion of a new division of labour under the constraints of capitalist 
economy and tutelage of the modem nation state and the invention of a Republican 
government based on the principle of popular sovereignty. 
95 Baltac1oglu, "All.!. Umdeye Gore Terbiye, Cumhuriyet Terbiyesi'' (Education According to the Six Principles, 
Republican Education) Yeni Adam. 222 (March 30, l 938), p.14 
96 .. 
Ulken Ask AhlakJ. pp. V-VIII. 
97 For characterization of the new Republican secular identity, see Baltac1oglu, '·Yeni Devletin Killtiir 
Programlari," (The Cultural Programs of the New State) Yeni Adam. 66 (April 4, 1935), p. 10, "'Laik Terbiyenin 
Kendini istiyoruz." p. 10, For peculiarity of Kemalism, see Baltac1oglu, "Hilrriyeti Niirin Severim," (Why I Like 
Freedom?) Yeni Adam. 217 (February 24, 1938), p.2, "Halkevleri,"' p. 2, "'Tilrk Rejimini Ni\in Severim." (Why I 
Like the Turkish Regime?) Yeni Adam. 247 (September 21, 1939), p.2, "'Eski ve Yeni"' (The Old and the New) 
Y eni Adam, 340 (July 3, I 941 ), p.2, "Cumhuriyete 1naruyorum," (I Believe in Republic) Y eni Adam. 357 
(October 30, 1941), p.2," Soysuzlar," (The Degenerates) Yeni Adam. 412 (November 19, 1942), p.2, "'Milli 
Mant.J.ga Dogru,"' (Towards the National Rationale) Yeni Adam. 447 (July 22, 1943), p.2. "Bizim 
Cumhuriyetimiz," (Our Republic) Yeni Adam. 513 (October 26, 1944), p. 1, "Yeni Adamtn Yolu," (The Path of 
Yeni Adam) Yeni Adam. 613 (September I, 1949), p. 2, ''lnkdap ve Demokrasi," (Revolution and Democracy) 
Yeni Adam. 655 (June 22, 1950), p.2. 
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"Conserving" in Conditions of Kemalist Modernism 
Traditionalist-conservative ideas flourished in the Kemalist power structure. The 
Kemalist and traditionalist-conservative body of thought, both of which emphasized 
the uniqueness of the political institutionalization of the Kemalist state and authenticity 
of national culture, developed fully only after the dissolution of the traditional religious 
cosmology.98 Having favorably commented on Safa's emphasis on the uniqueness of 
nations, Tun9 argued that it was the nation but not religion which was essential for 
modem ages. In his words 
Safa says "In this path of progress. that there is no other way .... but nationality to reach 
the ideals of nation human and God" In fact. even the great religions which aimed at 
human unity -consensus among them set a side- could not stay aloof from centuries-long 
wars .... Humanity is just a spiritual consideration. It does not exist either in physical and 
spiritual sphere. In this scheme there are only humans who are visible through their 
bonds with national collectives. 99 
In line with Tun9's evaluations, Baltac10glu argued that every political regime in the 
world was national and unique. Thus, like every cultural institution, the state's 
uniqueness would be shaped by the national tradition. '00 This emphasis on culture as a 
realm in which the universal structures of modernity, such as the nation-state and 
capitalism would be re-traditionalized was characteristic for Baltac1oglu's 
traditionalism. 
· Although claims to conserve had existed long before the Kemalist revolution, 
those creeds to conserve also experienced a radical rupture after the institutionalization 
of Kemalist modernism. Former claims to conserve had limited themselves to the 
defense of the religious order and tradition. However, as revealed by Turn~, the modem 
creed to conserve was different from the previous ones. This creed to conserve had to 
find new means to foster the creative evolution of the society. Accordingly, 
the majority of humanity is composed of mediocrats. Their ethics is constructed by 
tradition and custom. Insisting on tradition eventually requires being conservative and 
avoiding new ethical formations. Habits weaken conscience .... Under ordinary conditions 
this kind of mediocratic ethics ean be counted as perfect, with respect to the daily life and 
98 Sec Tww, "Milliyet tdeali ve Topyekun Milli Terbiye," "Devlet ve Terbiye," "Devlet ve Millet." 
99 Tllll<;:. ··Millet ve tnsan:· (Nation and Man) Cumhuriyet. (April 7, 1943), "Ingiliz Karakteri," (The British 
Character) Cumhuriyet, (March 4, 1945). 
too See Baltac1oglu "'Soysuzlar," p. 2. See also Dlken, Ask Ahlaki, p. 167. 
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preservation of the existing ethical order. However. today's societies' experience is not 
limited to conservatism. They are also subject to a dynamic technical and cultural 
pressure which require progress. In this respect. the ethics of the order is in need of the 
accompaniment of a new ethics which would lead the way to progress.... ln our time 
almost all the nations have to create and organize the ethics of the new conditions. in a 
Id f . l . 101 wor o on-gomg revo utlons. 
For the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, like Baltac1oglu. Tuner and Safa, the 
modem creed to conserve was ultimately a search for overlapping forces of "change" 
and "order" which formed the constitutive categories and institutional structure of 
modernity. In this respect, Turn; maintained that Safa rightly focused on the realities of 
the nation as the constitutive category of order in the modem world. 102 In his words: 
we know that in each period. every particular society has its O\\n set of usage and 
customs. accepted common rules according to their own life conditions and a ~form'" and 
"order' determined by the relationship with each other. There is no organism and society 
without a form and order. 103 
In this respect, emergent national forms demanded to find new means of order which 
were different from the forces and forms of order of the preceding society. As revealed 
by Tun~ and Safa, modem times were characterized by transition to pure national 
order; from cosmopolitanism to the omnipotent nationalism in which history and 
culture were responsible for differing senses of "highest social and political good," 
responsible for differing national orders in varying societies. 104 Thus, Tun~ pointed out 
that what Kemalism had tried to do in Turkey was to formulate the new meaning of 
the highest social and political good that revealed itself as a search for finding out a 
national style and form_ Kemalism, for Tun~, as in the case of Safa's Turk Devrimine 
Bak1~lar, represented the historical attempt to find this national style and form_ 105 In 
this respect, Kemalist politics, which had been praised for its emphasis on culture and 
Turkishness, was a legitimate frame of orientation for traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals aiming to understand the new parameters of national Order. The foremost 
101 Tww, "Ahlakhhgm <;~idleri ve Zamanmuzm Ahlak.t," (Types of Virtue and Ethics of Our Age) 
Cwnhuriyet. (March 28, 1943). Also Dlken, "Bizde Tilrk~illiigli Geci.k"tiren Sebeplt:r - Dog~u - Biiyil~ii," p. 3. 
102 Tun~, "Millet ve lnsan." Also see Olken, "Hayali -Siyasi ve Hakiki Tiirk~iiliik," pp 2-3. 
103 Tun~, "Ahlakhhgm <;~idleri ve Zarnannmzm Ahlak.t." 
104 Tun~, "Millet ve lnsan." Olken, "Tanzimata Kar~1," (Against the Tanzimat) Millet ve Tarih Suuru, pp. 22-
33, '"Tannmat Devrinde Tiirk<;Uliik," (Turkism in the Tanzimat Era) lstanbul. (February 15, 1946), pp. 2-3. 
lOS See also Tun<;, "Milliye~ilik." "Devlet ve Millet," "Milliyet ldeali ve Topyekun Milli Terbiye.'' 
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question before the traditionalist-conservative intellectual, as revealed in Safa's Turk 
Devrimine Bak1~/ar, was to re-traditionalize, to contextualize and to historicise 
Kemalist modernism without abandoning its creative spirit and to reconcile it with 
national tradition. 106 
Contrary to the political objective of the old claims to conserve, which Olken 
depicted as maintaining the unity of the Islamic religious community, it was the values 
of the nation that were politically defined by Kemalism and which the traditionalist 
conservatism wished to conserve or reform. 107 Thus, Olken claimed that the pathology 
of those former religious claims to conserve had been inherent in their distance to the 
culture of their own society. The question of culture and the need to conserve the 
culture had been incorporated into the political agenda by the rise of nations and 
nationalism. Based on this, Ulken claimed that the new need to conserve at the same 
implied a new consciousness to conserve the national heritage. Thus, Olken set the 
traditionalist-conservative task for the intelligentsia to find out the essential cultural 
values and norms which constituted the nation as a unique political unit. 108 
In fact, traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia of the early Republican era was 
squeezed between the future and the past. The future-oriented utopian mentality of the 
radical positivist "westemists," who sought an ideal society, was countered by the anti-
westemist Islamic reaction which aimed to revive the Great Golden Age of the 
Prophet. 109 Until the enforcement of Kemalist modernism, nobody seemed to be the 
"owner" of the "present." Thus, Tune;: stated: 
It should not be misunderstood that we are destined to live \\'ith the legacy of our history. 
The issue of legacy is complicated and ambiguous in both organic and spiritual spheres .... 
In this respect there is less that we (can) inherit from the past. We have to create almost 
everything for the present. Nations are not static but dynamic essences. They are subject 
to continuous change in relation to time, environment. work and understanding. We have 
106 Safa, Tiirk Inktlabma Bak1slar, pp. I07-IO. 
107 Dlken, "Tanzimat Devrinde Tiirki;Uliik. .. p. 3. 
108 See also Dlken, '"Biz.de Tiirk~iilugu Gecll..1.iren Sebepler - Dog~u - Biiyii)il~ii," p. 3. For Safa's evaluation 
on the uniqueness of nation.. see Safa, "'Kendi Kendimiz Olmakta Isranrrnz," (Our Insistence on Being Ourselves) 
Tasvir-i Efkar quoted in Yeni Adam. 344 (July 31, 1941 ), p. 13. Also Safa, "Tarih ve Milliyet~ilik," (History and 
Nationalism) CmaraltJ.. 37 (June 6, 1942 ), p. 6. 
109 Baltac1oglu., '·Eski ile Yeni, Olii ile Diri." pp. 2, 8-9. 
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acquired all that we could from the past. Our main task is to construct the present and to 
prepare the future. 110 
A striking difference between Islamic traditionalism and traditionalist conservatism in 
the Republican era was the latter's world view which searched for those things worthy 
of preserving at the moment of this discontinuity characterized by the consolidation of 
the structures of modemity. 111 In this respect, traditionalist conservatism also 
represents a rupture from ahistorical religious creeds to conserve since things which 
were praised as worth preserving were the nation state and capitalist order, but not the 
universal religious tradition. Thus, though traditionalism could find common grounds 
with conservatism, as stated by Baltac10glu, or could share a lot with revolutionism, as 
in the case of Safa, Baltac1oglu further assured that his traditionalism was not the kind 
of"conservatism" represented by religious reactionaries. 112 
Traditional conservative opinions, having been stimulated by the new 
culturalism, were developed to formulate new terms of legitimacy for the nation state 
and to promote the development of new Turkish personality. Thus, Baltac1oglu argued 
as follows: 
When obliged men might submit unwillingly. The nuance is that if this submission is due 
to an intrinsic conformity, it does not connote force or threat, but freedom and pleasure. 
As a subject of Turkish Republic I ask myself: whether my compliance is a result of force 
or will ? My answer confirms that this compliance is a result of freedom. Because there is 
an absolute congruity between the principles of the Turkish regime and my 
nal . 113 perso tty. 
It is noteworthy that traditionalist-conservative ideals and opinions had also had a 
catalyzing effect for the legitimacy of post-revolutionary Kemalism. Traditionalist 
conservative's attempts to reconcile positivist radicalism with tradition, customs and 
religion and to place religion, custom and tradition in their proper place m the world of 
110 Turn;, "Devlet ve Millet." 
111 S B l ·1 'M . Imi. . • ,., " ee a tac1og u, ·· Urtec1 ~un. p. -, 
112 Baltac1oglu, "Ananecilik ve Muhafazakarhk.," p.'.?, '"Milli Anane," (National Tradition) Yeni Adam. 366 
(December I, 1942), p.2, ''Yeni Adamm Yolu," p. 2. Safa, Tilrk Inlalabma Baktslar, p. 91. 
113 Baltac1oglu, ''Tilrk Inkilabiru Niirin Severim," ·p. 2, "Tilrke Dogru," (Towards the Turk) Yeni Adam. 329 
(April 17, 1941), p. 2, "Dil Uz.atanlara" (To Those Who Defame) Yeni Adam. 480 (March 9. 1944), p.2, ''Maarif 
Vekilinin Genelgesi Ozerine," (On the Circular of the Minister of Education) Yeni Adam.. 486 (April 20, 1944), 
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"Ahlakta Ttirke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Morality) Yeni Adam. 372 (February 12, 1942), p. '.?. 
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modernity had provided a history to the Kemalist vision of modernity. Thus, Safa 
assured that 
in history. no civiliz.ation went under total destruction. Instead there had been an 
evolutionary process of the replacement by an emerging order of values ... Rernlution 
takes place. not as an all-out destruction of a system of nlues. but as the construction of 
the connection between the old and the new. In the historv of Revolutions. there are no 
dead ci,iliz.ations. but ties which link the old to the new. 11.i 
Meanwhile, Kemalism was indebted to traditionalist-conservative ideals in fonnulating 
the legitimate theoretical framework of the revolutionary practices. Traditionalist 
conservatism had fonnulated a view of dynamic national tradition in reference to which 
the legitimate tenns of order in modem society could be restored. Baltac10glu' s 
"traditionalism" was an example of how Kemalist radicalism was reconciled with living 
tradition and history. 115 In his reply to Safa's article, Esasta Anla§mak Sarmr (It is 
Essential to Agree in Principle), Baltac1oglu noted that there was a strict relationship 
between his traditionalism and nationalism where the fonner is the outcome of his 
nationalism. 116 Baltac10glu further maintained that there were beliefs, myths, tales, 
proverbs, customs, prejudices that linked the present society to its original ancestors. 
He added that it was neither in our hands to utterly eradicate the past nor was 'it a 
beneficial act. The original essence of national entity, which transcended the realms of 
reason and technique was embedded in this deep and dark mentality. 117 For him, the 
idea of nation, when seen from this perspective, in fact, denoted a sense of continuity 
in history and authentic cultural experience. The idea of nation meant statis, stability, 
and unifonnity. For Baltac1oglu, "it is easy to establish a state, it is very difficult to 
make a nation, but it is impossible to create a tradition. " 118 The below quoted passage 
from his, Millet Nedir, Ne Degildir? (What is or is not Nation?) will get us closer to 
this particular conception of culture and tradition. In his words: 
114 Safa, ··Anupa Medeniyeti Yik1hyor mu?" (ls the European Civilization Collapsing?) Cmaralti, 45 (August l, 
1942), p. 5. 
us For typical examples, see Twt(f, "Devlet ve Millet." See also Baltac1oglu, Tarih ve Terbiye. 
116 Baltac1glu, "Milliyetctiligim," (My Nationalism) Yeni Adam 384 (May 7, 1942), p. 2. See also Safa;· Esasta 
Anl~mak Esastrr," (It is Essential to Agree in Principle) Tasvir'i Etkar. (April 15, 1942). 
117 Baltac1oglu, '"Mi.lliyetctiligim," p.2 
118 Bal ,v;I "Mi.JI" Anan ., .., taClvi;.i U, I e, p. - . 
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I observe the Turkish nation. Its religion. language. ethics. law. arts are changing. 
However. there are such aspects as the linguistic mentality and perception of which are 
immune to change. These are cited as legacy, tradition. custom. Traditions are those ties 
which do not and cannot change and thus which fonn the link between the past and 
present and between present and past .... We should be confident that there is no nation 
. h d' . 119 E base . wit out tra 1t10n. ( mp s are mme) 
Baltaetoglu made a distinction between li\ing and decayed/dead tradition, which, for him, 
was essential to draw the distinction between his traditionalism and others' reactionarism. 
The defense of dead tradition, for Baltaetoglu, was the basic conviction of religious reaction 
against modernism. Rising awareness of the creativity of the living culture, which had been 
praised as a modern phenomenon, was regarded as an attempt to shed light on the 
authenticity of the nation. 120 Thus, genuine modernism came to mean a return to the 
natural traits of the nation where religion and ethics would be re-valued as dispositions of 
the autonomous individuality and as a part of the national tradition, like customs and 
folklore. Baltaetoglu's traditionalism, Peyami Safa's conservatism which had been framed 
by Tuny's Bergsonism, Olken's moralism and culturalism provided a set of ideas and 
aspirations to the Kemalist state elites and elicited an awareness that living tradition was an 
amalgam of religion, ethics, language and customs that were ultimately responsible for the 
uniqueness of culture and politics in modern societies. In the 1940s, subsequent to the 
consolidation of the Kemalist regime, Balta.cioglu further emphasized the place and function 
of religion in modern society. According to him, religion, unlike science, was not a logical 
construct. Religion was a logical construct as much as ethics, law and art. Like ethics, law 
and art, religion had a unique rationale in itself Unlike science which derived its legitimacy 
from logical reasoning, or ethics which derived its legitimacy from customs, or law which 
119 See Baltac1oglu, "Millet Nedir, Ne Degildit1" (What is or is not Nation?) Yeni Adam. 416 (December 17, 
1942), p.2. Also see Baltac1oglu, ''Tiirk Nedir," p. 2, "Tilrke Ogut," (Advise to the Turk) Yeni Adam. 346 
(August 14, 1941 ), pp. 2, IO, "Milliye~iliglln," p. 2. For Baltac1oglu's traditionalism, see Bedi Ziya Egemen, 
·Tilrke Dogru," (Towards the Turk) Yeni Adam. 430 (March 25, 1943), pp. 8-9, l I. For Safa's short note on the 
same topic, see Safa "Milli Olmak Zorlugu," Tasvir-i Efkar quoted in Y eni Adam. p. 11. Also Safa, '·Psikoloji ve 
Milliyet1Yilik," (Psychology and Nationalism) Cmaraltt. 40 (June 27, 1942), p.5. For O'Iken's views on the 
question of inheritence, see O'Iken, Veraset ve Cemiyet. For O'Iken, nationalism was a consciousness on the 
unique history and living culture. The growth of an awareness on the national history signed the trimnph of concrete 
over the abstract and fonnal. See Olk.en, "Billie Tiirk~ugo Gecil'tiren Sebepler -~ - Bil~" p.3. 
120 Baltac1oglu, ''Gelenek," (Tradition) Yeni Adam. 417 (December 24, 1942), p. 2, "Eski ve Yeni," pp. 2, 8-9. 
See also Baltac1oglu, ''Dinliler, Dinsizler ve Softalar" (Believers, Atheists and Religious Bigots) Yeni Adam. 
618 (October 6, 1949), p. l. For further infonnation, see Baltac10glu, "Ananecilik ve Muhafan1karhk," p. 2, 
"Zavallt Gelenek," (Poor Tradition) Yeni Adam. 484 (April 6, 1944), p. 3. Safa, "Dilnyada 1nsan Var MI?'" (Is 
There Man in the World?) Yeni Mecmua, (July 18, 1941), p. 4. 
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derived from rules, or art which derived from beauty, religion derived its legitimacy directly 
from the so-called "illegitimate" mysterious experience. 121 This emphasis on the place of 
religion and ethics in modern societies and tradition as the backbone of historical nation 
always occupied a central place in the development of a unique traditionalist-conservative 
11"' vocabulary. --
Traditionalist Conservatism on the Structures of Kemalist Modernism 
Traditionalist conservatism, with its emphasis on culrure and history, juxtaposed tradition to 
the Kemalist vision of modernity. What it sought was to develop a conceptual structure 
which would grasp the dynamics of unique instirutionalization of the structures of modernity, 
namely, the nation-state and capitalist market. Balt:acloglu elaborated this point as follows: 
There is not ·'Republic" but ·'Republics" like the Turkish Republic. American Republic, 
French Republic.... Republic is the common name of the regime based on people's 
sovereignty and is realized by nations in conformity with their varying national traditions 
in terms of language and culture and like all concepts it is nothing more than an abstract 
word What gives the value of Republic are events: real life events lived in the past 
experienced today and worth of living in the future! 123 
For Baltac1oglu, as well as for Safa, language, geography, customs, religion, tradition 
and history were responsible for the uniqueness of the national identity. Paraphrasing 
from Joseph de Maistre, one of the founding figures of the French conservative thought, 
in his DUnyada insan Var M1? (Is There Man in the World?) Safa backed this stand: 
Our Assemblies have wanted to make rule for Man But, a single man in the world is an utterly 
nonsensical dream.... I have seen . . . Italians, Russians... etc.; but I have not met with the 
creature called Man in all my life time. A rule made for all nations is me.ant not to be made for 
any of the nations. This is a pure abitraction., it is a scholastic work where the intellect operates 
according to an ideal hypothesis that addresses the man within an imaginary space. 124 
121 See Baltac1oglu, "Din Zorbahgi," p. 1. 
122 For, Ulken's point on Tun~'s emphasis on religiosity, see Olken "TUrkiye'de idealizm Temayillil," p. 930. 
See also Safa, "Allaha Dogru Yoneli~," (Turning Towards God) Tasvir, (October 13, 1945). 
123 Baltac1oglu, .. Bizim Cwnhuriyetimiz," p.2. See also Safa, "Diinya'da insan Var Mt?" p. 4. 
124 Safa. ibid. Also Safa, ·'Yeni Bir Diinyaya Hasret," (Longing for a New World) Cumhuriyel (January 12, 1938). For 
Bergson's significance, see Rasim Ozgen., "H. Bergson,'' Yeni Adam. 241 (August 10, 1939), pp. 6-7, "R Bergson," 
Yeni Adam. 242 (August 17, 1939), pp. 6-7; .. Henry Bergson: Asruruzm En Buyilk Filoz.ofu.,'. (H. Bergson: The Great.est 
Philosopher of Our Century) Y eni Adam. 217 (December 23, 1941 ), pp. 8-9. See also Raymond Millet, "Bergson 80' inci 
YtldonumO.," (80th Anniversary of Bergson) Yeni Adam. 273 (March 21, 1940), pp. 9,15 The question of cultural 
uniqueness was linked to philosophical relativism. See Baltac1oglu, ·-sosyete Hayatmda Nonna! ve Anonnal,'' (The 
Normal and the Abnonnal in Social Life) Yeni Adam, 354 (October 9, 1941), p.2. For relativism, also Baltactoglu, 
·'Bilgi Teorisi IX," (Epistemology IX) Yeni Adam. 162 (February 4, 1937), pp. 14-5, "Bilgi Teorisi X," (Epistemology 
X) Yeni Adam. 163 (February 11, 1937), p. 14. For Olken's note on the rise of historicist-relativist philosophy, see 
Olken, .. Fikir Ananesi," (The Tradition ofThought) ~ 1, 4 (July 15, 1938), p. 282 
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These criticisms of rationalism were prominently shaped by the Bergson isms of Turn; 
and Baltac10glu. 
In his, Inkilap Edebiyall Ne Olabilir? and Topluluk Tt!rb~yesi Ni<,:in 
Vi:remiyont=? (Why Can Not We Provide Communal Education?) Baltac1oglu 
characterized the distinguishing features of the new modem society. 125 For him, the 
new society would rise on the principles of republicanism, democracy, science, equality 
and industry and on the development of groups which would conduct their daily life on 
these multiple processes. 126 A similar stand had been developed by Dlken. l'.!7 For him, 
the citizen had to be taken as a model for modem man. The creation of citizen in 
modem society was based on the recognition of autonomy, individuality and individual 
freedom. Yet, for Ulken, as for Safa in Eski ve Yeni Hiirriyet (Old and New Freedom), 
freedom was not an absolute category. 128 Limits of freedom were drawn by the duties 
and obligations of citizenship shaped by the unique institutionalization of the political 
regime. 129 In a similar vein, Baltac1oglu maintained that 
We have shown in our essay entitled Dev/ette Turke Dogru, (Towards the Turk in the 
State) that there is not a single common state regime which would fit the political 
structure of all nations in the world In fact, there is not a single regime but regimes. And 
every state's regime is strictly bound to the political traditions of the nation of which it is 
a unique depiction. One of the cases that proves the correctness of this understanding is 
the Turkish political regime. Regarding the followings, I) Turkish political regime is a 
regime of its own. 2) Turkish regime is neither a continuation nor a mimicry of any other 
regime. 3) The rationale of the Turkish regime is not at the outside but is in itself 4) Six 
Principles, which characterize the Turkish state regime, are nothing more than Turkish 
political traditions. The practical conclusion to be deduced from these assumptions is this: 
Try to understand the Turkish regime by approximating it to liberalism, fascism nazism 
and communism is not to understand it at all. 130 
This point had also been elaborated by Safa as follows: 
125 Baltac1oglu, "Inlalap Edebiyat1 Ne Olabilir?" p. 7, "Topluluk Terbiyesi Ni~in Veremiyoruz," (Why Can not 
We Provide Communal Education'?) Yeni Adam. 172 <April 15, 1937), p. 8. See Olken, ·'Demokratik 
Cemiyetlerde nen Geri," (Back and Forth in Democratic Societies) !stanbul. (June IS, 1946), pp. 3-4. 
126 Baltac1oglu, '"Topluluk Terbiyesi Niirin Veremiyoruz," p. 8. For characteriz.ation of modern society, see 
Baltac10glu, "Milliyet Terbiyesi VI, .. p. 14. For new division of labour, see Baltac1oglu, '·t~boliirnilne Dogru." 
(Towards the Division of Labor) Yeni Adam, 507 (September 14. 1944), p. 2, ·'Deger Karga~s1," (The Value 
Disorder) Yeni Adam, 583 (February 28, 1946), p. 2. 
127 Olken, ··HQrriyet," (Freedom) Millet ve Tarilt Suuru, pp. 69-73. 
128 Olken, ibid., p. 72. Safa, '·Eski ve Yeni Hu.rriyet," (Old and New Freedom) Tasvir-i Etlcar. (July 17, 1941). 
t:!9 Olken, "Vazifo," (The Duty) Millet ve Tarilt Suuru, pp.73, 77. 
130 Baltac1oglu, ''Milli Mant1ga Dogru," p. 2. See also Olken "Hurluk ve Mesulluk," pp. 2-4 
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Those who aspire for a regime as a total replica of Western democracy are in a Yicious 
circle. Because there is no such model of democracy. We cannot observe a democracy 
which is born out of abstract legal formulae and which is not subject to national 
conditions. 131 
In this respect, Olken has further assured that "nationality is not a construct but 
consciousness of a kind of society which has unity in an existing life style, language, 
thought and labour ..... " 132 Meanwhile Safa assured that political regimes were based 
on unique institutionalization of cultural and traditional values. 133 In this line of 
thinking, Turn;: affirmed that the ultimate goal of the revolutions in Turkey, Russia, 
Germany and Italy was to define a unique national style. According to Tun9, style and 
man, style and nation were the same things, and, in fact, the nation was nothing more 
than a unique style. Tun9 reinstated that nations were unique cultural entities from 
which the revolutionary practices, which freed the creative folk spirit, would derive 
their political legitimacy. 134 Baltac1oglu, in similar lines, reaffirmed that 
democracy is a political regime; and like all other political regimes it adapts to the social 
body in which it functions. There is not one democracy, but there are democracies. Unity 
and/or compliance set aside, there is even contrast betv.·een the main principles among 
democracies. One should comprehend the term democracy in solitude, but with respect to 
the nation under consideration. 135 
The historical uniqueness of the Kemalist Revolution was elaborated in detail by the 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals of the young Republic. The creationist 
progressive approach, inspired from a Bergsonian philosophy and eminently elaborated 
by Tun9, was adopted by the traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia, in varying tones, 
and paved way to an emphasis on the realness of the nation state, its political 
institutions and capitalist market. 136 
131 Safa, "Demokrasi Ne Tercfime Edilebilir, Ne de intihal," (Democracy Can Neither Be Copied or Translated) 
Vakit quoted in Yeni Adam, 607 (August 15, 1946), p.10. Baltac1oglu, "Bizim Cumhuriyetimiz.," p. 44. 
132 Olken, "Hayali-Siyasi ve Hakiki Tfirkyillll.k," pp. 2-3. For his characterization of modem society and 
democracy, see Olken, "Demokratik Cemiyetlerde ileri Geri," pp. 3-4 
133 Safa, "Milliye~ginB~Hakikati,"(SomeTruthsaboutNationalism)Cmaraltd2(March 14, 1942),p. 5. 
134 Tuny, '"Milliyetyilik" 
135 Safa, "Demokrasi Kavrarm," (The Concept of Democracy) Haber quoted in Yeni Adam. 538 (April 19, 
1945), p. 9. For Baltac10glu's reply see, Yeni Adam. 538 (April 19, 1945), p. 9 For Olken's evaluations on 
democracy, see Olken, "Demokratik Cemiyetlerde heri Geri," pp. 3-4. 
136 For Baltac1oglu's stand on creationism, see Baltac1oglu, "Metodlu :;lilheye Dogru," (Towards Methodical 
Skepticism) Yeni Adam. 528 (February 8, 1945), p.2. For an appraisal of voluntarist 1..Teativism, see Tuny, 
"Milliyet Ideali ve Topyel.."1111 Milli Terbiye." 
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Traditionalist-conservative quest to "make" the history of modernity in order to 
sustain the legitimacy of the Kemalist revolutionary practices also had profound 
political implications. Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals and the Kemalist statist 
elites shared a common sense of irritation against the enemies of the new modem 
Order i.e., those who resisted the nation's free expression of itself. Expectedly, 
reactionary religious fanatics, cosmopolitans, and the defenders of the old Ottoman 
political and social institutions were identified as those who obstructed the 
development of the national culture. 137 
The peculiarity of Turkish traditionalist conservatism lied in the fact that it did 
not derive its discursive frame of reference from pre-modem traditional religious 
forms. On the contrary, it operated within the structures of modernity. Yet, as it had 
already been sketched by Ulken, in his ilim Bitaraf Mul1r? (Is Science Objective?), 
there was a vital philosophico-political question posed by the traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals in an age when blind trust was placed on rationalism associated with 
scientific reasoning. 138 Unshakable belief on evolution, progress and on the 
transformative capacity of science, according to Olken and Tun~, were characteristics 
of the new times and modem society. In Tun~'s words: 
In our time, there is a constant search for improvement, which arises out of an 
evolutionary and progressive perception. Thus, three different life styles can be observed 
in these civilizations (the old and the new) : In antique Greece faith was in beauty, in the 
Middle Ages it was in virtue, and in our time it is in progress. 139 
Then he asked the vital question, which shaped the traditionalist-conservative 
philosophico-political concerns in the post-revolutionary era, 
There is no doubt that modem civilization is more powerful and progressive than the 
others. But where and why do we progress and who are the beneficiaries of this progress? 
However we do not know these. But these questions contain crucial issues. The 
137 Baltac1oglu, ""lnsaniyet Var Ml?" (Is There Hwnanity?) Yeni Adam. 248 (September 28, 1939), p.2, ''Din 
Zorbahgi," p.l, "Dinliler, Din.~izler. Softalar," p.l, "Din Pedagojisi," (Pedagogy of Religion) Yeni Adam. 622 
(November 3, 1949), p. 2. Also see Tum;, "Devlet ve Millet," ··Eski ve Yeni Do.nya Go~lerimiz." Tun~ stated 
that reactions against the creative evolution of the society were the causes of all evils, see Tww, '·ilim 
Balmnmdan Ahlak," (Morality in Terms of Science) Cumhuriyet. (June 23, 1942). See also Olken, '·Bi.zde 
Tiirk9iilugu Geciktiren Sebepler - Dogu~u - Bfiyiiyt$i.." p. 3. 
138 Ulken, "lnsani Vatanc1h.k," pp. 4-13, "ilim BitarafMl.d.u?" (Is Science Objective9 ) !nsan. 1,7 (December I, 
1938), pp. 458-62. 
139 Tww, ·'Hayatm Klymeti ve ~irdigi Buhran," (The Value of Lite and its Crisis Undergoing) Cumhurivet. 
(January 25, 1942). 
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questioning of the direction and the beneficiaries of the continuous progress in science 
and technical sphere. can also be applied to virtue and beauty. 140 
Within this context, traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia aimed to differentiate the 
standards of ethics, science and aesthetics within the confines of Kemalist modernism .. 
As expected, this contention aroused a lively controversy between the Kemalist 
scienticist positivist spirit and this traditional conservative occupation. The importance 
of Bergsonism for traditionalist-conservative circle, as noted by Ulken, in Bergson 'a 
Dair Yeni Bir Kitap (A New Book on Bergson) arouse at this point. The main issue, 
for the traditionalist-conservative intellectual, "is to differentiate the domains of reason 
and sensation; and thus art, which is the concern of sensation, and science and 
philosophy. "141 
The Kemalist project of modernization was also a struggle for the self-
constitution of the nation. Kemalist attempts to make the cultural history of the nation 
was further supported by traditionalist-conservative belief in the political uniqueness 
and independence since only the autonomous agents could make their unique history. 
However, Metin Heper has pointed out that the dominant Kemalist project of 
modernism was a transcendentalist project of constructing modem Turkey that 
required the continuous calculation of the nation's future. 142 The Kemalist vision of 
modernity, which was shaped by the politics of bureaucratic scientific state, had placed 
great emphasis on the scientific ethos not only in the field of technology but also in 
cultural issues and in secularization of the daily life. 143 The principle of self-
constitution, politically speaking, Kemalist culturalism, based on a metaphysical idea of 
"consciousness," which the traditionalist conservatives attempted to give a concrete 
political and cultural content. This normative content was derived from the Turkish 
l4-0 Idem. 
141 Ulken. '·Bergson'a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap," (A New Book on Bergson) tnsan, 2,12 (May 8, 1939), p. 1007. 
142 See Metin Heper, The.State Tradition in Turkev (Walkington: U.K: The Eothen Press, 1985). For utopian 
transcendantalism, also :;ee ~f Mardin, .. Yenile~e Dinamiginin Temelleri ve Atatiirk." (Bases of the 
~namics of Modemiz.ation and Atatiirk) Cagdas Dilsilncenin I~1gmda Atatiirk (Atatilrk in the Light of 
Contemporary Thought), 2nd. ed. (b'tanbul, Dr. Nejat Ec:mc1~1 Vakf1 Yay., 1986), pp. 36-7. 
143 For criticism of the diffusion of scienticist rationale to the fields of ethics and politics, see Dlken, ""insani 
Vatanc1hk," pp. 4-13. 
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people's national tradition as it manifested itself in existing living customs. Further, 
beliefs had to be institutionalized in the new political, cultural and legal space created 
and protected by the Kemalist nation-state. The caustic clash between Islamism. which 
had been identified by traditionalist conservatives as retrospective universalism. and 
Kemalism, as future-oriented utopianism, stimulated the emergence of a traditionalist-
conservative philosophy. Still, traditionalist-conservative distance to the bureaucratic 
scientific state had decisive impacts on the evolution of democratic politics and a vision 
of modernity in Turkey in the following decades. 
Traditionalist-conservative agenda emerged from the day to day experience of 
Kemalist modernism. Traditionalist-conservative outlook, traditionalist-conservative 
conception of authority and of legitimacy became visible in the political arena because 
of the deepening social differentiation, elite fragmentation and segmentation of the 
ruling Kemalist intelligentsia. In this context, traditionalist-conservative intellectuals 
offered highly sophisticated analyses of the historical impact of the revolution on 
Turkish society, politics and its future prospects. 
CHAPTER4 
HISTORIC4L SIGNIFICANCE OF HENRY BERGSON IN THE AGE OF 
RISING NATIONALISM 
140 
Bergsonian Critic of the Nineteenth Century Positivism and Its Implications for the 
Late Ottoman and Early Republican Intellectuals 
Diffusion of the nineteenth century European philosophy to the Ottoman intellectual 
life manifested itself as the development of positivist philosophies which ultimately 
resulted in an obsession with the idea of progress. Basic mechanist assumptions of this 
mainstream philosophy had also been developed before the nineteenth century, but, its 
critique, reached its apex in the nineteenth century. Henry Bergson was among the 
foremost figures of this anti-positivist and anti-intellectualist philosophy in the 
twentieth century. 1 
Indeed, the privileged stand granted to sciences and scientific knowledge in the 
rationalist schema had long ago been challenged by the European conservative and 
empiricist philosophers like Edmund Burke and David Hume. 2 However, the influence 
of this strong anti-rationalist intellectual tradition in western philosophical tradition did 
not have a significant influence on the Ottomans. Yet, the Bergsonian critique of 
rationalism of the early twentieth century found a significant resonance outside the 
Continent, especially among the Ottoman intellectuals, as compared to the empiricist 
conservative philosophies of the preceding centuries. 3 
1 For fwther elaboration, see A E. Pilkington, Bergson and His Influence: A Reassessment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976); AR. Lacey, Bergson (Routledge: London and New York, 1989). See also 
Leszek Kolakowski, Bergson (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 9-10. 
2 For Edmund Burke's conservative criticism of rationalism, see Ian Hampsher-Monk, The Political Philosophy 
of Edmund Burke (London: Longman, 1987). Also D.M. Austern, The Political Theories of Edmund Burke and 
Joseph de Maister as Representative of Conservative Libertarianism and Conservative Authoritarianism (Ann 
Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1984 ); A Cobban, Edmund Burke' and the Revolt Against the Eighteenth 
9IB!!!n'., (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962). For eighteenth century rationalism, see Jones Gray, Enlightenment's 
Wake: Politics and Culture at the close of the Modem Age (New York: Routledge. 1995). For Da\id Hwne·s 
empricism as a criticism of rationalism, see Laurance L Bongie, David Hume: Prophet of the Counter Revolution 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965). 
3 In 1914, G. Jacobi, a German profossor in philosophy, who was employed in Dariilfunun. published an article 
on Bergsonism in the journal of the Faculty of Literature, namely Edeb~vat Fakultesi Dergisi. He aimed to bring 
fore the German int1uence. especially that of Schopenhauer, on the development of Bergsonian philosophy. It was 
the first article on Bergson appeared in the Ottoman press. According to Ziyaeddin Fahri, Gokalp was also 
heavily inspired Bergson but then Durkheim in his sociological studies in 1909-1912 period. See liyaeddin 
Fahri, "'Tiirkiyede Bergsonizm I," (Bergsonism in Turkey I) Cumhuriyet. (January, 13, 1941 ). 
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By the 1920s, there emerged a Bergson-inspired group of intellectuals who 
started to publish a journal named Dergah. Bergsonian critique of materialism was 
adopted by the late Ottoman and early Republican intellectuals and provoked an 
interest in a new vision of the West. This new vision of the West, as noted by Ulken 
was motivated by Bergsonian philosophy which was critical of the W estem ideals of 
progress, humanity and rationalism . .i Bergsonism, and its overwhelming emphasis on 
creative evolution, life force, spiritualism provided new insights to the late Ottoman 
and early Republican intellectuals, who aimed to understand the reasons for 
destructive/creative processes of modernization. Bergsonism and the new metaphysics, 
which privileged the spiritual force of religion and morality, served as a new stand to 
understand the nation and state building dynamics that had been conceived as the 
nation's will to survive. In fact, Bergsonism, with its heavy emphasis on change and 
reality of the past, also provided a secure stand for the Republican traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals who were squeezed between the necessity to change and the 
need to conserve. Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals have found a new message in 
Bergsonism - the "philosophy of Becoming,"- in the age of re-traditionalization of the 
Turkish society towards modernity. 
Prophetic Message of Bergsonism 
Bergsonism is an highly abstract metaphoric system and resistant to sketching and the 
intellectuals concerned tended to provide their own particular interpretations of this 
system depending upon their own area of interest. Safa' s conception of Bergsonism as 
a philosophy of insight has some critical differences from Baltac10glu' s attempts to 
reconcile it with Durkheirnian sociology. Ulken's interest in Bergson is limited to his 
celebration of Bergson as the archcritic of vague positivism in the twentieth century. 
Agaoglu' s inspirations from Bergson in his discussions on the dynamics of social 
evolution, nature of social conflict and the place of individual in the modem world can 
4 For Hilmi Ziya Dlken's evaluations on different aspects of Western civiliz.ation, see Dlken, ''Hangi Bat!'1" 
<Which West'?) lnsan. 1, 3 (June 15, 1938), pp. 185-6. For Safa's critical note on materialism, see Peyami Safa, 
--Havaya Uiran ideolojiler,"' (Ideologies Scattering Around) Tasvir. (August 14, 1945). See also Safa., Tiirk 
Inlolabma Balaslar (Glances at the Turkish Revolution) (istanbul: Otuken Yaymlan, 1993 (1938)), pp. 111-31. 
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not be compared with Tun~'s preoccupation aimmg at adopting Bergsonism as a 
philosophy of revival for the first Republican generation. 
Bergson's attempts, as pointed out by Oiken in Yirminci As1r Filo=oflan (The 
Twentieth Century Philosophers), could best be understood as a quest to elaborate on 
an alternative metaphysics of life and nature. 5 In a similar vein, Tom Quirk maintained 
that Bergson was trying to replace mechanical evolutionary theories with an all-
encompassing evolutionism which was based on the notion of "creative evolution.''6 
Bergson's basic preoccupation, for Quirk, was to show that the dynamics of evolution 
in social life could not be explained by materialistic mechanism. 7 Bergson, for Quirk, 
as well as Kolakowski and Ulken, also distanced himself from conventional vitalist 
assumptions by rejecting finalism. 8 This point has been referred by Kolakowski in his 
book entitled Bergson as follows: 
Life then is a continuous process in which the original drive divides itself into a growing 
variety of forms. but retains a basic direction. It has no goal, Bergson says, in the sense 
that human actions have goals, in other words, no one can anticipate its future course, 
which is similar to an artistic creation than to the operation of a machine.9 
Change, he noted, was conceived by Bergson, to be a quality of life which evolves not 
in an uniform rate but in periods of rest and dynamic rush forwards. 10 Everything in 
life, Kolakowski stated, emerges from an original "life-drive. " 11 
In this respect, A. R. Lacey stated that in this new life metaphysics, science was 
not granted the privileged position to explain all aspects of human life. 12 The source of 
new life metaphysics would be intuitive knowledge. 13 Science, morality and aesthetics 
5 Dlken, Yinninci Asrr Filozoflan (The Twentieth Century Philosophers) (1st.: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1936), p. 62. 
6 Tom Quirk, Bergson and American Culture (Chapel Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1990), p. '27. -Olk.en., ibid., p. 61. See also liken, Veraset ve Cemiyet (Inheritance and Society) (istanbul: 
Kutulm~ Matbaas1, 1957 (1924)), p. 84. See also Lacey, Bergson, pp. 88-110. 
7 Quirk, Bergson and American Culture, p. 42. 
8 Quirk, ibid., p. ·B See also liken. Veraset ve Cemivel, pp. 66-7, 85, 101. 
9 Kolakowski, Bergson, p. 58. 
10 Lacey, Bergson, pp. 107-8, 163, Kolakowski, ibid, pp. 57-8. Tunir, "Ons0z," (Preface) Hemy Bergson, 
Yarat1c1 Tekamiil <Creative Evolution), trans. by Tun\: (1st.: M.E.B Yay. 1947), pp. XIlI, XVII, XXXIV, XXVI. 
11 Kolakowski, ibid, pp. 57-8 Quirk, Bergsonism and American Culture, p. 44. liken, Yirminci Asrr Filozoflan, 
pp. 59, 62. 
12 Lacey, 131..'fgson, p. -l?. 
13 Ib"d '>6 l -., 1 ., PP- - , '-· 
143 
were assumed to be based on different standards of judgment and the growmg 
influence of science in the realms of morality and aesthetics was considered to tum life 
into a mechanical totality. 14 Harmony and creativity in life, for Bergson, Lacey pointed 
out, exist behind the artificial constructs of Reason. 1' 
Quirk further maintained that Bergson and his followers reaffirmed a kind of 
"romanticism"16 whose basic feature was the "autonomy oflife."17 This point had also 
been put by Oiken in his Veraset ve Cemiyet (Inheritance and Society). Besides this, 
the question of inheritance, which Quirk referred in his discussion on Bergson's 
influence on the biologism of Hans Driesch, was also brought up by Olken to assure 
that there are also some permanents in life. 18 According to Lacey, Bergsonism asserted 
a kind of pluralism in philosophy where 'evolution' appeared in multiple, spontaneous 
states of creation. 19 Indeed, Tun9 in his lengthy introductory chapter written for the 
Turkish translation of Bergson's well known book Creative Evolution assured that this 
new life philosophy had introduced the concepts of possibility and freedom for modem 
philosophies of change. 20 Still, for Quirk "Bergsonian philosophy was difficult to label 
and to characterize."21 He added that Bergsonism "variously referred to as 
temporalism, evolutionism, neoromanticism and modernism" between 1918 and 1939.22 
Kolakowski and Quirk have suggested that Bergsonism could be understood as 
a kind of protomodernism. 23 This emphasis can be seen as peculiarly· appropriate to an 
investigation of traditionalist-conservative modernism. Bergsonism was the synthesis of 
all Western philosophies. Using this framework in the Republican era meant the denial 
14 tnken, Yinninci Asrr Filozoflan, p. 58. For criticism of mechanism, see Lacey, ibid., pp. 103, 177-9. 
15 Lacey, ibid., pp. 37-8, 41-2, See also Tun~, "Onsoz," pp. XVLI- XL.IX. 
16 Quirk, Bergson and American Culture, pp. 44. 
17 Quirk, ibid, pp. 39, 41. See Tww, Bergson ve Manevi Kudrete Dair Birkac Konferans (Several Conferences 
on Bergson and the Spiritual Will), 2nd ed. (istanbul: A Halit Kitabevi, 1933). For an assessment on elan vital 
and life force, see Lacey, Bergson, pp. 139, 187. 
18 tnken in Veroset ve Cemiyet addressed to the question concerned. See also Quirk, ibid., pp. 38-41. 
19 Lacey, Bergso!!, pp. 67-83. Also see Quirk, ibid., p. 41. 
20 T "On.. ·· " IV XVII XXII un~, soz, pp. , - . 
21 Quirk, Bergson and American Culture, p. 42. 
,., 
-- Idem. 
23 Kolakowski, Bergson, p. 9-10. For similar evaluations, see Quirk, ibid., p. 44. 
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of not only the traditional Islamic orthodoxy, but of all institutionalized religion plus 
radical modernism based on rationalism. Inspired from Bergsonian premises in varying 
tones, traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia tried to reduce the absolutism of the 
religious dogma to symbols subject to creative evolutionary change. The modem mind, 
as revealed in the literary works of Safa, was a mass of contradictions. Irreconcilable 
tastes and aspirations were to await reconciliation, and philosophy would ultimately 
reconcile those contradictory tastes and aspirations in a holistic perspective. 
Bergson had this stimulating effect on the traditionalist-conservative 
intelligentsia because the world offered by Bergson in an age of nation-state building 
was alive with possibilities of creation, freedom and plurality. As opposed to the future-
oriented positivist revolutionarism of the Kemalist state elites, Bergson represented for 
the traditionalist-conservative circle, not an advance into future possibility and not a 
return to an earlier Golden Age resorted to by Islamic reactionaries. 
Traditionalist Conservatism, Bergsonism and Modernism 
Among the intellectuals who gathered around the journal Dergah, Mustafa Sekip Tun~ 
became the foremost advocator of Bergsonism during the Republican era. 24 
Traditionalist conservatives, who in varying degrees were inspired from Bergsonian 
philosophy, established the Turkish Philosophy and Sociology Association in 1927 and 
published the journal, Felsefe Y11/1g1, between 1931-1935.25 Articles and comments on 
Bergsonism appeared in the journal during this period.26 Various articles were also 
24 Olken, Tiirkive'de Cagdas l?ilsfince Tarihi (History of Contemporary Thought in Turkey), 3rd ed. (Istanbul: 
Olken Yaytnlan, 1992), pp. 359, 375-9. For Olken's evaluations on the significance of the journal Dergah for the 
development of a nationalist romantic political perspective based on Bergsonism, see Olken, "Y eni ve Eski 
Mecmualar:· (Old and New Journals) insan. l, 3 (June 15, 1938), pp. 272-4. Olken, "Bergson'a Dair Yeni Bir 
Ki tap," (A New Book on Bergson) tnsan. 2, 12 (May 8, 1939), p. I 004. 
25 Dlken, "Maksat," (The Objective) Felsete Y1lhg1. l (lstanbul, 1932). pp. 1-7 For Tun<;'s asseSl>ments on the 
new function of philosophy and the Turkish Philosophy Association, see Tun<;, "Felsefe," (Philosophy) Fe\sefe 
Y1lM1. I (istanbul, 1932), pp. 131-6. For Bergson's significance, see Tuner, "R.asyonaliml ve Irrasyonaliml," 
(Rationalism and Irrationalism) Felsefe Y1lhg1. II (tstanbul: 1934-1935), pp.193-206. For a short note of 
Baltac1oglu on Turkish Philosophy Association, see Baltac1oglu, "Anlama Giicune ve ~iinme Manasma Dair," 
(On the Capacity of Comprehension and the Meaning of Thinking) Yeni Adam, 536 (April 5, 1945), p. 2. 
26 For Ulken's assessment on Bergsonism, see Olken, ··Tf.lrkiye'de ldealiml Temayfilii" (The Trend ofldealism 
in Turkey) 1nsan. 2, 12 (May 8, 1939), p. 935. 
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appeared in Baltac10glu's journal, Yeni Adam between 1930 and 1940.:?7 Tune; 
translated various books from Bergson and Olken hailed T un9 as the protagonist of 
Bergsonism in Turkey. 28 In his Hayatm K1ymeti ve Ge<,.·irdigi Buhran (The Value of 
Life and its Crisis Undergoing) Tune; revealed the reasons for his devotion to 
Bergsonism. Accordingly, the new vision of modernity, which was embedded in an 
unshakable belief on progress and evolution, was also responsible for the emergence of 
new questions on the nature of this progressive process. For him, there also emerged 
pathologies of progress, particularly when this progressive positivist spirit was applied 
to the questions of ethics, aesthetics and justice. 29 Thus, Bergsonism had provided a 
fresh answer to these pathologies of scienticism. 
Bergsonian concepts of 'creativity', 'intuition' and 'elan vital' had been 
politicized in Safa's well-known book, Ti.irk Inkzlabma Ba~lar (Glances at the 
Turkish Revolution). Bergsonian themes also shaped his basic literary concerns and 
laid down the basic characteristics of his personalist style in literary works. 30 Bergson's 
influence on Safa's personalist literary perspective was responsible for the introduction 
of the time dimension as a part of his literary style. The divided self between the East 
and West; between past and present; dilemma of determinism and freedom were 
important Bergsonian themes to understand the general conservative convictions that 
27 Baltac1oglu, "Yeni Tefrikannz," (Our New Feuilleton) Yeni Adam, 225 (April 20, 1938), p.2. Also 
Baltac1oglu, '"Bir Burjuva Alimi ~Emile Durkheim," (Emile Durkheim was Said to Be a Bourgeois Scientist) 
Yeni Adam. 122 (April 30, 1936), p.3, "Te~kilatsiz Edebiyat," (Unorganized Literature) Yeni Adam. 119 (April 
9, 1936), p. 2, "Feylozof Kimdir'?" (Who is a Philosopher?) Yeni Adam. 153 (December 3, 1936), p. 14, 
"Felsefenin Metodu, " (The Method of Philosophy) Y eni Adam," 155 (December 17, 1936), p.14, "Feyloz:of ve 
Sosyetesi," (Philosopher and His Society) Yeni Adam, 156 (December 24, 1936), p. 14, "Bug1lnkil Kadm," 
(Today's Women) Yeni Adam. 477 (February 17, 1944), p.2, "Felsefoye Dogru," (Towards the Philosophy) Yeni 
Adam. 499 (July 20, 1944), p. ll, "Feyloz:of Kime Derler," (Who is Called a Philosopher?) Yeni Adam. 500 
(July 27, 1944), p. 2, "Pedagojinin Yalanlan," (The Lies of Pedagogy) Yeni Adam. 578 (January 25, 1946), p. 2. 
Rasim Ozgen, "H. Bergson" Yeni Adam. 241 (August 10, 1939), pp. 6-7, ''H. Bergson," Yeni Adam, 242 
(August 17, 1939), pp. 6-7, "H. Bergson" Yeni Adam. 243 (August 24, 1939), p. 6, Raymond Millet trans., 
"Bergson 80'inci YddOntimii," (80th Anniversary of Bergson) Yeni Adam, 273 (March 21,1940), pp. 9-15. 
"Henri Bergson, Asruruzm En Bu~iik Feyloz:ofu," (Henry Bergson, The Greatest Philosopher of Our Age) Y eni 
Adam. 317 (December 23, 1941), pp. 8-9. For Baltac1oglu's Bergsonism, see Dlken, '-1. H. Baltac1oglu'nun 
Felsefo K.itab1" (1. H. Baltac1oglu's Book on Philosophy) tnsan. 1,7 (December I, 1938), p. 404. 
28 Dlken, "Bergson' a Dair Yeni Bir K.itap," p. 1004. 
29 Tum;:, "Hayatm Klymeti ve <Jecrirdigi Buhran" (The Value of Life and its Crisis Undergoing) Cumhurivet. 
(January 25, 1942). 
30 Safa, "Tfirk Inktlabma Bala~lar," pp. 155-231, See also Safa, "Sezi~, Tahlil ve Riyaziye," (Intuition, Analysis 
and Mathematics) Ki1ltllr Haftasl. 13 (April 8, 1936), pp. 247, 258. 
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revealed themselves in Safa' s novels in the 1930s. Bergsonian philosophical vocabulary 
also provided basic themes for Safa in developing a literature of insight and intuition. 31 
Bergson's peculiar irrationalism, which at the same time was substituted for his reliance 
on progress and change, led the traditionalist conservatives, especially Tun9 and 
Baltac10glu, to develop a vision of social change which could be labeled as creative 
evolutionism.32 Bergson's attempts to mediate between science, philosophy and 
aesthetics had an impelling stimulus on traditionalist-conservative intellectuals in 
developing an alternative holistic vision of modernity and a vying approach to Kemalist 
positivist-scienticism. 33 
Ulken affirmed that Bergsonism, with its emphases on vitality, optimism and 
progress, disclosed the national mood among this group of the Turkish intelligentsia 
especially after the War of Independence. 34 Dlken depicted this Bergsonian mood 
among the early Republican intelligentsia as follows: 
A new generation of journalists, '"Titers, novelists, etc. have been acquainted with such 
tenns as the "power of the soul." "elan vital of life." intuition, etc., - which have replaced 
"culture (hars)," "national conscience, "duty,"- by press in the last ten years. These terms 
have also formed the basis of philosophy which has almost ensured popularity35 
In the 1920s and 1930s, Bergsonism found its substantiating philosophy m the 
aspirations and ideals of the traditionalist-conservative circle. Bergson was among the 
most celebrated figures of the decades concerned since he was equated with the grand 
critique of materialist philosophy of positivism which was held responsible for the 
degeneration of the moral purpose of the Turkish Revolution and the deterioration of 
its transcendental moral purpose. Bergsonism came to represent a future hope and 
source of optimism for the traditionalist-conservative circle on the road of realizing the 
31 Safa, "Memleket ve Edebiyat," (Homeland and Literature) Killtilr Haftas1, 2 (January 22, 1936), p. 33. For 
intuition, see Safa, ·'Sezi~, Tahlil ve Riyaziye," pp. 247, 258. Also see Baltac1oglu. ''Te~kilatsiz Edebiyat,"' p.2. 
32 Tunir, "Hayatm K.Jymeti ve Geyirdigi Buhran." Also Baltac1oglu, Tarih ve Terbive (History and Education) 
(istanbul: Suhulet Matbaas1. 1933), pp.43. 65-6. 68-9. See also Baltac1oglu, ''Tekammill, Tekemmill," (Evolution 
and Pertection) Y eni Adam. 281 (May 16. 1940), p. 3. Also Ulken, Veraset ve Cemivet, p.56. 
33 Tuni;, "ilim Bakmundan Ahlak," (Morality in Terms of Science) Cumhuriyet. (June :?3, 1942), "Tiirkire"de ilk 
Alllak Tarihi," (The First History of Ethics in Turkish) Cumhuriyet, (May 30, 1943), "Zamarunuz.da Ahlak 
Meselesi," (The Question of Morality in Our Age) Cumhwiyet, (April 12, 1942), "Ahlakbhgm <;:e~itleri ve 
Zamarnrmzm AhlakJ.," (Types of Virtue and Ethics of Our Age) Cumhuriyet. (March 28, 1943 ). 
34 01ken, ·'Tilrkiye'de idealizm Tema:yiilil,"' p. 935, ·'Bergson·a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap." pp. 1004-7. 
35 Ulken, "Bergson'a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap," p. 1004. 
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ideal of establishing a new modem open society. As noted before, the Turkish 
Revolution had been celebrated as the manifestation of the national creative will 
towards the establishment of an open society, as an industrial, urbanized society based 
on a new division of labour among functional social groups. For Safa, the Turkish 
society was on the road of industrialization and urbanization. Besides the ultimate goals 
of industrialization, u(banization and rationalization, there was an urgent need to cease 
the development of materialism, dogmatism and nominalism. This was the historical 
chance and meaning of the Turkish Revolution which aimed to revolutionarize the 
mystical Eastern mentality that had been shaped by a peculiar intuitive capability 
towards the realization of an ideal of open society. 36 This new society had been 
characterized, first, by its capacity to transcend group loyalties;37 second, by its leaning 
on free individuals; third by the consolidation of aspirations based on feelings and 
emotions (emphasis made on nationalist sentiments) and brotherhood of the members 
of the nation;38 fourth, by the development of a "individualist" morality which would 
not function as a social imperative compared to the religious Weltanshauung of the 
traditional society. Indeed for Olken, as revealed in Dogu ve Batz (The East and West), 
this new modem spirit could be understood through a holistic philosophical approach. 
Thus, philosophy would be in search of this modernist truth and this philosophical truth 
would lead to the development of a new ethics and politics. Enforcement of freedom 
would stimulate individual awareness of the necessity to maintain social order; and 
individuality would become the basis of the society. The individual, who becomes an 
autonomous free acting agent, would gain the capability to voluntarily adhere to a 
national order.39 In this sense, the Revolution also signified the transition from 
36 Safa, Tilrk Inlalabma Baktslar, pp. 185-9, 193. For Olken's charactemation of open society as a society of 
free individuals and systemic thought, see Olken "~ark ve Garp," (East and West) Millet ve Tarih Suuru (Nation 
and the Consciousness of History) (Istanbul: Pullian Matbaast, 1948), pp. 11-7. The book was compiled from 
Dll.:en's various articles written between 1923 and 1948. For Agaoglu and Olken·s parallelisms on the question, 
see Olken, "Tanzimata K.ar~t," (Against the Tanzimat) Millet ve Tarih Suuru, p.30. Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve 
Sanat (Democracy and Art) (lstanbul: Sanayi-i Nefise Basunevi, 1931 ). Also Baltac1oglu, "Demokraside 
Terbiye," (Education in Democracy) Yeni Adam. p.2, "Inlalab Edebiyatt Ne Olabilir?" p. 7. 
37 Safa, Ttirk Inlalabma Baktslar, pp. 90-7. 
38 lb"·' 89 lu., p. . 
39 Ulken, "Dogu ve Ball," Millet ve Tarih Suuru, p. 103. 
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closed/static religion and morality of the scholastic to the open/dynamic, religion and 
morality, which Bergson affirmed in his The Two Sources of Religion and Morality, in 
'~ 
which freedom and the individual gained new emphases as personal dispositions . .ui 
Traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia backed revolutionary engineers of creative 
force for their harsh stand towards any kind of religious formalism and dogmatism seen 
I 
as the manifestations of philosophical determinism and fatalism~ 1 
A second and more immediately significant reason for an emphasis on Bergson 
was his critical philosophy of the dominant positivist scienticist spirit which was the 
cultural inheritance of 19th century. ~2 To that extent, his authority and popularity had 
been determined by the modernist intellectual context that was utilized to redefine 
philosophical dilemmas and challenging hypotheses inherited from Gokalp' s 
positivism. 43 Traditionalist-conservative modernism was not devoted to a superficial 
positivist modernism by declaring that the past was dead. Traditionalist-conservative 
modernism was a search for the nature and dynamics of things in transition and was 
stimulated with an interest in dynamism and mobility of societies characterized by 
discontinuity, ruptures and dualities in social, political and economic structures. This 
contention, as revealed by Tuny in his Zaman Fatih/eri (Conquerors of Time), 
displayed itself as a devotion to the philosophies of change and becoming. In his 
words: 
All philosophies are constituted on the perception of "standing," which reflects space, and 
"being," which reflects "time." While Bergson provided the ultimate philosophy of 
becoming, which had been originated by Heraclitus. "evolutionary theories" in biology 
have represented one of the most significant steps in the conquest of time, since they have 
aspired to express and explain the conspicuous variations in the sphere of time 44 
40 Bergson, Ahlak ve Dinin ila Kaynag1 (The Two Sources of Morality and Religion), trans. by M. Karasan 
(Ankara: Milli Egitim Basunevi, 1949). 
41 According to Safa, one can not doubt that religious sentiments were intertwine with nationalist ideals and 
aspirations during the War of Independence. For him, these religious sentiments did not stem from a ··clerical" 
mentality. It was only created a sense of affection which strengthened the nationalist sentiments and bonds 
among the individuals. See Safa, Tiirk Ink1labma Bak1slar, p. 86 . 
. p. 
· - Olken, '"Tiirkiye'de tdealizm Temaytilii," pp. 929-38. 
43 For a brief swnmary on positivism and mechanism, see Olken, "Ferd ve Cemiyet," (Individual and Society) 
1nsan. 1,1 (April 15, 1938) p. 57, "Bergson'a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap," pp. 1004-7; Olken, "Tiirkiye'de Pozitivizm 
TemayUlii,"' (The Trend of Positivism in Turkey) insan. 2,11 (April 8, 1939), pp, 849-53 . 
.w Tww, ··Zaman Fatihleri," (Conquerors of Time) Cumhuriyet. (June 15, 1942). See also Olken, ''T\irkiye'de 
Pozitivizm TemayiilU," pp. 849-53, "Bergson'a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap," pp. 1004-7. 
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Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals openly advocated Bergsonism as a new 
philosophy of change and as a new kind of philosophy of experienced and real time, 
which aroused interest in the reasons of tensions and conflicts that characterized the 
present ambivalent world created by Kemalist modernism. As disclosed by Tun~ 
Bergson. who has perceived the world in a continuous process of creative evolution 
referred to substance as a product of intelligence. and to the lifeless as a residue of the 
living. For Bergson. life and society expect us to possess a constant consciousness of our 
existence and a spiritual readiness to adopt to the changing circumstances .... "Tension" 
and "Readiness" are the two indispensable powers of life. 45 
In this respect, in an article published in Yeni Adam, it has been pointed out that 
From the time of Plato, Aristotle. Descartes. Malbranche and even Auguste Comte 
philosophy had been concerned with the object and thought The essence was immobility. 
constancy, eternity, inactivity. For Bergson the essence has been neither the constant nor 
eternity; but change and longevity. 46 
Furthermore questions of rationality and irrationality, human freedom, autonomy, 
responsibility, ethics and experience were incorporated into traditionalist-conservative 
vocabulary to develop a peculiar understanding of the place of beliefs, conventions and 
especially that of religion in a new traditionalist-conservative vision of modernity. 
Olken in Turkiye 'de <;ag~ DU§iince Tarihi (History of Contemporary 
Thought in Turkey) acclaimed that Bergson and his critique of positivism, rationalism, 
intellectualism, scienticism, evolutionary progressivism had decisive impacts on framing 
the intellectual and political interests of the traditionalist-conservative circle in the 
revolutionary era.47 For traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, especially for Tun~, 
Baltac1oglu and Safa, as displayed by Ulken in Bergson 'a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap, (A New 
Book on Bergson) Bergson represented the emergence of a new West with an 
alternative philosophy to the nineteenth century positivist-rationalist understanding of 
45 Tllll~, "Bergson'llll Giilme Naz.ariyesine Dair," (On Bergson's Theory of Laughing) Cumhurivet. (April 15, 
1945), ''Abl Romantizmi," (Reason Romanticism) Cumhuriyet. (July 5, 1942), "Bergson' a Gore Sanat ve Sanat 
Adanu," (Art and Artist According to Bergson) Cumhuriyet. (April 6, 1945). 
46 Oz.gen, "H. Bergson," p. 6-7. See also Safa, "Psikoloji ve Milliyet~ilik,., (Psychology and Nationalism) 
Cmaralh. 40 (June 27, 1942). p. 5. Olken characterized Comtian positivism as an example of modern scholastics, 
~ Olken, ''Descartes ve Skolastik," (Descartes and Scholastics) lstanbul. (May I, 1946), pp. 6-8. For Olken's 
critical notes on Comtian positivism, see Dlken, "Ferd ve Cemiyet," pp.57-65, "TOrkiye'de Pozitivizm 
Temay1Hii," pp. 849-53. 
47 Olken, TOrkiye'de Cag<las D1L5iince Tarihi, pp. 375-82. "Ferd ve Cemiyet," p. 57. Tllll~, "Onsoz" in H. 
Bergson, Yarahc1 Tekamiil, trans. by Tllll~, pp. I-Lil. Safa, "Yeni Bir Diinyaya Hasret," (Longing for a New 
World)Cumhuriyet. (January 12, 1938). 
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the man, society, and universe.48 Indeed, Baltaetoglu, in a commentary note on Bergson, 
translated from Albert Thibaudet's book entitled Bergson's Philosophy, affirmed that 
after Platon. philosophy mainly was concerned \\ith a restricted being disregarding 
continuity and sustenance through time as mere speculation. On the contrary. for Bergson 
what the philosopher considers as a being has continuity. sustenance. and even it is itself 
time. He has replaced the statement of Descartes -"I am a thinking being"- by ''je suis 
une choise qui dure." He has replaced the eternal values by continuity and sustenance. 
• and static values by the values of motion and change. In fact by this standing, "hich can 
be linked to the peculiarities of nineteenth century German and English history and 
evolutionary philosophy. Bergson initiated a revolution. All works of Bergson are 
concerned with continuity and sustenance. He does not start with general speculation. 
Each one of his works are directed to the examination of one specific problem. And this 
makes up the second aspect of his peculiarity. According to Bergson. philosophy -in 
contrast to science- does not dwell upon general speculations and universal systems. but 
upon specific issues. . . .In his works ... the aim... is to analyze and explain the philosophy 
of continuity and change. For him the essence of the existence can only be comprehended 
by intuition. However. those who believe that those incidents which can only be 
comprehended via reason, claim that Bergson synthesizes intuition with mystic values 
while neglecting intelligence totally. 49 
Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals welcomed the Bergsonian philosophy as a new 
philosophy of time and becoming which was ultimately critical of the positivist unilinear 
evolutionary scheme of nature and society. Bergsonism was celebrated as the new 
philosophy of creativity, vitality and time and as a modern reply to the positivist scienticist 
philosophy. Traditionalist~nservative intellectuals exploited Bergsonian philosophy of 
time, in varying tones, to formulate a peculiar philosophical stand against the future-utopian 
mentality of the Revolutionaries and retrospective universalism of Islamic orthodoxy.50 
Bergsonism also served to develop a mystical individualist stance against the 
positivist solidarism of the statist Kemalist elites, heavily inspired from the societalism 
of Ziya Gokalp. 51 In Turkiye 'de jdealizm Temayii/u (The Trend of Idealism in 
Turkey), Ulken affirmed that the idealist philosophers, who had been inspired from the 
pragmatism of William James and Bergson, developed a kind of voluntarism with a 
48 In Yeni Tefrikamzz. Baltac1oglu admitted that he was a Bergsonian in his philosophical orietations. 
Baltac1oglu, '"Yeni Tefrikanuz,'' p.2. See also Baltac1oglu, ·'Te~atsiz Edebiyat," p. 2, "FeylozofKimdir," p. 14, 
.. Felsefenin Metodu, ·· p.14, .. Feylozof ve Sosyetesi," p. 14, ·'Bugilnkil Kadm," p.2, "Felsefeye Dogru," p. l l, 
"FeylozofKime Derler," p. 2. Also Ulken '"Bergson·a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap, .. pp. 1004-7. 
49 Quoted in Baltactoglu, ~Henry Bergson," Yeni Adam. 433 (April 15, 1943), p.3. Also 01ken, "'Zaman ve 1nsan," 
(Time and Man) inll1!!!. 2, 12 (May 8, 1939), pp. 987-92. Also Safa,"~, TahW ve Riyaziye," pp. 247, 258. 
50 Olken, '·Bergson' a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap,"pp. 1004-7. For Safa's emphasis on the changing conception of time 
see Safa, --Medeniyet ve Siirat, .. (Civilization and Speed) Yedi Giln. (February IO, 1937), p. 4. 
51 Viken ··r0rkiye'de ldealizm Temayulil.," p. 933. See also Ulken, "Bergson' a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap," p. 1005. 
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heavy emphasis on individual will in history to counter the social deterministic 
philosophy of Gokalp. 52 Olken held Gokalp responsible for being the protagonist of 
"miifrit cemiyeu;ilik" (fanatic societalism). 53 In his words: 
Liberals in democratic societies aspire to derive the responsibilities of the citiz.en from his 
freedom. On the contraiy. collectivists aim at deriving his freedom from his responsibility. even 
to the extent of contending that the state of freedom -i.e .. if the citiz.en has rights- is a result of 
• his duties and responsibilities with respect to the state... Hence. in Turkey collecti\ ists have 
believed that they could reduce freedom to responsibility and right to duty. 54 
Safa also pointed out that Gokalp was a political ideologist rather than a social 
scientist. His sociology, according to Safa, was nothing more than an elementary 
translation of Durkheim's sociology. The significance of Gokalp lied not in his 
sociological studies but in his political stand. Gokalp, for Safa, was a second class 
social scientist, but a first class ideologue of emerging nationalism, who first realized 
that the future world would be shaped by nations. 55 Personalist criticism of societalism, 
which had been heavily inspired from Bergson, was employed to keep a distance from 
the scienticist-solidarist obsession of the Kemalist state elites and other competing 
"ideologues" of the Revolution in the 1930s56 Bergsonism contributed to the 
development of a creationist evolutionary approach within traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals against the unilinear positivist evolutionism of the positivist 
revolutionaries. In this respect, the Bergsonian terms, "creative evolution" and 
"creative will" were successfully adopted to welcome the Revolutionary practices as an 
outcome of a dynamic creationist-progressive process, and this adaptation secured a 
safe place for traditionalist-conservative intellectuals on the outskirts Kemalist power 
structure, as part of the new elan engineers. 57 
52 Dlken ''Tilrkiye'de idealizm Temayiilil," p. 933. 
53 For fwtlter criticism of societalism. see Olken, Ziya Gokalp (Istanbul, Ahmet Said Matbaas1, 1942 ). 
54 Olken, ··m1rlfik ve Mesullfik," (Freedom and Responsibility) istanbuL (October I, 1946), pp.2-4. Also 01ken, "Ferd 
ve Cemiyet,'' pp. 57-65, "Tilrlciye'de Pozitivi2m Temayillii," pp. 849-53, "TUrkiye'de ldeafum Tema~iilii," pp. 929-38. 
'i~ 
·· See Safa, "Dogan Dilnyamn Miljdecisi: Ziya Gokalp," (The Harbinger of the Emerging World: Ziya Gokalp) 
Cmaralt1. 12 (October 25, 1942), p. 5. 
56 For criticisms ofComtian positivism, see Safa, "Psikoloji ve Milliye{\:ilik," p. 5. For criticisms of rationalism 
Safa, "Yeni Bir Dilnyaya Hasret." For criticism ofGokalp's societalism, Olken, "Hilrliik ve Mesullfik," pp. 2-4. 
Also see Olken, "Ferd ve Cemiyet," pp. 57- 65. For further elaborations, see Olken, Ziva Gokalp. 
57 Olken, "Bergson.a Dair Yeni Bir K.itap," pp. 1004-7, "Tilrlciye'de ldeafum TemayOlii," pp. 929-38. For Safu"s point 
on the question of creative evolution see Safa, "Madde Sizlere OmUr," (Matter is Dead) Tasvir. (October 27, 1945). 
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Adaptation of Bergsonian themes and motives shaped traditionalist-
conservative vision of modernity which revealed itself in a particular conception of 
society, politics, modernity, art, aesthetics, West, "Westernization", religion, 
metaphysics, individual, freedom and free will. This peculiar Bergsonian vocabulary 
was arliculated in the literary works and/or philosophical and political essays of the 
prominent traditionalist-conservative figures. Indeed, Bergsonian philosophical 
framework, which had been developed in Europe during the 1900s, influenced the 
refinement of traditionalist-conservative political ends among the cultural elites of the 
young Republic. 58 Bergsonism, as the common philosophical perspective, hitherto 
shared by the prominent traditionalist-conservative figures of the 1930s served to typify 
a 'traditionalist-conservative perspective' towards the questions of life, man, eternity, 
and spirituality. Bergsonian vocabulary was incorporated, as a complementary if not 
necessarily contradictory philosophy of metaphysics, to the dominant radical-positivist 
Kemalist vision of modernity. 59 Baltac10glu, comparing Bergson with Descartes - the 
founding figure of Cartesian rationalist philosophy - openly labeled the philosophical 
orientation of his own towards the questions of metaphysics as Bergsonian. 60 The 
influence of Bergsonism could not be limited to the philosophical orientations of 
Baltac1oglu and Tun~, or Safa, but, as noted by Dlken, it had a significant influence on 
Dariilfanun scholars in istanbul, which after the University Reform of 1933 became 
the istanbul University.61 
Bergson played conceivably a decisive role in the development of various 
orientations among traditionalist-conservative intellectuals. In the case of Tun~ and 
Baltac1oglu, he was responsible for the development of a philosophical and political 
perspective ultimately serving traditionalist-conservative aims. Olken's relation with 
58 For significance of Bergson, see 01ken, ""Telifi,:iligin Tenakuzlan," (The Contradictions of Compromising) 
Miilkive. 25 (April 1933), p. 7. 
59 01ken, "Bergson'a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap," pp. 1004-7. 
60 Baltac1oglu, "Yeni Tefrikanuz," p.2. For Dlken's stand on Descartes, see 01ken "Descartes ve Skolastik," pp. 
6-8. For Dlken's evaluations on Baltac10g!u's Bergsonism, see Olken, "Baltac1oglu'mm Yeni Felsefo Kitab1," p. 
404. Baltactoglu, "Yeni Tefrikamtz," p.2. Also Baltac1oglu "Bir Bwjuva Alimi hni~ Emile Durkheim,- p.3. 
61 Olken, "Bergson' a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap," p.1004. 
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Bergsonism was determined by his distance to the vague positivist spirit of the 
Revolution and by his appeal to Bergson's emphasis on the uniqueness and 
distinctiveness of tQe human world, plus his criticism of scienticism. In the case of Safa. 
the underlying Bergsonian philosophical framework revealed itself as a modernist 
personalist style in literary works. 62 Tuni; disclosed that this new traditionalist-
conservative philosophical challenge of the unilinear positivist 'model of development 
also had decisive political consequences in terms of comprehending the Kemalist 
state's positivist model of "progress." Adopting a novel conception of time, 
traditionalist-conservative circle focused on the social and political pathologies of the 
positivist scienticism and its progressive ideals. This traditionalist-conservative 
conception of time was best illustrated by Tuni; as follows: 
All beings are circumscribed by time and space. We can cannot think of anything outside 
time and space. By asking "where" and "when" we want to learn time and space. When 
we are lost in respective answers we also see that we have lost our capacity of thinking. 
Just as we do not know the beginning and the end of space. we have no idea of where and 
when time begins. But we live in the cradle of time and space. Hence. we are incapable of 
getting into their essence. Nonetheless. we aspire to surmount surface of time and space. 
Space, to which we have aquitance through life, has three dimensions of length, width 
and depth. With respect to our perception it has front. back. right and left sides. Since 
motion through these sides is possible -though limited- we assume that we have 
surmounted the space. Have we progressed through time that far? At first sight, time 
resembles a river, coming from the past, posing in the present and moving to future, of 
which direction is unknown. However, this river does not only flow, but changes 
everything through its motion, at least we perceive as such. In this respect, time is 
essentially different from space. Time which is measured in calendars and clocks is 
abstract. The real, experienced time is a power sphere affecting all beings by destroying 
and reconstructing simultaneously. It is this time which has to be surmounted. It is this 
time which does not repeat itself, which does not revert. It is this time through which 
nature and human history have evolved. And it is this time that we aspire to 
63 
comprehend 
For the Republican traditionalist conservatives, Bergson stood between the 
nineteenth century scienticism [read universalism] and the twentieth century 
romanticism [read particularistic nationalism] between which the late Ottoman and 
early Republican generations were squeezed. 64 He represented the rebirth of the 
spiritual and contemporary attempt to reconcile sciences with metaphysics and religion, 
62 Modernism, for Safa, displayed itself as a new consciousness of time. See Safa., "Medeniyet ve Siirat. ·· p. 4. 
63 Tum,:, --zaman Fatihleri. ·' 
64 See Dlken, "Bergson'a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap," pp. 1004-7. 
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scientific knowledge with life, order with liberty, the ideals of West with the ideals of 
East, the present with the past and future. 
The First Traditionalist-Conservatilie Attempts to Achiel'e an Institutional 
Recognition as Part of Kemalist 1Wodernism: The Turkish Philosophy Association 
The controversy between materialist-progressives and traditionalist conservatives was 
intensified after the establishment of the Turkish Philosophy and Sociology Association 
in 192 7. The establishment of the Association, where Tun~ and Baltac1oglu became 
prominent figures, marked a turning point for the development and circulation of 
traditionalist-conservative ideals and aspirations during the Republican period. The 
establishment of the Association can be considered as a cornerstone for the early history of 
Turkish traditionalist conservatism. The Association provided a legitimate institutional 
framework for the development of traditional conservative ideas and its journal, Felsefe ve 
i'Ytimaiyat Dergisi, popularized these ideals and aspirations. The Association signified the 
traditionalist-conservative attempt to introduce Philosophy as a secular mode of thinking on 
man's new conditions of existence in the modem world manipulated by Republican 
modernism. In the manifesto of the Association the objective was set as follows: 
Nations, which aim at internalizing real civilization, have to adopt scientific and 
economic institutions of the civilized societies. Our nation has experienced two stages 
throughout history. The first stage of the Empire was too far to this aim and level. On the 
other hand, the Republican phase has carried the faith in the most desirable life and 
maturity ... Republican regimes opt for the protection and enhancement of freedom of 
thought, scientific autonomy and all those institutions which serve to this end. In fact, 
science and freedom mean Republic, and Republic can only be constructed through 
science and freedom ... For self-sustenance. any regime aspires to educate the citizens in 
line \\ith its own ideal. 65 
As already noted, philosophy would be a new holistic mode of thinking on Man and 
society.66 Moreover, philosophy, the secular mode of thought on Man's existence, 
would be an antidote of Islamic orthodoxy which historically discarded philosophy as a 
human endeavor to replace the God-given meaning of the universe. 
65 
"Tiirk Felsefe Cemiyeti," (The Turkish Philosophy Association) Milli Mecmua, IX, 104 (February 15. 1928), 
p. 1669, in Atatilrk DOnemi Fikir Hayat1 II (Intellectual Life in Atatilrk's Era II), Mehmet Kaplan, inci Enginiln 
et al., eds. (Ankara: Kiiltilr Bakanhgi Ya~mlan, 1992), p. 329. See also Baltac1oglu, "Felsefe Nedir'!"' (What is 
Philosophy?) Yeni Adam, 152 (November 26, 1936), p. 14, "Felsefenin Mevzu Nedit?" (What is the Subject 
Matter of Philosophy?) Yeni Adam, 154 (December IO, 1936), p. 14. 
66 Tun~. ·'Felsefo,'' pp. 131-6. Philosophy, for Baltac10glu, is a fonn of knowledge on existential conditions in 
the universe, see Baltac1oglu, "Yeni Adam.," Yeni Adam. 6 (February 5, 1934), p.8. 
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The Association soon became an institutional platform for a political and 
philosophical discussion group which included Olken, Tun9, Baltac1oglu, Agaoglu and 
Safa. Particularly religious issues, the place and function of philosophy as a new secular 
mode of thought on Man's relation with Nature, society and God, the nature of the 
new regime and the future prospects of the Revolution was placed on the agenda of the 
Association. In various public seminars held by the Association, the traditionalist-
conservative problematic was formulated as understanding the reasons of value and 
norm crises felt at the social and individual levels in the course of further consolidation 
of the structures of modernity. A series of public and semi-public seminars and 
discussions on these topics marked the emergence of a group consciousness among the 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals. 
Yet, the activities of the Association terminated in 1930. Then, Olken, having 
encouraged Tun9 to become the chairman of the Association, had revived the Turkish 
Philosophy and Sociology Association and re-named it the Turkish Philosophy 
Association. Tun9 was a well-known figure for his Bergsonism and personalism. After 
its revival in 1931, besides a series of discussions on the importance of philosophy and 
religion, seminars were held on the limits of state intervention in society, the 
philosophy of individualism, basic characteristics of the western civilization and the 
authenticity of national culture. 
After the revival of the Association in 1931, Safa delivered the first seminar on 
the characteristics of modem philosophical thought with a special emphasis on 
Hegelian dialectics. He argued that the aesthetic conception of the world through the 
works of art would be a new synthesis between the thesis and the anti-thesis, namely 
materiality and spirituality, which was seen as the grand philosophico-political dilemma 
of the modem ages leading to ambivalence and crisis. Tun9 defended that the centrality 
of human experience in the modem world could only be grasped if the philosophical 
truths that constituted the individual experience as a unique category of modernity had 
fully been elucidated. Baltac1oglu claimed that it was the intuitive method through 
which the new philosophical truth could be grasped. Traditionalist-conservative 
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op1mons and ideals, which had been developed through the activities of the 
Association, pointed out the centrality of the individual in the modem world. 67 
In 1931, again Olken took the initiative and Association started to publish a 
journal, Fe/sefe Y1/11g1. In the article entitled Maksat (The Objective) Llken hinted at the 
common objects of reaction of the intellectuals gathered around the Association as follows: 
We should not be surprised by the rise of alienation as a natural outcome of excessi\·e 
popularity of the standardization of man in Turkey. Standardization perceives man as 
compiled of particulars which enable external control and opts to mold man as chessmen 
and pawns. Thus. it is incompetent to reflect...rich reality. Alienation is another 
theoretical default which disregards reality and the factual evolution of being. Two other 
such standings are religious and anti-religious mysticism which absorb human and 
spiritual reality into meaningless matrice and schedules. These are lost in the universe of 
the conscious and are prone to perceive the conscious only within the artificial boundaries 
of abstractionism and totality. Examples are Eckhardt who has claimed to have been filled 
with God. and A Comte who has claimed to have been a mortal in the society. 68 
Elucidating the common grounds for the intellectuals affiliated to the Association, he 
added that 
In both of these philosophical standings it is impossible to achieve a total reconciliation of 
humanity and reality. We believe that such a reconciliation can on(v be achieved in 
"persona/ism". Total merge between "ego" and the "universe", substantial connection 
between humanity and reality, and the actual place of man in the universe can only be 
achieved in "personalism."69 (Emphases are mine) 
The revival of the Association served to strengthen the group cohesion among the 
traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia. It was an initial attempt to formulate a 
common philosophico-political platform for diverse interests and orientations of the 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals. 70 
Throughout the thirties positivist/scienticism of the dominant ruling elites and 
Bergsonism of traditionalist conservatism remained as controversial positions in the 
political life of modem Turkey. Both sides conceived themselves as the valid 
interpreters of the Kemalist Revolution. Distinctively, traditionalist conservatism, with 
its emphasis on national tradition, as the carrier of the national heritage, rejected 
67 .. 
Ulken, '"Maksat;' pp. 1-7. 
68 Ib'd ., I ., P·-· 
69 Ib'd I ., p.J. 
70 01.ken pointed out that they derived basic concerns of their personalist approach from Henry Bergson, William 
James' s criticisms of organic detenninism, Simmels and M. Scheller' s criticisms of social organicism. See Olken 
"Maksat," p. 4. 
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Reason as a standard of truth and as a method of re-traditionalization of society 
towards the vision of modernity. Thus, group cohesion of traditionalist-conservative 
intelligentsia was further strengthened on a common opposition developed against 
nominalist-rationalist readings of Kemalist practices. Traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals were in fact devoted to the general axioms of the Revolution, such as the 
sovereignty of the people, citizenship rights and duties. Yet, in their views, these were 
not absolute categories and could only be realized in a concrete society as the rights 
and obligations of the concrete, living individuals. 
As already mentioned, traditionalist-conservative commitment to the nationalist 
ideals granted them the privilege to be a legitimate player in the Kemalist power 
structure. Moreover, traditionalist-conservative emphasis on philosophy had radical 
consequences on the dissolution of the religious tradition. The Kemalist Revolution, as 
revealed in Safa' s Turk Devrimine Bak1#ar, was conceived to be a grand cultural 
movement which aimed to ground the future of the nation in its genuine history and 
past. Accordingly, the emerging nation state would liberate the national tradition from 
its muteness of centuries. It meant that the new modern nation state was organically 
developed from different ways of life, customs and the interests of the nation. 71 
Besides, traditionalist-conservative 'philosophers' of the thirties proposed a new 
hierarchy of secular moral values to prevent the further breakdown of society by the 
grand process of the deterioration of the religious values. As revealed by Olken after a 
decade later, philosophy would lay down the standards of truth, and truth would give 
way to a new ethics which would be the basis of modern politics. 72 
In the conferences held by the Association until 1933, Tun9, Safa, Agaoglu, 
Olken and Baltac1oglu, with all their varying interests, aimed to develop an alternative 
understanding of Kemalism and the ongoing crisis of politics and morals. The question 
of religious refonn was one of the most provocative issues that the intellectuals 
71 See Safa, Tork Devrirnine Baluslar. pp. 97-102. Baltac1oglu in his Demokrasi ve Sonat, and Tarih ve Terb~ve 
tried to show that ''modem" has its o'Ml history which could be W1derstood through the study of national 
tradition. 
72 O'lken, "Dogu ve Bat1," Millet ve Tarih Suuru, p. 102. 
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gathered around the Association tried to solve. Tun~ proposed a new set of values of 
humanity for the society. The new humanist civic religion would be the synthesis of all 
the Semitic religions including Islam, Judaism and Christianity. For Ba1tac10glu, the 
question was not to formulate a new set of values, which would be the synthesis of all 
Semitic religions, but to find a genuine and modern essence in Turkish folk Islam 
which served as a means of integration for various strata in society. 73 The future 
possibilities of the reformation in Islam and a new faith placed on individual will 
shaped the traditionalist-conservative agenda of the time. In this respect, Turkification 
of Islam was one of the topics placed on the agenda of the traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals. This question was important since it became one of the means to define 
the authentic Turkish way of life, where the individual would assume significance as a 
member of a particular nationality shaped by culture. It is this fundamental choice of 
"culture" in place of civilization that underpins the traditionalist-conservative 
understanding of Islam, as opposed to the Islamic trend which upheld it as a 
framework of a glorious civilization in retreat. 
Emphasis on culture did not come to mean denial of the individual. On the 
contrary, traditionalist conservatives wanted to recast the value hidden in individual 
will as the constitutive category of religion, morals, politics and economy. Thus, 
creative individual will was privileged either against the rationalism of Islamic 
scholastics patterned by the Ke/am school and/or positivist and/or materialist social 
determinism. 74 This emphasis on individual will always served as a framework for 
individualist ideals in the Republican period. Furthermore, Bergsonism, through its 
articulation in traditionalist-conservative discourse, always remained as a philosophical 
contour for the "individualism(s)" absorbed by the so-called 'liberal revolts' raised 
against the societaJism of bureaucratic Kemalism by the mid-I 940s. 
73 For similar assessments, see Olken, Ask Ahlaki, p. VI. Also Olken, Tilrk Mistisizmi'ni Tetkike Giris 
(Introduction to the Study ofTurkish Mysticism) (lstanbul: Aqam Matbaas1, 1935). 
74 Olk See en, '·Maksat," pp. 1-7. 
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Since the late-Ottoman era, Bergsonian philosophy in Ottoman-Turkish 
intellectual milieu signified a new and modem philosophical perspective. Historically, 
Bergsonian philosophy was a crossroads between W estemism, modernist Islam.ism and 
Turkism. 75 Resurgence of Bergsonism in the early Republican era and the circulation 
of traditionalist-conservative ideals through the activities of the Turkish Philosophy 
Association reflected that there were competing intellectual groupings seeking to 
formulate a legitimate understanding of Kemalist practices. During the early thirties, 
Kadro's materialist philosophy and its historical-materialist perspective provoked and 
thus united diverse critics of the materialist-positivist and mechanist philosophies 
around the ideal of formulating an alternative conception ofKemalism. 
Kadro's Revolutionary Kemalism and Traditionalist Conservatives 
The Kemalist Revolution had profound effects on the social, economic and political 
structure of the society. Within a decade after the proclamation of the Republic in 
1923, the ruling Republican intelligentsia came to complete their radical westernization 
project under the tutelage of the newly established nation-state. Cultural, political and 
economic reforms were implemented under the surveillance of the charismatic 
leadership of Gazi Mustafa Kemal. In a decade various intellectual groupings emerged 
with the aim of formulating the valid interpretation of the Revolution. Between 1932 
and 193 5 a group of Republican intellectuals began to publish the journal Kadro to 
formulate a theory of the Turkish revolution. The core circle of the intellectuals 
comprised Sevket Siireyya Aydemir, S~kin Yazman, Vedat Nedim Tor, ismail Hiisrev 
Tokin, Burhan Asaf Belge, and Sevki Yazman.76 Aydemir, was the prominent figure 
of the joumal.77 
75 During the late Ottoman and early Republican periods, Islamic traditionalist were organiz.ed around the 
jownals Sebil/ilrresat and Ceride-i llmiye, Westemists, who published other journals such as Servet-i Fiinun, 
iftihat and Y eni Mecmua, in the same period were heavily inspired by a vague positivist philosophy. See 
Selahattin Hilav, "~tince Tarihi," in Tilrkiye Tarihi. Cagdas Tilrkiye 1908 - 1980 (History of Turkey -
Contemporary Turkey 1908 - 1980), vol. 4, Sina ~in, ed. (lstanbul: Cem Yaymevi, 1990), p. 385. 
76 H"l .dem 1av,1 . 
77 Om11r Sezgin, "Kadro Hareketi," (The Kadro Movement) in Kadro. Cem Alpar, eds. (Ankara: Ankara tk:tisadi 
ve Ticari Uimler Akademi Yaymlan, l 978 ), p. l'.!. 
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Kadro's conceptualization of the Kemalist Revolution had profound effects on 
Turkish intellectual life in the 1930s. More important than its self-dictated historical 
mission of formulating an ideology of Kemalism, Kadro 's revolutionary Kemalism 
provoked the strengthening of the traditionalist-conservative resistance. 78 Kadro 's 
attempt to formulate a valid interpretation of the historical meaning of the Kemalist 
state and the ideal of nation brought about early rivalries i.e. revolutionaries and. 
counter-revolutionaries, vanguard intellectuals and cadres of the Revolution and the 
savant of the Old regime and/or the spokesmen ofliberalism and/or individualism. 79 
Kadro's historical materialistic perspective, which was employed to understand 
the underlying economic and political reasons of the Turkish Revolution, was 
countered by traditionalist-conservative intellectuals who were inspired by the common 
philosophico-political aspirations against materialism after the Bergsonian reaction to 
the development of historical materialism and positivist-mechanism in the Ottoman 
Turkish polity in the 1918-1920 period. The journal, KultUr Haftasz, (1933-1937) 
became a common platform for the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals who had 
been severely criticized by Kadro because of their inherent moralism, individualism and 
Bergsonism. Articles by Agaoglu, Tun~, Olken and Baltac1oglu appeared in the 
journal. Moreover, individual figures also published various pamphlets, books and 
series of articles in the dailies and in their own journals which enriched the resistance 
among the Republican intelligentsia against Kadro's revolutionary Kemalism. Despite 
their varying orientations, Hiiseyin Cahit's journal, Fi/cir Hareketleri, Baltac1oglu's Yeni 
Adam and Olken' s journal, insan were also published to counter the materialist-
positivist Weltanshauung. The materialist philosophy circulated through Kadro 
publications had a stimulating effect on the resurgence of the deeply-rooted historical 
materialist-Bergsonian controversy in the Republican era. In response to the Kadro 
78 See "Kadro," Kadro. 1(January1932), p. I. 
79 ~vket Silreyya Aydemir accused of A~oglu of being a protoganist of a colonialist liberal thought represented 
by Cavit Bey, the last Ottoman Finance Minister. See Aydemir, .. Darillfilnun Inlalap Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey 
tktisatv1hgi," (Darill.filmm's Sensibility to the Revolution and Cavit Bey's Economism) Kadro. 14 (February 
1933), pp. 5-11. 
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circle, traditionalist-conservative intellectuals exploited various themes and key concepts 
of a Bergsonian reaction to the positivist mechanism of the early 1920s more clearly. 
In the new age of national awakening, Kadro aimed to safeguard the 
uniqueness of the Turkish revolution by neutralizing the "idealist-pessimist" 
philosophical aspirations of the defenders of the old Ottoman regime. 80 In Kadro's 
perspective, Kemalism was a state-building ideology and a new theory of anti_. 
imperialism. 81 It also symbolized a new materialist-scientific Weltanshauung which 
awaited for systematization in the cultural scientific institutions for the people. It 
signified the march of Reason over passions and emotions, science over religion, 
superstitions and mysticism and finally absolute Revolutionary truth over particular 
interests of the society. 82 The objectives set by Kadro for the ruling cadre of the 
Revolution were to sustain the legitimacy of the revolutionary institutions and to 
consolidate the revolutionary practices by inferring some general principles from the 
'historical conditions' in which the revolution was born. The historical significance of 
Kadro's attempts to systematize the Revolutionary practices stemmed from its net effect 
of uniting even contradictory philosophico-political stand-points on a common 
traditionalist-conservative continuum. Ultimately, both perspectives presented 
themselves as the legitimate interpretations of the Kemalist Revolution. 83 
Yet, one question still waited for an answer: who would be the carrier of the 
rationalist discourse of the scientific nation-state? Kadro gave the answer: The 
enlightened intelligentsia who devoted themselves to the future ideals of the nation and 
who had the wisdom to act as a legislators. 84 The revolutionary theory of Kemalism 
was expected to shed light on the future prospects of the Revolution aiming to create 
80 Aydemir, '"Ink.ilap Bitti Mi?" (Did the Revolution Come to an End?) Kadro. 3 (March, 1932), pp. 5-10, 
·'Dariilfllllun Ink.ilap Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey iktisati;1hgJ.," pp. 5-11. 
81 Nedim Ttir, "Devletin Yap1c1bk ve !darecilik Kudretine !nanmak Lanm," (It Is Necessary to Believe in 
State's Power of Construction and Administration) Kadro. 15 (March, 1933), pp. 13-9. 
82 Burhan A. Beige, "Dniversit.e 'nin Manas1," (The Meaning of University) Kadro. 20 (August, 1933 ), pp. 24-8. 
83 See ''Kadro," p. l. For a similar view, see Safa, ·'Ink.ilablilllZlil ldeolojisi," (The Ideology of Our Revolution) 
Cwnhuriyet. (July, 29, 1933). 
84 
"Kadro," p. I. For "Enlightened Despots," see Leonard Krieger, Kings and Philosophers 1689-1789 (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicol~ 1971), p.174. 
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an industrial society and a rational state. Consequently, it was the enlightened 
intelligentsia, which would play a crucial role in formulating the new scientific 
Weltanshauung for the state of its nation. 
During those stormy years of the debate with Kadro, traditionalist-conservative 
resistance gained a new impetus among the Republican intelligentsia. For the 
traditionalist-conservative circle Kemalism was a multi-dimensional phenomenon. This 
new approach to Kemalism, contrary to Kadro intellectuals, aimed to free Kemalism 
from being merely a rationalist dogma. For Olken, it was an era when the intelligentsia 
put its rationalism before the so-called mystic irrationalism of the masses. 85 In this new 
age, intellectuals did not act only as men of contemplation but they also came to be the 
devoted and enlightened vanguards of the nation. As argued by Olken, "Thought and 
Will" marched over society to secure its rational administration as if the society was an 
artifact subjected to the rational control of the intelligentsia. 86 As will be elaborated on 
in the succeeding chapters, the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals were aware of 
the fact that Kemalism had a strict emphasis on science as the ultimate policy criterion 
of the new administration. However, for about three decades later, Baltac10glu, as 
already revealed in his series of articles on philosophy published in Yeni Adam in the 
1930s, more openly illustrated that a unique synthesis of philosophical and scientific 
reasoning would free both from turning into merely hard ideologies over life. In his 
words: 
Philosophy cannot exist without science. Although it is not science, it has to depend on 
science, intemafu.e scientific data, and reconcile itself with science. Or else it is not 
philosophy, but ideology. Science, which is contained by philosophy, is rational. 
However, here, reason is not mathematical and static, but alive. 87 
Kemalism, in traditionalist-conservative vocabulary, was a modem form of elan 
engineering. The War of Independence, as maintained by Agaoglu in his Dev let ve 
Ferd (The State and Individual) and by Safa in Turk Devrimine Ba~lar, was an 
85 .. 
Ulken Ask Ahlakt, p. VI. 
86 Ibid., pp. 76-7. 
87 See Baltac10glu, Ziya Q()kalp (lstanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1966), pp. 57-8. See Tum;, "Tilrkiye'de Felsefe," 
(Philosophy in Turkey) ls MecmU8SI. l l l/2(1937), pp. 25-34. 
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outcome of life-tension in the society which at the end turned into a total war for 
survival. The reasons of the Turkish victory could not be found on the level of 
development of the material sources of the nation. On the contrary, it was elan vital of 
the society derived from the vital impulse to survive which was responsible for the 
Turkish victory. 88 Kemalism signified the triumph of quality and creative life forces 
over quantity and mechanism but not the other way around. It was the manifestation of 
the creative essence of the society. In this respect, Kemalism was a grand cultural 
movement which aimed to constitute the unique national forms since it impelled the 
nation to return to itself for survival and to follow its own path of development. '89 In 
this respect, Kemalism represented authenticity and particularity but not 
cosmopolitanism and formalism. This cultural authenticity, which Kemalism sought to 
bring to the fore, for the traditionalist-conservative circle, could be grasped as a 
synthesis of the images of folk spirit and folk religion. 90 
Towards a New Metaphysics: Kadro's Societalism Against Traditionalist-Conservative 
Persona/ism 
In this new era of nation-state building, individualist and old-minded scholars in 
Darii/fonun were accused by Kadro of being responsible for the resurrection of 
Bergsonian pessimism and individualism. 91 Accordingly, the old scholars m 
Dariilfonun, before its dissolution in 1933, were accused of being engaged m 
regenerating a new individualist metaphysics to degenerate the Revolutionary 
principles and values. Indeed, Baltac10glu revealed that new secular personalist 
88 TuDf;:, "Bugil.nkfi Hayatumzm Aki~lan," (The Flows of Our Life Today) Hayat, VI, 136 (July 1929), p.3, in 
Atatorlc Devri Fikir Hayati IL Kaplan, EnginOn, et. al. ed., pp. 331-4. See also Olken, Tark TefekkOr Tarihi 
(History of Turkish Thought), vol.I (1stanbul:Ebu'z Ziya Matbaas1, 1932), pp. 81-5. Also Agaoglu, "Yaratm 
Tekamiil," (Creative Evolution) Kiiltur Haftas1. 3 (January 29, 1936), pp.59-60. See Safa, "Bergson ve 
Zamarunuz" (Bergson and Our Age) Cumhwiyet, (September 16, 1937). 
89 Baltactoglu, "Inktlabm Begendigi Adam," (Man Approved by the Revolution) Yann Mecmuast, 8 (December, 
I, 1337) p. l, quoted in Necmettin Tozlu, Ismail Hakla Baltac1o@u'nun Egitim Sistemi Ozerine Bir Arastuma (A 
Research on the Educational System ofismail Hakla Baltactoglu) (lstanbul: M. E. BaslDlevi, 1989), p. 39. 
90 Safa., Tiirk Inkdabma BakJslar, pp. 213-7, 185-9. Olken., 1nsani Vatanperverlik (Humanist Patriotism) 
(lstanbul, Giln~ Basunevi, 1933). See also Baltac1oglu, Tarih ve Terbiye. pp. 61-9. 
91 Aydemir, "Yan MOnevverler Klubii," (The Club of Semi-Intellectuals) Kad.ro, 8 (August 1932), pp. 40-3, 
"Bergson Bahsi ve Httrriyet Telakkimiz," (The Bergson Question and Our Conception of Freedom) Kadro. 13 
(January 1933), pp.42-6, "Bergsonizm Yahut bir Korkunun Felsefi tfadesi," (Bergsonism or the Philosophical 
Expression of a Fear) Kadro. 11 (November 1932), pp. 43-50, "Darillftlnumm Inlalap Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey 
~gi," pp. 5-11, "1smail Hakla Beyin Met1run:ciligi," (The Idealism ofismail Hakla Bey) Kadro. 29 (May 1934), 
pp. 37-42; Beige, "Aikada Kalan Danllfiintm," (Darillfilmm in the Past) Kadro. 8 (August 8, 1932), pp. 47-8. 
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metaphysics would provide the moral principles and values from which the ultimate 
good in Kemalist practices would be deduced. 92 This civic conception of metaphysics 
would provide new answers for the purpose of human existence in modem society.93 
In his reply to Aydemir's criticisms, he revealed that he was neither an individualist, as 
Kadro acclaimed him, nor a societalist but was a personalist.94 Traditionalist-
conservative emphasis on the individual will in a personalist perspective had important 
repercussions in consolidating a new secular metaphysics, since religion lost its 
essential function to render a meaning to human existence within the universe of 
Kemalist modernism. Traditionalist-conservative circle, devoted to personalism, 
ultimately aimed to replace the religious dogma with a new life metaphysics. 95 
This traditionalist-conservative emphasis on the new life metaphysics was also 
an attempt to provide an ethical content to the political construction of the Republican 
citizen and had far-reaching repercussions in politics. Traditionalist-conservative 
attempts to formulate a new metaphysics of man provided substantive views to the 
ruling Kemalist intelligentsia to delineate the just and moral action of the citizen in a 
hierarchical and stratified society. Within this framework, the conflict-hidden dualities, 
such as individual against society and rights against obligations, became political issues 
which revealed the deeply-rooted controversy between the rationalist-societalist and 
empiricist-personalist ethics of the revolutionaries and the traditionalist conservatives, 
respectively. 96 
92 Baltac1oglu, "Laik Terbiyenin Kendisini 1stiyoruz," (We Demand the Secular Education Itself) Yeni Adam 68 
(April 18, 1935), p. 2. Olken tried to fonnulate a moralist-personalist ethics which would serve as a means of 
integration for various strata in new modem hierarchical society (meratip cemiyeti). See Olken. Ask Ahlakt, 
pp.120-31, 162-3, 165, 271, 379-80, lnsani Vatanperverlik, p. 73. See also Olken, Sosvolojive Giris (Introduction 
to Sociology) (1stanbul: O~ler Basltnevi, 1947), pp. 19-25. 
93 Baltac10glu, "Laik Terbiyenin Kendisini lstiyoruz," p. 2. 
94 Baltac1oglu, ''Kadro'yaG6re Yeni Adam, Yeni Adam'a Gare Kadro," (feni A.dam for Kadro, Kadro for Yeni 
Adam) Y eni Adam. (April 23, 1934 ), p.11. 
95 See Aydemir, ·'Bir Ruh Fantazisi Yahut Yerli Peygarnberi," (A Spiritual Fantasy or Native Prophet) Kadro. l 
(January 1932), pp. 31-7. 
96 ,.,,._ See u1.1..en., AskAhlakl. pp. 71, 77, 87, 89- 90, 192, 346. 
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Kadro's Critique of Persona/ism with an Ethical Content 
It was not accidental that the debate between Kadro and traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals began by Kadro's severe criticisms of Bergsonism and individualism of 
[read personalism like Olken and Baltac1oglu chose to label it] the traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals. 97 This debate started three years after the Republican ruling 
elites had ended the short lived 'liberal' Free Party episode. Because of the rising statist 
tendencies in the 1930s, intellectual and political agenda of the time was shaped by the 
limits and evils of individualism. 98 
The leitmotivs of Kadro's criticisms were "individualism," and "liberalism" in 
economics, "Bergsonism," and "idealism" in politics. Kadro 's challenge began for 
about a year before the Republican government had launched a university reform 
program. The old Dariilfanun was dissolved and the istanbul University, which had 
been planned to be in the service of the Revolution, was established. The Kadro 
intellectuals welcomed the university reform program. 99 Besides the self-dictated 
mission of formulating a revolutionary ideology, Kadro tried to demonstrate that 
individualism and moralist mysticism that revealed themselves in Dlken' s A§k Ahlak1 
97 In his article revealing the objectives of the Turkish Philosophy Association, Dlken characteriz.ed the common 
philosophical orientation of the intellectuals gathered around the Association as ~Yetfi/ik (personalism). See 
Olken, "Maksat," pp. 1-7. Baltac1oglu emphasized on the differences between individualism and personalism 
and set the mission as to maintain the uniqueness and unity of personality. He added that following the 
Renaissance period, a trend toward personalism was emerged in the Western world. For his distiction between 
personalism and individualism, see Baltac1oglu "Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri, Terbiye" (Lectures of People's 
University, Education) Yeni Adam, 28 (July 9, 1934), p.2. For an emphasis on the realness and unity of 
personality and the demystification of religious world and changing conceptions of individual towards 
personalism, see Baltac1oglu, "Halk Universitesi Dersleri, Terbiye," (Lectures of People's University, Education) 
Y eni Adam, 29 (July 16, 1934 ), p.2. Baltac1oglu, in his reply to Kadro, also typified his philosophical orientation 
as realism, see Baltac1oglu, '1Cadro'ya Gore Yeni Adam Yeni Adam'a Gore Kadro," p. 11. Also Baltac1oglu, 
"Kadro'ya Cevap,~ (Reply to Kadro) Yeni Adam. 29 (July 16, 1934), p.8. For his personalist conception of 
educational philosophy, see Baltac1oglu, lctimai Mektep Prensipleri (The Principles of Social School) (lstanbul: 
Tecelli Matbaas1, 1935). Safa also pointed out the changing conceptions of individual in modem societies. See 
Safa, ·'So7.de MUD.evverler Cesaretini Nereden Alrrlat!" (From Where Does the Pseudointellectual Take His 
Courage?) Curnhurivet. (August 15, 1933). 
98 Ulken made a distinction between excessive societalism and individualism, which either resulted in slavery of 
the individual or anarchy in society. Olken's distinction reflected a common stand shared by the traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals. See Olken, Ask Ahlala, p. VII. Also Safa, "Dtinyarun Muh~ OldlJ#u Ni.zam," (The 
Order Which the World is in Need of) Curnhuriyet. (October 11, 1939). Agaoglu's polemics with Kadro were 
compiled in his book entitled Dev/et ve Ferd. Agaoglu tried to show how particular interests could be reconciled 
with general interest without deteriorating two principles, namely public order and individual freedom. 
99 See Beige, "Medrese ve lrtica,., (Madrasah and Reaction) Hakimiyeti Milliye (August 8, 1933). Beige's 
article was a reply to Agaoglu. See Aga<>glu, "A4rtk Mektup:Oniversite Kadrosuna Ahnnu~ ~lar," (Open 
Letter: Friends at the University) Alan, (August 6, 1933). 
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(Piety Ethics) and Tun~'s Bergsonian philosophy were the bearers of an intellectual 
reactionism against revolutionary Kemalism. Burhan Asaf Beige accused Agaoglu and 
the scholars in old Dariilfanun of being "opportunists," "reactionaries" who were 
inspired from "liberalism and constitutionalism."100 Kadro's attack on traditionalist-
conservative figures was motivated by the fact that there was an alternative 
philosophico-political framework to their own materialist revolutionary Kemalist 
ideology. Moreover, they were aware of the fact that this competing conception of 
Kemalism was not an outsider of Kemalist politics since it also had a radical project of 
emancipation from Islamic scholastics. Traditionalist conservative legitimacy in politics 
was due to its personalism, willing to free the Republican citizen from the restrictive 
formalist Islamic scholastics. Even though the theme of freeing from Islamic scholastics 
granted traditionalist-conservative discourse a recognition in politics, the extension of 
the idea of freeing the individual and society from the state's excessive tutelage made 
traditionalist-conservative ideas unacceptable to Kadro. Still in the articles which 
appeared in Kadro in 1932, the attacks were not directed at Islamic scholasticism but 
to those 'liberal', 'individualist,' 'moralist,' 'mysticist,' 'Bergsonian' 'idealist' 
intellectuals, namely, Agaoglu, Ulken, Tun~ and Baltac1oglu, whom in Kadro's 
perspective were fed by the nineteenth century nihilism against modernism and 
rationalism. 101 In this way, Kadro aimed to secure the uniqueness of its own 
revolutionary Kemalism by neutralizing the traditional conservative intellectual milieu. 
In 1931, a booklet of ~evket Sureyya Aydemir, entitled Cihan Ekonomisinde 
Turkiye (Turkey in the World Economy) was published. 102 Then, his provocative book 
Inkzlap ve Kadro (Revolution and the Cadre) appeared in 193 2. 103 The sacred mission 
Kadro set for itself was stated by Aydemir as follows: 
100 Belge, idem. 
101 Aydemir, ~yan Munevverler Klubti," pp. 40-3, "Bergson Bahsi ve Htlrriyet Telakkimiz," pp. 42-6, 
"Bergsonizm Yabut bir Korkunwt Felsefi ifadesi," pp. 43-50, "Daliilfilnwiwi Inkdap Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey 
iktisatcril1g1," pp. 5-l l, "lsmail Haldu Beyin Metkureciligi," pp. 37-'12. 
102 Aydemir, Cihan Ekonomisinde TOrkiye (Turkey in the World Economy) (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye 
Basunevi, 1931 ). 
103 Aydemir, Inktlap ve Kadro (Revolution and the Cadre) (Istanbul: Milliyet Bas1mevi, 1932). 
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' .... During Ataturk's period there were the attempts of formulating doctrines all over 
Europe. In Russia revolutionary socialism (Marxism). in Italy Fascism, in Germany 
Nazism and in democratic countries reformist socialist ideology and socialism were all 
active doctrines .... .In Turkey. we faced the reality of the Revolution. however we did not 
have a theory and philosophy of Revolution. If there is a revolution. then there must be an 
interpretation of the revolution. The theory of revolution had to be based on the objective 
conditions which were responsible for its emergence in history and the scientific study of 
f h .ginal . . l 104 context o t e on pnnc1p es .. 
The dispute between the 'ideologues of the Revolution' and 'Bergson-inspired 
reaction' was intensified when Aydemir severely criticized Olken's "moralist 
mysticism" in his article entitled Bir Ruh Fantazisisi Yahut Yerli Peygamber (A 
Spiritual Fantasy or Native Prophet) in Kadro's first issue. 105 The focus of the article 
was one of Olken's books entitled A~k Ah/ak1, published in 1931. In Aydemir's words, 
"it was indeed a book written for the people in spite of people. "106 He, as in his 
criticism of Baltac1oglu, opposed Ulken's eclecticism, which for Aydemir, had resulted 
from Olken' s "vitalist, pan-naturalist, effectualist, monist and realist perspective. " 107 
According to him, Ulken was the protagonist of a new mystic religion which could be 
characterized as a "state of indolent slavery of soul." 108 
For Aydemir, Turkey was in a state of permanent Revolution. Thus, Kadro 
would theorize on the current state of society and would try to develop a theory of 
permanent revolution. For Aydemir and the emergent Kadro perspective, any kind of 
pessimist mystic individualism could not be a legitimate philosophical perspective on 
which the future ideals and principles of the Revolution could be built. For Kadro, 
neither the individual nor the individual will could be taken as the basic categories of a 
revolutionary theory of Kemalism. The essential determinant for individual action was 
society and social cognizance. The direction, purpose and the value hidden in social 
development could only be grasped through a revolutionary theory which granted 
priority to the society. 109 
104 Aydemir, Tek Adam (The Single Man), vol. 3, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi,1966), pp.459-60. 
105 Aydemir, "Bir Ruh Fantazisisi Yahut Yerli Peygamber," pp.31-7 
106 lb"d l .,p.31. 
107 lb"d 3" I ., p. -· 
108 lb'd 5 I ., p. 3 . 
109 Aydemir, "Inla.lap Heyecam," (Revolutionary Excitement) Kad.ro. 2 (February, 1932), p. 5. 
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The legitimate ideology of Revolution had to explain the underlying economic 
reasons of the political and social changes experienced in society. For Aydemir, 
Olken's moralism, as revealed in his book, like Agaoglu's liberalism and/or 
Baltac1oglu' s idealism, was an archetype of an "outdated individualism" and a "mystic 
view on Man and society" in which the essential category was the "subject" [the ego] 
but not the "object" [society]. 110 However, in revolutionary times, the essential 
category of philosophico-political analysis was society [read the object] but not the 
individual [read the subject]. 111 The achievements of the revolution could only be 
safeguarded through the concurrent revolutionary changes fostered in society. For 
Kadro, deference to any kind of "individualism," be it either "mystical-religious" or 
"philosophical," was an attack on Kemalism. Thus, Kadro' s etatist-rationalist stand 
dictated that "individualist/mysticist philosophies" would hinder the consolidation of 
the political and social ideals of the Revolution. 
In 1933, Olken published several books which showed that society was in a 
deep moral crisis after the dissolution of the traditional religious order. 112 Alienation of 
the intelligentsia and the distance between the ideals of the rulers and the ruled had 
further been deepened and widened by growing rationalism and radicalism in 
politics. 113 Neither materiality nor spirituality could be sacrificed to each other. 
Increasing standardization and dehumanization of social relations turned the society to 
a set of mechanical relations through which a power-driven solidarity among the 
citizens was sought. 114 For him, the foremost problem was to counter the rationalist 
revolutionary philosophies which saw the society as a rational artifact. Thus, Olken, in 
Tun~'s sense, argued that the new "truth" philosophically manifested itself in the 
mysticism of the people which sociologically corresponded to what Baltac10glu 
110 Aydemir, "Bir Ruh Fantazisisi Yahut Yerli Peygamber," p. 36. 
111 Aydemir, "lnlolap Heyecaru," pp. 5-8. 
112 These themes were elaborated in various books. See Dlken, Ti1rk Tefekki1r Tarihi II, lnsani Vatanperverlik, 
Telifcili&in T enakuzlan (The Contradictions of Compromising) (lstanbul: Hamidbey Matbaas1, 1933 ). 
113 Olk en, ~k Ahlab, pp. ill-VII, 170-4. 
114 Olken, "lnsani Vatancilik," (Humanist Patriotism) Mo.lkiye. 1-9 (December 1931), pp. 4-13. 
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referred as tradition. He tried to reconcile Turkish mystic thought [read a unique life of 
contemplation] with modem rationality which was seen as a means of domination of 
the material but not the human world. 115 
Olken stressed that the antagonism between rationalism and mysticism became 
visible in the life experiences of different strata of the society. Intellectuals had started 
to conceive themselves as the representatives of a mode of rational conduct of daily 
experience whereas the rest of the populace was degraded as the holders of a mystic 
irrational experience. However, there was an urgent need to reconcile these competing 
truths in the society. For Olken, the task of Republican intelligentsia was not to 
disregard the hidden truths which manifested themselves in the traditions of the 
society. 116 Only through getting closer to the world of irrationality, that is, culture, a 
unique conception ofKemalism could be formulated. 117 
Towards an Ethical Theory of Politics: Work Ethics in Traditionalist-Conservative Discourse 
The basic traditionalist-conservative contention was to show that every epoch had 
created its own highest truth in the fields of politics, aesthetics and ethics, and had its 
own typical model of man. 118 In this respect, Dlken argued that the higher truth of the 
Ancient Greek polis civilization was represented by a typical personality, namely the 
judge. This old civilization also had its own conception of the universe. The cosmos 
meant the order of universe and society. 119 From the democracy of the polis, an age of 
tyranny and its corresponding hedonistic morality, which had been represented by the 
rise of Stoicism and Epicureanism emerged. 120 Subsequent to the emergence of 
Semitic religions, the highest truth of the universe was represented by the saint (veli). 
115 .. . . .. 
Ulken, 1b1d, pp. 8-11. See also Ulken, Ask Ahlalu, p. VI. 
116 .. 
lnken.. Ask Ahlalu, pp. ill-VIII. 
117 See Olken., Tiirk Kozmolojisi. TUrk Mitolojisi.Tilrk Hikmeti. Teknik Tefekkilr (Turkish Cosmology, Turkish 
Mythology, Turkish Wisdom, Technical Thinking) (Ankara: B~vekalet Mudevvanat Basunevi, 1933), Insani 
Vatanperverlik. ( 1933), TUrk Filozotlan Antolojisi (The Anthology of Turkish Philosophers) (1stanbul, ~irket-i 
MUrettibiye Matbaa..">1, 1935). 
118 Ulken, "Vatan ve Demokrasi," (Fatherland and Democracy) Millet ve Tarih Sugrn, p. 58. Also Baltactoglu, 
"Inktlab Edebiyat1 Ne Olabilir?" p.7, "Inkilabm Mektebi," (The School of the Revolution) Yeni Adam, 7 
(February 12, 1934), p.5. 
119 Olk.en, ibid, pp.58-9 See also Baltac1oglu, 1zmit Konferanslan: Terbiyenin Kivmetleri ve Vas1talan (tzmit 
Conferences: The Values and Means ofEducation) (1zmit, Muallimlerevi N~yatJ., 1933), p. 6. 
120 Ulk' "b"d 59-60 en, I I ., pp. . 
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The clergy, the privileged group of the religious order, was seen as the carrier of an 
ascetic ethics until the age of Renaissance which had been characterized by the rise of 
modem state and monarchy. In the modem world shaped by the rise of modem state, 
an ethics of honesty developed. The model of honest man in the New Age was a 
synthesis of the saints ethics of the Middle Ages and the judge, ideal-typical personality 
of the Ancient polis civilization. The ethics of honesty became an imperative of the 
rationalist-individualist ethics, which had been represented in the writings of Voltaire 
and had further been consolidated by the deepening of the political structures of the 
modem state. 121 Then, Jean Jacques Rousseau's model of virtuous man, which 
celebrated the emergence of citizenship ideal and national ideals, triumphed over the 
ethics of honesty shaped by a belief on the governing ethos of Reason and an apriori 
symmetry between Reason and universe. 122 Traditionalist-conservative conception of 
politics, with an ethical content, was primarily engaged in delineating an ethics of 
spontaneous and "voluntary self-sacrifice" of the free citizens, for deepening of the 
political and cultural institutions of the modem-nation state. 
In search of an ethical basis for individual action m modem society, 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals recognized work as an empirical process of self-
realization for the individual. 123 Traditionalist-conservative approach to work process, 
which had been praised both by Baltaetoglu and Dlken as a means of self-recognition 
and realization, was a challenging alternative to the dominant Republican 
understanding where the legitimate public identity was constituted through a rationalist 
citizenship ethics. Work and profession became the ultimate sources of individual 
ethics which drew the limits of his rights and obligations. Moreover, as pointed out by 
121 Olken, ibid., pp. 62-4. Also see Baltac1oglu, "Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri, i1ttimaiyat." (Lectures of People's 
University, Sociology) Yeni Adam. 41 (October II, 1934), p. 5; Baltac1oglu, izmit Konferanslan: Terbivenin 
Kivmetleri ve Vas1talan. p. 6. 
122 Olken, ibid, pp. ~5. See also Baltac1oglu, Tarih ve Terbiye. p.175. 
123 See Baltac1oglu, lctimai Mektep Nazariyesi. Also Olken, Ask Ahlalo. pp. 34-5. See also 01.ken, "l1ttimai 
T~kkUliln Temeli, t~." (The Basis of Social Organization, Work) insan. 2,8 (January 1, 1939), pp. 671-6, -·~ 
Hakkmda," (On Work) insan. 2,10 (March 1,1939), pp. 822-31, "lfe Dair," (About Work)~ 2,12 (May 8, 
1939), pp. 997-1002. AWtoglu used the term "work" as a criterion to denote the basic cleavage system of the 
capitalist societies, See Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferd. p. 49. 
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Baltac10glu, it was only through work Man constituted himself as a member of a 
society, as a functional part of a totality. 124 This conception of work, as the basis of a 
stratified society (meratipler cemiyeti), was characterized in detail by Olken in his A~k 
Ahlak1. Accordingly, work was the basis of a modem, differentiated and hierarchical 
society. The growing functional division of labour resulted in the emergence of a 
modem stratified society which was composed of various groups and classes that were 
mutually dependent on each other. 125 Yet, transition to the modem stratified society, at 
the same time, implied the deterioration of the religious Welta11shauu11g; replacement 
of it by saint ethics with a new personalist work ethics. n 6 
When work was regarded as the basis of moral personality, then, there emerged 
a distance from religious ethics and/or the rationalist Republican citizenship ethics. The 
ideal typical model of the individual of the religious order was the saint. In a similar 
vein, it was the revolutionary citizen armored with science and rational thought who 
stood as an ideal-typical model of the individual for Kemalism. 127 Having provided an 
ethical theory through their work conception, traditionalist conservatives advocated the 
view of a personality which realized itself in concrete work process as an ideal to 
secure the autonomy and the real existence of the 'hypothetical Revolutionary citizen,' 
without being entrapped by individualism and societalism. The organization of work, 
which had been praised as a process which would bring into being productive agents, 
had been severely criticized by Gokalp as incorporating an utilitarian end to the 
educational philosophies. Though these intellectuals did not try to impose a utilitarian 
basis for either work or education, Gokalp had maintained that education could not be 
provided on a utilitarian basis although utility could be a legitimate end of education. 128 
124 See Baltac10glu, innit Konferanslan: Terbiyenin Kiymetleri ve Vas1talan. 
125 Dlken, Sosyoloji (Sociology), 2nd. ed. (lstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, l 943), p. 197. 
126 .. 
Ulken, Ask Ahlaki, p. VI. 
127 Baltac10glu, ictimai Mektep Prensipleri, p. 6-7. Also Baltac1oglu, Toplu Tedris (Mass Education) (lstanbul: 
Sebat BaslIIlevi, 1938). 
128 See Ziya Gokalp, "Terbiye ve Milliyet-Milli Hakimiyet," (Education and Nationality - National Sovereignty) 
Muallim Mecmuas1, l, 2 (August 15, 1927) pp. 33-9, quoted in Tozlu, Ismail Hakla Baltac1oglu'nun Egitim 
Sistemi Dzerine bir Arastuma. p. 109. 
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In this sense, Olken, like others who belonged to this circle, aimed to find out a 
way out of the dilemma of social determinism against individual freedom. The old 
question concerning the limits of individual freedom and individual will was resolved 
through a new conception of work as an empirical process of self-realization where the 
individual felt both his autonomy and responsibilities towards the society. The critical 
traditionalist-conservative questions were as follows: If the "individual" was always 
framed by a particular social order, then what would be the status of the 'individual 
will" and his creative capacity with respect to the social determinants? If the individual 
was free and because of his freedom and autonomy, there emerged responsibility, then 
what was the meaning of social determinism? Olken and Baltac1oglu's conception. of 
personality, which realized itself in concrete work process, aimed to reach a balanced 
approach which neither sacrificed the individual's creative capacity to realize himself as 
part of the moral order of the society nor reduced the moral order of the society to an 
artifact of individual's reason, passions and will to realize himself 129 
Olken's conception of personality presumed that personality was neither a pure 
individual construction nor solely shaped by the moral values of the society. 130 
Personality had been constituted as a harmonious totality of individual passions and 
social norms. Personality was not the conscious individual reflection of the moral 
values of society nor was the individual the creator of morality, as suggested by 
classical individualism. Against classical liberal individualism, Olken also held that 
personality was not the reason of a unique and private moral life against commonly 
shared social ethics. Personality was the manifestation of both the autonomy and 
independence of Man and his dependence on the society. Yet, more than these, it was 
the work process in which a mutual-dependence between individuals and with society 
were constituted. 131 
129 See Olken, Ask Ahlakl, p. 117, Telifciligin Tenakuzlan, p. 6, tnsani Vatanperyerlik, p. 264. Baltac1oglu, 
1ctimai Mekteo Naz.ariyesi. Terbiyenin Klymet ve Vas1talan, (The Values and Means of Education) (innit: 
Ahmed Fevzi Basunevi, 1933). 
130 Ulken, "Cemiyet ve Marazi ~uur," (Society and Pathological Conscious) Felsefe Y1lhgi. I (istanbul: 1932), 
pp. 23, 130. 
131 Olken, 1nsani Vatanperyerl!k, pp. 167-71. See also Olken, Ask Ahlaki, p. 69. 
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Work, according to Olken, was not simply an economic phenomenon which 
paved way to the rise of the legitimate category of classical economy, namely the homo 
economicus. 13:! Work, [read labour] was the quantitative and effective equivalent of all 
values that made up of the mores of a particular society. 133 The ethical content of 
human activity found materiality in the work process which constitutes the society as a 
dynamic totality. Organization of labour was the basis of society. It was also a realm 
for the unique objectivization of values and norms which shaped a particular 
conception of religion, ethics, law and art. 134 Yet, personality was a totality which had 
been shaped in an interactive relationship between the mores of the society and the role 
attributions in the work process, where the values and norms of a particular society 
found a concrete form. 135 For Olken, the ideal-typical personality in modem society, 
could be modeled on the principles of work organization which was ultimately shaped 
by the traditions, customs and history of individual societies. Yet, differences between 
various societies were due to the changing functions of mores and nature of work 
organization in constituting the personality as a moral authentic totality. The new the 
occupational groups, which emerged on the basis of the changing work structure of 
modem society, also reflected the shifts in the cleavage system of the modem society. 
Both for Olken and Baltac10glu, occupational structure and social hierarchy were 
responsible for the constitution of the personality as a form of moral existence. 
Olken, together with Baltac1oglu, was aware of the fact that the new regime 
was in search of a new set of principles and values which would provide legitimate 
answers to the questions of"how to behave in modem society?," and "on the nature of 
legitimate limits of moral and political actions of the members of the moral community, 
namely the nation." For the traditionalist-conservative circle, fulfillment of individual 
personality and maintenance of individual freedom were ultimately realized in the work 
I "'' .o~ Ulken, "~ Hakkmda," p. 827. 
133 Ulken, "t'rtimai T~kldlliln Temeli (4)," p. 671. 
134 Olken, "Sosyolojinin Me•1zu ve Usulu," (The Subject Matter and the Method of Sociology) Dil. Tarih. 
Cografya Fakilltesi Dergisi l,l (1942) p. 23. 
135 f°nl. "b"d "6 UUl.en, l l , p. - . 
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process. Yet, it did not come to mean that particular interests of groups and/or 
individuals in the work process could easily be substituted for the communal good and 
interests. Emphasis on work aimed to denote that society was in transition to a new 
organizational form which was based on a new division of labour among the newly 
emerging occupational groups. Yet, there was still an hierarchical structuration among 
the newly emerging groups, which Olken characterized as a basic tenet of modem 
stratified society. Although the traditionalist-conservative intellectual praised the 
individual as a productive creative agent in the work process, emphasis was more on 
the mutual-dependence among the individuals and groups than on the isolated individual, 
since mutual-dependence was seen as the basic tenet of the modem stratified society. 
The focus of analysis of traditionalist-conservative intellectual was the new 
functional division of labour which was held responsible for the emergence of a new 
sense of order, unity and dependence within and among the new occupational groups. 
The responsibility principle was derived from the interdependence of individuals and 
groups with each other. For the traditionalist-conservative intellectual, the responsible 
individual was an "active" citizen, who by internalizing the national ethics and bringing 
his individual capacities into the service of the nation contributed to the life of his 
nation. Thus, Baltactoglu revealed that 
Republic, independence, state and nation are all moral ideals. These are not ordinaly concepts. 
The power of the ideal ~ on our competency of sensation. All these are national. 
emotional and spiritual ism:s depending on the degree of our unconscious sensation. The ideal 
cannot coexist with interest and reason. It can be sensed only if it is spread throughout life. 136 
Traditionalist-conservative emphasis on unity within multiplicity to be emerged in the 
work process enriched their conception of social obligations. The exercise of free 
choice was both natural and a right but it also implied that feelings, views, interests and 
welfare of other members of the nation must also be taken into account because social 
life was more than a selfish satisfaction of individual interests. The individual, as a 
productive and acting agent, had moral, social, economic and political obligations 
towards the community to which he belonged, namely the nation. 
136 Baltac1oglu, bmit Konforanslan. Terbiyenin Ktymetleri ve Vas1talan, p. 7. 
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The question of ethics had a special importance for the traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals since the resolution of ethical questions would shed light on 
conditions of free obedience to the newly established national state. 137 Traditionalist 
conservatives tried to maintain that free obedience to the restraints and imperatives set 
by the new state should stem from the spontaneously possessed moral values through 
the self-devotion of the citizens to the national political institutions and living authentic 
traditions. Traditionalist-conservative contention with ethics aimed to close the 
distance between the order of the nation state and the order of the culture. Order of the 
new state, which was represented by Kemalism, would not be imposed from above but 
would have to emerge spontaneously from an inner sense of responsibility of the social 
groups and individuals who voluntarily felt a sense of belonging. In this respect 
Baltac1oglu affirmed that there was a correspondence between the ethical basis of 
Kemalist regime and his moral personality. 138 Furthermore, in his Cumhuriyete 
h1amyorum (I Believe in Republic) he characterized this contention as follows: 
I believe in the Republic, because I know that it belongs to us. I know that the Republic 
does not arise from the book, conceptualiz.ation., reason. But it is an outcome of our own 
living, of our own blood and flesh. I know that our Republic belongs only to us. I know 
that it is the actual reflection of our zeal for life, struggle and independence. 139 
Kemalism, in the broader sense, as it had been illustrated by Safa in Turk 
Devrimine Bakeylar, was the manifestation of the ideals of the War of Independence as 
the nation's will to return itself Thus, the new political order of the society was more 
than a political experiment, and it had to be a moral and spiritual enterprise for the 
members of the new political community. Thus politics, with a moral purpose, as 
delineated by Olken, had to deal with the problems of concrete man and society in the 
process of self-formation through their own unique way of development. Politics in 
search of a deeply rooted order had to aim for the perfection of man and society in 
137 .. 
Ulken, Ask Ahlakt, pp.13-5. 
138 Baltac1oglu. "Tilrk Rejimini Ni1tin Severim?" (Why I Like the Turkish Regime?) Y eni Adam. 247 
(September, 21, 1939), p.2. 
139 Baltac1oglu, "Cumhuriyete lnaruyorum," (I Believe in Republic) Yeni Adam. 357 (October, 30, 1941), p.2. 
See also Agaoglu. "Milliyet-rilik Cereyarun Esaslan," (The Principles of the Trend of Nationalism) Tiirk Yurdu. 
2, 11 (August 1925), pp. 389-95, quoted in Atatilrk Devri Fikir HayatJ I, Kaplan, Enginiln et.al., ed., pp. 115-22. 
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their own path of development and not transform them to some other things alien to 
themselves. Ulken remarked on this point as follows: 
Stability and the progress of the society to the perfect form of its structure should be 
distinguished from the transformation of a society into a totally different structure. 
Morality in a definite structure is the zeal for perfection. 1 ~0 
Politics was expected to deal with things in transition, those which are in self-formation, be 
it, personality or nationality. Thus, political institutions needed to be responsive more to the 
demands of the new age, without sticking to a model of positivist civilization which had 
been abandoned by the rise of a new West, critical of the positivist-rationalist West. As it 
will be elaborated in the succeeding chapters, an empiricist-realist method in politics and 
education was adopted and substituted for a rationalist-utopian one since the basic 
contention was to counter any kind of transcendentalism which could be derived from 
Kemalism. Baltac10glu' s educational philosophy stood for the most significant example of 
this traditionalist-conservative contention. 
As depicted by Agaoglu, societies moved from simple to complex forms 
through the intensification of functional division of labour and deepening property 
relations. 141 In comparing Western, Islamic and Brahmanian civilizations in his book 
U~ Medeniyet (Three Civilizations), Agaoglu also tried to show that it was lack of 
individuality and freedom in Islamic and Brahmanian civilizations which were 
responsible for the underdevelopment of a sense of public order at the individual 
level. 142 It was the development of the sense of individuality and individual activity 
which inevitably gave way to the necessity of establishing a new social harmony. New 
social harmony and order, which were brought up by secularization and maintained 
through the consolidation of citizenship ethics, would be maintained by a state 
responsive to its changing functions towards ensuring of individuality. 143 Agaoglu 
pointed out that social ethics had to be strengthened by public sanctions. The lack of a 
140 .. lnken, Veraset ve Cemiyet, p. 56. 
141 Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferd, pp. 30-1. 
142 See Agaoglu, Uc Medeniyet (Three Civilizations) (lstanbul, Milli Egitim Basunevi, 1972 [1927]). 
143 Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferd, pp. 40-2. 
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modern public sphere in Eastern civilizations was held responsible for the absence of a 
social ethics empowered with public sanctions. The lack of a social ethics also manifested 
itsel( according to Agaoglu, in the emergence of a sole ethics of obedience which 
contradicted modern citizenship ethics seeking for an active, productive individual in 
affiliation with the symbols of modern public sphere, conditioned by social ethics and 
framed by the politics of the nation state. What was lacking in the Eastern civilization was 
individuality and freedom which were the sources of social Order in modern societies. 
Bergsonian Persona/ism As a Philosophico-Political Shield for "Individualism" in the 1930s 
Agaoglu, who, then, was a scholar at Dariil.ftinun, celebrated the emergence of the 
Kemalist order. Kadro's severe critics of Agaoglu's "individualism" and "liberalism" 
popularized the debate between the personalist-liberals and rationalist-statist 
intelligentsia. In his article, Dariil.ftinun 'un Inkzlap Hassasiyeti ve Cavil Bey 
iktisadr;zilgz (Dartilfiinun's Sensibility to the Revolution and Cavit Bey's Economism) 
Aydemir openly criticized Agaoglu for keeping a distance from Revolutionary ethics, 
politics and philosophy and for hiding his reaction against the revolution behind the 
iron walls of silence and science. 144 
According to Aydemir, Agaoglu and his adherents in Dariil:ftinun were not 
equipped with those concepts and approaches to tackle the novelties brought by the 
Turkish Revolution. 145 For Kadro, cultural institutions, especially universities had to 
serve the realization of the revolutionary ideals. They had to be more responsive to the 
needs of the Revolution. For Kadro, Dariil:ftinun's elitist distance from the 
Revolutionary ideal mostly revealed itself in its motto of "science for the sake of 
science." It was a search of a metaphysics which aimed to promote the alienation of 
state institutions from society. Science had to be in the service of the Revolution, 
because it was the only source of knowledge. Revolutionary politics had to be based on 
a scientific approach in maintaining technical and economic development. 146 However, 
144 Aydemir, '"Dmillfilnunun Inkdap Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey tktisa~1hgi," pp. 6, 8. 
145 lb"d 9 l ., p .. 
146 Ibid., p.7. 
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for Aydemir, neither Agaoglu nor his disciples in Darii/fiinun had produced works 
which analyzed the historical conditions responsible for the establishment of a new 
revolutionary state in Anatolia. Thus, Aydemir criticized Agaoglu for his indifference 
to the fundamental principles of the Revolution. 
For Kadro, Agaoglu held a conscious distance from the state's principles of 
revolutionism and etatism. Kadro charged that the "liberal-minded scholars" of the old 
Darii/fiinun were in opposition to the new revolutionary state. For Kadro, Agaoglu, 
like Baltac1oglu, Tun~, and Olken, was the protagonist of an outdated liberalism and 
individualism which would cause anarchy, disorder and chaos in society. In Kadro's 
perspective, these intellectuals were destined to live as strangers to the national 
economic, social realities and national problems because of their conscious distance 
from the Revolutionary state's problematic of creating a modem society. 147 For Kadro, 
Agaoglu's "liberalism," and "individualism" would ultimately serve the establishment 
of a "colonial economy,"148 but definitely not a national one. 
Individualism, which had been severely criticized by the Kadro circle, was not 
an alien notion to the Republican intelligentsia. Since the appearance of the journal 
Servet-i Funun in the 1890s as a literary movement, individualism and the centrality of 
individual will was propagated under the influence of eighteenth century French 
philosophers. 149 Since the rise of Servet-i Funun as a literary movement, 
'individualism' was conceived to be a kind of humanism which referred to Man's 
potentiality of freeing himself from social restrictions, especially religion. This 
conception of individualism was limited in the sense that it did not imply an underlying 
rational man axiom of liberalism which referred to that individual as a freely acting 
constituent agent of the universe. Emphases made on national will and general 
interests, as the new categories of politics, further hindered the development of a 
147 Ibid., p.11. See also See Gtindilz Okiyiin, Tilr:kiye iktisat Kongresi- 1923 izmir: Haberler Belgeler. Yorumlar 
(The Turkish Economic Congress - 1923 1zmir: News, Documents, Corrunents) (Ankara: Ankara Oniversitesi 
Siyasal Bilgiler F aku.ltesi Yayutlari, 1971 ). 
148 Idem. 
149 See Ahmet 0. Evin, Origins and Development of the Turkish Novel (Miruteapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 
1983 ), p. l 79fn. 
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theory of liberal individualism among the Republican traditionalist conservatives. 
Though the Kemalists would likely tolerate to any creed 'freeing from the Islamic 
dogma,' as state and nation builders, they could hardly tolerate any kind of negative 
conception of liberty implying the ideal of freeing the individual and society from the 
state's transcendentalism. 
Agaoglu's individualism denoted to a shift in the conception of 'individual and 
individual freedom.' For Agaoglu, 'individualism' was a question fundamentally 
related to the existence or lack of the 'notion of individual' as the source of social 
ethics which, at the moment, denoted emergence of a worldly-ethics and particularly of 
citizenship ethics. As stated by Agaoglu: 
Islamic thought does not consider ethics as a separate branch of knowledge, but as eventually 
contained in religion. For lslamists the sharia is the ultimate authority in the determination of 
the values of the good and the bad. According to them ethical norms which had been marked 
out by sharia are surpassing and eternal. Due to their disregard of time, space and social 
conditions, Islamists do not consider ethics as a distinct realm outside religion. 150 
Individualism that had been propagated by Agaoglu aimed to replace Sharia with an 
individualist social ethics. This was definitely what the Kemalists ultimately sought to 
do in their grand modernization project. Yet, the Kemalists still kept a distance from 
the negative conception of 'freedom', which ultimately provides a legitimacy for the 
individual to resist the demands of the transcendentalist nation-state. Agaoglu, with 
other traditionalists conservatives, who was committed to personalism, rejected all 
kinds of rational state intervention which would hinder the individual's self realization 
d . d . b f h . 151 as a pro uctive an active mem er o t e society. 
Agaoglu was trying to replace the classical individualist humanism with the 
kind of Bergsonian personalism as the authoritative philosophy of economic liberalism. 
For Agaoglu, economic liberalism, like the economism of Marxism, reduced the 
collective existence of the individual to one of its components i.e., 'the nature of 
economic initiative.' For him, all kinds of economisms would result in various types of 
determinist and cosmopolitan approaches. Moreover, like the economism of liberalism, 
150 - . Agaoglu Uc Medemyet, pp. 67-8 
151 Agaoglu, Devlet ve FerQ, p. 79. 
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Kadro's economistic determinist understanding of Kemalism could not grasp the true 
evolution of the nation. The true meaning of individual in modem society could not be 
understood through reductionist economic approaches which views the complex issue 
through one of its components. Agaoglu' s distance to all kinds of economisms led him 
to see individuality as an issue which could only be understood through its cultural 
l~" components. --
For Agaoglu, the modem world had created new forces of integration and 
disintegration with deepening functional division of labour. 153 Though economic 
liberalism could result in anarchy, still, 'freedom' was the only source of order and 
responsibility in society. 154 Order could not be maintained in a mechanical sense but 
through conscious self-sacrifice of free individuals in the political and cultural premises 
of the new regime. The new national order would be based on interdependence and 
solidarity among free individuals who deeply felt the sense of belonging to an authentic 
culture. The motto of "my homeland is world and nationality is humanity" was a 
slogan of all kinds of economisms, be it liberal economism and/or Kadro's Marxism. 155 
For Agaoglu, the real question faced by the Revolutionaries was to ensure the 
development of an authentic Turkish personality. Spontaneous formation of this new 
authentic personality could be restricted neither by the religious dogma nor through 
arbitrary state interventions. Islamic theology, namely sharia, was conceived to be a 
factor which was restricted to the development of the new Republican personality 
whereas living religion, besides language, customs, common beliefs and convictions, 
were regarded as modem 'cohesive factors in society. ' 156 
152 Agaoglu, "Milliye~ilik Cereyamn Esaslan," Atatlhk Devri Fikir Hayati I, Kaplan, Enginun, et al., ed., p. 117. 
153 Agaoglu, Devlet ve Fer!!, pp. 91-4. For Agaogl.u's creative evolutionist perspective on nationality, see 
Agaogl.u, "Tarihi Devirler Arasmda Milliyet," (Nationality Between Historical Epochs) Turk Yurdu ill, 17 
(March, 1926), pp. 534 -37 in Atatfirk Devri Fikir Hayatt I, Kaplan, Enginun, et. al., ed., pp.154 -60. In Dev/et ve 
Ferd. Agaoglu tried to show that the universe was in a state of continuous becoming which could be characterized 
by clashes among tension-laden forces. Social evolution was seen as the outcome of these clashes. See Agaoglu, 
Devlet ve Ferd. pp. 36-41. 
154 Agaoglu, ibid, p.87. 
155 Ibid., p. 95. 
156 Agaoglu, "Milhyet~ilik Cereyarun Esaslan," Atatlhk Devri Fikir Hayat:I I, Kaplan, Enginon, et al., ed., p. 117. 
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Agaoglu 's Kemalism Against Kadro's Interpretation 
Agaoglu's stand against criticism raised by Kadro set the tone of his political distance 
from the rationalist-nominalist interpretations of Kemalism in the 1930. Agaoglu 
announced himself as a revolutionist, etatist and Kemalist, as much as the Kadro 
intellectuals were. 157 Still he delineated that his understanding of these concepts was at 
odds with the Kadro circle. For him, Kemalism was not a guiding book for the 
oppressed nations of the world. The Kemalist mission was to emancipate the individual 
from the restrictive effects of all kinds of Islamic mystic - absolutism and from those 
ideologies, such as Marxism and/or fascism. 158 The Kemalist historical mission could 
be deduced from its emancipatory effect on the individual Will. In short, Kemalism, for 
Agaoglu, had signified the strive to liberate the 'individual' and to create a new 
harmony and order in society. 159 For Agaoglu, "life" itself was the reply to Kadro's 
rationalism, because artificial models could not resist the necessities oflife. 160 
For Agaoglu, Kadro's Kemalism was one-sided and derived from an abstract 
and absolute model of political and social institutions which inherently had the 
tendency to intervene, manipulate and organize the society along a predetermined 
ideal. 161 It was a form of "fascism," which aimed to rationalize and standardize all 
spheres of individual action, be it political, cultural and economic, in order to ensure 
the state's absolute dominance and control over society. For Agaoglu, the aim of 
fascism could not be understood only as the abolishment of private property or national 
representative government. Fascism aimed to establish excessive state regulation over 
the economic, political and moral life of the nation. 162 In this respect, for Agaoglu, 
fascism could defend absolutist monarchy in Poland and republican institutions in 
Italy. 163 It did not have a definite political form and objective, but an unerring 
157 Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferd, p. 58. 
158 Ibid., p. 57. 
159 lb"d 4 l ., p. l. 
160 Ibid., p. 128 
161 lb··· 8 lu., p .. 
162 lb"d 5"-4 I ., pp. • . 
163 Ibid., p. 52. 
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Weltanshauung formed through 'absolutism and rationalism.' For Agaoglu, despite its 
devotion to historical materialism, Kadro advocated a fascist model of relationship 
between the state and nation. 
In Kadro's ideal state-society relations, no place was left to the nation before 
the omnipotent state. For Agaoglu, nation, as a political and economic category, was 
always an essential component of the emerging nation-state. 164 Kadro's envisioned 
revolutionary state took all responsibility for the survival of the nation. Yet, in Kadro' s 
perspective, the rationalist scientific state 
would represent the national will; would create and maintain the existence of the national 
institutions: [state] would rule. manipulate and control the national institutions: would take the 
economic initiative: would create wealth and welfare and would invent and implant the 
teclmique: and ultimately [state would] swallow the nation. 165 
Agaoglu claimed that Kadro mixed up and interfused the functions to be performed by 
the state, government and the nation. Accordingly, all the functions, which had to be 
performed by the society [read nation] were transferred to the State. 166 Historically, 
the State had never been an all-embracing ruling institution, which embraced both the 
nation and government. Thus, for Agaoglu, Kadro's rationalist conceptualization of the 
State was an obstacle to understanding the nature of the newly established state in 
Anatolia. 
The meaning attached to the terms, namely nation, government and state, had 
to be evaluated in reference to the level of social development. At various stages of 
development, different functions were performed by the state, government and national 
institutions, respectively. 167 There were no pre-determined functions which could be 
derived from the genetic explanations and definitions of the terms nation, government 
and state. Only institutional structures could be derived from genetic explanations, but 
not their functions. The State was only responsible to maintain "Order" constituted in 
164 Ibid., p.59. Agaoglu, "Milli ~uur," (The National Conscious) Hakimivet-i Milliye (August 8, l 924), in 
Atatilrk Devri Fikir Hayatt I. Kaplan, Enginiln, et. al., ed., p. 97. 
165 Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferd, p. 60. 
166 Idem. 
167 Ibid., p. 61. 
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society smce it "was statist by nature."168 Its pnmary objective was "conflict 
management" but not the elimination of all conflicts in society. 169 
Contrary to the Kadro perspective, which viewed the abolishment of social conflicts 
as the primary objective of the revolutionary rationalist state, Agaoglu, asserted that social 
conflicts were not pathologies of modem societies but were natural tenets of all modem 
societies. 170 In this respect, expansion of state activities was closely related to the 
restrictions imposed upon the functions supposedly to be performed by the society. 
Tensions in the society emerged as a result of social conflicts and antagonisms. "Tensions," 
and their historically determined nature, for Agaoglu, were essential characteristics of 
modem societies. Moreover, they were also responsible for the unique path of the 
development of countries. In England, tensions between the feudal aristocracy, people and 
monarchy had resulted in the emergence of parliamentarism. Thus, the functions of the 
state had gradually changed. In France, deepening tensions between the monarchy, people 
and feudal aristocracy had resulted in the emergence of absolutism and absolutist state. At 
various stages of social development, functions to be performed by the state changed in 
respect to the nature of tensions in different countries. 171 
Agaoglu came to conclude that the emergence of social conflicts was not the 
sign of social decadence or resurgence of anarchy in the society. On the contrary, 
social conflicts were the reasons for social development. Functions of the state could 
only be expanded with the deepening of those social, political and economic conflicts. 
Besides its primary responsibility to defend the polity, other economic and cultural 
functions of the state could only be derived from the nature of social, political and 
economic tensions which were originally generated from the conflicts and contradictions 
among various groups in society. 172 Agaoglu saw the origin of the state in congruity with 
the society's formation. In a continuous state of formation, new needs and correspondingly 
168 Idem. 
169 Idem. 
170 Ib'd 3-1 ., p. ). 
171 Ib'd I ., pp. 36-40. 
172 Ib'd I ., p. 40. 
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new functions for the satisfaction of those needs were generated by the state. Expansion of 
state functions, at the same time, implied a search for a new hannony, because the state, by 
its very nature, meant society's essential need of Order. 173 
Agaoglu aimed to show the destructive effects of state policies which imposed 
some abstract models on the society and restrictions on individual will. As emphasized, 
the Kemalist objective to emancipate the citizen from all kinds of absolutism could not 
relinquish the absolutism of ideologies in modem times. Agaoglu's challenge of 
ideologies, such as Marxism and Fascism, were mostly supported by Tun~'s Bergsonian 
philosophy. This view was later elaborated by Safa in his book, TUrk Devrimine B~lar. 
For Safa, like Agaoglu and Tum;;, there was no absolute principle or a book of revolution 
from which the nature and the ideals of the Kemalist revolution could be derived. 174 Only 
through freeing of the components of the collective unconscious i.e. language, myths, and 
traditions of the nation, from every kinds of absolutism, a new order would be maintained 
and the revolutionary ideal of creating a modem society could be realized. 
Baltacwglu 's Personalist Educational Philosophy in the Kadro Perspective 
In 1933, Aydemir's article, ismail Hakla Beyin Mejkureciligi (The Idealism of Ismail 
Hakkt Bey), appeared in Kadro. 115 This critical article was about the "idealist" 
"individualist" educational philosophy of Baltac1oglu, a distinguished academician of 
the Republic, who was well-known for his studies in the fields of psychology and 
sociology of education. Baltac10glu's replies to Aydemir were published in his journal 
Yeni Adam. 116 The Kadro intelligentsia condemned Baltac1oglu harshly of being the 
protagonist of an "outdated nineteenth century individualism and democracy."177 
According to Aydemir, Baltac1oglu's politics was a kind of opportunism which would 
hinder the realization of the revolutionary ideal of creating a modem society. This 
opportunism revealed itself in Baltac1oglu' s overemphasis on society as such. Aydemir 
173 Ib"d 1 .,p. 41. 
174 Safa, Tilrk Inktlabma Baktslar. pp. 190-2. 
175 Aydemir, "tsmail Haklo. Beyin Mefkureciligi," pp. 37-42. 
176 Baltac1oglu, "Kadro'ya Gore Yeni Adam, Yeni Adam'a Gore Kadro," p. 11, "Kadro'ya Cevap," p. 8. 
177 Aydemir, "lsmail Haklo. Beyin Mefkureciligi" p. 39 
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pointed out that even though Baltac1oglu had stressed the society's influence in shaping 
the basic features of a concrete and real personality, he, at the last instance, failed to 
associate his political goals and ideals with the ideals of Revolution. 178 
For Kadro, if Baltac1oglu's new social man, with all its ideals and traits, was 
rooted in society, he would be a sample of a lost personality and generation since his 
conception of nation was mystical. This mysticism was due to his subjectivist 
societalism. 179 In Aydemir' words: 
What are the criteria that you utilize in your educational program? In other words. on 
which model of society and social prerequisites that you employ in the process of molding 
out social man? If your model is the Turkish society, what is your scheme of the Turkish 
ideals? Because. how can you put targets to this man if you have not formed your vision 
of progress or if your standing is not in conformity with social reality. 180 
Aydemir criticisms were directed at the purposes and means of Baltac10glu' s 
educational philosophy and sought for an answer to the following questions: How 
would it serve the realization of a future perfect society? To which demands would the 
education be responsive? Would it serve the needs of society as such, or would it 
create a revolutionary citizen which would respond to the needs of a future society? 
For BaltaCioglu, the "ideal" was different from the "utopia."181 He defined the task 
of the educator as not inventing new ideals for the society, but to adapt the already existing 
life conceptions in society and to transmit them to the educational sphere. 182 The answer 
provided by BaltaCioglu on the tasks of the new educator and ruling institutions were 
similar to those provided by Agaoglu and Safa. For BaltaCioglu, only in the last instance, 
the ideal of education could be understood to create revolutionary personalities. Thus, 
178 Idem 
179 Idem. 
180 Idem. 
we cannot claim that social forces are realized via education. Turkish Revolution did not arouse 
out of education It was accomplished by the revolutionary ... The mission of the schools is not 
to educate revolutionaries. Schools educate the new man, who ~ emerged from within the 
society, in accordance with the social model. Thus, the duty of the schools is not to sean:h for a 
totally new man, but to educate man in accordance with the already existing model. In other 
words, to free itself from abstractions, and to mold out the real man. 183 
181 Baltac1oglu Tarih ve Terbiye, p.9. 
182 Idem. 
183 Baltac1oglu, ictimai Melctep Prensipleri. pp. 6-7. 
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The economic ideal of the Turkish revolution was the machination of the economy and 
to move towards industrial capitalism from manufacture economy; the political ideal 
was the consolidation of democracy based on justice, tolerance and freedom; and the 
ultimate ideals of the Turkish nation was democracy in politics, tolerance in law, 
industrialism and solidarism in the economy, and development of personalism in 
ethics. 184 Thus, the ideal of Republican education had to be the formation of real men who 
defined their respective roles for the consolidation of these ideals in real and concrete work 
proc~ which could be learned through an empiricist educational philosophy. 185 
Still, if public recognition had to be sought for individual personality, it would 
not be attained through the formation of the revolutionary citizen but rather through 
the conscious realization of Turkishness shaped and transmitted by living tradition. 186 
Man and personality had to be understood in their concreteness but not through an 
abstract rationalist model. 187 Thus, 
the man of the Turkish pedagogy will be Turkish. He will not be English, Russian or 
American. All nations have their distinct models of man. The utmost responsibility of the 
national pedagogue is to draw the portrait of national man. What is the peculiarity of this 
portrait? Language, ethics and taste are the three specifities of nationality. In Turkey 
studies on pedagogy had started in 1908. Educators of that period were Westernists. Thus, 
they searched not for national but for European pedagogy. However, there is not one 
European pedagogy, but pedagogies of European nations. There are French, English and 
German pedagogies, but not an abstract and universal pedagogy. One has to comprehend 
the cultural tradition to find the nationality of each and every cultural branch .. 188 
For Baltac1oglu personality was a question of totality. Individual identity constituted a 
micro-cosmos for national identity. 189 Collective identity was not an independent 
universe constituted without any interaction with the microcosmos of the individual. 
184 Quoted in Aydemir, "ismail Hakki Beyin Mefkureciligi," pp. 40-l. 
185 Baltac1oglu, ·'tstedigimiz Terbiye Ned.it?" (What Kind of Education Do We Demand?) Yeni Adam. 58 
(February 7, 1935), p.2, "Toplu Ted.ris Teknigi," (Technique of Mass Education) Y eni Adam. 65 (March 28, 
1935), p.5. See also Baltac1oglu, "Halle Partisinin Progrann Ozerine," (On the Program of the People's Party) 
Yeni Adam, 72 (May 16, 1935), p.2. 
186 Baltac10glu, "Yeni Ahlak Yeni Fikirde Degil Yeni Sosyetededir," (New Morality Lies Not in New Idea But 
in New Society) Yeni Adam. 118 (April 2, 1936), p.2. 
187 For the concept of "concreteness," see Baltac1oglu, "Halk Universitesi, Toplu Tedris Uzerine Ders,·· 
(People's University, Lecture on Mass Education) Yeni Adam. 55 (January 17, 1935), p.16, "Yeni Devletin 
KUltur Programlan," (The Cultural Policies of the New State) Yeni Adam. 66 (April 4, 1935), p.10. 
188 Baltac1oglu, "Pedagojide Tfirke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Pedagogy) TUrke Dogru (Towards the Turk) 
(Ankara: Atatilrk Killtur Merke:ri Yaymlan, 1994 [1942]), p. ::! 14. 
189 Baltac1oglu, "Bu 4te 1nsan Yeti~tiricilere ~ YUlciimliillik Nedir?" (Responsibilities of the Human 
Educators in This Work) Y eni Adam. 73 (May 23, 1935), p. 2. 
187 
Totality and harmony which would first be secured in individual personality, was also a 
precondition to maintain social order and harmony. 190 
As already maintained, the distinguishing features of the new public personality 
could not be deduced from abstract and predetermined rational models of public identity 
unless the society was reduced to a mechanical totality. For Baltaetoglu, if a model had to 
be formulated for education, this mode~ unlike a philosopher's aspirations from 
metaphysics, or a physicians' deductions from logic, had to be based on reality, and not on 
an abstract model. 191 Education, for Baltac1oglu, had to free the individual personality from 
the constraints of rootless utopias in real life. 192 Since in real life, "we see Turkish sailors, 
carpenters and artists", then, the aim of education was to educate these unique men of 
profession."193 Education had to contribute to the individual by achieving a role and 
function in professional groups in real life. In Baltac1oglu's words: 
Educated man acts in conformity with the social life. What does "man in conformity with 
social life" mean? ... Hence, in contrast to what Durkheim has claimed. the aim of 
education is not to prepare man for life... The aim of education is to bring forth those 
educators, soldiers, engineers, etc., who already exist in real life. The aim of education is 
not abstract. There is no . . . volition or heart to be educated. There is a real man, who 
compiles all these in himself, and thus who is the subject of education. It can be asked 
whether the aim of education is an ideal .... There has been no incident of the education of 
such an abstract man since the creation of the universe ... Thus, the aim of education is to 
effectuate the real man. 194 
The aim of education was to institutionalize particular modes of behavior, thought and 
sensitivity that constitute a unique national identity in its concreteness. In other words, 
education meant "institutionalization" of the values and norms of a culture which 
would be transmitted to the new generations. In this respect, education had to stimulate 
an awareness of the living tradition in order to be national and authentic. The subject 
of education was not to impose an abstract model of 'individuality,' as Kadro accused 
him, but to model the abstract public personality according to the multidimensional 
190 Baltac10glu, "Yeni Nesle Yeni Dil,'' (New Language to the New Generation) Yeni Adam, 91 (September 26, 
I 935), pp. 4-5. 
191 As cited in Aydemir, "tsrnail Hakkt Beyin Metkureciligi," p.40. 
192 Baltac1oglu, "Maarifte Tiirke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Education) Yeni Adam. 382 (April 23, 1942), p.2. 
193 Bal "' . . . M . . tac1otru, Ictima1 ektep Prensmlen, p. 8. 
194 lb'd - 8 I ' pp.), . 
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process of the self-constitution of the personality in real life processes. 195 Baltac1oglu 
associated the development of authentic personality with man's participation in real life 
processes which would stimulate the ideas of autonomy and creativity. 196 He adopted a 
critical stand against intellectualism and rationalism in educational philosophy and this 
educational philosophy became the leitmotif of his unique "traditionalism" in politics. 
195 Baltacmglu, Mel.."teplerde Demokrasi Var Mldlr'?" (Is There Democracy in Schools?) Yeni Adam, 123 (May 
7, 1936), p.6. 
196 Baltac1oglu, "Kadro'ya Gore Yeni Adam Yeni Adarn'a Gore Kadro," p.11. 
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CHAPTER5 
TRADITIONALIST-CONSERVATIVE QUEST TO UNDERSTAND TURKISH 
EXPERIENCE OF 1HODERNITYAND ITS BERGSON/AN BACKGROUND 
Henry Bergson was born in 1859. Less than fifty years, Bergsonian concepts of vitality, 
creative will, creationism, elan vital, tension and creative evolution appeared in his 
disciples' works in the fields of politics, ethics, philosophy and aesthetics. 1 To 
understand the Bergsonian background behind the traditionalist-conservative 
philosophical political aspirations a short review of the basic tenets of rationalist 
philosophy, its Enlightenment origins and basic policy implications are in order. 
Politics of Rationalism in the Twentieth Century and Its Enlightenment Origins 
The common denominator in the writings of various writers of the Enlightenment 
thinkers, Voltaire, d' Alembert, Diderot, Condorcet, Hume, Adam Smith, was that the 
world could be controlled and ordered rationally if it is represented rightly. Reason was 
praised as a means of representing the universal order and became the governing ethos 
of the rationally operating universe. 2 To most of the students of political thought and 
philosophy, Enlightenment thought symbolizes Man's ambition to regulate the human 
world on the principles laid down by reason and through the norms justified on the 
same base.3 Historically, Enlightenment, which has its roots in the renaissance and 
Reformation thoughts, is the culmination of a reaction against the God-centric 
scholastic conceptions of the universe. Everything, from traditions to the religious 
beliefs and conventions, was put under the critical judgment of reason. Concomitantly, 
new theories on state, religion, society, and universe developed. 4 The rationalist spirit 
of the Enlightenment demanded liberty of conscience, worship, equal opportunity, 
1 For a briefswnmary ofBergsonism, see Nejat Bozkurt, 20. Yiizvtl Thisiince Akunlan. Yorumlar ve Elestiriler 
(The 20th Century Currents of Thought, Interpretations and Criticisms) (tstanbul: Sannal Yaymevi. 1995), pp. 45-9 . 
., 
- See James E. Force and R.H Popkin, Essays on the Context. Nature and Influence oflsaac Newton's Theology 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publications, 1990). 
3 See Paul Kurtz and Timothgy J. Madigan, Challenges to the Enlightenment: In Defence of Reason and Science 
(Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1994 ). 
4 For a detailed analysis of Enlightenment thought, see Peter Hulme and Ludmilla Jordavona, ed., The 
Enlightenment and Its Shadows (London, New York: Routledge, 1990). 
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economic freedom and the equality of all men. 5 The respect for universal human 
reason and universal values of humanity, natural rights, liberty and equality have 
characterized almost all modern political ideologies based on Enlightenment thought. 
Seventeenth and eighteenth century social and political revolutions in England and 
France were the historical symptoms of an all-embracing move of the Western societies 
towards modern forms of political, economic and social organizations.6 
The eighteenth century Enlightenment thought reached its most radical political 
point in France. 7 Its influence both on the European and in non-European countries, 
including the Ottoman Empire was enormous in the following century. Nineteenth 
century political radicalism, which was ultimately based on positivistic, technocentric 
and rationalistic ideals of progress, was imposed by a group of intellectuals, bureaucrats 
or by those who assumed themselves as the guardians of the universal truth. This mood 
was revealed in the Ottoman cultural geography first among the intellectuals - as -
bureaucrats who demanded reforms in traditional religious institutions in the face of a 
vision of modernity represented by Western civilization. 
This vision of progress was seen in the language of modem social and political 
theory through the works. of Marquis de Condorcet, Auguste Comte and Karl Marx. 
Rationalist obsession with the idea of unilinear progress, rational organization of 
society and rational action became the governing ideas of the modem ages. 
Enlightenment thought served as a f~amework to legitimize the modern ·state's 
intervention in the society to create and maintain the socio-political conditions for the 
realization of 'good action' and to eliminate the harmful ones. 8 State legislation, 
armored with rational argumentation and scientific rationale stood against tradition 
' - See Richard Van Dulmen, The Society of the Enlighterunent: The Rise of the Middle Class and Enlightenment 
Culture in Gem1anv, trans. by A Willams (New York: St. Martin's Presss, 1992). 
6 See Leonard Kreiger, Kings and Philosophers, 1689-1789 (New York, London, W.W. Norton, 1970). 
7 For social conditions in Europe, see Alfred Cobban, The Eighteenth Century: Europe in the Age of 
Enlightenment (l-0ndon: Thomas & Hudsons, 1969). Also Ray Porter, The Enlightenment (London: Macmillan, 
1992). See also Catherine Betty Abigail Behrens, Societv, Goverrunent and the Enlighterunent: The Experiences 
of the Eighteenth Centun· France and Russia (New York: Harper and Rows Publications 1985). 
8 See N. Mac Connick and Z. Bankowski eds., Enlighterunent, Right and Revolution: Essavs in Legal and Social 
Philosophy (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1989). 
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which had been held synonymous with superstition and irrationality. The emergence of 
nation-states by the eighteenth century onwards was coupled with citizanization 
processes, in France, in the Germanies and/or England, through which the nation-state 
found new means to "make" the modern society. 9 
A rational centralized government, as illustrated m Jeanne Frarn;:ois Arouet 
Voltaire's appraisal of the enlightened despot, was also coupled with the rise of the 
ideology of rational individualism. 10 The idea of rational man were detailed in the 
works of prominent Enlightenment thinkers. It was a vision of man whose thoughts 
and practices were objects of practice and redirection. It was ultimately based on the 
seventeenth century Cartesian rationalism which envisioned the universe as a rational 
machine. 1 I Enlightenment, which derived its legitimacy from seventeenth century 
Cartesianism, was an era when an 'ideal-type of rational Man' and a new form of state 
power emerged with the claim to be the center of the universe. The society could be 
shaped and administered according to the universally valid principles and norms. New 
world-views, which granted new status to the worldly institutions and to the rational 
subject, envisioned the universe as an ordered totality. Control and progress came to 
express Man's increasing capacity of rational control, plan and design of the society. 
Effective control depended upon knowledge about the rational order of the universe 
and society and adequate knowledge could only be attained through the natural sciences. I:! 
The presumed rational order of the universe had practically resulted in the exclusion 
of any kind of metaphysics from the social, political and philosophical vocabulary that 
sought any form of life principle other than Reason. Strictly speaking, the historical 
philosophico-political answer provided for the question of the evolution of the universe was 
mechanism. By the end of the nineteenth century, scienticism and intolerant rationalism also 
9 See Eric Hobsba\\11 and Terence Ranger eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 199 3 ). Also see Benedict Anderson, In1agincd Communities (London, New York: Verso. 199~ ). 
10 Server Tanilli, Voltaire ve Avdmlanma (Voltaire and the Enlightenmt-'llt) (istanbul: Ccm Yaymevi. 199-1 ). 
I I See Peter A Schouls, Descartes and the Enlightenment (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 1989). 
I:! See H. M. Scott ed., Enlightened Despotism: Refonn and Reformers in Later Eighteenth Centun· (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1990). 
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turned subjectivity into a metaphysicsu Safa, appraising Paul Valery as a poet who had 
revolted against a self-creating reason, applauded Bergsonism as a modern revolt against 
rationalist philosophies and the cult of reason in the twentieth century. u 
After all, as revealed by Safa in his Fe/sefi B11hra11 (The Philosophical Crisis) 
new life philosophies highly critical of mechanist-materialistic theories were also 
developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 15 These modern criticisms of 
rationalism and scienticism, as revealed by Olken, had adopted a dynamic conception 
of society. The search for the reasons of historical dynamism and essence of life had 
resulted in alternative approaches to life. 16 Meanwhile, Olken noted that a widespread 
skepticism on the determinacy principle in natural sciences was also formulated in the 
philosophical works of Emile Boutreaux. 17 Moreover, Bergson had already laid down 
the shortcomings of mechanistic theories in understanding of the dynamics of human 
experience and the dynamism of the human world. 18 A philosophy of irrationalism, 
which had its roots in the eighteenth century reaction to Enlightenment, was developed and 
incorporated into the Bergsonian philosophical language in the twentieth century. 19 
Bergson ism had also granted a new status for intuition and imagination. ~0 In 
this respect, Olken emphasized the irrational layers of Man's inner world which was an 
indispensible part of his total personality. Moreover, Safa, in his novels, expressed the 
13 Safa '·Paul Valery," Tasvir, quoted in Yeni Adam. 558 (September 6 1945), p.10, "Uslubunu Kaybeden 
Danya," (World Which Lost its Style) Tasvir-i Etkar, (March 3, 1944 ). 
14 Safa, "Bergson ve Zamamm1z,'' (Bergson and Our Age) Cumhuri\et, (September I, 1937): Dlken, Yirminci 
Asir Filozotlan (The Twentieth Century Philosophers) (istanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1936), p. 57. 
15 See Safa, Felsefi Buhran (The Philosophical Crisi:>) (Ankara: Rccep Ulusoglu Bas1mevi, 1939). 
16 Dlken, Yirminci A:m hlozot1an, pp.8-9, 11, 19-24. 
17 Ibid., 19-24. For Bergson's criticism of mechanical theories, see Bozkurt, 20. Yiizv1l Dlisiince Ak1mlan_ 
Yorumlar ve Elestirikr. pp. 32-3, 38, 42. 
18 Dlken, ibid., pp. 11-3. See Bergson, Time and Free \Viii. trans. by F.L. Pogson, (London: Allen and Unwin. 
1950). Turn; translated Bergson·s above stated book into Turkish in 1950. 
19 See Safa, Felseti Buhran. Also see Viken, "insan Sevgisi," (Philanthropy) insan, 15, 17 (August 1941 ), p 2. 
For a review of the development Bergsonism in Turkey, see Ziyaeddin Fahri, "Tiirkiye'de Bergsonism 1:-
(Bergsonism in Turkey l) Cumhuriyet, (January 13, 1941), "Tiirkiye'de Bergsonism 2," (Bergsonism in Turkey 
2) Cmnhuri\et, (January 15, 1941); Ali Canip Yontem, ''Bergson ve Ziya Gokalp," (Bergson and Ziya Gokalp) 
Cumhuri\et, (Janua1)' 22, 194 l ). Also see Rasim Ozgen, "H. Bergson:· Yeni Adam, 241 (August IO, 1939), pp. 
6-7, "H. Bergson," Yeni Adam, 242 (August 17, 1939), pp 6-7, --H. Bergson," Yeni Adam, 243 (August 24, 
1939), pp. 6-7, "Henri Bergson, Asrumzm En Bii)iik. Fcylozofo," (Henry Bergson: The Greatest Philosopher of 
Our Century) Yeni Adam, 317 (December 23, 1941), pp. 8-9; Ra)mond Miller trans., "Bergson, 80inci 
Y1ldonnmu,-- (Bergson: 80th Anniversary of Bergson) Yeni Adam, 273 (March 21, 1940), pp. 9, 15. 
20 Bo1i"llrt, :'O. YiizHI Dlisiince Ak1mlan, Yorumlar ve Elestiriler, pp. 37, 41- 2, 4-t. 
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anxiety of a consciousness caught up between the rational and irrational, i.e., to accept 
the stress and failure of being an Eastern character or to move towards universal 
civilization for rejuvenation. :!t These philosophical and literary stands were 
traditionalist-conservative attempts to register man's attempts to generate alternatively 
legitimate knowledge about his worldly existence. The significance of art, which will 
be elaborated in the succeeding chapter, as a source of knowledge was determined at 
this conjuncture. The significance of Bergsonism lies in the fact that it raised a critical 
threat to the legitimacy of reason in fully comprehending human experience.:!'.! 
Bergsonism and the Basic Common Philosophical Categories of Traditionalist-
Conservative Vocabulary 
As depicted by Ulken the influence of the nineteenth century positivist philosophies 
reached their apex during the stormy years of the Second Constitutional Period. He 
traced it back to the appearance of the journal Servet-i F unun in 1894. 23 The influence 
of this "positivist milieu" could be felt from literature to politics. Soon these 
intellectuals, civil and military servants, who adopted this 'positivist milieu,' turned 
their political organization to a political party in 1913 and named it the Party for Union 
and Progress. 24 Meanwhile, Bergson, who would be a source of inspiration for 
Ottoman intellectuals within a decade, was enjoying a widespread. reputation in Europe. 
Having been inspired from the writings of E. Boutroux, French spiritualists 
including Maine, Byran and Ravaisson and pragmatism of William James, Bergson had 
developed a historically significant anti-rationalist philosophy. 25 Especially after the 
First World War, Bergsonism had represented the mood of a new West, critical of old 
Western ideals of progress which was based on evolutionary optimism. It was this 
21 See Safa, "Buyuk Adam," (The Great Man) Yeni Mecmua, (July 18, 1942), p. 4, ''Se:ri~, Tahlil ve Riyaziye," 
(Intuition, Analysis and Mathematics) Kultur Haftas1. 13 (April 8, 1936), pp. 247, 258 . 
..,.., .. 
-- Ulken, Yinninci Asrr Filozotlan, pp. 57-69, 202-9, 231-3. 
23 Dlken, To.rkiye'de Cagdas DOsunce Tarihi. (History of Contemporary Thought in Turkey), 3rd. ed. (istanbul: 
Dlken Yaymlan, 1992,), pp. 139-200. 
24 Niyazi Berk.es, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: Mcgill University Press, 1964 ), 
pp. 325..Q. 
25 Ulken, Yinninci Asrr Filozot1an, pp.57-69. For Bergsonism in the Ottoman-Turkish thought, see Dlken., 
Tilrkive'de Cagdas Dtlslince Tarihi, pp. 375-82. Also.see Dlken., "Bergson' a Dair Bir Kitap," (A New Book On 
Bergson) 1nsan. 2, 12 (May, 8, 1930), pp. 1004-7. 
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mood that profoundly influenced the post war early Bergsonians in the Ottoman 
geography who suffered from the defeats of the War in all spheres of life. 
Kolakowski noted that Bergson's radical criticisms were directed against 
"mechanism and determinism in philosophy and utilitarianism in ethics," yet still his 
philosophy has been characterized by "an optimistic confidence in progress". 26 Having 
stated that "life" became the catchword of the age, Kolakowski added that Bergson 
developed a "philosophy of life" to counter the privileged place granted to "apathetic 
reason. "27 In this respect, Bergson's new life philosophy provoked a widespread 
interest among the late Ottoman and early Republican intelligentsia, mostly known for 
their Turkist-nationalist stand, who sought to formulate an harmonious approach 
between the 'need to change' and 'the need to conserve." The optimistic mood after 
the War of Independence had revived Bergsonian themes and aspirations. A group of 
intellectuals, including literary figures, artists, politicians, and academicians, who were 
mostly among the prominent figures of the emergent traditionalist-conservative circle, 
revealed their Bergsonian aspirations and commitments in formulating their political 
objectives.28 Tun~, Agaoglu, Safa and Baltaetoglu's commitment to the ideals of the 
War of Independence politicized their Bergsonian background of philosophical 
aspirations. In the Republican era, Bergsonism was further developed in the higher 
education institutions since prominent Bergsonian figures, like Tun~ and Baltac10glu, 
were employed in the Turkish academia or in other newly established cultural 
institutions. It also had significant impacts on the intellectual life of the young Republic 
since the key Bergsonian terms, - creativity, dynamism, elan, vitality - and the 
Bergsonian conception of self, which was seen as a totality of rational faculties and 
irrational impulses, were employed by the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals to 
26 Lestek Kolakowski, Bergson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 9. 
27 Kolakowski, Bergson, p. 9. For a similar evaluations, see Bozkurt, 20. Yiizvli DiisOnce Aknnlan. Yonunlar ve 
Elestirjler, pp. 44, 48. 
~ . ~ 
- Safa, Tilrk Ink1Iabma Bakislar (Glances at the Turkish Revolution) (Istanbul: vLi.IKen Yaymlan, 1990 
[1938]), pp. 85-110, 190-2. For Safa's positive remarks on Bergson's seminal book Creative Evolution, see Safa, 
"Madde Sizlere Omiir," (Matter is Dead) Tasvir-i Efkar. (October 27, 1945). See also Olken, ·'Eski ve Yeni 
Mecmualar," (Old and New Journals) tnsan. I, 3 (June 15, 1938), pp. 272-4. 
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illustrate the reasons for the new dynamism in society, to characterize modem life, and 
to affirm their optimism in the age of nation-building. 
Bergsonian influence on the Republican intelligentsia found new grounds of 
manifestation especially in the political essays, cultural and literary studies of the 
traditionalist-conservative circle.29 As pointed out by Tuny, the foremost issue of the 
day was to formulate a holistic philosophical perspective which would both confirm the 
legitimacy of the Kemalist revolutionary practices, and protect the culture from the 
degenerative impacts of the politics of scienticism and from the philosophy of 
rationalism. 30 Bergsonian inspirations enabled the traditionalist-conservative figures to 
formulate a middle way between politics of rationalism, fostering the need to change, 
and the necessity to conserve in a rapidly changing political and social environment. 
Bergson's significance for the traditionalist-conservative Republican 
intellectuals lay in his quest to elaborate a critical philosophy of positivism. The notion 
of "creative evolution," which he had tried to substitute for mechanical evolutionism, 
tended to reflect the optimism of traditionalist conservatives for the future of the 
Republic, its creativity, and ambition to stimulate the national culture to create a new 
Turkey.31 As pointed in the preceding chapter, the fundamental principle of 
Bergsonism which was the autonomy of life and as in the case of Safa's Felsefe ve 
Milliyet<;ilik (Philosophy and Nationalism), was utilized to employ an "hybrid organic 
metaphor. "32 denoting the question of how society could change and always remain 
the same. 33 This argument, as noted, was revealed in Oiken' s Veraset ve Cemiyet 
(Inheritance and Society), and in Baltac1oglu's Tarih ve Terbiye (History and 
29 TWll(, '"Memlekette On Senelik Felsefe," (10 Years of Philosophy in the Country) Varhk. 8 (October, 29, 
1929), p. 3 in Atato.rk Devri Fik.ir Havatt II (Intellectual Lifo in Atato.rk's Era II), Mehmet Kaplan, lnci Enginiln, 
et. al., ed, (Ankara: Kiiltiir Bakanhgi Yaymlan, 1992), pp. 334-40. Also Olken.. "Eski ve Yeni Mecmualar;' pp. 272-4. 
30 For a typical traditionalist~onservative assessment, see Safa, "Yeni Bir Diinyaya Hasret," (Longing for a 
New World) Curnhuriyet. (January 12, 1938). 
31 See Safa, "Madde Sizlere Omor." For the concept of --creative evolution," see Bozkurt, 20. YOzyIJ Dusilnce 
Aktmlan, Yorumlar ve Elestiriler, pp. 34, 39, 47-8. 
32 For Bergson's organicisrn, see Bozl.."Urt, 20. YOzyIJ Dtl§ilnce Aktmlan. Yorurnlar ve Elestiriler, pp. 36, 39. 
33 Safa, ''Felsefe ve Milliyetcrilik," (Philosophy and Nationalism) Cmaraltt. 41 (July 4, 1942), pp. 5, 11. 
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Education) and was further incorporated into their conception of inheritance. 34 A new 
kind of romanticism captivated the traditionalist-conservative nationalists who hoped to 
utilize Bergsonism to neutralize materialism and mechanism.-~ 5 
In this respect, Bergsonism had" a crucial importance for the traditionalist-
conservative intelligentsia who sought to develop a philosophy of reconciliation and an 
alternative vision of modernity. Bergson's time awareness had also created a sense of 
consc10usness among traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia on actuality and 
concreteness.36 Bergson's emphasis on "real time"37 , and his peculiar perspective on 
the 'past', and 'present, ' 38 which characterized life as a product of metamorphosis 
rather than the product of rational construction, provided new grounds to challenge 
scienticist policies of interventionist-transcendentalist state without losing faith on a 
future perfect society. 39 Bergson's appraisal of "intuition',.w as a source of genuine 
knowledge resulted in the emergence of an inward-looking perspective, which made it 
possible to focus on authenticity, particularity and uniqueness. 
Traditionalist-conservative discourse had converted Bergsonism to a 
philosophy of renewal. New institutions and values introduced by the Republic were 
regarded as the simultaneous moments of manifestation of the creative will of the 
society to move towards higher forms of social organization. 41 The new always 
appeared in retrospect; it was neither inevitable nor unpredictable; thus Safa's Simdi, 
34 Dlken, Veraset ve Cemiyet (Inheritance and Society) (istanbul: Kutulm~ Matbaas1, 1957 (1924]). For further 
elaboration on the question of inheritance, see Olken, illiyet Meselesi ve Diyalektik (The Question of Causality 
and Dialectics) (Ankara: n.p., 1938). Also Baltac1oglu, Tarih ve Terbiye (History and Education) (1stanbul: 
Suhulet Kiitilphanesi, 1933). 
35 Hayrani Altm~, Mustafa Sekip Tune (Ankara: Ktiltii.r Bakanhgi, 1989), pp. 28-38. 
36 See Safa, --~imdi," (The Present) Yedigtin, (May 13, 1936), p.4. For 01.ken's assessment on the development 
of the philosophies of time, see Sigismond Zawirski, "Zaman Metltumunun Tekamiilii I," (Evolution of the 
Concept of Time I), trans. by Dlken, Kiiltilr Haftas1. 6 (February 19, 1936), pp. 106-7. Sigismond Zawirski, 
"Zaman Metltumunun Tekamtilti II," (Evolution of the Concept of Time m. trans. by Olken, Ktiltii.r Haftast. 7 
(February 26, 1936), pp. 136-7. For Bergson's conception of time, see Bozkurt, 20. YUzyil Dii§iince Akunlan, 
Yorumlar ve Elestiriler, pp. 33-6, 41, 46-7. 
37 Bo 'b'd zkurt., I 1 ., pp. 334. 
38 Ib'd. l , pp. 35-6. 
39 For a typical Bergsonian conception time, see Safa, ·'~imdi," p.4. 
40 Bozkurt, 20. YQz\:11 Otisiince Aknnlan. Yorumlar ve Elestiriler, pp. 37, 41-2. 
41 Tun~, "Bugonktl Hayatmuzm Akl~lan," (The Flows of Our Life Today) Havat. 6, 136 (July 1929) p. 3 in 
Atatilrk Devri Fikir HayatJ. II, Kaplan, Engintin et. al., ed., pp. 331-3. 
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(The Present) claimed that the past could not fully explain the present, 42 and the 
direction of progressive evolution could be grasped through intuition. Baltac1oglu 
illustrated this as follows: 
1be approaches of mysticism and rationalism are in total contrast to each other. For an 
intellectual the value of the intellect is only as much as that is a pragmatist gives to pragma On 
the other hand an intuitionist considers both. rut approaches the universe 'ia intuition 43 
In a similar vein T un9 argued that the basic characteristic of reality and life, as a 
spontaneous mobility, could only be grasped through intuition. 44 
In line with Bergson, the traditionalist-conservative intellectual suggested that 
the experienced and real time was different from abstract time. 45 This conception of 
"subjectively experienced real time''46 was incorporated into the traditionalist-
conservative vocabulary to develop a challenging view to the unilinear evolutionary 
schema of progress which had been resorted to by the statist/positivist-modemizing 
intelligentsia. Real time, as revealed by Tun9, was an irreversible sequences of 
subjective experience. 47 However, abstract time, as revealed in future-oriented 
consciousness of the radical revolutionaries, was static and prohibited creativity and 
spontaneity. Change manipulated towards an historical end to be attained in the future 
was merely an attempt of arbitrary ordering of the real time. Thus, unilinear 
progressivism which gave rise to determinism left little room for freedom. The 
foremost application of the method of structuration of the concepts of vital impulse and 
42 s +: •<;;!. di ,, 4 a1a, · .,,un , p .. 
43 Baltac1oglu, "Felsefe Doktrinleri," (Doctrines of Philosophy) Y eni Adam 157 (December 31, 1936), p. 14. 
44 Turuy, "Zamarurmzda Ahlak Meselesi," (The Question of Morality in Our Time) Cumhuriyet. (April 12, 
1942), "Hakikatte Het¥yin Madde Oldugu iddias1," (The Claim that Everything is Matter in Reality) 
Cumhuriyet. (December 10, 1944); Baltac1oglu "Tarihi Nas1l Ogrettim?" (How I Taught History?) Yeni Adam, 
378 (March 26, 1942), p.4; Ulken ·'Zit Kuvvetlerin Yarati~1," (The Creation of Antipodal Forces) Mfilkiye l, 12 
(May, 1931), pp. l-7. 
45 See Tum;:, ''Zaman Fatihleri," (Conquerors ofTime) Cumhuriyet. (July 26, 1942), -Akll ve niro," (Reason and 
Science) Cumhuriyet. (July 19, 1942), "Akll ve Sezgi," (Reason and Intuition) Cumhuriyet. (July 26, 1942). See 
also Baltac1oglu, "Felsefe Nedir?" (What is Philosophy) Yeni Adam. 152, (November 26, 1936), p.14, ''Feylesof 
Kimdir'?" (Who is a Philosopher?) Yeni Adam. 153 (December 3, 1936), p. 14, "Felsefonin Metodu," (The 
Method of Philosophy) Yeni Adam, 155 (December 17, 1936), p.14, p.14. See also Olken, Yirminci Asrr 
Filozoflan, pp. 17-77. For Bergson's time conception, see Bozkurt, 20. Yilzyll Dfisiince Aklrnlan. Yorurnlar ve 
Elestiriler, pp. 33-6, 41, 46-7. 
46 Boz.kurt, ibid., p. 41. 
47 See Tum;, "Ons0z," (Preface) in Henry Bergson, Yarat1c1 Tekamiil (Creative Evolution), trans. by Tun~ 
(Istanbul: M.E. Basunevi, 194 7). pp. XIV-XVI. See also Baltac1oglu, "Felsefenin Problerni," (The Problem of 
Philosophy) Yeni Adam. 159 (January 14, 1937), p. 14. See also Bozkurt, ibid., pp. 47- 8. 
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creative Will was traditionalist-conservative conception of liberty.48 The underlying 
stimuli was to develop a conception of individual, rights, obligations and freedom 
which would counter Ziya Gokalp's societalist-determinist approach to the issue.49 
For the traditionalist conservative, like Safa, 'freedom,' was a fact. 50 The 
question of freedom in traditionalist-conservative discourse, as in the Bergsonian stand, 
was linked to their intuitionist philosophical position. 51 For Tun~ and Safa, like 
Baltac10glu, intuition gave us life's fluidity, so we could grasp human freedom and 
novelty in life. 52 According to Safa "freedom ... is a flux state of spiritual mood .... (It) 
is itself life and spirit."53 The intellect, as revealed in Tun~'s Aki/ ve Hayat (Reason 
and Life) could not provide this since it is interested in sameness and generalities. 54 
However, the traditionalist conservative was looking for uniqueness and experience. 55 
For the traditionalist conservative, intuition sought to understand the reasons for 
uniqueness in the universe. Indeed, traditionalist-conservative endeavor to formulate a 
philosophical stand to neutralize religious orthodoxy further led them to see intuition as 
a kind of introspectivism which would advance the Republican motto of getting back 
into nationhood [read ourselves] by forgetting the Islamic past. Intuition, as a source of 
inspiration in traditionalist-conservative philosophical framework further supported the 
claim to give freedom to the ignored sense of nationhood against all kinds of 
formalisms imposed by Islamic theology. Moreover, the philosophy of intuition would 
48 Tun~, Fikir Sohbetleri (Intellectual Conversations) (istanbul: 01kii Basunevi, I 948), pp. 129-38. Aslo 
Olken,"Ferd ve Cemiyet," (Individual and Society) ~ I, l (April 15, 1938), p. 57, "TOrkiye'de Idealizm 
Temaytlhi.," (The Trend ofidealism in Turkey) lnsan. 2, 12 (May 8, 1938), p. 932. For Bergson's conception of 
freedom, intuition and plurality, see Bozkurt, ibid., pp. 35, 37, 42-3 
49 See Olken, "HOrltlk ve Mesulluk," (Freedom and Responsibility) istanbul, (October 1, 1946), p. 62. For 
further evaluation, see Olken, Ziva Gokalp (istanbul, Ahmet Said Matbaas1, 1942). 
50 See Safa, "Bergson ve Zamanumz." Also Safa, "Eski ve Yeni HOrriyet," (Old and New Freedom) Tasvir-i 
Etkar, (July 17, 1941), "Yannki Dilnyanm Ahlala," (Ethics of the Future World) Tasvir-i Etkar, (December 23, 
1941 ). For Olken' s discussion on freedom, see Olken, "Existentializm' in Kokenleri I," (Origins of Existentialism 
I) istanbul. (August 15, 1946), pp. 2-4, "Existentializm'in Kokenleri IL" (Origins of Existentialism II) istanbul, 
(September 1, 1946), pp. 3-4. 
51 Bozkurt, 20. YiizV1l Dllsiince Akunlan. Yorumlar ve Elestiriler, pp. 42-3. 
52 Baltac1oglu, "Felsefede TOrke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Philosophy) Yeni Adam. 367 (December 8, 
1942), p. 2; Tun~, "Akil Romantizm," (Reason Romanticism) Cumhuriyet. (July 5, 1942), "'Akil ve Sezgi." 
53 Safa, "Htlrriyet ve Htlrriyet~ilik," (Liberty and Liberalism) Ayda Bir. (December 1, 1935), p. 7. 
54 Tun~, "Aktl ve Hayat," (Reason and Life) Cumhurivet. (May 12, 1942). See also Tun\:," Akil Romantizmi." 
55 Tun~, "Aki! Romantizmi." See also Baltac1oglu "Felsefe Doktrinleri," p. 14, "Felsefenin Metodu," p. 14. For 
Safa' s evalutions on the uniqueness and peculiarity of Kemalist Revolution, see Safa, Tilrk Inktlabma Balaslar. 
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further counterbalance the universalistic claims of Islamic scholastics since it searched 
for the authenticity and uniqueness of all kinds of experience, including the religious 
one. In an age of nation-building, where a nationalist challenge was raised against the 
universalistic religious tradition, traditionalist-conservative philosophy, with its ultimate 
aim of self-discovery found strong support among the ruling Kemalist cadres. Strong 
emphasis was made on the constituents of the inner self of the nation, such as 
language, national religious experience and national tradition that would be posited for 
the emerging sense of nationhood. 
Traditionalist-conservative understanding of inruition was also inseparable from 
their conception of life as a dynamism of multiple tensions.56 As revealed in Olken's insani 
Vatanczlzk (Humanist Patriotism) and Zzt Kuvvetlerin Yaratl§l (The Creation of Antipodal 
Forces), the living and concrete society and self, in multiple tensions, were always striving 
to abandon standardiz.ation and rationaliz.ation in the name of survival and dynamism. 57 
Bergson had also pointed out that the "self renewed itself by an effiuence of primal 
experience" in which "succeeding selves melt into an other" and "formed an organic 
whole."58 For Baltacioglu, this organic whole was constituted in tradition and his 
conception of tradition was also based on the idea ofBergsonian conception "duree" (real 
and experienced time).59 As revealed by Agaoglu in Dev/et ve Ferd (The State and 
Individual), life was an endlessly continuous creation and pure mobility in which everything 
was shaped by conflicting forces emerging from life tensions.60 Correspondingly, Safa, in 
56 See Tum;, "Bergson'un GOlme NazBr:iyesine Dair," (On Bergson's Theory of Laughing) Cwnhuriyet, (April 4, 
1945), ''Aktl Romantizmi." 
57 See Olken, "insani Vatanc1hk," (Hwnanist Patriotism) Millkive. 1, 9 (December, 1932), pp. 4-13, "Zit 
Kuvvetlerin Yaradl.~1." See also Dlken, "Maksad," (The Objective) insan. l, l (April 15, 1938), p. 2. For Dlken's 
preoccupation with the "concrete," see Olken, "Fikir Ananesi," (The Tradition of Thought)~ 1, 4 (July 15, 
1938), p. 282; Tuny, "Alu! ve Hayat." See also Tuny, "Millet ve insan," (Nation and Man) Cwnhuriyet, (July 4, 
1943). See Baltac10glu, "Sistemler ve Hayatlar, Methumlar ve Geryelder," (Systems and Lives, Concepts and 
Realities) Yeni Adam. 118 (April 2, 1936), p. 3. For the question of 'concreteness,' see Baltac1oglu's reply to 
Safa's article entitled Oturan ve Ayakta Geni;lik (Active and Inactive Youth), Baltac1oglu, "~ilnceler," 
(Thoughts) Yeni Adam. 291(July25, 1941), p.11. 
58 Bergson, Time and Free Will, p.167. Bozkurt 20. YAzvil Dilsilnce Akunlan. Yorumlar ve Elestiriler, p. 36. 
59 See Yunus K.amn Koni, "Baltac1oglu"nun N~ettigi Bir Kitap DolaylSly!a," (On Account of a Book 
Published by Baltac10glu) Yeni Adam, 418 (December 31, 1942), pp. 4, 11. 
60 See Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferd (The State and Individual) (Ankara, Sanayi-i Nefise Basrmevi, 1933). Also 
Baltac1oglu., "Felsefe Doktrinleri," p. 14, "Felsefenin Metodu," p. 14. 
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his novel Fatih Harbiye, illustrated how people were always caught between two worlds, 
i.e., Eastern and Western, spiritual and material, and confronted each other on the dilemma 
of creation and destruction. The reality, for the traditionalist conservatives, like Bergson, 
which was presented us in creative evolution. It was an ordered totality in confusion which 
canied the potentials for disorder in creation. Yet, traditionalist-conservative discourse 
promised progress in struggle since the creativity of evolution, as illustrated by Tun9 and 
Agaoglu or in Olken's Zit Kuwetlerin Yarau.g lied in the tensions among competing 
forces. 61 
Traditionalist conservatism posed "subjectivism," into the philosophical and 
political agenda of the Republican intellectual life.62 In a similar vein, it provided new 
venues for the early Republican intelligentsia who experienced disturbances of the 
secularization of daily life in the form of increasing demystification of the former 
religious Weltanshauung and materialization of daily life by further expansion of the 
capitalist market. Referring to Bertrand Russell, who stated that Bergsonism was a 
reaction to "the scientific optimism which made men believe that the kingdom of 
heaven was about to break out on earth,''63 it can be said that traditionalist 
conservatism tended to prevent the mediated between science and religion, as well as 
between rationalist universalism and cultural relativism, and promised progress without 
sacrificing those things that were also responsible for authentic experience. 
In this respect, Bergson's highly qualified views on intuition, time and 
experience were responsible for the development of Safa' s traditionalist-conservative 
modernist literature, Tun9's psychology and Baltac10glu's educational philosophy. An 
analysis of the writings of traditionalist-conservative figures of the 1930s and 1940s 
61 Tun\:, "Bergson' a Gore Sanat ve Sanat Adamt," (Art and Artist According to Berg.son) Cumhuriyet. (May 6, 
1945). See also Tum;, Filill Sohbetleri. Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferg, pp. 30-41. See also Ulken, ··zit Kuvvetlerin 
Yarad1~1." Also Ulken, ·'Sanat ve Cemiyet," (Art and Society)~ 3, 1-13 (April I, 1941), p. 26. For similar 
evaluations, see Baltac10glu, "Tarihi Nasil Ogrettim?" p. 4, "'Pedagojinin Thin.ti, Bugfinti, Yanru 3," (The Past 
Present and Future of Pedagogy) Y eni Adam. 233 (June 15, 1939), p. 19. 
62 One of the leitmotif of Safa's novels was the disturbace of values which appeared as antithetical life 
experiences of novel characters. For personalist aspects of Bergsonian philosophy, see Bozlrurt, 20. YOzytl 
Do.stince Alomlari. Yorumlar ve Elestiriler, pp. 32, 44-5. 
63 Bertrand Russell, Wisdom of the West: A Historical Survey of Western Philosophy in its Social and Political 
Setting (New York, Garden City: Doubleday, 1959), p. 287. 
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would reveal that the adaptation of Bergson's concepts of tension and conflict was 
responsible for the development of a peculiar traditionalist-conservative conception of 
society and politics. Bergson's emphasis on tension and creation was adopted by the 
traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia first to show that there is not a universally valid 
formula to establish a modem democratic society. Further, modem democracies were 
unique modes of political reconciliation among the conflicting interests of social classes 
and groups.64 Second, the limits of state-society relations were drawn upon the 
acceptance that tension and conflict were natural tenets of the modem dynamic society. 
Thus, state should not intervene into society to abolish conflicts and tensions. On the 
contrary, the state had to protect the natural spontaneous order and status quo 
constituted on the new functional division of society. Third, the dynamism of the 
historical evolution was bound to the nature of tensions and conflicts among social 
classes and groups. Moreover, having been inspired from Bergson's criticism of 
utilitarian-rationalism, traditionalist-conservative intellectuals developed a 
comprehensive challenge of utilitarian moral assumptions and proposed an alternative 
conception of social ethics based on a personalist conception. Bergson-inspired 
conceptions of individualism, irrationality, freedom and religiosity were developed in 
the traditionalist-conservative corpus of writings and were regarded by the Kadro 
circle in the 1930s as the prototype Turkish 'liberalism.' 
Republican traditionalist-conservative intellectuals were also responsible for 
creating of a new vision of West, which, became a source of inspiration for the 
development of a new competing vision of modernization. Republican traditionalist 
conservatives realized that there was another West critical of the so-called basic 
progressive principles and values of the old West which was based on and shaped itself 
through its devolution of positivist philosophy. the other West, as revealed in Safa's 
64 For a typical stand, see Agaoglu, Devlet ve Feni. Also Baltac1oglu, Sosvoloji (Sociology) (lstanbul: Sebat Basunevi, 
1939), pp. 199-232, 343-54. Tun\:, "Devlet ve Millet," (State and Nation) Cumhuriyel (October 8, 1942). Olken., in his 
Tiirkiye 'de<; ag<Ja., Diqiince Tarihi, stated that his primary concern in his book C em(vet ve Marozi :juur (Society and the 
Pathological Conscious), published in 1928, was to shed light on the nature of contlict See Olken, TOrkiye' de Cagdas 
DfisUnce Tarihi, p. 314fu. See also Olken., Umumi 1ctimaivat (General Sociology) (lstanbul: Ebil"z Ziya MatbaasJ., 
1931 ), insani Vatanperyerlik (Humanist Patriotism) (lstanbul: G~ Matbaas1, 1932). 
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Felsefi Buhran, was basically critical of the Western ideals of progress, humanity and 
rationalism. 65 Traditionalist conservatism and its overwhelming emphasis on 
spontaneous creative evolution promised that there could be more than one road to 
modernization. Furthermore, what was also striking in traditionalist conservatism was 
that it granted a new place to religion and morality in modem societies. Traditionalist-
conservative philosophy of revival aimed to shape the new secular spiritual life of the 
young nation. In fact, with their emphases on change and reality of the past, 
traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia provided the new intellectual and political 
venues to the Republican ruling elites. 
Nonetheless, there was not a unique Bergsonism common to all traditionalist 
conservatives. For Tun~, Bergson was ultimately the 'philosopher of modem times,' 
whereas for Baltac10glu, Bergson was 'a philosophical source of inspiration. '66 
Bergson's criticism of materialism, scienticism and positivism were fascinating for 
Olken. In his Yirminci Aszr Filozoflar1 (The Twentieth Century Philosophers), Olken 
referred to Bergson as the founding figure of irrationalism in the twentieth century.67 
Likewise, for Safa, Bergson was a source of philosophical inspiration for artistic 
creation and was one of the archcritics of the positivist model of evolutionism. 68 It has 
65 See Safa Felsefi Buhran. Also Safa., ~k-Garb Milnaka~sma Bir Balo~ l," (A Glance At the East -West 
Dispute 1) Killtiir Haftast. 3 (January 29, 1936), pp.42,58, '~-Garb M~1118 Bir Balo~ 2," (A Glance At 
the East -West Dispute 2) Killtiir HaftasL 4 (February 5, 1936), pp. 65-6, "~k-Garb M~ma Bir Balo~ 
3," (A Glance At the East -West Dispute 3) Killtiir Haftast. 5 (February 12, 1936), pp. 85-6, "~-Garb 
MGnak~tna Bir B~ 4," (A Glance At the East -West Dispute 4) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 7 (February 26, 1936), 
p.123; Ulken "~ark ve Garb," (East and West) lstanbul, (November I, 1946), p. 2-4, "Medeniyette Uerleme ve 
Gerileme," (Progress and Retreat in Civilization) lstanbul, (December 31, 1946 ), pp. 2-4. 
66 See Baltactoglu, "Bir Burjuva Alimi lmi~ Emile Durkheim," (Emile Durkheim Was Said to Be a Bourgeois 
Scientist) Yeni Adam. 122 (April 30, 1936), p. 2. For Bergson's philosophy, see Baltac1<>glu, "T~kilatsiz 
Edebiyat;' (Unorganiz.ed Literature) Yeni Adam, 119 (April 9, 1936), p. 2. See Dlken, "Bergson'a Dair Bir 
Ki tap," pp. I 004-7. 
67 Dlken, Yinninci Asrr Filozoflan, p.11. 
68 Ulken, '·Medeniyetin Yiirii~il," (The March of Civilization) tnsan. I, 2 (May 15, 1938) p. 85. See also 
Ulken, Yinninci Asrr Filoz.oflart, p. 57. See also Ulken, "Bergson'a Dair Bir Kitap," pp.1004-7. For Ulken's 
assessments on Verstehen (wtderstanding), see Ulken, "1-rtimai Determinizm," (Social Determinism)~ 2, 11 
(May 15, 1938), pp. 165-73, For further evaluation on the question of monist and pluralist origins of modern 
philosophies of freedom and individual, see Dlken, "Tilrkiye'de ldealizm Temayillil, .. pp. 929-38. Tun-r refers 
Nietzche and Bergson as archcritics of positivism and celebrated them as the philosophers of freedom in modem 
ages. See Tun-r, "Mackle ve Ruh Arasmda Sallanan Dilnyanuz," (Our World that Sways Between Matter and 
Spirit) Cumhuriyet. (May 20, 1945). See also Twi-r, "Zaman Fatihleri." For Baltac1oglu, Bergson was a modem 
philosopher of freedom, see Baltac10glu "Feylozof Kimdir'?" p. 14. Baltac1oglu in his book entitled iftimai 
.'vfektep (Social School) tried to reconcile Durkheimian sociology with Bergsonian philosophy. See Baltac1oglu, 
"Tilrke Dogru, HttZtrahman ~it Oymen'e Cevap Veriyorum," (Towards the, Turk., I am Replying to 
Htfurahman ~it Oymen.," Y eni Adam. 427 (March 4, 1943, p. 4. 
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to be noted that among the traditionalist-conservative figures, Baltac1oglu and Tun~ 
were ultimately responsible for the adaptation of Bergsonism into a peculiar 
traditionalist and conservative context in the Republican period. 69 
Political Repercussions of Bergsonisms 
The world, which Bergson offered to traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia, was 
characterized by creation as well as destruction since, in Tun~' s words, it was not a world 
"created by Reason devoid of tensions, fears and hopes. "70 It was a universe spirited by a 
creative power. 71 Traditionalist-conservative detour of Bergsonian philosophy resulted in 
shaping their politico-philosophical concerns. Traditionalist- conservative conceptions of 
the limits of legitimate political rule over society; the nature of political power and 
characteristics of Republican elan engineering were all shaped by Bergsonian terms. Direct 
influence of Bergsonism manifested itself in emphases made on the present over future 
and/or past; actuality over possibility; intuition as the legitimate source of knowledge in 
human world; the privileged place granted to religion and ethics, and most importantly, in 
their understanding of historical time and progr~. n 
Bergson's well known premise of"time is real" became a means for traditionalist-
conservative attack on any kind of reactionism(s), especially that of Islamism since its 
logical conclusion was the irreversibility of the historical course of events which ultimately 
nullified the reactionary Utopia to return to the Golden Ages of the Prophet. Tun~ referred 
to the Bergsonian distinction between abstract and real time (duree) and stated that 
the real -i.e., experienced life- is perceived as sphere of power which destroys and 
reconstructs simultaneously ... It is this Time which is difficult to be discovered. It is this 
Time through which nature and human history evolve. It is this Time which we aspire to 
discover. 73 
69 Tuner, "Bergson'a Gore Sanat ve Sanat Adanu," For Dlken's evaluations on Tuner's Bergsonism, see Dlken, 
"Yeni Felsefo Tercilmeleri," (New Philosophy Translations) insan. 1,1 (April 15, 1938), p.75. 
70 T .. Alai R . . " urn;, " omantlZllll. 
71 Tuner., idem. See also Tuner, "Alai ve Hayat." 
72 Tuner, "Alai ve Hayat." See Baltac1oglu, "Maarifte Siyaset," (Politics in Education) Yeni Adam, 322 
(February 27, 1941) pp. 10-1, 16. For empiricism in education, see also Baltac1oglu, lctimai Mekteb Prensipleri 
(The Principles of Social School) (istanbul: Tecelli Matbaas1, 1935), Terbive'nin Kwmetleri ve Vasttalan (The 
Values and Means of Education) (lzmit: Muallimlerevi Ne~yat1, 1938), Hususi Tedris Usulleri (Methods of 
Private Education) (lstanbul: 1Ihami. Basunevi, 1931 ). 
73 Tuner, "Zaman Fatihleri." See also Dlken, ·'Existentializm'in Kokenleri L" pp. 2-4. 
204 
Traditionalist-conservative philosophical concern with the concrete and subjective 
experience (of time) and the denial of purely conceptual construct (of time) had 
important political connotations for consolidation of Kemalist modernism 74 since the 
novel traditionalist-conservative modernism, in Baltac1oglu' s words, aimed at "turning 
to the reality, existence and being in life. Like the renaissance men, Romantics and 
modernists to tum to the essence, the source, nature ... New man ... can only be created 
by this progress."75 For Baltac1oglu, the demarcation line between actuality and 
possibility, which would be drawn by the educators of the young Republic, had 
important political repercussions in terms of formulating radical-rationalist and/or 
empiricist educational policies. 
In this respect, Tum; linked this rationalism to its historical roots. Accordingly, 
the modem ideal of man and freedom emerged after the French Revolution. This 
rationalist conception of freedom, for him, was fed from the Enlightenment thought 
which granted a new status to Reason where the world was assumed to be controlled, 
manipulated and dominated by Reason. Enlightenment thought, laid aside historical 
realities. History was supposed to be constructed through reason. Religious, ethical, 
legal and economic institutions and language were regarded as those things which 
could be rationally reconstructed and tradition, the source of irrationality and 
prejudices would disappear by the adaptation of rational thought. Thus, Baltac1oglu 
concluded that folk philosophy, like folk tradition, had to be one of the sources of 
national philosophy. National renaissance that would be fostered by Kemalism had to 
shed light on the essence of national tradition. The new Republican metaphysics, 
[read philosophy] for Baltac10glu, had to be based on the creative essence of the folk 
spirit. 76 
7~ For Tum,:'s typical criticism of Enlightenment radicalism and universalism, see Tun~, "Gen~lik Nereye 
Gidiyor?" (Where is the Youth Heading?) Cmaralt1. 38 (June 13, 1942), p. 3. See also Baltac1oglu, "Dunna, 
Yarat!" (Do not Stop, Create!) Yeni Adam. 348 (August 28, 1941), p.11, "Halk ve Biz," (People and Us) Yeni 
Adam. 307 (November 14, 1940), p.3. 
75 Baltac1oglu, ''Avrupa Pedagojisi Neden Kocarm~tu'?" (Why Did the European Pedagogy Become Outdated?) 
Yeni Adam. 527 (February 1, l 945), p. 2, 11. 
76 Tun~. "Gen~lik Nereye Gidiyor?" p. 3. See Baltac1oglu, "Durma Yarat!" p. l l. 
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Traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia, like Bergson, believed that philosophy had 
a practical importance to understand the constitutive practices and principles of Republican 
modernism. Philosophy also gained its likely importance in Tuni;: and Olk.en's critical 
vocabulary of positivist-scienticism. 77 Philosophy, besides Islamic theology and Republican 
scienticism, would serve as a new means of comprehending the new national reality. For 
Safa "there is a depres.5ion of touchstone throughout the world. Philosophy, knowledge of 
substance and meaning, aesthetics, ideologies and policies are employed in the worldwide 
search for a limit of stability and harmony. " 78 In traditionalist-conservative vocabulary new 
aesthetic, political and philosophical convictions implied the spirituality of the individual and 
it was the new spiritual world of the individual which was seen as the carrier of the folk 
spirit and as subject of the philosophy itself 79 
Intutionist philosophy was seen as the principal intellectual endeavor to 
understand the spiritual life of the nation as revealed itself through the hidden rationale 
of the folk. Thus, Baltac10glu stated that 
there is the philosophy of the philosopher and the people. These are different things. 
Philosopher has his philosophical system. people has a philosophical rationale. These are 
separate things. Philosopher constructs his philosophy through abstraa reason and 
consciousness whereas people with instincts. intuition and feelings. Philaiophy of the 
philosopher is a systemic complicated body of thought whereas people's philosophy is all in 
folk products. There are nations without philosophers but there is no nation without a 
philosophy ..... Every nation has its own philosophical tradition. This tradition is secluded in the 
folk art and truth which live as tradition.... Ethics, law, art. language, religion is part of a 
greater thing. This is the spirit of people .. It is urgent to find this creative spirit 80 
As noted beforehand, traditionalist-conservative politics could best be understood as 
the promotion of a kind of life politics. Baltac1oglu brought up the aim of politics and 
philosophy as to create the means which would translate the hidden creative will of the 
nation into concrete policies. 81 Traditionalist-conservative anti-collectivism manifested 
77 See Oiken, "Medeniyette ilerleme ve Gerileme," pp. 2-4. 
78 Safa, ·'Mehenk TW?t," (The Touchstone) Tasvir'i Efkar. (April 12, 1945). 
79 Baltac1oglu, '"Felsefo Nedir?" p.14, "Felsefe de Ttirke Dogru?" p. 2. Also Tun-r, Fi.kir Sohbetleri, pp. 53-9. 
Tun-r. ··Zamarunnz.da Ahlak Meselesi." See also Safa, Felsefi Buhran. Also Safa, "Hakikat Buhram," (The Crisis 
ofTruth) Her Ay. (March 20-April 20, 1937), pp. 60-73. 
80 Baltac1oglu, "Felsefede Ttirke Dogru" p.2. Also see Baltac1og!u, Felsefe (Philosophy) (lstanbul: Sebat 
Basunevi, 1938). See also Dlken, Ask Ahlaki. p. 72. Tun-r, "ZamanlllUZda Ahlak Meselesi." See also Tun-r, Fi.kir 
Sohbetleri, pp. 53 - 9. Safa, "Sezi.~, Tahlil ve Riyaziye," pp. 247, 258. 
81 Baltac1oglu, "Dunna Yarat," p. 11. 
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itself, in the case of Baltac1oglu, as the defense of self-government and model of 
education for the formulation of a realist culturalist perspective. 82 
Direct influence of Bergsonism on traditionalist-conservative conceptions of 
past, present, future, personality, and liberty could best be detected in their 
philosophical argumentations. Inspired from Bergsonian philosophy, Tun~'s intutionist 
critique of scientific reason, belief on the 'reality of time' and his explorations of the 
inner depth of psychic life had decisive effects among traditionalist-conservative 
intelligentsia. Baltac1oglu incorporated the Bergsonian philosophy into his 
philosophical studies. On that account, Ulken, portraying Baltac1oglu' s attempts to 
reconcile Bergsonian philosophy and Durkheimian sociology in his remarks on 
Baltac10glu's ir;timai Mektep (Social School) added that "on the one hand, there is 
Durkheim's social duty, perception of the universe and language, and on the other hand 
there is Bergson's duree. These are in contrast to each other. However in the work of 
ismail Hakla their dynamism and unity are observed."83 Traditionalist-conservative 
reading of politics through the Bergsonian precepts was responsible for the emergence 
of a peculiar traditionalist-conservative stand. Bergsonian philosophical insights 
constituted a vantage point for traditionalist-conservative politics. Traditionalist-
conservative modernism and progressive optimism no doubt stimulated a sympathy 
towards traditionalist-conservative ideals among the Republican intelligentsia. 84 
Traditionalist-Conservative Conception of nme, Freedom, Intuition and Life Tensions 
Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals felt awkward about future-oriented 
revolutionism because they, like Bergson, tended to see the future as an artifact 
without an existence at all. 85 The present, as revealed by Safa, was capable of creating 
82 Baltac1oglu, ·'Koy Enstitilleri," (Village Institutes) Yeni Adam. 279 (May 2, 1940), p. 2. 
83 As cited in Baltac1oglu, "Tiirke Dogru," p. 4. See also Safa, ''Sezi~, Tahlil ve Riyaziye," pp. 247, 258. 
84 For creationist-evolutionism, see Baltac1oglu, ''Milli ~efimiz ve Maarifimiz," (Our National Chief and 
Education) Yeni Adam. 255 (November 16, 1939), p. 2. For a note on evolution, see Baltac1oglu, "Tekamul-
Tekemm\ll," (Evolution and Perfection) Yeni Adam. 281 (May 16, 1940), p. 3, "Dil Devrimine Takdanlar," 
(Those Who Stick to Language Revolution) Yeni Adam. 569 (November 22, 1945), pp. 2, 11. 
~ -For further elaboration, see Tun<; ''Ons0z," in Bergson, Yarat1c1 Tekamiil, trans. by Tun<;, pp. XII-XVI., Also 
Tun<r, "1ngiliz Karakteri," (The British Character) Cwnhuriyet. (March 4, 1945). For Bergson's evaluations on 
"past," "present" and "future," see Bozkurt, 20. Yilzyll OOsunce Akunlan. Yorumlar ve Elestiriler, pp. 33-6, 47. 
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a new future in unpredictable ways. 86 If the present was able to give nse to an 
unpredictable future, then, as assured by Bergson, it had to be able to declare its 
independence from the past. 87 It, as pointed out by Ulken in his Veraset ve Cemiyet in 
reference to Bergson, meant that there is not a deterministic relationship between the 
past, present and future. 88 In T un9' s words: 
We are face to face with a progressive evolution. The natural tendency of the conscious is 
always towards the future and new. Thus. it is impossible to turn back. According to this 
approach, the past resembles an ever-growing hill which prevents turning back. Although 
it is a beneficial reference. it also becomes a burden .... Thus. we can neither know what 
we will think and do in the future nor see the present by taking the past as the only 
reference point. Because for an ever-growing past it is impossible to mirror the present 
and to reflect the future. The impossibility of prediction also outlaws determinism. 89 
Thus, freedom in fact, meant a rupture from the past. Thus, the Kemalist Revolution, 
which aimed at a rupture from the traditional political and inert cultural practices of the 
religious past, could free the nation and individual from past determinations towards 
the constitution of an authentic modem society. 90 
Freedom, for Tun9, as well as Bergson, had a dual characteristic. 91 In Fikir 
Sohbetleri, (Intellectual Conversations) he treated freedom, as the creative capacity of 
the inner irrational layer of the self which was restricted, limited and adopted by the 
outer layer.92 Freedom was born as a result of inherent tensions between the outer and 
inner selves. It was part of the irreducible conflict between the self and the world.93 
86 Safa, "~imdi," p. 4. Also lrlken, "Bir Tarih Felsefesi Milmkiin Miidiir?" (Is a Philosophy of History 
Possible?) Millet ve Tarih Suuru (Nation and the Consciousness of History) (istanbul: Pu1han Matbaas1, 1948), 
p. 260. For similar evaluations, see Baltac1oglu, Tarih ve Terbiye, p. 65. 
87 See Bozkurt, 20. Yiizytl Thisiince Alomlan. Yorumlar ve Elestiriler, pp. 35, 38. 
88 For Bergson' a criticism of mechanical determinism, see lrlken, Veraset ve Cemiyet, p. 84. 
89 .. 
Tum,;, "Onsoz," in Bergson, Yaratic1 Tekamiil, trans. by Tum,;, pp. XVII. See also Tum;, "Yeni Tiirk Kadrm ve 
Ruhi Miinasebetleri Meselesi," (The New Turkish Woman and the Question of Her Psychological Relations) 
insan. 1, 2 (May 15, 1938), p.154, ''Neden Yaruhyoruz," (Why are We Mistaking?) Cumhuriyet, (December 14, 
1941 ); lrlken, "Tarihte HUrriyet ve Determinizm," (Freedom in History and Determinism) Her Ay. (March 20-
April 20, 1937), pp. 53-4. 
90 Safa, Tilrk Devrimine Babslar, pp. 213-7, 185-9; Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat (Democracy and Art) 
(istanbul: Sanayi-i Nefise Basunevi, 1931 ), pp. 139-45; Tuniy, "Milliyet Mefkuresi Nedir?" (What is the Ideal of 
Nationality?) in Ataturk Devri Fikir Havati I (Intellectual Life in Atatiirk's Era I), Mehmet Kaplan, inci Enginiin, 
et. al., ed. (Ankara Killtiir Bakanhgi Yayutlan, 1992), pp. 102-8. 
91 Safa "Eski ve Yeni Hiirriyet." For dynamic nature of social phenomenon, see lrlken, "Iiytimai Hadise Nedir?" 
(What is a Social Event?) iru!!m. 1, 7 (December 1, 1938), pp. 396-401. See also Bozkurt, 20. YilZVll Diisiince 
Akunlan. Yorumlar ve Ele§tiriler, pp. 42-3. 
92 Tuniy, Fikir Sohbetleri, pp. 131-8. Safa, .. Yannki Dilnyamn Ahlala," "Hiirriyet ve Hiirriyetiyilik," p. 7. 
93 Tuni;, "Bergson'un Gi1lme NllUlriyesine Dair." Baltac1oglu, "tkizlik," (Dualism) Yeni Adam. 387 (May 28, 
1942)p. 3. 
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Even though such a world is useful to human freedom, it can also lead to restrictions to 
that freedom. At a philosophical stand Tun9, in line with his general Bergsonian 
convictions, asserted that it was the tension between life and death, perfection and 
imperfection, order and disorder, truth and lack of truth that were responsible for freedom, 
vitality and dynamism. 94 Dynamism and its creative flow of life would be hindered when 
we disregard between antipodal forces. Olken also argued that Bergsonism could be 
characterized by its rejection of finalism. 95 However, unilinear evolutionism, for T un9 and 
Olken, tended to assert that there was an inherent aim in the creative evolution oflife.96 
Moreover, Tun9's Bergsonian attitude towards sciences as necessary, but as a 
set of metaphysically imprecise claim of truth, found strong resonance. 97 A definite 
realm had been drawn for scientific-rational explanation. In Baltac1oglu' s words: 
In a normal society all these different mentalities are distinguished from each other and 
have their own authorities. "Religion is not in the sphere of reason, but it belongs to the 
sphere of conscience" is among those common statements. This conception can be 
adopted to all issues concerning culture: language, ethics, taste do not belong to the 
sphere of reason, but conscience. To evaluate those values, whose sphere falls within the 
boundaries of conscience, in accordance with reason means to render them impotent. 98 
This attempt to draw the legitimate sphere for the sciences and to draw a demarcation 
line among sciences, aesthetics and ethics took definite political forms in traditionalist-
conservative texts. 
In this respect, Agaoglu' s understanding of history and evolution of societies 
was an illustrative example for delineating how the Bergsonian terminology was 
adopted as a framework for unique political aims. For Agaoglu, organic contradictions 
were the basic tenets of every modem society. History, the dynamic process of 
multiplication of tensions in society, was also a search of harmony among these 
94 Tum,:, ibid. Also Tum;, ·'Neden Yaruhyoruz," "Akll ve Sezgi." See also Safa "Hilrriyet ve Hilrriyet~ili.k," p.7. 
95 i'm. 
u1J1.en, Veraset ve Cemiyel p. 66-7. 
96 Tun\, "Akll Romantizmi." For criticism of Darwinism, Tww, "'Eski ve Yeni Di1nya Go~lerimiz," (Our Old 
and New Worldviews) Cumhuriyet, (October 11, 1942). See also Baltac1oglu, "Bilgi Teorisi IX,'' (Epistemology 
IX) Yeni Adam. 162 (February 4, 1937), pp 14-5, "Bilgi Teorisi X," (Epistemology X) Yeni Adam. 163 
(February 11, 1937), p.14, ''Bilgi Teorisi XI," (Epistemology XI) Yeni Adam, 164 (February 18, 1937), p.14. 
Also see, Dlken, "Tarihte Hilrriyet ve Determinizm," pp. 46 - 59. 
91 Tun\, "Aki! ve Uim." For Bergsonian criticism of modern sciences and metaphysics, see Bozkurt, 20. Yiizyd 
DfisUnce Akunlan. Yorumlar ve Elestiriler, pp. 32-3. 
98 Baltac1oglu, "Milli Mant1ga Dogru," (Towards the National Rationale) Yeni Adam 447 (July 22, 1943) p.2. 
See also Tun\, "Aloi ve Sezgi," "Akll Romantizmi." Also Safa, "Sezi~, Tahlil ve Riyaziye" pp. 247, 258. 
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conflict-ridden tensions. 99 Societies evolve from simple to complex forms in 
subsequent stages of "becoming,"100 which signified further levels of progress that 
arose out of the tensions in the societies. 101 History was a continuous state of "creative 
evolution,"102 where each stage contains its own peculiar forces of order and tension. 103 
Creative evolution in history, which revealed itself as the society's move towards complex 
forms of order, was ultimately due to the tensions among "rising" and "descending" social 
groups in the course of evolution. As noted beforehand, tensions manifested themselves as 
social, political and economic conflicts and clashes which at the same time were the main 
stimuli for societies' search for Order in different historical epochs. 
For Agaoglu, the state and individual gained their likely importance in this 
framework. The state and individual emerged as the main constituents of modem 
society from the clash between the forces of order and tension. 104 The modem world 
was constituted on the dynamics of individual action. 105 The state, on the other hand, 
was the manifestation of the search for order. Tensions between state and individual in 
various societies were historically and culturally determined. 106 Agaoglu's personalist-
individualist ideals were based on this conception of history, state and individual. 
Moreover, it provided a justification for his Kemalist stand, which in most aspects 
differed from the statist intellectuals of the era. Between the state and individual there 
was a sub-stratum namely, the nation which was responsible for unique determinants of 
collective action and individual personality. The nation was constituted by those 
institutions and values responsible for the emergence of an affiliation 107 among 
individuals who felt the sense of belonging and sameness through language, customs, 
99 Agaoglu, Devlet ve Fert, pp. 35-7. 
100 Idem. 
IOI ib"d I ., p. 40. 
102 Agaoglu, "Yarahc1 Tekamill," (Creative Evolution) Kiiltilr Haftas1. 3 (January 29, 1936), p.59. 
103 Agaoglu, Devlet ve Fert. p. 40. 
104 Ibid., pp. 98-9. 
105 lb"d 34 - 40 .., 1 ., pp. -), --
106 Ibid. 
107 lb"d 3 1 ., p. 9 . 
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religion and culture. 108 History and culture laid down the material basis for the sense of 
sameness and belonging which revealed itself as national consciousness in modern 
times. This affiliation with common cultural institutions and values historically formed 
a spontaneous national order which the state was entitled to protect and support. 109 
Thus, for Agaoglu, like Safa, Olken, Baltac1oglu and Tune;, the individual was not an 
absolute category, but a culturally and historically determined one. 110 The individual 
was part of a particular society, history and nation. 111 The state was expected to 
support the sense of belonging by taking necessary measures to raise the sense of 
responsibility brought out by the affection among individuals. 112 This would lead to the 
further consolidation of the spontaneous order of society. 
Agaoglu' s contention with the forces of order did not mean that he sacrificed 
freedom to the need for order. On the contrary, freedom, was an essential trait to 
understand human creativity and social dynamism. 113 Freedom was essential for the 
formation of personality and its self-realization. 114 Freedom would never lead to 
anarchy and disorder. 115 Practice of freedom would lead to the emergence of a sense 
of responsibility which would ultimately stimulate order, harmony and unity in 
society. 116 This emphasis on individual and individual freedom became a means to 
show the novelty of Kemalist modernism and its thesis of rupture from the Ottoman 
past since for Agaoglu, the Ottoman era could be characterized by the lack of the 
concept of individual in the philosophical and political vocabulary. For Agaoglu, the 
peculiarity of Kemalism depended upon its historical mission to develop a unique 
108 Agaoglu, "Milliyet~ilik Cereyarurun Esaslan," (The Principles of the Trend of Nationalism) Tiirk Yurdu 11 
(August 1925) in Atatilrk Devri Fikir Hayatt l Kaplan, Enginiin,et. al., ed., pp. l 15-22, Devlet ve Fert, pp. 92. 
109 Agaoglu, Serbest Insanlar Olkesinde (In the Land of the Free Men) (!stanbul: Sanayi-i Nefise Matbaas1, 
1930) p. 69. 
110 Idem., Also see Agaoglu, Ben Neyim (Who Arn I?) (Istanbul, Gllven Basunevi, 1939) p.10. 
111 Agaoglu. ''Milliyet~ilik," (Nationalism) Alon. (July 10, 1933). 
112 Agaoglu, Serbest Insanlar Olkesinde, p. l 05 
113 Agaoglu, Ibid .• p.121. 
114 Idem, Agaoglu, Devlet ve Fert, pp.22,106. 
115 Agaoglu, Devlet ve Fert, pp. 22. 87. Also Agaoglu, "Nizamh Hllrriyet," (Disciplined Freedom) Alon. (Jwie 
5, 1933). 
116 Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferd, pp. 22, 87. 
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Turkish individuality. 117 The new state would promote self-realization of the 
individual, which would ultimately promote the emergence of free people. In this way 
achievements of the Revolution, which had been secured at the political level, could be 
turned into cultural values for spontaneous voluntary internalization by the citizens. 118 
As noted before, Agaoglu held a distance from the universal conception of freedom, 
based on a rational man assumption of classical liberalism. For him, a free man would 
achieve liberty in a particular society. 119 This conception of freedom further distanced 
him from cosmopolitanism and universalism. 120 Thus, he tended to see the people's 
state as a natural institution which promotes individual freedom. 121 
The twentieth-century personalist reaction against the " ... subjectivism of liberal 
individualism," of which Bergson was a part, shaped the basic tenets of Agaoglu's 
conception of the individual. 122 Individual as a totality was described, as in the case of 
Tun9, in terms of two opposing layers of the self, namely "the outer self' and "the 
inner self"123 Materiality and external constraints were the basic stimuli for the outer 
self, which also referred to the ego-centered individuality that poses itself as an end for 
the world in experience. It implied the fundamental "rational man" principle of classical 
liberalism. The inner self, on the other hand, was characterized by "prudence,"124 and 
"insight."125 Unlike the outer self, the inner self was not bound to materiality and 
external constraints which was reason for the outer self 126 It was a break from the 
rational man conception of classical liberalism. Like Safa, Tun9, Baltaetoglu and 
Olken' s interpretations of the Turkish Revolution, as the manifestation of the 
117 lb"d "9ff I , pp. - . 
118 Ibid., pp. 80, 74-75, 122. 
119 lb'd 35 A" ·1 'Nizaml H . " 1 ., p. . gaog u, · 1 ilmyet. 
120 Agaoglu, "Niz.amh Hiirriyet." 
121 Idem.;'Ana Kanunlar ve Naznn Kanunlar" (Fundamental Laws and Regulating Laws) Alan, (June 27, 1933). 
122 Kenneth H.F. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution (Oxford: 
Martin Robertson, 1980), p. 72. 
123 S A" ;;1 B N . ee gaoiru, en ey1m. 
124 Agaoglu, Serbest Insanlar Olkesinde, p. 61. 
125 Ibid., pp.112-113, Agaoglu, "Maarifimizin Islaht," See also Agaoglu, Ben Neyim, p.40. 
126 Agaoglu, "Yaratic1 Tekamiil." 
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immateriality, unconsciousness of the nation, Agaoglu's understanding ofKemalism as 
a grand movement, which freed the people from the collectivist static Eastern 
civilization, remained within the confines of his personalism where spontaneous bursts of 
the inner self leads to "creative evolution". 127 The new society, citizen and state would be 
constituted by freeing the inner self of the nation from external constraints and materiality. 
When Agaoglu' s personalism, which was based on an image of a divided self, 
and his conception of state were associated with his "hybrid-organic metaphor" which 
perceived " ... the individual as an integral part of the society ... "128 who can realize his 
" ... value and dignity ... "129 only through integration with the society, then a common stand, 
which will be elaborated in the succeeding chapters, among the traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals could be delineated on the questions of state, individual and society. 
As it has been shown in the case of Agaoglu, the influence of Bergsonism in 
shaping the early Republican traditionalist-conservative agenda has been 
underestimated by the students of Turkish politics. Nonetheless, Baltac1oglu had 
already assured that Bergson, with Descartes and Rousseau, was among the modem 
revolutionaries in philosophy. For him, the significance of Bergson lay in the fact that 
he freed the subject matter and methodology of philosophy from the hegemony of 
science and religious mysticism, 130 and that was what the traditionalist conservatives of 
the early Republic were willing to do: to formulate a new life philosophy at a mid-way 
between science and religion. Nevertheless, 'individualist,' 'traditionalist' and/or 
'conservative' ideas were searched in refined forms as they had appeared in the 
W estem context. However, these themes and ideas did appear in different ways in the 
process of nation-state building and were articulated by the modernist secularist 
intellectuals of the Republic. Still, traditionalist and/or conservative ideals had not fully 
127 Ibid. This point has been analyz.ed in Simten Co~, State and Intellectual in the Turkish Republic: From 
Liberal Ethos to the Myth of Democracy, Ph.D. in progress, (Ankara: Bilkent University). 
128 Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, pp.143-50 
129 Ibid., p.165. 
130 See Baltac1oglu, "Yeni Tefrikarruz Sosyoloji Metodunun Kaideleri," (Our New Publication, Rules of the 
Sociological Method) Yeni Adam, 225 (April 20, 1938), p.2., "Feylomf ve Sosyetesi," (Philosopher and His 
Society) Yeni Adam. 156 (December 24, 1936), p.14, ''Felsefede Tiirke .Dogru," p. 2. 
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been transformed into concrete policy preferences. 131 A hybrid body of ideas were 
developed by the interfusion of diverse philosophico-political perspectives, such as 
romantic-culturalism, Turkism, personalism, traditionalism, Bergsonism. Despite 
various orientation among them, Bergsonism provided common aspirations that have been 
adopted by Safa, Agaoglu, Baltac1oglu and Tun~, if not by Olken to that extent, in varying 
tones and degrees in formulating a peculiar traditionalist-conservative vision of modernity. 
A novel criticism of rationalism in politics, which ultimately distanced 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals from the modernizing policies and strategies of 
the Kemalist scientific state, had been elaborated. 132 Traditionalist conservatives 
strongly reacted to the reduction of life to a moment of control and manipulation in the 
road of attaining a higher level of social, political and economic organization towards 
Westernization. Accordingly, "the evolution of the society" was not "a rational 
evolution but an empirical one," therefore, "Reason," noted Baltac1oglu, "was not 
entitled to create life. " 133 In a similar vein, Safa stated that "none of the statesmen, 
economists, or reformist can rationally re-create even the most primitive kind of 
society."134 Intellectualism, as referred in Baltac1oglu's Efsaneye K1yma (Do not 
Sacrifice the Myth), was meant the spiritualization of human reason135 which 
implied that there was an equivalence between 'life' and 'Reason.' 136 However, 
Tun~, in line with Baltac1oglu, had affirmed that "Reason was the product of 
131 For Dlken' s evaluations on lack of coherent political ideologies, see Dlken, "Fikir Ananesi," p. 282. 
132 Tun", "Aktl ve Hayat." For criticism of intellectualism., see Baltac1oglu, ''Feylozof ve Sosyetesi,"p.14, 
"Felsefe Doktrinleri," p. 14, "Pedagoji, Diinii Bugilnii, Yanru l," (The Past, Present and Future of Pedagogy I) 
Y eni Adam. 231 (June 1, 1939), pp. 18-19, "Pedagoji, Diinii Bugiinii, Y anru 2," (The Past, Present and Future of 
Pedagogy2) Yeni Adam. 232 (June 8, 1939), p. 19, "Pedagoji, DiinuBugiinii, Yanru 3," p. 19, "Halk ve Biz," p 
3. For Dlken's criticism of rationalism., see Dlken, Ask Ahlakt, pp. 164-5. Also Safa, "Yeni Bir Diinyaya 
Hasret," "Uslubunu .Kaybeden Diinya." 
133 BaltacJ.oglu, "Erkek ve Kadm," (Man and Woman) Y eni Adam. 332 (May 8, 1941 ), p. 2. 
134 Safa, "Yeni Bir Diinyaya Hasret." 
135 Baltac1oglu, "Efsaneye Klyma.," (Do not Sacrifice the Myth) Y eni Adam. 360 (November 20, 1941 ), p. 2. See 
also Tun't, "Zeka Nasil i~ler?" (How Does the Intellect Operate?) Cumhuriyet. (April 16, 1943). For Safa's 
criticism of materialism and other modern ideologies, such as liberalism and socialism, see Safa, "Bu Diinyanm 
Derdi Nedir?" (What is the Problem of This World?) Cumhuriyet. (August 31, 1939). See also Safu "Yannki 
Diinyanm Ahlakt." 
136 See Dlken, Ask Ahlakt, pp. VI. Also Dlken, "Biz.de TUrk"iilOlc Geciktiren Sebepler - Dog~u - Biiyii~," 
(Our Turkism: Reasons for its Belatedness - Its Birth - Development) lstanbul, (February l, 1946), p.3. Also 
Dlken, "Sanat ve Cemiyet," p. 26. See Tun't, "Aktl ve Hayat," "Aktl Romantizmi." Also Baltac1oglu, 
"Felsefonin Tarihi VIII," (History of Philosophy VIII) Yeni Adam. 161(January28, 1937), p.14. 
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life" 137 but not its creator. Moreover, Olken maintained that intellectualism became 
a natural shield of the "alienated intellectual" and distanced him from the indigenous 
culture. 138 In fact, nationalism for Olken, was a reaction to the Enlightenment and its 
rationalism which paved way to intellectualism in the twentieth century. 139 What the 
traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia had introduced through the criticism of 
intellectualism and formalism were relativism, pluralism and pragmatism. 140 
Relativism occupied a central place in traditionalist-conservative challenge 
raised to scientism and positivism. 141 According to Tune;, inherent monocentricism of 
scienticism deteriorated the plurality of values in the human world. No place was left 
for subjectivism and introspection. Based on Bergsonian criticism of materialism and 
scientism, Tune; tried to maintain a secure realm for the uniqueness of introspection in 
modern world. 142 For Tune;, the question was not only a matter of philosophical 
speculation, but was directly related to the tendency to reduce human spirituality to the 
satisfaction of selfish material interests which would ultimately result in loss of 
autonomy and freedom. In Tunc;'s words: 
In this respect, neither the concept of life nor that of substance has been comprehended in 
the way Descartes had presumed to be achieved via modem science. Thus, the ever-
increasing tendency towards materialism in the last century is not a result of the scientific 
victory, but of the dominance of the economic life over the faith of the human-beings. 143 
137 . 
Tuniy, "Zeka Nastl ~ler." Baltacioglu, "Erkek ve Kadm," p. 2. 
138 See Olken, Ask Ahlala. pp. VI. 
139 Olken, "Biz.de TilrkiyillUk: Geciktiren Sebepler -Do~ - Buyfi~U," p.3. 
140 For Tuniy's pluralism, see Altm~, Mustafa Sekip Tune pp. 24-8. See also Tuniy, "Zeka Nasil ~ler," "Akll 
ve Hayat," "Tecrubeciligin Kuvvet ve Zaaflan," (The Power and the Weaknesses of Empiricism) Cwnhuriyet, 
(September 6, 1942), "Alolciligm Kuvvet ve Zaaflan," (The Power and the Weaknesses of Rationalism) 
Cumhuriyet, (August 30, 1942). See also Olken, "Destan ve lnsan." (Myth and the Human Being)~ 23 
(April 1943), p.7; Safa, "Sezi~, Tahlil ve Riyaziye," pp. 247, 258; Baltac1oglu, Sosvoloji, pp. 233-63. Also see 
Baltac1oglu, Felsefe (Philosophy) (istanbul: Sebat BasIIDevi, 1938). 
141 Baltac1oglu, "Felsefe Doktrinleri VI," (Doctrines of Philosophy VI) Yeni Adam. 157 (January 31, 1936), 
p.14, "Felsefenin Problemi VII," (The Problem of Philosophy VIl) Yeni Adam, 159 (December 14, 1937), p.14, 
"Felsefenin Tarihi VIII," p.14, "Bilgi Teorisi IX," p.14, "Bilgi Teorisi X," p.14, "Bilgi Teorisi XI," p.14, 
"Maarifte Tilrke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Education) Yeni Adam. 382 (April 23, 1942), p. 2. Also Tuniy, 
"Madlle ve Ruh Arasmda Sallanan Dil.nyamiz." See Olken, "Tiirkiye'de Pozitivizm TemayillU," (The Trend of 
Positivism in Turkey) !nsan. 2, 11, (April 8, 1939), pp. 849-53. For OJ.ken's critical evaluations on logical 
positivism, see Olken, Yirminci Asrr Filozoflan. pp. 301-55. See also Olken, "Descartes ve Skolastik," 
(Descartes and Scholastics) lstanbul (May 1, 1946), pp.6-8, "Medeniyette llerleme ve Gerileme," pp. 2-4. 
142 Tuniy, "Hakikatte H~ Madde Oldugu lddias1." See also Tum,:, "Madde ve Ruh Arasmda Sallanan 
Dil.nyanuz." Also Tuniy, Fikir Sohbetleri. pp.161-6, "Hayatm Klymeti ve (Je(,:irdigi Buhran," (The Value of Life 
and its Crisis Undergoing) Cumhuriyet, (January 25, 1942). For criticism of materialism, see Safa, "Havaya Uiyan 
ldeolojiler," (Ideologies Scattering Around) Tasvir-i Etbr, (August 11, 1945). 
143 Tuniy, "Hakikatte Her~yin Madde Oldugu tddias1." Also see Tuniy, Fikir Sohbetleri, pp. 161-6. 
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His distance from materialism was coupled with his criticisms of rationalism. Then, life, 
became a realm of possibilities for the self-realization of the individual. The human will 
to realize itself, as stated by Bergson, was revealed as a totality of the inner and outer 
selves. 144 This totality was of the individual will, as revealed by Baltac1oglu, was 
praised as the manifestation of individual's search of freedom and autonomy, 145 since, 
in Safa's words, 'freedom" was "the manifestation of personality in the domain of 
will," a point already implied by Agaoglu. 146 
Unilinear determinism, which gives way to monocentricism, discarded 
multiplicity in life in favour of unity. 147 Tuny, who was also critical of the idea of 
'progress for the sake of progress,' attacked scienticist materialism on these grounds. 
In his words: 
There is no doubt that the new civilization is much more pcmerful and progres.tjve than the 
preceding one. But, what is the direction of this progress? Who are the beneficiaries? We do 
not know. Hcmever. these questions contain essential issues : We can adopt to these questions 
on the power that 1:1$ been provided by the day-to-day progress of science and technique to the 
progress in virtue, beauty and justice .... This forms the weakest point of new civilization. 148 
For Turn;, as well as for OJ.ken, as it had been detailed in his Yirminci As1r 
Filozoflarz and later in Tarihi Maddecilige Reddiye (Refutation of Dialectical 
Materialism) materialist determinism was also an obstacle to the realization of human 
autonomy and freedom. 149 Materialist rejection of the spirit, as revealed in 
Baltac1oglu's Milli Mantzga Dogru (Towards the National Rationale) or Tun~'s Riiya 
ve Mistik Diinya (Dream and the Mystical World) resulted in a limited conception of 
freedom where freedom had been linked to some external limitations. 15° For Tun~, as 
144 See Safa, "Hiirriyet Sarho~lan," (The Liberty Drunkards) Yeni Adam. 569 (November 22, 1945), p.10 For 
free act and personality, Bozkurt 20. Yiizytl Dtisiince Akrmlan. Yorumlar ve Elestiriler, p. 42-3. 
145 Baltac1oglu, "Hiirriyeti Ni~in Severim?" (Why I Like Freedom?) Yeni Adam. 217 (February 24, 1938), p.2. 
Baltac1oglu, "Feylozofve Sosyetesi," p.14. 
146 Safa, "Hiirriyet ve ~ahsiyet," (Freedom and Personality) Yeni Adam. 594 (May 16, 1946) p.10. See also 
Safa "Gen~lik ve Spor Bayrarm," (The Youth and Sports Day) Yeni Mecmua. (May 19, 1939), p.4. For definition 
of freedom, Safa, "Hiirriyet ve Hiirriyet~ilik," p.7. 
147 Tun~, ''Madde ve Ruh Arasmda Sallanan Diinyanuz.'' See also Baltac1oglu, "Feylozofve Sosyetesi," p.14. 
148 See Tun~, "Hayatm K.iymeti ve ~irdigi Buhran." 
149 Tww, ''Onsoz." in Bergson, Yarabcr Tekamiil. trans. by T~, pp. ill-X; Oiken, Tarihi Maddecilige Reddiye 
(Refutation ofHistorical Materialism) (istanbul: Kanle!iler Basunevi, 1951 ); Oiken, ictimaj Doktrinler Tarihi (History of 
Social Doctrines) ( istanbul: Y enidevir Ba.smievi, 1941 ), pp. I 09-15, Yinninci Aslr Filowtlan, pp. 357-74, 398-409. 
150 Baltac1oglu, ''Milli Mant.J.ga Dogru," p.2; Tun~, "Ruya ve Mistik Diinya," (Dream and the Mystical World) 
Cwnhurivet. (September 10, l 941 ). 
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well as for Olken as expressed m his Ferd ve Cemiyet (Individual and Society), 
individual freedom and autonomy could not be determined by external limitations. 
Even though autonomy and liberty were not values in themselves, for Agaoglu and 
Safa as expressed in his Eski ve Yeni Hiirriyet (Old and New) external restraints had to 
be substituted to internal possibilities. For Safa, moral external constraints which have 
been internalized by the members of the society would serve to maintain stability and 
order in society. 151 Only through such a conception of freedom, social responsibility 
and obligation could be understood as inner moral dispositions of the individual and 
not as external restraints imposed by the state over the individual. 152 
The positivist revolutionary perspective, traditionalist conservatives strongly 
believed, had created an obsession with achieving a historically defined mission. This 
critical position was elaborated by in Safa his Tiirk Devrimine Bakcylar (Glances at the 
Turkish Revolution). 153 He argued that determinist-reductionist conceptions of history 
could not provide those means to understand the true essence of the Revolutionary 
spirit and the possibilities it offered. Polycentic existence could not be substituted for by 
Revolutionary monocentricism, 154 since, in Ulken's words: 
Societies are both similar to each other and distinct in themselves. Religion. civilization and 
humanity ck> not change. When conceived as realities they lose all their values. H~. one 
can talk about a religion practiced by a particular society; a civilization embraced and practiced 
by a society; and also about a new race within a particular society. 155 
In many ways, there were emphases on the concreteness of the society, actuality of the 
individual, uniqueness of human creativity, and richness of human experience which 
had been all employed to show the uniqueness of various national cultures that implied 
a polycentric existence in the world of modernity. In Baltac10glu's words: 
151 Safa, "Ayakiistu Cevap," (Answer in Haste) Cumhuriyet, (August 8, 1939). 
152 Tww, ''6ns0z." in Henry Bergson, Yaratlc1 Tekamiil, trans. by Twi~. pp. XVII-XXI. See also Twi~, Fikir 
Sohbetleri, pp. 129-39; See also DJ.ken, "Ferd ve Cemiyet," pp. 57-65; Safa, "Eski ve Yeni Hurriyet." Safa, 
'·Diinyarun Muh~ Oldugu Nizam," (The Order Which the World is in Need of) Cumhuriyet. (October 11, 
1939). Safa, "Gen~lik ve Spor Bayrarm," p.4. 
153 Safa, Tiirk Inktlabma Balqslar, p 213. 
154 Twi~, "Akll ve Hayat." 
155 Baltac1oglu, "Ordu,'' (The Army) Yeni Adam. 275 (April 4, 1940), pp. 2, 19, "Tiirke Ogiit," (Advice to 
Turk) Yeni Adam. 346 (August 14, 1941), pp. 2,10; Safa, "Kendi Kendimiz Olmakta Isrannuz," (Our Insistence 
on Being Ourselves) Tasvir-i Efkar quoted in Yeni Adam. 344 (July 31, 1941 ), p.13. 
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They perceive humanity as a real social being which contains an authentic spirit and suhc;tance. 
Thus. they conceive it as possessing not only ethical but also material sanctions. The concrete 
societies that we can observe in the realm of realitv are as follows: tribe. feudalism, citv state 
and nation. Apart from these basic social types. the~ is no real society as "humanity." 156 . 
Cultural and historical differences among nations could not be eliminated m 
homogeneous 'community of Man,' even though similar life experiences in economics, 
politics and in social life in different countries might emerge under a capitalist 
economy. 157 In traditionalist-conservative vocabulary, 'progress' and 'change' did not 
come to mean the rational construction of the future and modem society. In 
Baltac1oglu' s words "unity in civilization does not eliminate cultural differences, on the 
contrary it deepens them."158 
Traditionalist-conservative polycentric culturalism placed equal emphasis on the 
living continuity of national forms in the tradition, since the idea of nation, at the same 
time, referred to the ideals of '"purity, durability and uniforrnity."159 Durability and 
uniformity of the nation could be maintained by the historization and contextualization 
of the universal procedures and structures of modernity which had been brought about 
by the Turkish Revolution. 
156 Baltac1oglu, "lnsaniyet Var Mtdu'!" (Is There Humanity?) Yeni Adam. 248 (September 28, 1939), p.2. See 
also Safa, "1nsan Yok, Millet Var," (There is no Man but Nation) Cmaralt1. 4 (August 30, 1941), p. 5, "Thlnya da 
insan Var Mt" (Is There Man in the World?) Yeni Mecmua. (July 18, 1941), p. 4. 
157 Baltac1oglu, "lnsaniyet Var Mtdir?"p. 2, "Koy Egitmen ve Ogretmenleri," (Village, Instructor and Teachers) 
Yeni Adam, 240 (August 3, 1939), pp. 16-17, "Eski ile Yeni," (The Old and the New) Yeni Adam. 340 (July 3, 
1941) pp. 2, 8-9, ''Turke Dogru," (Towards the Turk) Yeni Adam. 329 (April 17, 1941), p. 2, "Halledilecek En 
Buyilk Problemler," (Major Problems to be Solved) Yeni Adam. 379 (April 2, 1942), p 2, "Millet Nedir, Ne 
Degildir?" (What is or is not Nation?) Yeni Adam. 416 (December 17, 1942), p. 2, "Milliyete Dogru," (Towards 
the Nationality) Yeni Adam. 390 (June 18, 1942), p. 2, "i.H. Baltac1oglu Ttirke Dogru Hakkmda Suallerimiz.e 
Cevap Veriyor," Yeni Adam, p. 4. See also Safa, "insan Yok, Millet Var!" p.5. See also 01.ken, "Killt11r Birligi," 
(The Cultural Unity) Millet ve Tarih Suuru. pp.7-1 l; Tuniy, "Peyami Safa ve TOrk lnkilabma Baki~lar," (Peyami 
Safa and Glances at the Turkish Revolution) in Safa, Tfirk Inktlabma Bakislar. pp. 17-26, "Milliyetiyilik," 
(Nationalism) Cumhuriyet. (March 21, 1943); Safa, Tfirk lnktlabma Bakislar, pp.107-36, "insan Yok, Millet 
Var," p.5, "Milli Olmak Zorlugu," (The Difficulty of Being National) Tasviri Efkar quoted in Yeni Adam, 384 
(December 18, 1941 ), p.11. 
158 Baltac1oglu, '·lnsaniyet Var Mtdrr?" p. 2, "Garba Dogru," (Towards the West) Yeni Adam. 493 (June 8, 
1944), pp. 2,11, "Bat1ya Dogru," (Towards the West) Yeni Adam. 568 (November 15, 1945), pp. 2,11, 
·'Medeniyet Nedir," (What is Civilization?) Yeni Adam. 622 (November 3, 1949), p. l. 
159 Baltac1oglu, "Tilrke Dogru," p.2. For Baltacmglu, nation was a cultural reality more than a political entity. 
See also "t.H. Baltac1oglu Tfirke Dogru Hakkmda Suallerimize Cevap Veriyor,"p. 4. Also Baltac1oglu, "Eski ile 
Yeni." p. 9, ·'Gelenek," (Tradition) Yeni Adam. 417 (December 24, 1942), p. 2, "Milli Anane," (National 
Tradition) Yeni Adam. 366 (December 1, 1942), p. 2, ''Kiiltilr ve Medeniyet," (Culture and Civilization) Yeni 
Adam. 485 (June 22, 1944), p. 3. For a similar conception of nation, see Olken, "Kiiltilr Birligi,"pp. 7-11. 
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The Vindication of Traditi.onalist Conservatism in the 1930s 
This alternative understanding of the Revolution can be seen as the symptom of an elite 
fragmentation in the Kemalist ruling center which registers the existence of competing 
conceptions of Kemalism in the 1930s. The clash within Kemalist center, which first 
revealed itself as a dispute between the Kadro circle and traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals, was shaped around competing conceptions of the nature of revolutionism 
and Kemalist revolution: its future course of development and legitimacy of 
individualism [read personalism] through which the traditionalist-conservative themes 
of free will, freedom, irrationality, spirituality and spontaneity, pluralism, etc. had been 
incorporated into the political discourse of Republic. 
As noted earlier, the debate between the positivist Kadro and traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals manifested itself in various forms. Ulken's debate with the 
Kadro circle had begun after Kadro's severe criticism of his book, A~k Ahlakz (Piety 
Ethics). Vitalism, monism, spiritualism, and individualist-mysticism were those critical 
terms used by Kadro in its criticism ofUlken's moralism. Aydemir had accused Ulken 
of being a mystic-individualist who tries to instill mysticism into the Revolutionary-
scientific rationale. 160 In addition, vitalism, monism and individualist-mysticism, anti-
intellectualism, irrationalism, and pessimism were terms employed in Kadro's criticisms 
ofTun~.161 For Aydemir, Tun~, the protagonist ofBergsonism, was also a defender of 
a trend of anti-intellectualist irrationalism. Baltac1oglu also took his share of Kadro's 
criticisms. 162 For Kadro, Baltac1oglu, like Agaoglu, was the protagonist of an outdated 
nineteenth-century conception of individualism. 163 
At its initial phases, Kadro's preference for revolutionary Kemalism was not 
discouraged by the ruling Kemalist elites. On the contrary, Kadro had received semi-
160 $evket Siireyya Aydemir, "Bir Ruh Fantazisi Yahut Yerli Peygamber," (A Spiritual Fantasy or Native 
Prophet) Kadro, l (January, 1932), pp. 31-7 
161 Aydemir, ·'Bergsonizm Yahut Bir Korkumm Felsefi ifadesi," (Bergsonism or the Philosophical Expression 
of a Fear) Kadro, l l (January, 1932), pp. 43-50. Also Aydemir, "Bergson Bahsi ve Hilrriyet Telakkimiz," {The 
Bergson Question and Our Conception of Freedom) Kadro, 13, (January, 1933), pp. 42~. 
162 Aydemir, "1smail Hakkt Baltac1oglu.,nun Metkureciligi," (The Idealism of Ismail Hakkt Bey) Kadro, 29 
(May, 1934), pp. 37-41 
163 Aydemir, "Darillfiinun Inkilap Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey iktisat\:1hg1," (Darillfiinun's Sensibility to the 
Revolution and Cavit Bey's Economism) Kadro. 14, (February 1933), pp.5-l l. 
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approval from the ruling state elites. Their statist, collectivist and nationalist stand had 
found support within the ruling statist elites and even Prime Minister inonii published 
an article entitled Partimi=in Devlet<;i Vasft (Our Party's Etatist Nature) in the 
journal. 164 This semi-official approval had further been strengthened by Kadro 
intellectuals' faith in the revolutionary nature of the regime and they started to act as 
the semi-ideologues of the Republic. 165 
In attempting to strike a balance among the Republican intelligentsia, Kadro 
countered the position of the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals by placing emphasis on 
the state's capacity to transform the social, political and economic life of the nation. Indeed, 
Kadro's emphasis on the role of the Kemalist state, as an active agent in all spheres of life, 
provided a secure place for the Kadro intellectuals within Kemalist power structure. Thus, 
Kadro attempted to discredit the traditionalist-conservative individualism, [which refers to 
personalism, spiritualism, freedom, and individual will and initiative] by claiming that it 
constituted an obstacle in the way of realizing the revolutionary ideals of the state. 
Kadro's criticism of individualism, which had been equated with the 
personalism of the traditionalist-conservative circle, was also in conformity with the 
worldwide trend that marked the end of the classical age of liberalism in the Western 
World. End of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s witnessed a challenge to 
economic liberalism and classical liberal conception of the state. Thus, Kadro' s state 
fetishism had found strong support among the Republican intelligentsia during those 
years when economic and political liberalism and individualism were generally 
discredited. Concurrently, state's role in managing Turkey's economic life had started 
to expand. Growing influence of the state over the society was not only limited to the 
sphere of economy. State's political tutelage over society, which further strengthened 
the elitist approach among the modernizing elites, further consolidated Kemalists' 
revolutionary claims to modernize and to westernize the traditional Islamic community. 
164 ismet inoml, ·'Firkanuzm Devletirilik Vasft," (Our Party's Etatist Nature) Kadro, 22 (October, 1933), pp. 4-6. 
165 Aydemir, Inlalap ve Kadro (Revolution and the Cadre), 3rd.ed. (1st: Remzi Kitabevi, 1993 [1932 ]), pp. 83-4. 
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Kadro's elitist approach to politics, which grants monopoly of knowledge and 
political wisdom to a limited number of 'enlightened intellectuals,' hinted at the nature 
of the power game. 166 The progressive impetus attributed to the rationalist scienticist 
Weltanshauung of the intelligentsia; revolution from above; strict separation of the 
enlightened intelligentsia from the rest of the population; and the ideal of 'one nation 
without class conflicts' had separated the outlook of Kadro and from that of the 
traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia. In Agaoglu's words: 
Kadro envisioned a new type of economic state. which would lead the advanced social 
classes of the society to accumulate the surplus economic values on behalf of the society, 
and direct, establish. and operate in a well-planned way all the economic activities. 167 
The Turkish revolution, for Kadro, was the first and unique example of the 
liberation movements of the oppressed countries from the imperialist Western capitalist 
countries. However, growing socialist sentiments and Kadro's attempts to formulate a 
'more revolutionary Kemalism' than the revolutionarism of the Kemalist ruling center 
had also created a distance between the ruling intelligentsia and this group of semi-
official ideologists of the Revolution. Ruling Kemalist intelligentsia was also suspicious 
of Kadro's Marxist tendencies. Then, there emerged a widespread understanding that 
Kadro aimed to articulate Marxist ideals with Kemalist revolutionary ideals. This 
ultimately became one of the main reasons for its disappearance. 
Kadro's view of society and revolution had a deep impact on the intellectuals 
of the time. What it gave rise to a new cleavage among the modernist-westernist 
intelligentsia of the Republic. The Kadro group succeeded formulating a 
comprehensive views on politics, revolutionary state and revolution but it also helped 
to unify its traditionalist, conservative and Bergsonian opponents. Thus, the rise and 
fall of Kadro, and its debate with the intellectuals concerned have crucial importance 
for gaining an understanding of ideological climate and cleavages in the early 1930s. It 
is apparent that the intellectual life of the young Republic was shaped by deeply-rooted 
controversies among the 'competing modernist ideologists' of the Revolution. 
166 d . "b"d 7 8 Ay emrr, 1 1 ., pp. 11 - . 
167 Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferd. p.13. 
221 
Growing distrust among the ruling Kemalist-statist elites towards the Kadro 
version of Kemalism resulted in increasing opposition against Kadro, both within the 
ranks of the government and traditionalist-conservative circle. Besides the 
traditionalist-conservative opposition, a new group of liberal politicians, headed by 
Celal Bayar. had also started to exert pressure on government to close down the 
journal. At this junction, liberal opponents of Kadro within the ranks of the Republican 
intelligentsia started to exploit the individualist themes elaborated by the traditionalist-
conservative circle, such as individual initiative, free will, individual creativity and self-
govemment, which later became responsible for increasing popularity of traditionalist-
conservative ideals and sentiments in the ruling center. 
The politics of 1930s was characterized by a power game between the soft-line 
and hard-line Republicans. For example, Recep Peker, the RPP secretary-general in the 
1930s who came to represent the hard-liners, described the Revolution in his lectures 
at istanbul University, as a means "to tear away the backward, the bad, the unjust and 
harmful from the social structure, and to replace them with the advancing, the good, 
the just and the useful elements... and to see that the old would not come back. " 168 
Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals of the time, who stayed distanced from ruling 
center, could not be considered as devoted supporters of the Republican factions. They 
were not supporters of RPP's dirigiste political and economic policies. Still, against the 
societalist ideal of 'one nation without class conflict,' traditionalist conservatives 
asserted that classes and social groups were natural elements of division of labour in 
society; against the revolutionism of the Peker clique, a kind of creationist evolutionary 
perspective was adopted; against the elitism of Kadro and of the revolutionary 
intelligentsia, a kind of life politics responsive to authentic culture was elaborated. 
1930s were those years, when the RPP had begun to identify itself more with 
the institutional structure of the state and set out to include in its program all the 
economic, social and political needs of the social groups. The national leader, Mustafa 
168 Recep Peker, Inkllap Dersleri (Lessons on the Revolution) {tstanbul: Ueti~im Yaymlan, 1984), p.7. 
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Kemal Atatiirk, represented the basic views, the Will and the creative power of the 
party and faith laid not in individualism, but in solidarism. A new kind of 
authoritarianism was injected into politics. The revolutionary scientific state had 
attempted to mobilize political, economic and, especially, educational institutions to 
realize the revolutionary ideal of creating a scientific culture and marshalling it into the 
service of the revolution. The question at stake had vital implications for the 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, since it had been interwoven with the declared 
and tacit aims of the 1933 University Reform. 
1933 University Reform: Expulsion of Traditionalist Conservatives from the Turkish 
Academia 
The Minister of Education, R~it Galip, who was responsible for the reformation of 
Dariilfonun in 1933 said that "Darulfunun showed a strong detachment towards 
Kemalist Revolutions... There appeared to be radical transformations ..... but it just 
stayed uninterested and indifferent, never trying to adopt itself to these changes. "169 
The aim of the university reform had been formulated so as to establish a new 
university which would be the symbol of the scientific rationality of the Revolution and 
contribute to the creation of Republican type citizen .. 17° For some of the Republican 
intelligentsia, including those around Kadro, Dariilfonun scholars' indifference to the 
revolution was a reflection of their anti-Kemalist and conservative world view. The 
distance, specifically of Agaoglu and Baltac1oglu, as well as Tun~, to Kemalism was 
regarded as a resistance to the Revolution. 171 Thus, for Ali Galip "the education of the 
future generations could no longer be undertaken by such an institution that closed all 
169 The statement made by R~it Galip, Minister of National Education, Hakimiyeti Milliye (istanbul daily) 
August 1, 1933, quoted in istanbul. Oniversitesi. Kurulus. Tarihce. Teslcilat ve Ogretim Oyeleri, 1453 - 1981 
(The Establishment, History, Organiz.ation and Staff of 1.tanbul University 1453-1981) (istanbul: istanbul 
Dniversitesi, 1983), p.312. 
17° For further evaluation on University Reform, see Mete Tuncay and Haldun 07.en, "1933 Daru.lfunun 
Tasviyesi veya Bir Tek Parti Politikac1s1D1Il Onelnemez: YUkseli~i ve ~ii," (The 1933 Purge ofDaiillfunun or 
an Unavoidable Rise and Fall of a Single Party Politician) Tarih ve Toolum. (October 1984), pp. 222-36. See 
also E. Hir~, Dtinya Oniversiteleri ve Tfirkiye'de Oniversitelerin Gelismesi (Universities in the World and the 
Development ofTurkish Universities), two volumes (Ankara: Ankara Oniversitesi, 1950). 
171 Burhan Asaf(Belge), "Arkada Kalan Daru.lfunun," (Daru.lfunun in the Past) Kadro. 8 (August 1932), pp. 47-
8, "Universite'nin Manas1," (The Meaning of University) Kadro. 20 (August 1933), pp. 24-8; Aydemir, 
"Darillfunun Inktlap Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey tktisat~d1gi," p. 8. 
., ., .... __ .) 
its doors to the revolutionary developments."m Consequently, Darii/fiinun was 
abolished by the law dated July 31, 1933 and left its place to istanbul University. Most 
of the academic staff were dismissed and radical changes in the curriculum were 
introduced. 173 
What was the significance of the 1933 University Reform for the traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals? The answer has vital importance to shed light on the 
relations between the state and the traditionalist conservatives in the 1930s. After the 
abolishment of Darii(fiinun, Baltac1oglu, who was the protagonist of 'traditionalist-
individualist ideals,' and Agaoglu, the 'liberal politician' of the late 1920s, were 
dismissed from their posts. In 1933, Baltac1oglu started to publish the journal called 
Yeni Adam. In 1939, inonii, the National Chief, took the initiative and Baltac1oglu was 
offered a post in academia in Ankara. Then in 1942, he was elected to the National 
Assembly as a Republican representative. Tuny, the Bergsonian philosopher of the 
Republic and 'the representative of Bergsonism and the philosophy of pessimism,' in 
Kadro' s vocabulary, was first dismissed and then appointed as professor to the F acuity 
of Literature in 193 3. In fact, state's aim to establish an academia which would be in 
service of the Revolutionary spirit drew the demarcation line with Baltac1oglu's 
traditionalism, Agaoglu's liberalism and Tuny's Bergsonism. 
Turkish academic life had long been dominated by the French philosophy. 
Ahmet Suayip had been a follower of Taine, whereas Gokalp and Baltac1oglu were 
influenced by the works of Durkheim and Bergson. Tuny was a follower ofBergsonian 
philosophy and Freudian psychology. During the First World War, in line with 
increasing political relations with Germany, new interest on German politics and 
philosophy arose among the late Ottoman intellectuals. This appeal in German 
philosophy had revealed itself as an interest in the writings of great German 
Enlightenment thinker, Immanuel Kant. Mehmet izzet had begun to emphasize the 
172 The statement made by Re~it Galip, the Minister of National Education in Hir~, Donya Dniversiteleri ve 
TOrkiye'de Oniversitelerin Gelimiesi, p. 312. 
173 For full list of academicians dismissed from the University, see Tuncay and Oz.en, "1933 Darulfunun 
Tasviyesi," (The l 933 Purge of Dariilftinun) Yeni Gilndem. (October 1984), pp. 16-9. 
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importance of Kant and his rationalism for W estem political and intellectual life. 
German influence on Turkish academia peaked subsequent to the emigration of 
German scholars to Turkey after 1933. 
By the rise of Nazism to power in Germany in 1933, German scholars, who 
were mostly Jewish in ethnic origin and social democrat in their political commitments 
had migrated to Turkey form Germany. The ruling Kemalist intelligentsia employed 
the newcomer German academicians in its newly founded university to contribute to 
the reformations in the Turkish academia. It must be noted that the prominent German 
figures like, Hans Reichenbach, the author of Logic and Scientific Philosophy, E. von 
Aster, historian of philosophy, W.A Rustow, social philosopher, G. Kessler, an expert 
on ancient philosophy, E Hirst, Heimsoth and Ritter, philosophers of law, were mostly 
well-known for their positivist aspirations which became a widespread phenomenon in 
Europe by the rise of Vienna School in the 1920s. They were prominent 
representatives of the positivist philosophy, in the fields of philosophy, history and 
ethics and were expected to transplant this scientific Weltanshauung to the newly 
established university of the Republic. 
Subsequent to the enactment of the University Law, dismissal of the "old-
minded" scholars, such as liberal Agaoglu and traditionalist Baltac10glu, and 
employment of positivist-oriented German scholars was a symptom of widening of the 
distance between Kemalist ruling elites and the traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia. 
Baltac10glu' s interest in Islam, as part of the living tradition, and his personalism were 
responsible for his expulsion from the university, whereas it was the 'personalist-
liberal' stand responsible for this in Agaoglu' s case. 
Both Agaoglu and Baltac10glu were also politically motivated intellectuals, if 
not the protagonists of any specific political program. They became prominent figures 
of the Free Republican Party which was established on August 12, 1930 and abolished 
on November 17, 1930. As noted, Agaoglu was among the founders of the party and 
Baltac1oglu served as the chairman of party's istanbul branch. Among them, only Tun~ 
did not display active interest in politics. Therefore, he was offered a post, as a 
professor, in the newly founded university after a period of short break. Though the 
ruling state elites had chosen to distance themselves from the traditionalism of 
Baltac1oglu and liberalism of Agaoglu, T uny' s Bergsonism was neither repudiated nor 
acknowledged. Yet, Kemalist ruling center, by drawing some limits, had also registered 
the legitimacy of Bergsonism in apprehending the new reality created by the 
Revolutionary rationale. Even though key figures were dismissed from the University 
in 1933, it can be said that Kemalists did not totally expel them from the political and 
intellectual arena. Indeed, Tun9's Bergsonism, which had been adopted by Baltac1oglu, 
Agaoglu and Safa, in varying degrees, was the underlying reason for traditionalist-
conservative alliance with the ruling center if not always with the stratum of ruling 
statist intelligentsia where its consequences could be observed in the University 
Reform. 
Bergsonism adopted by traditionalist conservatives, which emphasized on 
creative evolution, elan vital, intuition and charisma, made contributions to the 
Kemalist search for legitimate rule over society. However, scienticist-positivist 
intelligentsia and socialist intellectuals, as reflected in Kadro's criticisms and/or in the 
debate between Safa and Nazim Hikmet in the mid- l 930s, took the same Bergsonian 
vocabulary as the polar opposite of their envisioned revolutionary Kemalism. Thus, 
even though the scienticist-radical tough-liners attempted to neutralize the traditionalist 
conservatives, the latter continued to employ the terms of heroism, charisma, intuition 
and creative will to reflect the nature of the new political regime - very words that 
partly reflected the charismatic Kemalist power structure manipulated by Mustafa 
Kemal but gradually dissolved by the dominance of bureaucracy in politics after his 
death in 1938. 
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CHAPTER6 
TRADITIONALIST-CONSERVATIVE CONCEPTION OF ARTS 
Traditionalist-conservative themes and motives mostly appeared in refined forms in the 
literary works in the early Republican period. At an early stage, traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals ascribed enormous importance to art, especially to literary arts, since art in 
general, and the "novel" in particular, was assumed to be "the mirror of society as 
much as the individual spirit."1 In this respect, Baltac10glu confirmed that aesthetics was 
necessary for the human beings as much as economy and industry. He claimed that with the 
dissolution of the traditional religious order and consolidation of a secular one, the old 
concept of religion was being replaced with new sciences, secular ethics, and folk art. 
Thus, the sublimation function provided by religion in traditional society, would now be 
performed by the arts in modem society. The political and social functions of art, for 
Baltac10glu, stemmed from the fact that modem sense of aesthetics, which made 
artistic experience meaningful, could only flourish in a democratic environment. 2 In a 
similar vein, Safa delineated the new function of arts and literature as follows: 
Novel. which has both adopted the peculiar aesthetic of the art of story and incorporated 
philosophy and psychology within the system of its observation and explanation 
throughout its progress in the last century and a half, is the mirror of the spirit of 
individual and the society. Art and novel are not isolated from the society. On the 
contrary, if art. and especially the novel, reflect the dissolution of the societies into 
individual interests, they display examples of utmost concern for all sociologists. The 
reasons of this dissolution should be searched in the novel, which is the mirror of social 
evolution and thus in social organs and the evolution that they experience. 3 
Art, especially literary arts, had a crucial importance for social and political 
regeneration in Turkey, since "politics," as revealed in Safa's Sanat Eseri Bir~ey ifade 
Eder mi? (Does Work of Art Mean Anything?) was "life, and literature was one of its 
reflections in art. " 4 
1 Peyami Safu, "Roman Cemiyetin A)11llSl," (Novel is the Mirror of the Society) Tasvir'i Efkar. (November 23, 1942). 
, . . 
- Ismail Hakla. Baltac1o@.u, Demokrasi ve Sanat (Democracy and Art) (Istanbul: Sanayi-i Nefise Matbaasi, 193 l ), pp. 
11, 88-90. 
3 Safa, --Roman Cemiyetin Aynas1." Also Baltacioglu, "Estetik: Ni~in Lazundrr?" (Why Aesthetics is Necessary?) 
YeniAdam. 170(April 1, 1937),p.14. 
4 Safa, "Sanat Eseri B~ ifade Eder mi?" (Does Work of Art Mean Anything?) Cwnhuriyet. (March 22,_1938). 
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The expanding influence of Cartesian analytical thinking into the realms of art 
and ethics stimulated further the traditionalist-conservative challenge to scienticism and 
resistance to an all-encompassing rationality. As a result, the traditionalist conservatives 
came to view art as a source of legitimate knowledge as compared to that generated by 
analytical reasoning. 5 Unlike scientific activity, the aim of which was to gain an 
understanding of master the material world, "the task of the artist," for Baltac1oglu "is 
to drag us to the depths of our inner selves but not to the material world. "6 In this 
respect, Baltac1oglu posited that "there may be scientific and ethical truths in a work of 
art, but its task is not to provide them. Works of arts do not depend on practical needs 
such as technical activity."7 In Safa's words: 
The philosophical conscious, which arises out of the junction of artistic intuition and scientific 
control, is neither art nor science. We have to distinguish the specific characteristics and 
methods of art and science : The means of artistic intuition, comprehension and collection 
constitute the unity of spiritual sense and intelligence; the means of scientific research, 
conclusion, experimentation, and standardiz3tion analytical thought But both of them have one 
common goal: understanding. There is no scientific discovery which excludes intuition, no 
novel which excludes analysis, and even no poem which bas not been prone to analytical 
experience, despite its all combinatoiy characteristics. The failure of Emile Zola, who tried to 
adopt the methods of natural science to art, should be sought in his aspiration to carry the 
similarity of artistic and scientific goals to the extent of methodological unity. 8 
Traditionalist conservatives overemphasized the new function of art and centrality of 
artistic experience in understanding individuality in modem world. 9 
Artistic experience was seen as an unique mode of human experience which 
could not be grasped by analytical reason alone. Safa, in his Sanatta Malum ve 
Me~hul, (The Known and the Unknown in Art), posited that the distinguishing features 
of art were its creativity, indeterminacy, and unpredictability. 10 In this respect, art also 
5 Hilmi Ziya Olken "insani Vatanc1hk," (Humanist Pauiotism) Millkiye. 1-9 (December, 1931), pp. 4-13. See 
Baltac1oglu, "Romana Dogru," (Towards the Novel) Yeni Adam. (December 7, 1944.), p.2, Demokrasi ve Sanat, 
p. 28; Mustafa ~ekip Tun4r, "Kendi Kendim: Olan Sanat," (Spontaneously Emerging Art) Kiiltiir Haftas1. 5 
(February 12, 1936), pp. 8-9. 
6 See Baltac1oglu, "Artist Kimdir?" (Who is an Artist?) Y eni Adam. 173 (April 22, 1937), p.13 
7 See Baltac1oglu, "Roman Nedir?'' (What is Novel?) Yeni Adam. 449 (August 5, 1943), p.2 
8 Safa, ''Edebiyat ve Kultiir," (Literature and Culture) Tasvir'i Etkar. (April 10, 1941 ). 
9 See Baltac1oglu, "Artist Kimdir?" p.13. Also Baltac1oglu, "Sanat Eseri Nedir?" (What is a Work of Art?) Yeni 
Ad3m. 172 (April 15, 1937), p.14; Safa, "Seziis, Tahlil ve Riyaziye," (Intuition, Analysis and Mathematics) 
Kiiltiir Haftas1. 13 (April 8, 1936), p. 247, "Sanatta Malum ve M~hul," (The Known and the Unknown in Art) 
Kultiir Haftas1. 14 (April 15, 1936 ), p. 262; Olken, "Artist ve Filoz.ofTipleri," (Types of Artist and Philosopher) 
Kiiltur Hatl:as1. 9 (March 11, 1936), pp. 165, 172; Tunfi:, "Kendi Kendine Olan Sanat," p. 89. 
IO Safa, "Sanatta Malum ve M~hul," p. 262; Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat. pp. 26,28. 
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stood for a model of creativity and novelty. 11 This contention, in fact, represented a 
commonly held viewpoint among the Republican intelligentsia. 12 For about a decade 
later, Safa further elaborated this point to conclude that the basic characteristics of 
twentieth century art was its creative potential resulting from its irrationalism and its 
reaction to the cult of Reason that had once been \iewed as the sole judge over life. 13 
Art and artistic creativity should play a central role in understanding the dynamics of 
the new cultural and political creationism practiced in Turkey. It also provided fertile 
grounds for questioning scienticism of the young Republic because 
the power of artistic creation against and in-between reason and insanity, the fact that it 
does not fall out of control though it exceeds rational schemes (its consistency despite its 
transcendence over rational schemes). the fact that it does not end up in nonsense though 
it stays over and aloof from reason, the fact that it does not get lost in disorder though it 
surpasses order, hence its victory against the mediocre in its attempts between extremes, 
lies in the strength of its base and starting point. 14 
Relationship between the artist and his work of art could provide a model of 
relationship between the state and society~ between the charismatic ruler and the ruled. 
In this model, like the creation of a novel, neither spontaneity nor order would be 
sacrificed to each other. 15 As best illustrated by Safa, 
the life of novel is in a state of becoming, from its very beginning onwards. Its creation 
depends on unpredictable events which fall into the category of coincidence as well as on 
time, as in the case of life itself. A work of architecture had already consumed all its 
possessions as early as in its draft form. A novel gives the opportunity of drafting only 
those main points of the theme among the numerous events that lead to its existence, 
before it is written down. During the phase of writing, novelist reserves the freedom to 
chose among the numerous events that belong to the life of novel. The prerequisite of 
creation is this freedom. A plan which freezes all the events and chances of the novel (the 
life in the novel) destroys this freedom. It puts the life of the novel into a geometric model 
and makes it artificial. 16 
11 Baltac1oglu, ibid., p. 28. 
12 H. Cemil <;:ambel, "Tilrk Ktiltilr Davas1," (Turkish Cultural Struggle) Yeni Adam. 440 (June 3, 1943), p. 9. 
13 Baltac1oglu, "Romana I>ogru," p.2. Tuni; viewed art as a continuous process of creation through symbols. See 
Tuni;, "Kendi Kendine Olan Sanat,"p. 89. For Tuni;'s distrul>"1 in reason, see "Nazrm Fikirler," (Dominant Ideas) 
Kiiltilr Haftas1. l l (March 25, 1936 ), p. 20 I 
14 Safa, "Sanatta Malwn ve Mei;hul," p. 262; Baltac10g!u, "Roman Nedir?" p.2. For Baltac1oglu's earlier 
emphasis, see Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, pp. 27-30, "Artisti.k idrak Nedir?" (What is Artistic 
Comprehension?) Yeni Adam. 175 (May 6, 1937), p. 14. 
15 Safa, "Roman Nedit!" (What is Novel?) Resimli Ay, (June 1939), p.4. For similar view see Baltactogl.u, "Milrteci 
Roman," (Reactionary Novel) Yeni Adam. 175 (May 6, 1937), p.2, "Roman Nedir?" p.2 
16 Safa, ''Roman Teknigi," (Technics of Novel) Milliyet, (October 9, 1958), "Roman - Buhram ve Meseleleri," 
(Novel - Is Crisis and Problems) Tasvir'i Etkar. (April 12, 13, 22, 1943); Baltac1oglu, "Roman Nedir'?" p.2. 
Baltac1o@.u, "Artisti.k tclrak Nedir'?" p. 14. 
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An examination of the traditionalist-conservative reaction, first, to the 
Republican rationalism and its policy implications; second, the Westernization policies 
and their implications in daily life; and third, to the consequences of Kemalist modernism, 
which ultimately rested on science as a policy framework, would help to gain a better 
understanding of the traditionalist-conservative importance given to art. Literature, as 
argued by Safa in A1emleket ve Edebiyat (Homeland and Literature) was ultimately 
expected to contribute to the consolidation of the new Republican Weltanshauung through 
its dependence on aesthetics, spiritual sciences, and philosophy. 17 In Yeni Sanatlar O=erine 
Bir Konu~ (A Discourse on New Arts) written by the mid-1950s, he summarized the 
basic problematique on which traditionalist conservatives had based their resistance to 
excessive rationalism during the preceding two decades. In his words: 
Where does this revolt against reason, the enmity against rationalism, that has been 
continuing for 80 years, originate from? In the history of human thought this points to a 
phase of ultimate importance to the extent of requiring the questioning of all ideas and 
values that belong to antiquity, Middle Ages and modem times. We should not go deep 
into this. This revolt against reason is the reaction against the preceding adoration 
towards natural sciences, materialism and human reason in Europe. In 1859 Darwin 
wrote The Origins of Species and opened the way for the nineteenth century zoological 
and materialist anthropology which place man among the category of animals. Claude 
Bernard wrote in the same century The Introduction to Experimental Medicine, which 
published in 1865. In the mean time a series of practical and technical inventions: the 
invention of the telephone in 1876; again of the dynamo in 1876; the opening of the 
exhibition of electricity in 1881; Pasteur's inventions; anthrax; and the cure for the rabies 
after 1870. All these developments enhanced public trust not only of scientists but also of 
natural and positive sciences. Thenceforth, there was faith in reason as a means of 
organizing social life, eliminating wars, and thus leading society to the Golden Age. 
However, this dream did not last long. The incident called "Collapse of Science" followed 
it. Newer and sounder forms of philosophical research elaborated the fact that scientific 
rules were not trustworthy, and that instead of considering the mystery of nature, life and 
society, they only made up a functional harmony between reason and object. There 
occurred an enormous reaction on the part of the philosophers and artists against narrow-
minded and short-sighted scientific approach which circumscribes man inbetween reason 
and substance. 18 
Indeed for Baltac1oglu, renaissance humanism had replaced form with content, 
rationality with mysticism, concreteness with abstractionism, natural order with God's 
rational order. For him, absoluteness, formalism, and indifference, which dominated 
17 Safa, "Memleket ve Edebiyat," (Homeland and Literature) Kiiltilr Haftas1. 2 (January 22, 1936), p. 33, 
"Edebiyat Tarihi Degil, Edebiyat Karnavah," (Not the History of Literature But Carnival of Literature) Kiiltilr 
Hailas1. 6 (February 19, 1936 ), p. 111; Baltac1oglu, "Estetik Ni(fin Lazimdrr?" p. 14. 
18 See Safa, "Yeni Sanatlar Dzerine Bir Kon~a," (A Discourse on New Arts) Tilrk DUsiincesi 2, 10 
(September I, 1954), p. 248. 
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seventeenth-century art, could also be observed in the scientific and administrative 
rationale of the century. 19 
The crucial political question common to traditionalist conservatives was to 
exploit the potential of art, in general, and literature, in particular, as a means for 
steering the Turkish people away from the dry formalism and rationalism resulting 
from positivist spirit of the Revolution and for fostering among them vivid sensibilities 
and tastes. :?o Art could be mobilized for such an end because of its capacity to project 
essential forms behind appearances and thus to serve as a model for directing cultural 
transformation. Safa argued that the Turkish revolution symbolized the revival of the 
national unconscious and thus aimed to focus the nation to recognize its language, 
history, land;:?1 arts of the new Republic would do the same. 
Nation, as a cultural entity, was defined by various essential characteristics and 
deeply rooted in its historical experience which survived in living folk traditions. These 
characteristics could be captured by means of studying literary forms. Moreover, the 
very development of literary forms themselves curtained the clues for gaining an insight 
into cultural authenticity. Early Turkist literature had tried to do this. However, 
philosophical and idealist Tur~ which was the prototype of modern revivalisms, though 
emphasizing the importance of cultural permanents, had ignored the material conditions of 
nationality. The Republic raised the historical posmbility of highlighting the historical 
synthesis experienced in daily life and transmitted through the folk tradition. 22 Thus, for the 
traditionalist-conservative circle, one of the chief aims of Turkish modernist art was to 
uncover the unique relations among the elements of the cultural synthesis responsible for 
national authenticity. In this respect, language, religion, and tradition were those elements 
which carried this essence and placed this accumulation of the past before the present. 
19 See Baltac1oglu, "Sanat ve Sosyete," (Art and Society) Yeni Adam. 202 (November 11, 1937), p.8. 
:!O See Safa, "Milliyetcri Edebiyat/' (Nationalist Literature) Tan. (March 14, 1936). See Baltac10glu, Demokrasi 
ve Sanat, pp. 9-13. 
:!I S t. "d a a, i em. 
" 
-- Safa, "Sanatta Tllrke Dogru," (Towards the Turrk in Art) Tasvir'i Efkar. (May 5, 1942). 
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The self-defined task of traditionalist-conservative intellectuals was to define 
new standards of taste in order to bring into public awareness ideal aspects of authentic 
Turkish culture. They were aware of the fact that these standards of aesthetics and taste 
could not be transferred across cultures. Safa assured this as follows: 
While even the Amasya apple. Jaffa orange. Brazilian coffee have a fatherland -- a 
fatherland with specific soil. climate and national characteristic. to grow. can we claim 
that the artist who stems out from a hundred percent nationalist conditions as language. 
history and tradition is a rootless and landless ghost without any responsibility to his 
environment. and that art is an adventure which has lost its fatherland? 23 
Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, who had been squeezed in the 1930s between 
the radical revolutionism of the Kemalist state elites and the reactionism of the Islamic 
circles, adopted a reformist strategy without rejecting the radical consequence of 
creationist politics symbolized by the Republic. Placing an emphasis on the cultural 
components of the nation, they indeed politicized these cultural symbols and values. This 
reformism, with radical culturalist implications, manifested itself in traditionalist-
conservative vision of creative arts, ethics, and their culturalist and nationalist perspective. 
This potential of art, for traditionalist-conservative circles, could be exploited 
for social and political reformism. 24 As already referred, social and political 
significance of literary arts had been repeated by Safa, Baltac1oglu and Tun~ in various 
contexts. They attempted to establish a new enriched secular vocabulary which would 
mirror the values and norms of the new Republican order. Art could function as an 
alternative mode of knowledge which define the norms and values a new Republican 
model of virtue and explain historical cultural reasons for the maladies of individual 
isolation, alienation and bifurcation that emerged by the deterioration of the value 
system of Republican model of virtue. 25 
Traditionalist-conservative criticism of rationalism as explained earlier did not 
deny the relevance of reason to gain an understanding of the material world. For the 
23 Safa, "'Sanatm Vatam," (Art's Homeland) Cumhuriyel (July 13, 1939),"Almak ve <;almak," (Paraphrasing 
and Plagiarism) Yeni Mecmua (May 23, 1942), p.4. 
24 See Olken, --Sanat ve Cemiyet," (Art and Society) lnsan. 3, l-13 (Aprill, 1941), pp. 27-9. 
25 Safa, "'Almak ve <;almak," p. 4, ""Sanatm Vataru." Artist was a man of sensations. The sensuality of the artist 
covers everything which can not be grasped by reason. See tnken, "Artist ve FilorofTipleri," pp. 165, 172 
., ... ., 
_ _,_ 
traditionalist-conservative, reason could not serve alone as a basis for understanding 
aesthetics and ethics, and the utilitarian bias of rationalism could not stimulate people 
to create harmony among "goodness," "utility" and "beauty."26 This distinction 
implied that there was a difference between the realm of deductive reasoning and that 
of the arts. 27 The former referred to predictability and manipulation whereas the latter 
referred to spontaneity, creativity and originality. In Baltac1oglu's words: 
The OOsis of artistic work is imagination. We should distinguish imagination from scientific 
conception. The characteristic of scientific conception is its confonnity \\ith the material world 
i.e., its objectivity. Scientific conceptions teach us about the nature observed their aim is to 
inform us about the reality. On the contrary, artistic \\Orks do not have such confonnity nith 
the oorld observed .. Perfect compliance with nature turns art into science. 28 
The human experience in life was similar to that of artistic experience. As revealed by 
Baltacmglu, it could neither fully be grasped nor manipulated through reason alone. 
Thus, traditionalist-conservative emphasis on the arts functioned as a means of 
consolidating and deepening of the new secular values and norms of the Republic. It 
laid down the basic philosophical and literary aspirations of traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals for social and political change. 
Literary Criticism: A New Secular Mode of Consciousness 
Traditionalist conservatives' conception of arts was developed m reaction to the 
scienticism of the Revolution. It was also a response to the diffusion of the rationalist 
spirit of the age to the fields aesthetics and ethics. 29 This traditionalist-conservative 
involvement in art reflected an ambivalence on the part of these intellectuals about the 
rationalist ethos of the Revolution and its future course of development. The 
Bergsonian and twentieth century criticisms of rationalism, referred to in Safa' s Fe lsefi 
Buhran (The Philosophical Crisis) found strong resonance among them. Still, Safa, 
Tun<;, Baltac10glu, and Ulken never lost their faith in secular criticism, which they 
26 Tum;, "Ak1lc1hgm Kuvvet ve Zaatlan,'' (The Power and the Weaknesses of Rationalism) Cumhuriyet, 
(August 30, 1942). 
27 For elaborations on romantic revolt against Cartesian rationalism, see Baltac10glu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, pp. 
39-40. 
28 Baltac1oglu, Sosvoloji (Sociology) (lstanbul: Sebat Ba-.IIDevi, 1939), p.170; Safa, "Roman Cemiyetin Aynasi." 
Also see Tum;, .. Sanatta Ahlak Davas1," (Moral Question in Art) Cumhuriyet, (August 23, 1942), ··Kendi 
Kendine Olan Sanat." Also Dlken, "Sanat ve Cemiyet;' pp. 27-9. 
"9 .. ln 
- See Ulken, ·' sani Vatanc1hk," pp. 4-13 
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regarded as a necessity for the creation of a new world through philosophical, artistic 
and scientific principles. 30 
The traditionalist-conservative circle, as best illustrated in Baltac1oglu' s 
Demokrasi ve Sanat (Democracy and Art), was aware of the fact that the concept of 
good life, beauty and taste had radically changed in modem ages and a new hierarchy 
of ethical, aesthetic, and political values had to be defined accordingly. 31 Safa, Tuny 
and Olken with Suut Kemal Y etkin, Milmtaz Turhan, Sebahattin Rahmi Eytipoglu, 
Milnir Serim, and Sabri Esad Ander also held a seminar on this topic whose notes were 
later published in the journal, Kultur Haftasz. 32 Participants had discussed the reasons 
for the value crisis in Turkish society in detail. Pointing to the inability of the 
Republican regime to consolidate new and modem values, Tuny, in line with Safa and 
Olken, claimed that there was an urgent need to develop a moral and aesthetic 
philosophy which would replace the medieval outlook. 33 If this new hierarchy of 
values and norms failed to be consolidated, then a state of anarchy would result and 
would degenerate the nationalist-culturalist ideals of the Revolution.34 Traditionalist 
conservatives were aware of the fact that the experience of modernity meant 
experience of new systems of morality and aesthetic tastes which could be flourished 
and consolidated if the society was re-traditionalized towards modernity. 35 Based on 
this argument, literature and literary criticism were conceived as a means for 
accelerating the diffusion of "modem" values and norms to the traditional value 
system. 
It was a Revolutionary era and vanous intellectual and political questions 
manifested themselves in literary works. Safa pointed this out as follows: 
30 Ibid., See also 01.ken, ''Fikir Ananesi," (Tradition of Thought)~ l, 4 (July 15, 1938), p.282. 
31 Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat. pp. I I, 54-69. 
32 See "Edebiyatlmtzm Fikirsizligi," (The Thoughtlessness of Our Literature) Killtilr Haftast. 7 (February 26, 
1936), p.121. 
33 Idem. 
34 See Baltac1oglu, "Deger Buhram," (The Value Crisis) Yeni Adam, 372, (February 19, 1942). p.2. For 01.ken, 
Tun~ and Safa's short assessments on the issue, see "Edebiyatm Fikirsizligi." 
35 See Olken, "Sanat ve Cemiyet." pp. 27-9; Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, p. 140. 
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This spirit (literature) had no philosophical and metaphysical difficulty arising from such 
basic problems as genesis. life. death. being, God. interaction between inner being and 
outer being, mystery of substance. nullity and non-existence. epistemology, individual and 
society. memory and conscious ... It did not give birth to an ideological understanding and 
political trend other than common religiosity. patriotism or nationalism. 36 
The latent aim of the traditionalist-conservative intellectual was delineated as to create a 
literature with political concerns. The potentials of arts, in general, and of literature, in 
particular, could be exploited since modem tastes, common national cultural standards and 
values could be popularized through them. Practically, they wanted the literature to 
illustrate the effects of the so-called modernization process on people's daily life. As noted 
by Safa, literature would provide a new vocabulary without falling into the trap of primitive 
religiosity and nationalism. The new "political tendency"37 in literature would pave way to 
a "metaphysical, philosophical understanding" of Kemalist modernism. 
The traditionalist-conservative understanding of the function of criticism as a 
means for consolidating new cultural standards of beauty and taste was clearly reflected 
in their own critical stand regarding excessive rationalism and de-humanization in the 
world and, in particular, in art. For the traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia, as it 
was elaborated by Baltac1oglu in his discussion on the development of modem 
architecture, moral, social and political crisis of modem society, which was generated 
by excessive rationalism in the fields of ethics and aesthetics, had created new burdens 
on art [read criticism].38 Uncompromising rationalism [read Revolutionary 
Weltanshauung] would alienate the Revolution from its genuine culture, history and 
tradition. Thus, tradition and culture were regarded as new sources from where 
literary, as well as political criticism would derive their respective standards of truths. 
Literary criticism was recognized as one of the fields where those values, such as 
creativity, spontaneity, and irrationality, could be adopted to foster social and political 
creativity. Literary vocabulary had to mirror the spirit of the people whose basic 
characteristics were creativity and spontaneity. 
36 Safa, "'Bizden Evvel.kilerin Edebiyat1." p. 129. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, pp. 88.-9. 
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The intuitive sources of literary creativity could also be employed to challenge 
the social and political models constructed by pure rationalist ideologies. As pointed 
out in Safa's Sanat Eseri Bir~ey ifade Eder J\1i?, or in Baltac1oglu's Demokrasi ve 
Sanat, art and literature would foster the ideal of organic totality against any kind of 
annihilative rationalism which would bring about social crisis and individual 
breakdowns that had been both characterized by detachment and non-belongingness. 39 
Thus, Safa posited that, in its search for the reasons of non-belongingness and 
isolation, literary criticism faced the conventional dilemma of order (of any kind, either 
enforced by Reason or maintained by tradition) and freedom. In his words: "criticism 
suffered from this crisis. What can it do? Does it have to defend tradition? (Or) allow 
freedom? Does it have to defend the principles of order and security or freedom?' 40 
Provoking an interest in the creative essence of the living tradition, literature could free 
human creativity from the formalism of dead traditions. Radical political consequence 
of arts was due to its ability to tum itself to the vocabulary of the forces of creativity 
which could transform society to a new mode of consciousness on non-material 
conditions of its material existence. Traditionalist-conservative concern with art, 
literature, and literary criticism was based on this new function attributed to the art. 
Criticism based on history, culture and authenticity of a particular society had 
political repercussions since, for Safa, it led to the growth of self-consciousness of the 
individual, as well as of the society, concerned with respect to the cultural conditions 
and resources of non-material [read spiritual] existence. 41 This kind of criticism, by 
illustrating the ambivalence experienced in social and individual levels and by 
39 Safa, "Sanat Eseri B~y tfade Eder Mi?" Also Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, pp.18-20. 
40 Safa, "Roman Nedir?" See also Nurettin ~ Kosemihal, "tki. ~,"(Two Outlooks) Killtiir Haftast. IO 
(March 18, 1936), p. 189. Kosemihal pointed out that there were two competing ways of thinking in history and 
two approaches to the "reality." First approach placed emphasis on "continuity," whereas the latter on 
"discontinuity." Cartesian rationalism was an example of the second approach. The philosophy of discontinuty, 
for Kosemihal, bifurgated the reality into different essences. Two essences, namely matter and soul, were seen as 
the creative essences of the reality. Those philosophies of history, which based on this premise, ultimately beheld 
that social evolution was a sequential process. Meanwhile, the first approach argued that continuify was the basic 
characteristic of the historical evolution. 
41 See Tum;, '"Kendilerine En <;ok lnananlar," (Those Who Mostly Believe in Themselves) Cumhuriyet, 
(December 3, 1944). See also Olken, "Fikir Ananesi,"p. 282. For Safa excessive secularization ultimately paved 
way to excessive individualism, see Safa, ''Milli Ahlak," (National Ethics) ~maraltt. 42 (July 11, 1942), p.5. 
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characterizing the tensions between traditional and novel forms, would contribute to 
the development of an individual consciousness regarding the reasons of the 
ambivalence experienced in his daily life. By the same token, this type of criticism 
would not be derived from a rationalist spirit. On the contrary, only the type of 
criticism which was based on creativity and intuition could provide the means for being 
critical about the great rationalist design of any society towards an historical end. 
Therefore, traditionalist conservatives were also deterred from turning criticism 
to a man-made standard over traditions and culture, which would lead to skepticism, 
and could also result in individual alienation and non-belongingness, since it could 
weaken beliefs and convictions. Thus, Tun<; revealed that they "should neither be 
turned aside from skepticism nor circumscribed by it. We should trust reason to a 
certain extent. But we should not seek all answers in it. "42 Excessive skepticism might 
tum into a strategy of rationalist radicalism which could undermine all moral and 
religious beliefs, as in the case of scienticism of the Republic. Yet, as pointed out by 
Safa and Baltac1oglu, it was necessary to live by some beliefs. In a similar vein, Tun<; in 
pictured the basic tenets of tension between competing claims of comprehending the 
human and material world as follows: 
Science ... grew out of the tendency to possess immortal values, as the offsprings of the 
tendency to possess magnificent and immortal values which arose out of the consideration 
of the universe of sensations and experiences, the universe of ethics. as well as religion, 
mystery and infinity : spiritual concepts as conscience, soul, justice, freedom and right 
were ascribed to the spiritual characteristic of man as the offsprings of this tendency ... 
Materialists, by linking the faith of man to the faith of nature, accept only one faith and 
believe that this faith has dominance over everything with a constant exigency and a 
sense of determination. Science also depended on materialist principles; however since it 
did not pursue any factionalism and avoided reaching ultimate conclusions due to the 
complexity of humanity, it was forced to ensure a more positivistic disposition. But, since 
the contrariety between the spiritualist conception in religion, ethics. and law, on the one 
hand, and materialistic tendency dominant in the scientific understanding on the other 
hand, are irreconcilable .... 43 
Dangers of excessive skepticism, when fed by rationalism, seem to become more acute 
if religious issues are considered. Thus, Baltac10glu admitted that he adopted a 
42 Tum,:, "Kendilerine En <;ok inananlar .. , 
43 Tum,;, "Madde ve Ruh Arasmda Sallanan Dtinyanuz," (Our World That Sways Between Matter and Spirit) 
Cumhuriyet. (May, 20, 1945). 01.ken, "Fikir Ananesi," p. 282. 
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"methodical skeptics" approach . .w Moreover, Tun~, and Olken, together with Safa, 
attempted to rescue beliefs and former prejudices by adopting a philosophy of mystical 
individualism based on intuitionists skepticism for which Olk en's A~k Ahlak1 (Piety 
Ethics) stood as an example. 45 
For Baltac1oglu, an equally damaging consequence of an excessive rationalist 
skepticism was that the modem man could lose his sense of identification with 
society.46 Literature, as an artistic form, had to restore this sense oflost identification 
with the supra-individual entity, namely society. 47 In a similar vein, Safa argued that 
society only continued to exist when there was unanimity among its members. Losing 
the sense of unity meant dissolution which revealed itself as detachment and isolation. 
It was dissolution of the sense of unity which Safa aimed to avoid. 48 Thus, Tuny, with 
the aim to point out the political significance of literature, argued that society was the 
source of individual's aesthetic and ethical choices.49 A "work of art" as noted by 
Baltac1oglu, was "born not from individual consciousness but from the aesthetic 
consciousness of man living in society. "50 Thus, 
just like the values of artistic creation, its technique also stems from society. Hence, so 
long as man remains to be an individual he cannot be considered an artist; however, after 
be accrues his social personality, he gains competence for artistic work. Of course, man ... 
does not possess artistic creativity. What makes man an artist is social sensitivity and 
education which are instruments for transmission of sensitivity. Artists are the organic 
workmen of the living conception of universe which we name as art. However, in all 
social realms this conception exists extensively and unconsciously. Social man resembles an 
orator when he is talking, a statue when he is standing, and an actor when he is acting. 51 
Baltac1oglu, in line with Tuny, implied that the individual acquired a sense of aesthetics 
and moral personality only in society. Indeed, for Tun~, there was a strong relationship 
between morality, aesthetics, and law which accounted for a unity between the 
individual and society. Values and principles of ethics, aesthetics, and law also had to 
44 Baltactoglu, "Metodlu !;)Opheye Dogru," (Towards Methodical Skepticism) Y eni Adam. 528 (February 8, 1945), p.2. 
~ - . See Ulken, Ask Ahlak.1 (Piety Ethics) (Istanbul: Express Matbaas1, 1931 ). 
46 Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, pp. 139-45. 
47 See Safa, "Milli Birlik ve Ahlak," (National Unity and Ethics) Crnaraltl. 60 (November 14, 1942), p.4. 
48 Safa, idem. 
49 Tww, ··Zamane Adami ve Cerni yet," (Contemporary Man and Society) Cwnhuriyet. (November 15, 1940). 
50 Baltac1oglu, Sosvoloji. p.170. 
51 Idem. Also see Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, pp. 20-3. 
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be in congruity with one another to ensure the coherence of new modem 
Weltanshauung through which the individual could identify itself with a supra-
individual entity, namely, the nation. 52 
Each historical epoch, from Middle Ages to the renaissance, had resembled 
different but internally coherent visions of art, religion, and law to maintain the unity of 
individual and society. However, modem society carried the seeds of isolation and 
dissolution. 53 The traditionalist-conservative intellectual aimed to prevent literature 
from being an aim in itself Thus, an emphasis was placed upon the social and political 
significance of the arts, in general, and literature, in particular. They had not been 
treated as a fetish devoid of an ideological content. Thus, in Sanatta Ahlak Davasz 
(Moral Question in Art), Tun9 asserted that the rise of nationalism became a stimulus 
for the revival of a moralist perspective in the arts and politics and that this new type of 
moralism in art could develop through the literary criticism based on rationalist 
utilitarian ethics. 54 
Dissolution of Man's Unity in Modern Society 
The loss of meaning, psychological disorder and the resultant egoism constituted 
manifest forms of the dissolution of individual's sense of moral and aesthetic unity 
with society. This phenomenon had stimulated the emergence of a purely 
individualist literature. In Bugunku Sanat (Art Today), a speech delivered at 
istanbul People's House, Olken portrayed the social and political changes that 
shaped contemporary conceptions of art and aesthetics. The development of 
modern art, he maintained, was strictly bound to the consolidation of social and 
political power of the bourgeoisie rose by the seventeenth century onwards. New 
humanist, individualist bourgeois culture carried, for Olken, the danger of 
52 Turn;, "Ahlakhhgm <;e~itleri ve Zamarummn Ahlakt," (Types of Virtue and Ethics of Our Age) Cwnhuriyet, 
(March 23, 1943). 
53 Tum;, '"Sanatta Ahlak Davas1:' "Sanatta Ferd ve Cemiyet," (Individual and Society in Art) Cwnhuriyet. 
(August 16, 1942 ). 
54 Tum;, '·Sanatta Ahlak Davas1." Also see Safa, "Milliyet~iligin Bir~ Hakikati," (Some Truths About 
Nationalism) Cmaralti. 32 (March 14, l 942), p.5. 
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facilitating the development of a literature of alienation; it had flourished a century 
after the bourgeoisie's coming to power by the French Revolution. 55 
For Baltac10glu, as well as Ulken, twentieth century art, which reacted to the 
reign of reason, was the logical outcome of a historical reaction to Cartesian 
rationalism. 56 Differing conceptions of art, for Dlken as well as Baltac10glu, 
symbolically referred to man's quest to restore his psychological unity which had been 
lost in the modem times. 57 From the rise of the bourgeoisie in the seventeenth century 
to the insurrection of masses, armoured with socialist ideals, in the twentieth century, 
different conceptions of art had always been an epitome of conflicting conceptions of 
individual in bourgeois society. 58 
Consequently, the nineteenth-century conceptions of nouveaux art had been 
inspired by the eighteenth century romanticism. 59 Dlken, like Baltac10glu, had pointed 
out that the romantic reaction was followed by a new mystical individualistic current, 
in which expressionist works of art came to reflect an excessive subjectivism. Dlken 
argued that Matisse and Picasso were representatives of this excessive individualism in 
which reality was reduced to peculiar moments of the unconscious. Realist reaction in 
art, for Dlken, fed from the resurgence of the masses in liberal-bourgeois societies. 
Emerging masses of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries had represented the rise 
of objectivist-realist philosophy against annihilative individualism of bourgeoisie 
particularism. Still, the primary objective of contemporary art had not been delineated 
as to abandon individualism and subjectivism, but to illustrate that both the individual 
and the individual's isolation were a reflection of the temperament of the masses.6° For 
Dlken, Marcel Proust's realist-objectivist literature and Gladkov's cubic style in 
55 Ulken, "Bugfinkii Sanat," (Art Today) Kiiltiir Haftas1. 5 (February 12, 1936 ), p. 92; BaltacJ.oglu, Demokrasi 
ve Sanat, p. 48. Also see ''Selahattin Ankan'm i.H. Baltac1oglu'na Sordugu Sorularm Cevaplan," (Anwers of the 
Questions Asked by Selahattin Ankan to i.H. Baltac1oglu) Yeni Adam (January 13, 1944), p.5. 
56 Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, pp. 39-40. 
57 Olken, "BugiinkO Sanat," pp. 92-3; Baltac1oglu, ibid., pp.30-6, 82-4, 118-20, 125-6. 
58 .. 
Ulken, idem. 
59 Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sana!, pp. 39, 48, 83-4. 
60 Olken, "Bugl'.lnkfi Sanat," p. 93. 
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architecture, which placed emphasis on 'function' rather than useless details and 
luxury, represented a new opening against individualistic bourgeois art. 61 Olken in 
Bugiinkii Sanat, or Tun9 in Sanatta Ahlak Davas1 and Sanatta Ferd ve Cemiyet 
(Individual and Society in Art), revealed that nineteenth-century art was based on an 
unshakable belief on individual capacity to dominate nature and society., However, 
twentieth-century art was enriched by the emergence of a new perspective that 
questioned this classical convention of individualism and rationalism. 62 
This belief on the categorical, rootless, universal Man, besides creating an inhuman 
and senseless art and literature, also shaped the political ideals of its time. Political liberties 
and the spiritual emancipation of the individual were bound to some ideal, abstract 
principles more than the perfection of existing human experience and social practices. For 
Olken, philosophical abstractionism and rationalism historically served the bourgeoisie to 
transcend the existing aristocratic privileges of the absolutist-feudal order and led to the 
establishment of a new society where the newly-emerged bourgeoisie could find means to 
develop its own vision of life through his conception of art. Works of Rousseau, Kant, 
Goethe, and Beethoven, for Olken, in the final analysis, defined the new principles of ethics, 
politics and aesthetics. 63 Yet, increasing monopoliz.ation of wealth, destruction of petit 
bourgeoisie, and the emergence of big cartels, had resulted in questioning the classical 
individualism in economics, politics and ethics. 64 In a seminar held in Kiiltiir Hajtas1 Safa, 
Olken and Tun9 discussed the reasons for these crises of modern societies. All participants 
agreed that humanist individualist philosophy had lost most of its influence in the twentieth 
century as compared to its dominance of the western intellectual life in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The idea of abstract humanism was replaced with the idea of nation. 
In other words, the "abstract" was replaced with the "concrete." For the participants of the 
61 Ibid., p. 92. For a similar assessment on Marcel Proust, see Safa, "Memleket ve Edebiyat," p. 33; Tun\:, 
·'Sanatta Ahlak Davas1." Also see Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, pp. 67, 94, 102-28. 
62 Olken, "Bugfinkil Sanat," p. 92; Tum;;, "Sanatta Ahlak Davas1," "Sanatta Ferd ve Cemiyet." 
63 Olken, idem. Safa, "Roman Cemiyetin Aynas1drr.'' Tunfi:, '"Sanatta Ahlak Davas1," .. Sanatta Ferd ve Cemiyet." 
64 Viken, idem. For the relationship between literature and social development, see Safa, '"Roman Cemiyetin 
Aynasidrr." 
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seminar abstractionist humanism could not provide the neces.wy means to understand the 
crises experienced by the newly-emerged nations since solidarity was replaced with 
indi\.idual egoism; concrete with the ideal; and life with a rational plan. 65 Importance of 
Bergson, for Olken, also lay at this conjunction, since contemporary challenges of 
individualism in literary arts was also fed from Bergsonism of the twentieth century.66 
The Crisis of Morality and Loss of Meaning: Art As a Mode of Identification 
The changing tempo of life in modem society manifested itself as crises in social, 
political and cultural fields. Crises of morality in modem societies had occupied a 
central place in shaping the functions attributed to art in traditionalist-conservative 
vocabulary. Any kind of literary form, indifferent to the crises of modem society, was 
discarded as an example of art without any ethical content. The general crisis of Order 
in modem society also had reflections in works of art. Still, this modem crisis, for 
Baltac1oglu, as revealed in Ahlak Buhram (The Moral Crisis) was characteristic of the 
cultural transformation of societies towards modernity since "there emerges value crisis 
when society moves from one social type to another. This crisis ... is necessary.''67 Safa, 
in his Roman Cemiyetin Aynasulu (Novel is the Mirror of Society), also pointed out 
that this was a global crisis which had find found an echo in literature. 68 He noted that 
when you analyze any kind of novel of any country, written for any class, you can observe 
a covert or overt resistance against either social injustice, or family, or state oppression, 
or incompetency of laws, or tradition and custom, or economic or ethical order .. 69 
Having characterized the crisis of modem society basically as a value crisis, Tun~, in a 
similar vein, added that 
if values of ethics, justice, freedom, and right are so special and humane to the extent that they 
cannot be reduced to the mechanical and aimless motives of nature, then trade, industry and 
economic life and all private and social interests and profits should gather around and be 
65 See "Nazun Fikirler," p. 20 I. 
66 Dlken, "'Bugiinku. Sanat," p. 92; Tum;:, "Sanatta Ferd ve Cemiyet Davas1." See also Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve 
Sanat, pp. 46, 49, I 14, 124-5, 
67 Baltac1oglu, "Ahlak Buhraru," (The Moral Crisis) Yeni Adam. 408 (October 22, 1942) p.2; Tum;:, 
''Ahlakhhgm <;:e!?itleri ve Zamanuruzm Ahlalo." Also Safa, "Milli Birlik ve Ahlak.." p. 4-5, "Dilnyayi Kurtaracak 
Me~ale," (The Torch to Save the World) Tasvir'i Elkar, (May 9, 1945). 
68 Safa, '"Roman Cemiyetin Aynas1drr." See also Dlken, "BugUnkii Sanat." 
69 s . "dem ata, 1 . 
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enlightened by these OOsic values of humanity. Spiritual uniquent!$ can only be achie\·ed this 
70 
ooy. 
As already emphasized, they were aware of the fact that this loss of meaning 
was not a phenomenon specific to the Turkish case. Loss of meaning and the value 
crisis was a global issue of the transformation of traditional societies to more 
differentiated modem societies. And this new crisis of meaning, Safa concluded, which 
manifested itself as a reaction to the cult of reason in twentieth-century literature, was, 
at the same time, the crisis of liberal, individualist Western societies. He argued that 
before upgrading sociology to the level of positive sciences. it should be ascertained if the 
reason for this dissolution did not lie in individual ferocity arising out of a liberal outlook which 
sees the basis of human society solely as the mechanical interactions among individuals. 71 
Nonetheless, different societies experienced this crisis in different ways, and as 
pointed by Tun9, various cultures produced different aesthetic and moral conceptions 
of this global crisis. 72 The potential risk of alienation was a problematic issue when 
linked to Republican W estemism. Revolution created new political and cultural 
symbols to reinforce the individuals devotion to the nation and to prevent social 
disintegration. Still, at the initial stages of this process, the 'essence,' which gives 
authenticity to culture, was displaced with designed social and political 'forms,' in the 
model of Republican Westernism. Kultur Haftas1 published the notes of a workshop 
held by Tun9, Safa, and DJ.ken. All of the participants had argued that Turkish society 
was experiencing a crisis of adaptation and this crisis had manifested itself in every 
facet of the intellectual life, from literature to painting and poetry. The reason for the 
deepening of this crisis was depicted as the inability of the Republican rule to 
consolidate a unique vision of modernism after the dissolution of the religious 
Weltanshauung of the former Ottoman regime. In the Turkish case, the revolutionary 
ideal of creating a 'scientific culture,' and the imitative rationale behind this 'civilizing 
ethos,' were held responsible for the deepening of the value crisis which had also 
weakened the bonds between the individual and society. Symptoms of this crisis in 
70 Tun'r, "Madde ve Ruh Arasmda Sallanan DUnyanuz." 
71 Safa, "'Roman Cemiyetin Aynas1drr." Also see Tun'r, ··sanatta Ahlak Davas1," "Sanatta Ferd ve Cemiyet" 
72 Tun'r, "Nesirle~ ~iirlerin 'Acaba's1," (The "Why" of the Poetry Which Turned Into Prose) Cwnhuriyet, 
(March II, 1945). 
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literature had manifested themselves as the immaturity of a new literature which would 
be sensitive to the alienation-effect of the value crisis felt both in individual and 
communal life. 73 Literature had to provide a history to this modernist spirit of the 
Revolution since severe distinctions could not be drawn between the old and the new 
and/or the traditional and the modem. Thus, Safa in Eski ve Yeni (The Old and the 
New) posited that "any pure essence, eternal substance, heartfelt work of art, is old as 
much as new and new as much as old."74 Traditionalist-conservative literature would 
shed light on the cultural permanents which could be exploited by the Republican 
politics to maintain stability, continuity, and durability of the society. 
At the center of this traditionalist-conservative interest in art and aesthetics lay 
the objective to illustrate the collective and individual ambivalence shaped by 
irreconcilable dualities, such as civilization against culture, emotional against rational, 
material against spiritual and order against spontaneity. Literature in general, and 
literary criticisms in particular, would ultimately dealt with the pathologies of these 
dualilities as revealed in communal and individual life. This conception of the arts, to 
be discussed later, manifested itself in a traditionalist-conservative literary style that 
strictly relied on the use of symbols. It is adequate to note for the moment that the use 
of symbols had a dual function. On the one hand, they were employed to challenge the 
rationalist philosophies and policies insensitive to the irrational essence of life, and on 
the other, to show the inadequacy of rationalist philosophy in grasping the organic 
nature of totality which binds the individual parts to each other. Moreover, meaning 
constituted through symbols could be only be intuitively grasped. This implied that the 
hidden dynamics of 'reality' could not be grasped by reason alone. Use of symbols 
hinted at the traditionalist-conservative commitment to the irrational dynamics of both 
life and thought which, which they felt, could be grasped better through one's inruition. 
73 See "Edebiyatl1Il1Z11l Fikirsizligi," p.121. 
74 Safa, "Eski ve Y eni,"' (The Old and the New) Cumhuriyet. (February 27, 1938). 
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New functions ascribed to arts as a means of re-identification for the individual in 
the modern world were also related to the traditionalist-conservative re-design of the role of 
religion in the Republican era. Republican willingnes.5 to replace the religious 
We/tanshauung with a modern scientific cosmology led the traditionalist-conservative circle 
to develop a conception of art with an ethical content. For that circle, religious myths, 
symbols and customs were about to dissolve. Thus, literature in particular, and art in 
general, had to adopt modem myths and symbols for the nation to stimulate new affections 
and sensitivities to maintain loyalty of the citizen and the continuity and authenticity of 
culture. These modem literary myths and symbol, which could also include religious 
motives, were expected to hinder the total disappearance of religion in modem society. 
In this respect, literature and arts would provide a novel synthesis of religiosity 
and secularity in the modem world. Literature would illustrate, mirror, and popularize 
the rules, principles and values of the new Republican order, on the one hand, and 
would provide a new understanding of the experience of the sacred by the individual 
in modem world, on the other. Literature and arts could provide new openings to the 
souls of the citizens and could support Kemalist state's culturalist project. Thus, arts 
could ultimately be used to refine and popularize Kemalist state's willingness to shed 
light on the authentic origin of the nation. Heroes and myths of the old could be 
revived and illustrated in works of art. Arts and literature could also promote the 
feelings of self-sacrifice and heroism among the citizens who were in urgent need of a 
living history which would be a part of the political culture. 
Culture and Arts: As Realms for Elan Engineering 
The underlying theme of traditionalist-conservative concern with arts and literature 
was formulated in Kiiltur Haftasz as to promote the development of a holistic aesthetic, 
and ethical approach to cultural questions. 75 Traditionalist-conservative vocabulary 
aimed to formulate a philosophy of culture in which freedom and responsibility, nature 
and limits of which defined moral qualities, would acquire novel meanings. According 
75 
''Kiiltur Nedir?" (What is Culture?) Kiiltilr Haftas1. 1(January15, 1936), p. l. 
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to the contributors of Kiiltiir Haftasz, culture, where the problem of loss of meaning in 
the world of modernity would be solved, occupied a central place in political and 
philosophical thought since Johann Gottfiied von Herder's studies on the topic. 76 
Culture, for the traditionalist-conservative circle implied harmony and development of 
life forces willing to find a unity between life and beauty. 77 The question of harmony 
was linked to the question of freedom that had been praised as the basic quality of 
personality. Freedom was the basis of culture and culture implied man's attempts to 
free himself from the God-given natural order. 78 Based on this connection, Safa 
argued that the objectives set by the journal and the ultimate purpose of modernist -
traditionalist-conservative literary arts constituted a perfect fit, and the journal, Kultiir 
Haftasz, was born out of pointing to the idea that culture was a new level of re-
identification. Accordingly, 
knowledge is a lifeles.s content which solely belongs to the memoxy; culture is a living 
knowledge which comes into being within the thinking experience of mind. Literature brings 
culture out of the lifeles.s mass of knowledge and links it to the most sacred and vital deeds of 
personality and selfhood. Ideas of a scientist, who lacks literary experience, are deprived of the 
passion which is requisite for their living and pursue a mechanical move in the ~of the 
tunnel from memory to conscious. The emergence of a sound cultural movement in Turkey can 
only be realized by the cooperation of science and literature. I am among those who are certain 
that pire Turkish culture and Turkish literature will emerge . .. when spiritless essence of 
culture without literature unites with the fervor of a literature which lacks the ~nee of 
culture. Kultiir Hajtasl gave rise to this mutual assurance. 79 
Nevertheless, traditionalist-conservative literature was based on the premise 
that society needed of order and Republican rationalism could alienate the citizen from 
the new national symbols. 80 The question of order and institutional formalism, the 
primary concerns of Kemalist Revolutionary cadres, had to be supported with a 
complementary perspective which would exploit such cultural essentials as religion, 
tradition, and folklore, to further consolidate the new order. Order, which had been 
understood in a mechanical sense, for Tun~, might also result in seeing the society as a 
76 Idem. 
77 Idem. 
78 Idem. 
79 Safa, "Kiiltiir ve Edebiyat," (Culture and Literature) Kiiltilr Haftast. l (December lS, 1936), p. 8. 
80 For the crisis of morality and changing nature of the social order, see Baltac1oglu, ''Tiirk Ahlak Gelenekleri," 
(Turkish Ethical Traditions) Yeni Adam. 434 (April 22, 1943) p.2; Tum;~, "Ahlakhhgm <;:e~itleri ve 
Zamanuruzm Ahlaki.,, 
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mere mechanical collectivity. 81 In this respect, indifference to the existing cultural 
practices and traditions, for the traditionalist-conservative circle, carried the danger of 
alienation of the individual from its genuine culture. 8~ Thus, national literature and arts 
had to mirror society's authentic values and tastes. Intuitive-creationist literature would 
also provide the bedrock for understanding the authentic means of cultural creativity 
essential for maintaining the historical continuity of nation as a cultural community. 
The legitimacy of the new Republican order could not merely be guaranteed by 
the consolidation of the formal institutional administrative structures of the state. Thus, 
Safa said, 
any culture has two fronts: the institutions of that culture which form its forefront. 
Second, its inner side, which is not visible, but is more significant, valuable, and forms 
which its essence and in fact the culture itself. Emphasizing one and disregarding the 
other leads to the destruction of culture. 83 
Potentials of art could also be exploited to contribute to the re-establishment of the 
bond between the individual and society. Authentic cultural personality, disintegrated 
by revolutionary rationalism, could be totally rebuilt through the new sensibilities 
represented in art. The new world that had been illustrated through work of art would 
be an organic totality of the general and the particular [read national spirit and 
individuality, respectively], the rational [technique] and the irrational [read culture], 
since "the essential and original existence of a work of art is not in its components but 
in this state of synthesis."84 The task of art was to restore a sense of cultural unity so 
that the individual [read citizen] could break his isolation and alienation. 
The definitions of art among traditional conservatives reflected their aspirations 
about the cultural and political consequences of Kemalist revolution. In the case of 
Safa, for example, thought the aim of the art was to salvage modem man from 
isolation and alienation and to reinstate national identity and belongingness. Tun9, 
defining art in terms of poetry, characterized its basic feature as displaying a spiritual 
81 T .d wu;,1 em. 
82 Tune;, idem. See also Safa, "Milliyetc;iligin Birkac; Hakikati," p. 5. 
83 Safa, "Memleket ve Edebiyat," p. 38. 
84 Idem. See also Baltac1oglu., "Sanattan Anlamak," (To Know Art) Yeni Adam, 474 (January 27, 1944), p. 2. 
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essence in a "fantastic" form. He insisted that human beings grasped the spiritual not 
through Reason but through intuition as a will to discover the essence of piety of the 
human soul. 85 Baltac1oglu did not take a different stand on the issue. In Sanat Eseri 
Nedir? (What is A Work of Art?) he asserted that 
artistic work is imagination. Artistic work is different from practical ritual and ethics. 
Artistic work prO\·ides no benefits. It resembles neither science nor technique ... It does not 
have any responsibility of searching for outer truth. Unlike technical activity it does not 
depend on practice. Artistic work is inciting. Artistic work is the organized work of the 
social man. who is called artist. and who gathers the values of a certain social group and 
restructures them \\ith respect to a genuine technique and reflects them to the same social 
group and thus generates a sui generis incitement which is called humane incitement. 86 
The basic claim of traditionalist-conservative literature was to replace the 
former religious Weltanshauung with a new sense of piety and religiosity shaped 
by strict moralism. The new traditionalist-conservative moralism did not 
necessarily disregard religion as an ethical system, but placed it in living national 
tradition as an authentic national experience of the sacred. In this respect, for Safa 
and Ulken, as well as Baltac1oglu and Tun9, art would contribute to the 
development of a sense of mutual affection and piety which would give way to a 
sense of belongingness and nationality. For example, Ulken in his A~k Ahlak1 tried 
to show that it was piety and the sense of affection which held the individuals 
together. 87 In a similar vein, Baltac10glu' s definition of art revealed that both the 
sense of affection and unity of man with society could be restored in art. Thus and 
so, Olken strongly reacted to the loss of a sense of piety in modern life for which 
he ultimately blamed egoism and materialism in modern society and the diffusion 
of technical-scientific mentality to the spheres of ethics and aesthetics. Nationality, 
as illustrated in A~k Ahlakz, made piety a common value among the citizens. For 
Ulken, art had to restore modem man's sense of belongingness to a nation. Tun9, 
in a similar line, claimed that this tendency was coupled with the re-moralization of 
85 Ttuu;, .. Yeni Nesil ~airlerimizde ~airlik ile Veliligin Birl~e Temayulleri," (The Tendency of Unification of 
Poetry and Sainthood in the New Generation of Our Poets) Cwnhuriyet. (March 18, 1945); Baltac1oglu, 
··Sanattan Anlamak," p. 2. 
86 Baltac1oglu, "Sanat Eseri Nedir?" p. 14. 
87 .. -Ulken, Ask Ahlakt. pp. 64-). 
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the society towards a national identity which ultimately aimed to restore man's 
cultural affinity with his fellows. 88 
Unity Through the Artistic Reorganization of Life 
Tun9 assured that the unity between psychologically particular and sociologically 
universal could be reconstructed in art. 89 Like the human world, art has its own 
dynamics and forces of creativity which can not be grasped through reason alone. In 
this respect, Safa, and Tun9, claimed that art, particularly poetry, signified the triumph 
of soul over the matter, irrational over the rational.90 Safa, In Riiya, Siir, Cinnet 
(Dream, Poetry, Insanity) had affinned this as follows: 
In my book published three months ago I wrote that every man becomes insane while 
dreaming and his consciousness reverts to its discipline after he wakes up. . .. Keyserling 
uses "poet" instead of "insane." Since the new conceptions of poetry eliminate the 
difference between the fantasies of the poet and the delirium of the insane, the distinction 
can only be observed in the words. The fact that every person becomes insane or a poet 
while dreaming or becomes a poet is due to the rationalization of the daily life or the 
tendency to escape from shallow truth. If we do not experience these escapes to the 
undisciplined universe of intensity and delirium every night our obedience to the rules 
and oppression of reason during daytime becomes harder. 91 
Thus, for Safa "the difficulty faced by those who had tried to understand poetry 
through reason lies here," since "there is not another key in their hands rather than 
intuition peculiar to poetry. "92 About two decades later, Safa, paraphrasing Tun9, said 
that "poetry does not expound, but (lets us) inspire ... " 93 In Gen~lik ve ideo/oji/er (The 
Youth and Ideologies) he had already mentioned that 
what is fascinating in any philosophical, economic or political theory as well as in artistic 
works is the original aspect which complements our own viewpoint and experience with 
88 Dllcen, Resim ve Cem.ivet (Painting and Society) (lstanbul: Oniversite Kitabevi, 1943 ). Tum;, "Sanatta Ahlak 
Davas1," See also Baltac1oglu, "Sanatta Garba Dogru," (Towards the West in Art) Yeni Adam. 534 (March 22, 
1945), pp. 2, 11, "Bir Sanat thtilali," (An Art Revolution) Yeni Adam. 616 (September 22, 1949), p. 2. 
89 Tuner, ''Yeni Nesil ~airlerimiz.de ~lik ve Veliligin Birle~e Temaytilleri." Baltac1oglu, ''Siir Nedir?" (What 
is Poetry?) Yeni Adam. 550 (July 12, 1945), p.2, "Yeni Siir Anlayi~1," (Our New Conception of Poetry) Yeni 
Adam. 536, (April 5, 1945) p.l~ Safa, "Siir ve Nesir," (Poetry and Prose) Hafta. (January 20, 1935), p. 
2, "Saganak," (Pouring) Tan (April 14, 1936), "Siir Ol'ilyor mu?" (Is Poetry Dying?) Yedigtln. (October, 13, 
1937), p. 12, "~iir \:aguu Degi~iriyor," (Poetry Changes its Age) Cwnhurivet. (May 7, 1938), "Siire Dair Bir 
Kon~a," (A Discourse on Poetry) Yeni Mecmua. (May 30, 1942), p. 4, "Siirde Mana,·· (The Meaning in 
Poetry) Tasvir'i Etl:ar, (April 3, 1945). 
90 Safa, ''Siir \:agnu Degi~tiriyor:· "Siirde Mana." See Baltac1oglu, "Roman Nedir'?" p.2. 
91 Safa, "Roya, Siir, Cinnet," (Dream, Poetry, insanity) Tan. (February 20, 1936 ). 
92 Safa, "Siirde Mana." The aim of novel was to characterize and illustrate the man as such. See Baltac10glu, 
"Roman Nedi.I'?'' p.2, "Romana Dogru," p.2. 
93 Safa, "Siirin Mahiyeti," (The Nature of Poetry) Milli yet. (May 22, 1958). 
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respect to another standpoint. We live in a universe of truth with numerous aspects which 
is perceived by the individual in particulars and by the society as a whole. For the 
comprehension of this whole. perception of the existing society is not enough: but 
perceptions of preceding and future societies are also needed 94 
Modem art. with its unique intuitionist method. would provide a holistic perspective to 
mirror the dynamics also responsible for unity and continuity between past, present and 
future of the society. 
Tun~, Safa and Baltac1oglu maintained that scienticism manifested itself as an 
obsession with naturalist literary forms that tended to calculate the value of art on the 
basis of its utility in understanding the human world. 95 Utility and rationality could not 
be captured as the basic aims of art. Baltac10glu assured this as follows: 
The worst sin it has committed from sixteenth century, from the renaissance, onward was 
that it has been engaged with non-artistic works. From renaissance onward painting has 
been tending towards perspective and anatomy! Oratory was confused with rhetoric! ...... . 
Drama became an art of decoration! Novel shifted towards stylism! Architecture turned 
from being an art of construction into decoration. Renaissance aimed to serve reason. 
Reason of the Middle Ages was mystical; Renaissance reason was Cartesian. Renaissance 
also aimed to serve art: it made art scientific. This was not required Art should have 
stood outside science and within sentiments. To explain the outer universe which is 
observable and calculable is the work of science; not of art. To explain the inner universe, 
which is rationalist, which is neither observable nor calculable, which is the universe of 
being, time and spirit, is the work of art; not of science. Art exists because science filters 
this universe through reason and can never comprehend it. Art exists on its own since it 
pursues with a different logic and method. 96 
The task of the artist was to display the rational and irrational sides of life 
and culture so that the people could find themselves in unity again.97 For 
Baltac1oglu, the artist would inform the individuals about their communal national 
identity. 98 In later decades, Safa further elaborated this view and concluded that 
"'poetry is the complete expression of all spiritual states,"99 including the 
spirituality of a nation. Turn; affirmed, in his discussions on the current state of 
mechanic and organic theories, in line with Safa, that artistic reorganization of life 
94 Safa, "Gen'tlik ve ideolojiler," (The Youth and Ideologies) Killtiir Haftast. 9 (March 11, 1936), p.162; 'DI.ken, 
"Artist ve FilozofTipleri." pp. 165, 172. 
95 Safa, ··sanatta Malum ve M~hul," "'Sanat Felsefosi," (Philosophy of Art) Hafta. (January 30, 1935), p . .2; 
Baltac1oglu, "Bir Sanat lhtilali," p.2, "Artist Kimdir," p.13, "Sanat Eseri Nedir," p.14, "Estetik Ni~in 
LazimdrrP' p. 14; Tun't. "'Sanatta Ferd ve Cemiyet Davas1.·' 
96 Baltac1oglu, "Bir Sanal lhtilali," p.2. 
97 See Baltac1oglu, ''Sanat ve Sosyete," p. 8. 
98 Idem. 
99 See Safa, "'~iirin Mahiyeti."' 
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could maintain the unity of man with society and its cultural world. As noted 
earlier, In his Sanatta Ahlak Davas1, Tun~, had further depicted that the march of 
nations was responsible for this new aesthetic conception of life which granted 
privilege to artistic creation again rationalist radicalism. 100 Artistic reorganization, 
for Safa, also meant transcendence of simply rationalist conceptions of reality into 
a new metaphysics. Thus, the artist would create a metaphysics of his own which 
would transcend the conventional subject-object dualism and would grasp the unity 
of opposites behind their various appearances. 101 For him, "poet has a divine 
mission: the work of visionary who comes closer to understand the universe in its 
great structure by transcending the level of worldly antinomies and conflicts. "102 In 
a similar vein, Ulken maintained that artist was the one who deeply felt the social 
and cultural tensions in his individual life and reflected the resultant tragedy the 
work of art. 103 Artist and/or philosopher would formulate a homogeneous 
Weltanshauung in this age of moral and social disintegration. 104 Thus, a literary 
approach, which would lead to the metaphysical, philosophical, and social 
understanding of the individual, could serve the artistic reorganization of life in 
modem times. 105 
Literature would mobilize all forces in society to ensure its creative evolution 
since, for Safa, society could not merely be dominated by the forces of total destruction 
and/or total renewal. The concept of society itself implied a process of"regeneration in 
the same direction of Becoming."106 Safa's discussion on the novel revealed the fact 
that, for him, the novel, just like the real life, embodied an unlimited number of 
possibilities. It was the world of the unknown which had been characterized and 
shaped by tension-ridden possibilities. Novel was itself a state of becoming from the 
100 Tum;, 'Sanatta Ahlak Davas1.'' 
101 Safa, "~iir O:zerine D~iinceler," See also Dlken, "Artist ve FilozofTipleri, "p. 172. 
102 Safa, ibid. 
103 D!ken, "Artist ve FilozofTipleri," p. 172. 
104 lhiJ., pp. 165, 172. 
105 Safa, "Bizden Evvelkilerin Edebiyatl," pp. 129, 132. 
106 Safa, "~iir c;:a.gnu Degi~tiriyor." 
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beginning to the end. The flow of events depended upon the occurrence of a number 
of possibilities, whose appearance depended upon uncertainty, unpredictability, and 
indeterminacy. Relationship between the author and novel also implied the idea of 
freedom. Freedom was the basic category of creation in the novel, as well as literature 
in general. A rational plan, as in the case of architectural design, which would been 
imposed on the series of events and possibilities before they occurred, would restrict 
the real freedom literature offered. 107 Thus, in order to understand the dynamics of 
the creative progress, it was necessary, in Safa's words, "to shake off all the 
principles inherited from the past in order to understand their durability and life 
capability, if not to overthrow them all. " 108 Only in this way, the original dynamics 
of political and social organization could be understood. 
Literature in particular, and art in general, Safa maintained, would promote 
a new romantic political understanding of culture which was different from 
primitive religiosity, patriotism, and nationalism. 109 Literature implied the act of 
grasping a higher meaning and celebration of the unknown as it had been 
manifested as an authentic dynamics of creation of the folk spirit. 110 In a similar 
vein, Tun~ argued that the 
extension of this idea to the state, law, etc., have provided a purer, richer and 
broader possibility on the totality, and established a closer, more sober relationship 
between man and existence. Based upon the need more for subjective experience than 
objective domination of an issue, the idea considering the law as an outgrowth of 
national spirit was, therefore, replaced with the one that preaches it. 111 
Society, like a work of art, could not be treated as a finished and completed thing 
in-itself but as a continuous and adventurous state of development in its unique 
spontaneous path of growth. This conception of arts and aesthetics, in the context 
of literature, was extended to state-society relations to ground the social and 
political function of art. 
107 See"-"' "R T kni~· " ~a, oman e gi. 
108 Ibid. See Baltac1oglu, "Sanat ve Sosyete" p. 8. 
109 Safa, "Biz.den Evvelkilerin Edebiyall." p. 129. 
110 See Safa., "Roman - Buhram ve Meseleleri." • 
111 Tww, ''Mekanik ve Organik Davalanrun Yeni Zamanlarda ~irdigi Safhalar," (The Stages of the 
Questions of Mechanics and Organic in Modern Age) Cumhuriyet. (September 20, 1942). 
Traditionalist-Conservative Modernist Aesthetics as a Mode of 
Political Creation 
Aesthetic Creation: A Model of Relationship Between the Charismatic Ruler and the Ruled 
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The key to understand traditionalist-conservative conception of power as a means for 
creating a national culture and a new society was to draw some parallelisms between 
their anticipated conception of the relationships between the work of art and the artist 
and the intuitive ruler and the ruled. 112 Indeed, it was this anticipated relationship 
between the work of art and artist that was responsible for the emergence of a unique 
traditionalist-conservative vocabulary, where peculiarly Bergsonian concepts, like 
artistic creation, will, creativity, freedom, spontaneity, and imagination, were employed 
to form a model of power relationship for charismatic leadership exploited in its elan 
engineering politics which was considered by the traditionalist-conservative circle as a 
function of charismatic power. 
Traditionalist-conservative vocabulary handed over to the Turkish intellectual 
tradition an alternative vision of modernity, essentially traditionalist, romantic, anti-
positivist113 where the concepts intuition, creativity, and concreteness were the most 
important terms. 114 In this preoccupation, the artist would contact a reality that 
transcended the rational. 115 The great statesman, like the artist, also faced with a world 
of unknowns. He had to order the spontaneously appearing life in precise forms. 116 In 
Ulken's words, he had to "systematize emotions in the form ofimages."117 
112 For the relationship between artist and the work of art, see Baltac10glu, "Estetik Nifi:in Lazumhr?" p. 14, 
"Sanat Eseri Nedir?"p.14, "Artist Kimdir?" p. 13, "Sanat ve Sosyete," p. 8, "Romanda Tiirke Dogru," (Towards 
the Turk in Novel) Yeni Adam, 390 (June 18, 1942), p. 2, "Roman Nedir?" p. 2, "Sanattan Anlamak," p. 2, 
·'Romana Dogru," pp. 2, 11. 
113 For Olken' s critical evaluations on positivism, see Olken, "Medeniyette ilerleme ve Gerileme,'' (Progress 
and Retreat in Civilization) istanbul, (December 31, 1946), pp. 2-4. 
114 See Baltac1oglu. "Feylozof Kimdir'?" (Who is a Philosopher?) Yeni Adam. 153 (December 3, 1936), p.14, 
"Felsefenin Metodu," (The Method of Philosophy) Yeni Adam, 155 (December 17, 1936), p. 14, "Miirteci 
Roman," p. 2; Turn,:, "Akil Romantizmi," (Reason Romanticism) Cwnhuriyet, (July 5, 1942), "Akll ve Hayat," 
(Reason and Life) Cumhuriyet. (July 12, 1942 ), "Felsefe ilim Arasmda," (Between Philosophy and Science) Fikir 
Sohbetler, pp. 53-9. 
115 Tunfi:, "Bergson'a Gore Sanat ve Sanat Adami," (Art and Artist According to Bergson) Cumhuriyet. (May 6, 
1945). 
116 For Tunfi:'s characterization of great man of elan engineers, see Twu;, "Yarat1c1 irade Meselesi," (The 
Question of Creative Will) insan. I, 1 (April 15, 1838), pp. 44-8; Dlken, ·'Sanat ve Cemiyet," p. 26. 
117 .. . 
Ulken, "Sanat ve Cemtyet," p. 26. 
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The artist, as portrayed in Safa's Almak ve Calmak (Paraphrasing and 
Plagiarism) was a mediator who inspired and displayed commonsense forms and made 
them new. 118 Basic characteristics of both the artist's and the statesman's acts was 
secular creation. Secluded dynamics of life were grasped and displayed in this secular 
creation. 119 The statesman, like the artist, had to free the creative dynamics, namely 
tensions. 120 Paraphrasing from Baudelaire, Tune; wrote that "pure art is to create a 
magic which covers the outer world as well as the inner world of the artist. " 121 The 
artist, like the statesman, had no purpose other than to eliminate the utilitarian symbols, 
the conventional and socially accepted generalities, in short, everything that distanced 
the reality from us. Hasan Cemil <;ambel in his Turk Kultur Davas1 (The Turkish 
Cultural Struggle), which he had been examined by Baltac10glu as an exemplary case 
in his Towards the Turk problem, illustrated this mood as follows: 
Today, the Turkish nation is struggling to lay roots in its history and myth, and put on its 
life the stamp of its literature. Death of history and myth means the death of life .... And 
Ankara introduced a new culture era. Ankara is a revolution in depth ... And a turning 
point of our national spiritual life... As such. everyone, like an artist, lives this new 
creation, while he, himself, creates a new man .. 122 
Baltacroglu in Pedagoji (Pedagogy) argued that the aim of this creation was self-
discovery and self-realization. 123 Traditionalist-conservative vocabulary suggested to 
adopt the intuitionist method as a technique for surfacing of the reality and dynamism 
behind the appearances. Aesthetic theory and artist, as pointed out in Olken' s Sanat ve 
Sosyete (Art and Society), would secure the very unity of life. 124 The artistic intuition 
that help us to move behind appearances would also make it easier for us to locate 
novelty and vitality brought about by the secular creator. The image and picture of 
reality, brought through intuition, might keep the artist, as well as the ruler, in contact 
118 Safa, "Almak ve <;almak." p. 4. For a similar evaluation, see Baltac10glu, Demokrasi ve Sanat, p.28, 
"Milrteci Roman," p. 2. 
119 Tum;, "Kendi Kendine Olan Sanat," p. 89; Baltac1oglu, ··Milrteci Roman," p. 2. 
120 Baltacioglu, "Artistik idrak Nedir?" p. 14. 
121 Tum,, "Kendi Kendine Olan Sanat," p. 89. 
122 <;ambel, "T11rk KO!tilr Davast," p. 9. 
I'.!3 Baltac1oglu, ·'Pedagoji," (Pedagogy) Yeni Adam. 233 (Jwie 15, l 939), p.18. 
124 Baltac1oglu, '·Sanat ve Sosyete," p. 8, "Artistik ldrak NediI1" p. 14; Tww, "Bergson'a Gore Sanat ve Sanat 
Adarm." 
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with the concrete. Thus, modernist aesthetics advocated by the traditionalist-
conservative writer helped the modernizing statesmen to see his creative will as 
intuitive formulations of latent will, tastes, and commitments of the people. 
Conservative Philosophical Framework in Peyami Sa/a's Works 
Literary artists of the early Republican era, who were inspired by traditionalist-
conservative ideas, ultimately aimed to characterize the unique processes of political, 
economic, social change. 125 Throughout the 1930s, Kemalist ruling intelligentsia 
tended to consolidate the political and cultural processes which would stimulate their 
W estemization project and institutionalize the Kemalist revolutionary practices. The 
idea of progress was the theoretical object of Kemalism. The rationalist revolutionary 
ideology of Kemalism espoused an image of modem society which was actively 
constituted on the desacrification of social and political organization. 126 Emphasis on 
the perfection of the social organization, secularization of daily life and appeal to the 
revolutionary project aroused a sense of discontinuity and insecurity within the first 
generation of the Republic. It also evoked an awareness among some segments of the 
intelligentsia on the necessity to conserve, to which the traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals have responded. 
Safa was one of the prominent literary figures of the early Republican period. 
Safa's conservative literature found fertile grounds to explore the questions of moral crisis 
and degeneration. The philosophical concerns behind his literary style, as reflected in 
Felsefi Buhran, were shaped by his distaste of a Western image. 127 As a literary figure, his 
reputation reached its zenith when he published Fatih-Harbiye, Bir Tereddiiliin Romam 
(Novel of a Hesitation) and Bi= insanlar (We, the Human Being.5). 128 Matrnazel 
125 For a similar role attributed to the artist, see Olken, "Filomfve Artist Tipleri," p. 172. 
126 See Olken, "Medeniyetlerde ilerleme ve Gerileme," pp. 2-4. 
127 See Safa, Felsefi Buhran (The Philosophical Crisis) (Ankara: Recep Ulusoglu Matbaast, 1939). See also 
thken, "6nsoz," (Preface) Yinninci Asrr Filozoflan (The Twentieth Century Philosophers) (istanbul: Kanaat 
Kitabevi, 1936), pp. V-VII. 
128 Safa. Fatih-Harbive (1stanbul: Semih Liltfi Kitabevi, 1931 ). Otto Baxa translated it into German in 1943. 
The title of German translation was "'Zwischen Ost und West." Safa, Bir Tereddiitiln Romaru (Novel of a 
Hesitatioo) (istanbul: Silhulet Kiitilphanesi, 1933), Biz 1nsaniar (We, the Human Beings) (lstanbul: Inkllap ve 
Aka Kitabevi, 1959). 
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Noraliya 'mn Koltugu (Mademoiselle Noraliya's Chair) and Ya/mzzz (yle are Alone) 
were among his literary works in which the early traditionalist-conservative themes of 
psychological disorder, ambivalence, and cultural duality were articulated. 129 
Safa' s basic literary and politico-philosophical concerns were shaped by the 
social, political, and economic problems of his era. He and his generation witnessed the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, occupation years and the War oflndependence. They 
were the last generation of the Ottoman Empire whose sense of belongingness had 
largely been depressed by the collapse of the Empire. They experienced the collapse, 
decadence and rebirth, creativity and self-reliance. Still, the War of Independence and 
Kemalist order could not overshadow the disturbing effects of the sense of non-
belongingness and despair. Ambivalence in the psychological order of individuals, who 
experience the rapid process of collapse and regeneration, conflict among generations, 
tensions among social and political groups and competing ideologies, collapse of the 
religious Weltanshauung and its institutional structure which shaped the life of 
individuals and groups for centuries, and regeneration of a new secular cosmology and 
its pathologies became the cardinal themes of his work. 
Another important theme of Safa' s novels was his attempt to depict the 
irrational inner layers of the self This philosophical emphasis on irrationality had 
already been incorporated through Tun~'s works on Bergson, which privileged the 
irrational against the rational side of life. 130 The hybrid dualist cultural forms, which 
manifested themselves as the emergence of a bifurcated self led Safa to scrutinize the 
manifestations of dualism experienced by the individuals. The collapse of moral values, 
increasing materialization of daily life, and dualities emerged in the psycho-sociological 
129 Safa, Matinaz.el Noraliya'mn Koltugu (Mademoiselle Noraliya's Chair) (!stanbul: Nebioglu Kitabevi, 1949). 
Safa, Yalmziz (We are Alone) (istanbul: Nebioglu Kitabevi, 1951). For Safa's early assessments on Western and 
Eastern civilizations, see Safa, "Sark - Garp Milnaka~ma Bir Bala~ 1,"" (A Glance at the East - West Dispute I) 
Ktlltllr Haftas1. 3 (January 29, 1936), pp. 51-3, "Sark-Garp M~ma Bir Bala.~ 2," (A Glance at the East -
West Dispute 2) Ktlltur Haftas1. 4 (February 5, 1936), pp. 65-6, "Sark-Garp Mtlnaka~sma Bir Saki~ 3," (A 
Glance at the East - West Dispute 3) Killtiir Haftas1. 5 (February 12, 1936), p. 85, "Sark-Garp M~ma Bir 
Bak1~ 4," (A Glance at the East - West Dispute 4) Killtllr Haftas1. 7 (February 26, 1936), p. 123. See also Turn;:, 
·'Asya ve Hendese Kafas1," (Asia and Geometrical Mind) Kiiltur Haftas1. 11 (March 25, 1936), p. 203. 
130 See '·Peyami Safa Diyor ki," (Peyami Safa Says ... ) Her Ay, I (March 20-April 20, 1937), pp. 119-23. 
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world of the individuals and groups provoked him to produce works which aimed to 
illustrate the catastrophic social and psychological consequences of the mimetic models 
of Westernization [read modernization]. 131 
As noted, Safa and his contemporaries witnessed not only the dissolution of 
Ottoman system, but also the regeneration of new secular values by the growth of 
capitalism under the tutelage of Kemalist state and secularization of the daily life. In 
Safa' s vision of Revolution, increasing material concerns of daily life meant the decay 
and collapse of tradition which was equated with the spiritual heritage of the Eastern 
civilization but not necessarily with Islam. 132 Breaking of the traditional social bonds 
and traditions were responsible for the development and deepening of a schizophrenic 
approach in the daily life of the citizens. Relative stability maintained by the Republic 
could not transform this schizophrenic temper to an all-embracing holism, though it 
created the necessity for literature and art to formulate such a holistic perspective. 
Schizophrenic attitude, which had been characterized by a mass of 
conflicting symbols and images, as illustrated in Safa' s literary works, displayed the 
mood of the laymen and was symbolically illustrated in his novels. This 
schizophrenic mood stood for dualities between Eastern-Western rationales in his 
Fatih-Harbiye. Use of symbols, such as the lamp, electricity, lute-player, violin and 
jazz, hinted at Safa's willingness to illustrate the invasion of individual world by 
tension-ridden images and dualities which stood for clashing civilizations, each 
representing a separate way of life experienced in different cultural spaces like 
Fatih [read East] and Harbiye [read West]. Safa's Fatih-Harbiye, and especially 
Bir Tereddiitiin Romam, were also based on these themes of individual 
ambivalence, decadence and dissolution of moral values. 133 
131 See Safa, --~ark - Garp Miinaka~ma Bir Balo.~ l," pp. 51-2, '~ark-Garp M~ma Bir Balo.~ 2," pp. 
65-6, "~ark-Garp Miln~"trul Bir Balo.~ 3," p. 85, "~ark-Garp M~ Bir Bak1~ 4," p. 123. 
132 Safa argued that Kemalism radicalism was a rupture from the Turkist and Islamist currents of the Second 
Constitutional Period. Yet, its radicalism could not be based on its hostility towards tradition. Safa, TOrk 
Inlolabma Bakislar (Glances at the Turkish Revolution) (1stanbul: Otoken Ne¢yatA~., 1990 (1938)), pp. 107-10. 
133 For a similar view see, Ulken, ~zit Kuvvetlerin Yarad1~1," (The Creation of Antipodal Forces) Mulkiye. 12 
(May, 1931), pp.l-7 
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Safa adopted a kind of subjectivism, which revealed itself as a perspectivist-
personalist style in his literary works. 134 Yet, his concern with the flux of life also made 
Safa more sensitive towards the social question since the ''novel is a mirror of society 
as much as the soul of individual."135 The social question in its political context 
together with a peculiar emphasis on human question, to which Ulken referred in 
Demokratik Cemiyetlerde j/eri ve Geri (Back and Forth in Democratic Societies) had 
always been an overriding concern for Safa. 136 Safa adopted a radical but not 
necessarily a revolutionary perspective towards the social question. This radicalism was 
strictly bound to his personalist-subjectivism which made him take, in his literary work, 
the inner life of the individual as the subject. Personalist subjectivism, which shaped his 
literary technique, served to counter the 'one-truth' obsession of positivism. 137 The 
Revolutionary vision of progressivism was historicized by multiplicity of subjectively 
constituted images of social world and real experiences of the progressive unilinear time. 138 
The personalist-subjectivist perspective reached its maturity in Matmazel 
Noraliya 'nm Koltugu and Yalmzzz. Safa pictured Turkish society during the stormy 
years of the World War IT and under the single party rule. He illustrated how multiple 
tensions had been created by one-truth obsession of positivist vision of modernization 
and were coupled with loss of individuality. For Giinyol, Safa, especially, in his 
Matmazel Noraliya 'nm Koltugu, was captived by a mystic and anti-rationalist current 
of thought surged after the First World War. 139 Giinyol tended to view Safa as the 
protagonist of a new kind of mysticism and anti-rationalism. Devoid of all pejorative 
connotations of the terms, mysticism and anti-rationalism were indeed those 
philosophical stands which could be used to label Safa's philosophical orientation, as 
134 Mustafa Baydar, Edebiyatplarumz Ne Diyor? P.Safa (What are Our Men of Letters Saying? P. Safa) 
(istanbul: A. Halit Yicyiroglu Kitabevi, 1960), p.171. 
135 Safa, "Sanat ve Siirat," (Art and Speed) Cumhuriyet, (July 28, 1932). 
136 01ken, "Demolcrasilerde Ueri ve Geri," (Forth and Back in Democratic Societies) lstan~ (July 15, 1946), pp. 3-5. 
137 See Safa, "~lik ve ideolojiler," p.162. 
138 Sigismond Zawirski, ''Zaman Methumunun Tekamtilii I" (Evolution of the Concept of Time I), trans. by 
01ken, Kiiltur Hallast. 6 (February 19, 1936) pp.106-7, Zawirski, "Zaman Methumunun Tekamtiltl 2" (Evolution 
of the Concept ofTime 2), trans. by Olken, KO.ltur Haftast. 7 (February 26, 1936), pp. 136-7. 
139 . Vedat Gfinyol, Dile Gelseler. (If They Talk ... ) (Istanbul: ~an Yaymlan, 1966), p. 11. 
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well as other traditionalist conservatives in varying degrees. Thus, it was not accidental 
that Aydemir had also employed same terms to criticize Tun9 and O"Iken's 
philosophico-political stands in the early 1930s. 1-«> It was also Safa himself who 
maintained that "every literary work, revealed or concealed, embodies a philosophical 
viewpoint,"141 and anti-rationalism could be a proper starting point for any search of 
the philosophical perspective behind his literary works. 
How did this partly revealed and partly concealed philosophical view point, 
namely Bergsonism, found a niche in Safa's literary works, especially those works 
appeared in 1930s and 1940s? Bergsonism was internalized as a set of precepts, first, 
on the nature of intuition; second, as a peculiar understanding of action; third, as a 
particular vision of time and space; fourth, as a vision of life where a set of multiple 
tensions were responsible for its dynamism and spontaneity; and fifth, as a distinct anti-
rationalist and anti-positivist standpoint. 
Metin Heper pointed that revolutionary transcendentalism which derived from 
an Aristotelian conception of society led the Kemalist state elites to see the existent 
forms of social organization as transitory. 142 Emphasis had been made on 'essence' 
rather than 'form' and the political power was employed to display the secluded 
'essence of society' rather than perfecting the existing institutions. It is exactly from 
this kind of political perspective that the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals were 
concerned about aesthetics in radical politics as a powerful political criterion which 
would further strengthen the emphasis made on 'essence' rather than 'form.' 
Safa's Conservatism and his Aesthetic Technique 
The relationship between Safa's conservative position and his conception of art, 
especially of literary art needs further elaboration. Safa occupies a unique position in 
the history of Republican literature as the first initiator of the psychological novel. Yet, 
140 ~vket Siireyya Aydemir, "Bir Ruh Fantazisi, Yahut Yerli Peygamber," (A Spiritual Fantasy or Native 
Prophet) Kadro, I (January, 1932), pp. 31-7, "Bergsonizm Yahut Bir Korkunwi Felsefi ifadesi," (Bergsonism or 
the Philosophical Expression of a Fear) Kadro. 11 (November, 1932), pp. 43-50. 
141 Safa, ''Edebiyat ve Kiiltilr," "Roman Nedir?" 
142 Metin Heper, ''Atatork.'te Devlet ~," (Idea of State in Atatnrk) in Cagdas ~ Istgmda Atatork. 
(Atatiirk in the Light of Contemporary Thought), 2nded (lstanbul: Dr. Nejat Ec:zact~ Vakfi Yay., 1986), pp. 207- 41. 
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in Soysuzl~cy Sanat (The Corrupted Art) and Eski ve Yeni, he explicitly stated that 
his views on art were modem and traditional, at the same time. 143 He did not, for 
example, view art as an end in itself As a Bergsonian artist he was committed to an 
optimistic faith in art as much as it got closer to real life since the "rules of novel are 
the rules of life." 144 In Okuyucu ve Romancz (The Reader and the Novelist) and Siir 
O=erine DU~nce/er (Views on Poetry) he also attributed a missionary role to the poet 
to transcend the worldly structures. 145 He ultimately adopted a positive and affirmative 
attitude towards the role of the artist in displaying this correspondence between art and 
life. 
What made Safa to adopt a positive attitude towards artistic creative capacity 
was his belief that art could promote cultural authenticity and sensitivity among citizens 
as members of a cultural community. 146 It was this solidarity, which bound lonely 
isolated individuals to one another, that the artist would seek to evoke. His 
commitment to art involved a commitment to multiple truths and sincerity. Safa 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of intuitive truth in literary arts. In his words: 
Every artistic work certainly has its own conviction that it wants to rea.Q:irm and 
inculcate ... However, literature expresses itself by means of language, and language is, 
above all, a logical means of expression. It is logical that a literary work resorts to logic to 
confirm its own conviction. But, literature is not solely a logical product as a 
mathematical calculation; it not only confirms but also inculcates. 147 
Artist's capacity to transcend worldly structures was linked to his capacity to highlight 
the co-existence of multiple truths in life. 
Safa, as a mode of artistic presentation, had adopted symbolism, time shifts, 
multiple narrators, and a new kind of subjectivist impressionism as characteristics of his 
conservative literary style. In his conservative style characters, scenes, or actions were 
presented not from the point of view of objective reality but as they appeared to the 
143 Safa, ''Soys~1~ Sanat," (The Corrupted Art) Cumhurivel (May 10, 1938), "Eski ve Yeni." See also 
Olken, "Orijinallik ve Garabet," (Originality and Strangeness) lnsan. 14, (May 1, 1941 ), pp. 20-1. 
144 Safa, ·'Roman Buhraru ve Meseleleri l," (The Crisis and Problems ofNovel 1) Tasvir'i Etkar. (April 12, 1943). 
145 Safa, "Okuyucu ve Romanc1," (The Reader and the Novelist) Tasvir-i Efkar. (Jlllle 14, 1944), ":';)iir O:zerine 
~tinceler." 
146 Safa, "Roman Cemiyetin Aynas1drr." 
147 Safa, "Sanat Eseri B~y tfade Eder Mi?" 
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characters in his fiction at a particular moment. Safa used language to describe the 
transient and subjective interpretation of the world. In his words: 
... When you step into a grocer's shop the goods vary \\'ith respect to the aims, professions 
and characters of each and every character of the nm-el that enters there ... Novel is living 
and apt when it expresses Lhese variations. Novel which eliminates Lhese differences and 
presents the viewpoint of the novelist in each and every observation and description is 
artificial and dead 148 
In line with his personalist subjectivist disposition, Safa, in Roman Nedir? and in 
Sanatta Ma/um ve Me9hul revealed the idea that reality was not an end product but a 
state of becoming. It was a process in which everything that had been assumed to be 
stable and coherent was dissolved and became unfinished and fragmentary. 149 
Safa adopted subjectivism as a technique because, like his conservatism, 
personalist subjectivism also saw reality as complex and flux. 150 Reality, for Safa, could 
not be understood as a solid form since it was always in a state of flux. 151 The 
complexity and fluidity of reality could not be understood through the ideologies of the 
modern world which all tended to adopt a dogmatic approach towards questions of 
life. In his words: 
In fact. we live in an age of hatred towards dogmatism; and descriptions, restrictions, 
rules cause rough and rude troubles as pontoons in the incited and free flow of new 
literature. 152 
There was an overlapping between his conservative criticism of rationalism and 
personalist subjectivist literary style. 
Safa's symbolism was also related to his traditionalist-conservative commitment 
to complexity of life and the limitations of human reason to grasp it. As mentioned 
earlier, his symbolism implied that there were some permanents in life which could not 
be grasped by reason but through intuitionism. Safa's intensive use of symbols in his 
novels also revealed his traditionalist convictions. Past traditions, which were 
symbolically referred to in his novels, sometimes with religious connotations, implied 
148 Baydar, Edebiyal£liannuz Ne Diyor'? p.171. 
149 Safa, "Roman Nedir?" "Sanatta Malwn ve Mei;hul," "~iir <;:aguu Degi~yor." For a later assessment see 
Safa., "Roman Teknigi." 
150 Safa. ·'Roman -Buhmru ve Meseleleri I." 
151 Safa, "insan Y aratan Eserler," (Works Which Create Human Being) Cumhuriyet. (April 28, 19 37). 
152 
"Peyami Safa Diyor ki ... ," pp. 119- 23, Also see Safa, "Sanatta Malwn ve Mei;hul." 
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that they were also part of the society's cultural products which had been regarded as 
old-fashioned and antiquated in the world created by Republican modernism. 
Safa was dissatisfied with ever-expanding materialist conception of life which 
renders it mechanical in order to satisfy merely the material needs of individuals. Thus, 
symbolism provided new means to re-assert spiritualism into the modem world. When 
Safa called for the establishment and reassertion of symbolic realism in Turkish 
literature, as best illustrated in Dokuzuncu Hariciye Kogu~ (External Ward Number 
Nine) and Matma=el Noraliya 'nm Ko/tugu, he was ultimately searching for an art with 
an ethical content. The self, which had been depicted as a divided whole, created by 
dualites of modernism, could not be reduced to a mechanical totality or could not be 
identified as a set interactions among mechanical psychological states. Thus, Safa' s 
symbolism, which implied the existence of a layer of truth that could be conceived 
spiritually, could be seen as an attempt to create a literature that ultimately sought to 
stimulate the inner self with a view to grasping these multiple truths intuitively. 
There are multiple narrators in Safa's novels which symbolically referred to 
these multiple truths. In Roman Cemiyetin Aynas1d1r, he pointed out that he had used 
multiple narrators to illustrate the difficulty of reflecting reality. 153 Fatih-Harbiye was 
also a typical work of Safa which he used the method of multiple narrators. Narrator's 
subjective experience of multiple truths in life framed the themes and various 
experiences oflife illustrated in the novel for which Safa's Fatih-Harbiye stood for an 
example. In fact, Safa tended to hide behind the narrators. He explained, 
perhaps the characters of each and every novel are the novelist himself. who moves in the 
manner of a liar and a fictitious personality to differing extents; but the novelist has to a 
great extent tended a complete creation so long as he skillfully put the mask of reality on 
them and made them live as if they possess real features. 154 
This method of multiple narrators also revealed his traditionalist-conservative 
convictions. Safa tended to show that reality was a many-sided state of fluidity which 
contained multiple truths experienced by the individuals. This line of analysis displayed 
153 S . .R C . . A dtr " ata, ,. oman emlyeun ynas1 . 
154 Safa., "Roman -Buhram ve Meseleleri 3," (The Crisis and Problems ofNovel 3) Tasvir'i Efkar. (April 22, l 943). 
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his skepticism about the one-truth obsession of Kemalist modernism framed by a 
positivist unilinearism. 
Safa also adopted time-shifts to further strengthen the effect that reality was 
a multi-faceted phenomenon where multiple truths of the past co-existed with 
those of the present to shape the future. These time shifts can be found in most of 
his works but Fatih-Harbiye, Doku=uncu Hariciye Kogu~u and Matma=el 
Noraliya 'nm Koltugu deserve special attention. Reality was depicted though 
multiple narrators by means of flashbacks and time dislocations and values and 
principles derived from these different moments characterized the present reality as 
a complex of multiple truths. Safa changed the order of time sequences because 
"novel is a preference and a synthesis of choices of life it has a different structure. 
It should not follow a chronology."155 
Safa maintained in his Eski ve Yeni that a sense of continuity with the past had 
to be constituted. By the use of time-shifts, Safa tried to show that past and future co-
existed in the present. Nevertheless, he was dissatisfied with the chronological mode of 
narration, which could be regarded as an example of unilinearism that tended to see the 
passing of time as a sequential and determined process. In his words, 
If we try to write down the mysteries and order of events directly, novel becomes dead, 
though it resembles life... Hence, we will not insist on writing down the events in their 
natural order ... We will change the chronological order of the events ... Hence, we will 
first engender a preference and then apprehension and postponement. 156 
Even though Safa had intervened in the time sequence in the chronological sense, still, 
he did not aim to completely ignore it since he did not place his works in a timeless 
spatial context. On the contrary, real and experienced time, in the Bergsonian sense, 
was incorporated as a structural constituent of his novel to stimulate the reader to 
recognize the history and continuity as personal experiences. The literary techniques 
employed by Safa served his traditionalist-conservative purposes and they became 
aesthetic manifestations of his traditionalist conservatism. His aesthetic conservatism is 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid., See also Safa, "~imdi,"' (The Present) Yedigiln. (May 13, 1936), p. 4. 
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representative and unique in the context of early Republican literature, as much as his 
traditionalist conservatism of being traditional and modem at the same time. 
Form versus Essence: Sa/ a 's Conservative Dilemma 
""Form - and - essence" dilemma, which was incorporated into Safa's perspectivist-
subjectivist conservative literary technique also displayed his political concerns. 
Perspectivism, which was employed to illustrate multiple images, served to give an 
account of the co-existence of various political-cultural images and symbols at a 
particular moment. In Fatih-Harbiye, Matma=el Noraliya's Koltugu and Yalm=zz, the 
form - and - essence dilemma provided hints of author's willingness to show how 
disjunctions between form and essence manifested themselves as individual and 
collective alienation, loneliness and rootlessness. In Fatih-Harbiye, perspectivism 
served to reflect how different worlds still survived despite the Republican 
Westemization. 157 In Matmaze/ Nora/iya 's Koltugu and Yalmz1z, he further 
emphasized the form and essence dilemma to illustrate the tensions in outer and inner 
selves of characters and cultural dualities of W estemization that revealed themselves as 
tensions between appearance and substance which he held responsible for the creation 
of the "half-men" of the Republic, partly Westernized and partly Eastern but has 
nothing on his own. 158 His cardinal motive was to display the social-psychological 
pathologies of cultural dualities and ideological cleavages, like materialism vs. 
spiritualism, Marxism vs. idealism, hedonism-egoism vs. self-sacrifice, etc., after the 
consolidation of the structures of modernity. 
Fatih-Harbiye, which covers a time-span of ten years between 1920 and 1930, 
was written in 1931. In the novel he tried to illustrate the cultural pathologies brought 
into being by the shift of the center of civilization to the West from the East. Though 
the cultural pathologies illustrated by Safa were not specific to the Republican era, as 
157 See Ahmet Oktay, "Tilrk Edebiyatmda Aydm," (Intellectual in the Turkish Literature) Tilrk Aydm1 ve 
Kimlik Sonmu (Turkish Intellectual and the Question of Identity), Sabahaddin ~ ed. (Ankara: Baglam 
Yaymc1hk, 1995), pp. 269 - 72. 
158 Safa, --~ark Garp MOnak~ Bir Bak!~ 1," pp. 51-2, "'Sark-Garp M~ma Bir Baki~ 2," pp. 65-6, 
"'Sark-Garp MOnak~Ina Bir Bak!~ 3," p. 85, "Sark-Garp MOnaka~ma Bir Bakl~ 4," p. 123; Tww, "Asya ve 
Hendese Kafas1," p. 203. 
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noted by Ahmet Oktay, Safa's position was representative of the traditionalist-
conservative stand on the questions of modernization [read westernization]. 159 The 
traditionalist-conservative task, set by Safa, was to develop a balanced literary style 
between form and essence in terms of their respective significance in shaping the 
ethical-thematic structure of the novel. The question could not be limited to a literary 
concern since the relinquishing of form in favour of essence would lead to 
cosmopolitanism, namely the loss of authenticity and meaning, and essence in favour 
of form to a kind of reactionism which would hinder the creative evolution of society. 
The proper understanding of the question of form and essence, as illustrated in Fatih -
Harbiye, could be possible only through the grounding of the questions of style and 
content in a philosophy of reconciliation. 
The new traditionalist-conservative philosophy of reconciliation, which derived its 
time conception from Tun~'s Bergsonism, ultimately questioned the unilinear abstract 
conception of time envisioned by positivist radicals, a point which made earlier. 160 Thus, 
Safa adopted a kind of retrospectivism which revealed his peculiar conception of time. He 
tried to show that reality was continuously reconstructed in human experience. Adaptation 
of retrospectivism and commitment to subjectivist personalism and of the incorporation of a 
non-chronological conception of time, as one of the basic structural elements of the form of 
the novel, prevented the form to become veil over the content. Consequently, determinism, 
which was assumed to be an attribute of form, was abandoned in favour of dynamism, 
indeterminacy, and unpredictability. 
This dynamic, non-chronological conception of time, which had been 
incorporated as a structural element of his literary form, could also be detected in his 
emphasis on the co-occurrence of multiple of events. Retrospective time was also a 
designative element in constituting the past-present-future dimension of the sequences 
of events in novel. In Fatih-Harbiye, for example, the novel was developed in 
159 Oktay, ·'Tiirk Edebiyaunda Aydm," p. 270. 
160 For changing conceptions of time see Zawirski, "Zaman Methumumm TekarnillU I," trans. by 01ken, pp. 
106-7, Za\\irski, "Zaman Methwnunun T ekarnillU 2," trans. by Olken, pp.136-7. 
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flashbacks and time disjunctions between three different time spans. The first time span 
was between the years 1909-1930, the second covered events between 19'.20 and 1930, 
and the third, events between the years of 1923 and 1930 when Kemalists' 
westernization from above was enforced by radicalism in means. Flashbacks, which 
imply time disjunctions, were used to support the idea that it was duree, the real and 
experienced time that maintained the continuity and dynamism of life [read novel] but 
not an abstract homogeneous time. 
Time was incorporated as a structural element of the novel through his 
retrospective subjectivist style. Safa attempted to show that human experience was, in 
fact, an articulation of real, dynamic and subjective time which Bergson called as 
duree. Safa's conception of time, as illustrated in his novels, referred to the Bergsonian 
"concrete time" or "concrete duration."161 In this conception time, duration is not 
something that is difficult to comprehend but something that one may or may not 
experience. Whatever special about conceptualizing duration in this way was that it 
rejected homogeneity, immobility, indivisibility and determinism. Instead, it promoted 
heterogeneity, mobility, indeterminacy, creativity, and free will. 
It was not accidental that the Bergsonian argument implying "the reality of time," 
found literaiy manifestations through Safa' s retrospective subjectivism, since only through 
this devotion, 'past' could be treated as a constitutive factor of the 'Present' and the 
questions of 'freedom,' 'spontaneity,' 'experience,' could be incorporated into literature. 
Politically speaking, retrospective subjectivism historicized the present day events and 
claims of Westernization and provided a fertile framework to show the plurality of images 
which shaped the present and probably the future course of events. 
Novel was the world of illustration of the essential opposing life forces and 
tensions responsible for dynamism and flux of life - those were the opposing forces, 
which Bergson elaborated in Creative Evaluation: the spirit and matter. 162 The first 
161 See Kcszek Kolakowski, Bergson (Oxford, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 12-24. 
162 See Tww, "Dnsoz," (Prefuce) Henry Bergson, YaraUct Tekamw (Creative Evolution), trans. by Tww, 
(lstanbul: Milli Egitim Basunevi, 1947), pp. 1-LII. 
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refers, in most of Safa's novels, to the Eastern life-style whereas the latter to the 
Western. The human element in Safa's novels was like the Bergsonian hero who 
sometimes grasped the problems of society intuitively. The human element was a 
complex whole of tensions and conflicts between the outer self, namely the intellect, 
the rational part of the human element, and the inner self, the unknown world of 
passions and emotions. As noted, Safa illustrated the cultural dualities in society 
through the subjective experience of his characters. The social, political, and cultural 
tensions between the rational-scientific Western civilization and the mystic Eastern 
Civilization displayed themselves through their reflections in the lives of novel 
characters. Each individual personality, which is expected to form a coherent whole, 
also acted and thought under the peculiar tensions between the rational and irrational 
layers of his self The novels moved from particularity to universality, from the 
illustration of dualities at a psychological level to the identification of dualities at the 
socio-cultural level as historical conflict between civilizations. Safa's creationist-
evolutionary approach revealed itself as the evolution of the soul in novel, from 
tensions and conflicts towards a stasis characterized by a synthesis of materiality and 
spirituality, civilization and culture, Western and Eastern values. 163 
One of the most important tenets of Safa's novels in the early Republican era 
was his attempt to incorporate Bergsonian concepts of time, freedom, becoming and 
Will, as the philosophical framework behind the themes elaborated in his novels. Safa 
used this relativized [read as subjective] conception of time to picture the plurality of 
experience and images at a certain moment of abstract time. The reason behind this 
emphasis made on plurality of experience and images was to dissociate the abstract 
progress of time from 'subjectively experienced time.' Safa's primary literary concern 
was to show the subjective experience of time and the existence of the plurality of the 
images to illustrate the cultural, social and political pathologies caused by the 
Revolutionary progressive scientific rationale. 
163 Sa.ta, "'$ark Garp M~ Bir~ l," pp. 51-2, '~-Garp M~1Illl Bir~ 2," pp. 65-6, ·~­
Garp M~ Bir Bala~ 3," p. 85; T~, "Asya ve Hendese Kafasi," p. 203. 
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Plurality of images of space and multiple experience of time were employed to 
illustrate tensions experienced by the individual subjects. For him, tensions, both at the 
collective and individual level were also the dynamics of creative evolution of the 
societies and the development of spiritual powers of the individuals. Creation could 
only be possible through the reconciliation of multiple images but not through their 
homogenization in rational organization disassociated from history, tradition and 
culture. 
There are two basic functions attributed to the time dimension in Safa's novels. 
First, a retrospective view was incorporated to show the historicity of the individual 
images of multiple narrators in the novels; second, subjective experience of time 
denoted that there were many alternative symbolic worlds which co-existed at a 
particular moment in history and these alternative worlds were awaiting there for re-
awakening. 
Philosophizing on time as a literary question had also had political connotations 
m the conservative texts of Safa. The political, social, and cultural processes of 
modernization were challenged through the adaptation of this new philosophy of time. 
Thus, in Fatih-Harbiye, he used some metaphors to show that varying experiences of 
time and space were significant in constituting human identity. Co-existence of 
different conceptions of time and space was utilized as an evidence to challenge the 
triumph of abstract progressivism fed from an abstract conception of time over 
subjective time and experience. At least, it provided a fresh and critical stand about the 
Republican obsession that progress was a natural course of the history. It was shown 
that unilinear progress was also a value-laden concept, based on an arbitrary ranking of 
co-existing images of social and individual experience. By the 1940s, early 
perspectivism was subordinated to a missionary role attributed to the writer, as a third -
person character in the novel. Besides the missionary role, a didactic style was also 
adopted. In Matrnaze/ Nora/iya 'nm Ko/tugu and YalnlZlz, essential themes and motives 
were conditioned by great conflicts between hedonism and self-sacrifice, materialism 
and spiritualism, Westernism and culturalism, revolutionism and conservatism. In this 
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respect, the ultimate aim of the conservative literary texts of Safa was to find out new 
openings for the development of an alternative vision of modernity by utilizing the 
marginalized images and daily social experiences manipulated by the state during 
process of modernization. As noted earlier, incorporation of real and experienced time 
as a structural element of novel opened up the way to Safa to adopt a novel criticism of 
republican progressiveness. 
CHAPTER 7 
BASIC TENETS OF TRADITIONALIST CONSERVATISM DURING THE 
PROCESS OF NATION-1\IAKING 
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Turkish politics in Revolutionary era of the late 1920s and I 930s was manipulated by a 
Republican politico-philosophical rationale which found its expression in the motto, 
"the truest way in life is science." In this period, the grand project of secularization was 
coupled with that of building a nation-state and nation. New emphases placed on 
national history and tradition with a \'iew to forming new national ethics on the basis of 
which the citizen's rights and obligations before the nation-state would be defined. 
Nation-state structures in the Turkish case were consolidated in a unique way. Former 
administrative apparatus, controlled by the military-civilian elites during the War of 
Independence, was transformed into a people's nation state. Consolidation of the 
nation-state and capitalist market were accompanied by the consolidation of a 
parliamentary regime, emergence of a political party system and new bureaucratic 
structure, together with a new sense of legitimacy all of which was designed to create a 
new means for social control and social engineering to achieve a more 'civilized 
modem society.' In short, the State, in a process of metamorphosing itself to nation 
state-structures was also in urgent need to define the legitimate political subject, namely 
the citizen, to secure its own legitimate political power, since it needed citizens for 
taxing them and asking them to make economic and political sacrifices. 
Early Republican intellectual life was revolved around these problems of the 
nation-state building project. Once modernizing elites had consolidated their own 
vision of modernity, then there emerged the need to conserve the new Kemalist 
political, social, and economic order. In this respect, the new creed to conserve, mainly 
articulated by the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, had a dual function. First, it 
attacked Republican rationalism by adopting a creationist-Bergsonian vocabulary in 
politics and arts~ second, it neutralized Orthodox Islamism by formulating a mystic 
individualist vision of religion answers a philosophico-political approach that still 
granted a legitimate sphere to the religion in modem society. Furthermore, this new 
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creed to conserve also contributed to the secularization of the legitimacy of the new 
Kemalist order. Though religiosity never lost its privileged stance in this new creed to 
conserve, it was embodied in a general theory of mankind. Turn; in Kader ve Kamm 
(Faith and Law) illustrated this rupture from the traditional religious Weltanshauung. 1 
i'iew creed to conserve aimed to further legitimize the reasons for secularization of daily life 
that revealed itself as the dissolution of rule of God, or what Turn;: called as "adetullah." 
As revealed in Tunc;:'s Eski ve Yeni Diinya Gorii~lerimi= (Our Old and New 
W orldviews) Kemalist modernizers and traditionalist conservatives both looked 
with sympathy upon the transformation of the religious community structures of 
the preceding Ottoman system to a political society, namely the nation. 2 Yet as 
noted before, traditionalist conservatives also maintained that the rationalist-
scientist radical politics of the Republic had further created a distance among 
"society," "state" and "intellectuals" and ultimately between "Reality" and 
"Utopia. "3 
By the end of the revolutionary era in the early 1930s, traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals were caught between revolutionism and religious fanaticism. 4 
The ruling Republican intelligentsia posed itself as the innovators of the nation. As 
pointed out by Bil~ra Ersanh Behar, devoted historians, anthropologists and 
ethnologists of the Republic were committed to a materialist-determinist conception of 
history to derive rational laws of historical development. 5 It was this rationale behind 
the cultural, economic, and political policies of the ruling state elites which became a 
1 Mustafa ~kip Tww, "Kader ve Kamm," (Faith and Law) Cumhuriyet, (April 26, 1942). See Peyami Safa, 
"Allaha Dogru Yonelil?," (Turning Towards God) Tasvir'i Etkar. (October 13, 1945). 
'l 
- Tun~, "Eski ve Yeni Diinya Go~lerimiz," (Our Old and New Worldviews) Cumhuriyet. (October l l, 1942), 
"Devlet ve Millet," (State and Nation) Cumhurivet, (October 8,1942), "Millet ve insan," (Nation and Human 
Being) Cumhuriyet. (July 4,1943), "Milliyet~ilik," (Nationalism) Cumhuriyet (March 21, 1943), "Milliyet ideali 
ve Topyekun Milli Terbiye," (The Ideal of Nationality and National Education in All) Cumhuriyet (April 5, 1943), 
Also see Safu "Milliye~iligi.n B~ Hakikati," (Some Truths About Nationalism) Cmaralll, 32 (March 14, 1942), p. 5. 
3 See Tun~'s "Peyami Safa ve TUrk Ink1labma Baki1?lar," (Peyami Safa and Glances at the Turkish Revolution) 
in Safa, TUrk lnkdabma Bakislar (Glances at the Turkish Revolution) (Ankara: Ottiken, 1990 [1938)), pp. 18-
26. See also Safa Tiirk Inlulabma Bakislar. pp. 190-3. For evaluations on the d}1UUilism of modern society, see 
Tun~, "Zamarumizda Ahlak Meselesi," (The Question of Morality in Our Age) Cumhuriyet, (April 12, 1942) 
Safa, "Yeni Bir DUnyaya Hasret," (Longing for a New World) Cumhuriyet, (January 12, 1938). 
~ Safa, TW-k Ink1I.abma Baktslar, pp. 85-98. 
~ !kt . 
- B~ra Ersanh Behar, idar ve Tarih(Power and History)(Istanbul: Afa Yaymlar, 1992), p. 196. 
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stimulus for the development of the traditionalist-conservative criticism. Tun~ adopted 
this typically traditionalist-conservative critical stand towards rationalism and added that 
all these state of beings cause reason to tend to eliminate the dark and grim aspect of our 
place in the world. to turn what is unique into general and content into form: and thus 
lead to the emergence of bald. weak and lifeless reality. Thought and life become totally 
abstract. artificial and ghostly. This weakness becomes even more apparent when a 
history is comprehended by totally speculative concepts. The tendency to believe that 
historical evolution exists primarily in reason puts more strain on reality. Because rational 
character is accrued to the historieal character later. and in different ways... For the 
rationalist all struggles in history are just instruments to strengthen reason. And irrational 
things are believed to be easily handled later by harmony and rational organization. 
History is not a gathering of experiences which complement each other. If this was the 
case there would be no need to search for new basis of liberation in each period 6 
For the traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia, politics of rationalism had annihilative 
consequences on the creative and spontaneous manifestation of cultural politics. 7 
Baltac1oglu affirmed that 
revolution ... actually happens. A revolution which contradicts with its basic principles. 
and aspires to defend them "ia reason, suspects itself, and is weak. All stages of the 
Turkish Revolution are not stages of dull, logical disputes, but of constructivism and 
creationism. Social reforms are not the results of the abstract functioning of our reason. 
but series of fait accompli. Evolution of the society is not rational, but empirical. The 
responsibility of reason is not to create, but to direct life which is self<reative. Reason is 
not the creator of evolution but it is itself a work of art created by evolution. 8 
Baltac1oglu's traditionalist-conservative criticism was focused on the Kemalist scientific 
state's attempts to shed light on the rational laws of history and society. In a similar 
vein, Safa, who adopted a critical stand against rationalist philosophies, also suggested 
that rationalism detracted from comprehending the essential nature of society. 
According to him, philosophical rationalism would ultimately give way to contractual 
theories of society. Contractual theories of society tended to view it as an artifact of 
human mind and he rejected this: 
6 Turn;:, "Alo.lc1hgm Kuvvet ve Zaatlan," (The Power and the Weaknesses of Rationalism) Cwnhurivet. (August 
30, 1942); Safa, "Diinya'da insan Var MI?" (Is There Man in the World?) Yeni Mecrnua, (July 18, 1941), p. 4. 
7 For Tum;'s criticisms of rationalism, see "Alo.lc1hgm Kuvvet ve Zaatlan," "Akil Romantizmi," (Reason 
Romanticism) Cumhuriyet. (July 5, 1942), "Gern;lik Nereye Gidiyor?" (Where is the Youth Heading?) 
Cwnhuriyet, (June 7, 1942); Hilmi Ziya Dlken, "Biz.de Tiilk~ilk. Geciktiren Sebepler -~ -B~" (Our 
Turkism, Reasons for its Belatedness - Its Birth - Development) istanbul. (February l, 1946), p. 3,"Tanzirnat Devrinde 
Tiirk~illtlk," (Turkism in the Tanzimat Era) !stanbul. (February 15, 1946), pp. 2-3, "TUrkiye Dt~da Tiiik'ftllUk -
Realist ve Umi Tiirk'ftlltlk," (Turkism Outside Turkey - Realist and Scientific Turkism) lstanbul. (March 1, 1946), pp. 
6-7, "Hayali -Siyasi ve Hakiki Tllrk~illiik," (Imaginary - Political and Genuine Turkism) tstanbul. (March 15, 
1946), pp. 2-3. 
8 ismail Hakkt Baltac1oglu, "Erkek ve Kadm" (Man and Woman) Yeni Adam. 322 (May 9, 1941), p. 2. See also 
Baltac1oglu, ''Pedagojinin Duntl, BugOnii, Yanru 2," (The Past, Present and Future of Pedagogy 2) Yeni Adam. 
233 (June 8, 1939), pp. 18-9. 
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Contrary to what the mechanists assume. society is not the mechanical and 
mathematical totality of individuals .... The well-known social contract of Rousseau. 
freedom. equality. electoral majority, parliamentarian regime arouse out of this 
conception. This mechanical conception of society which was counted in sociology 
and which has been experiencing its last periods in European political history is 
being replaced by this conception ... Society is an independent and living whole. It 
had been arisen not out of a rnluntary contract among individuals. as in the case of a 
commercial company, but an old, long-lasting historical evolution the roots of \\hich 
go back to the origin of the humanity. Although it is composed of individuals. it is 
an independent synthesis. and possesses different characteristics from the 
characteristics of its parts. 9 
Ulken linked the criticisms of mechanistic-rationalism to the atomistic conception of 
society and added that contractual theories had reduced society to an artificial 
collectivity assumed to be constituted by means of a rational agreement among its 
members. 10 In a similar vein, Baltac1oglu concluded that rationalism and mechanism 
would hinder the emergence and development of a new genuine cultural synthesis, 
since they rejected viewing society as a living totality of the "real and concrete states of 
becoming."11 Moreover, it tended to substitute reality with the utopia it created. Tuny, 
in his Aki/ Romanti=mi (Reason Romanticism) flatly stated that "what is critical about 
reason is that it leads men to errors by convincing them that the worlds it has created 
are more realistic than the real world." 12 
For Baltac1oglu, radical rationalism of the Kemalist state towards the 
establishment of a westernized society not only alienated people from their culture, 
history, and tradition but also hindered the free manifestation of individual and social 
creativity in the name of moral transcendentalism and rational manipulation. He saw 
Kemalist emphasis on revolutionary legitimacy as a symptom of radical 
transcendentalism. It was because of the fact that for him "laws are not the ideal words, 
like the words of God, (they are) man-made, human and will absolutely be 
defective. " 13 
9 Safa, "Sosyoloji ve Milliyet<;ilik," (Sociology and Nationalism) <;maralt1. 35 (May 23, 1942), p.5; Olken, 
·'Biz.de TUrk<;iilugti Geciktiren Sebepler - Dog~u - Buyii~ii,"p. 3. 
10 Olken, "Ferd ve Cemiyet," (Individual and Society) 1nsan. l,l (April IS, 1939), p. 59. 
11 Baltac10glu, ·'Pedagojinin DOnii, Bugilnii, Y anru 2," p. 18. Also Safa, TUrk Inlolabma Balo.star. pp.190-3, 
'"Dunya'da lnsan Var m1?'" p. 4. See also 01ken, ·'Ferd ve Cemiyet," pp. 57-65. 
12 Tun<;, '"Aktl Romanti.zmi." 
13 Baltactoglu, '"Toprak Kanunu," (The Land Law) Yeni Adam. 544 (May 31, 1945), p.2; Safa "Psikoloji ve 
Milliyet<;ilik" (Psychology and Nationalism) <;maralh. 40 (June 27, 1942), p. 5. 
273 
Indeed, state's authority over society, even coerc10n, was preferable if the 
alternative was anarchy and chaos, since "nation aims independence abroad, and order 
at home." 14 However, there is an element of opportunist reformism at this point. For 
Turn;:, worst "Order," was better then anarchy and chaos. In his words: 
Although laws are not perfect and absolutely virtuous. since they are man-made. they are 
more preferable when compared to lawlessness which leaves extreme forces free and 
. . h l'I 
mvttes anarc y. -
Politics of Reason, which was seen as an antidote of the state of disorder and anarchy, 
was supported by the revolutionary lawyers, bureaucrats, and scientists of the new 
Republican orthodoxy. Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals were aware of the fact 
that the philosophy of rationalism led some selected members of the intelligentsia, be 
they in the revolutionary political party or bureaucracy, to adopt the mission to create a 
future perfect society on "arbitrary" historical constructs according to which the 
spontaneously evolving history of society would be adopted. For them, rationalism was 
an illusion, therefore, Tuny, in his Secaat (Bravery) and in Yarat1c1 jrade Meselesi 
(The Question of Creative Will), maintained that 
Life is an abstract concept. an empty mould However, nations have custom and usage 
and common ethics which had been traditionalized in accordance with their historical 
traditions and geographical locations. Thus, we are not free to conceptualize life 
personally on our will. In this respect it can be claimed that the value we ascribe to life is 
not an aim but an imperative means for our common life and ideal. 16 
Even though, Revolutions have some political and economic ideals, they should 
not be transformed to "rationalist utopias" because, as already maintained by 
Baltac1oglu, 
Ideal is realized under appropriate conditions... When ideal is realized it complies with 
the requisites of the sphere of exigency, lose its absoluteness : from then on we call it not 
as ideal but institution. Ideal is the very self of social being which originates from past 
and proceeds into future. We should not confuse ideal with imagination and utopia. Ideal 
is realized under appropriate conditions. but imagination never becomes real. Fiction or 
utopia is what we call "raw imagination". Ideal emerges in the periods of development 
and progress of the societies and idealists arise in those periods. 17 
14 Baltac1oglu, ''istedigimiz Terbiye Nedir?" (What Kind of Education Do We Demand?) Yeni Adam. 58 
(February 7, 1935), p.2. 
15 Tun~, "Devlet ve Millet." Also Safa, ·'Ayalrustil Cevap;' (Answer in Haste) Cumhuriyet, (August 8, 1939). 
16 Tun~. --~t." (Bravery) Cumhurivet. (October 25, 1941); Safa, "Avrupa Medeniyeti Y1k1hyor mu?" (Is the 
European Civilization Collapsing?) CmaraltI, 45 (August l, 1942), p. 5. See also Tun~, ''Yaratic1 irade 
Meselesi," (The Question of Creative Will) in.'iall., l, l (April 15, 1938), p. 44; Dlken, "Ferd ve Cemiyet," p. 59. 
17 BaJtac1oglu, "ideal Nedir?" (What is Idea.I?) Yeni Adam. 233 (June, 15 1939), p. 2. 
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Thus, contrary to the dominant Kemalist view, the state - rational apparatus established 
to realize the civilizing mission - was not seen as an instrument of rational perfection, 
on the contrary, in Baltac1oglu' s words: 
the state is .... an institution ... to pursue what is possible. Reason. logic. ideal wait: but the 
executive power does not wait. In contrast to the God's word. laws are not ideal sayings, 
but human constructs: they are social and thus eventually imperfect. 18 
Then, Safa set the limits for revolutionary rationalism as an utopia in reference to 
some a priori absolute truths. In his words: 
Freedom is absolute. But. there is no revolution which is absolute even if it based 
freedom. When we accept the absoluteness of a revolution.. then we reject its abstract 
meaning. Real revolution is that which has comprehended the faith of change. 19 
A State, which was not nationalized [read, re-traditionalized] as an unique cultural 
structure, might have legality, but it did not come to mean that it also had legitimacy 
until its alienation from authentic culture was eliminated. It was only when a complete 
correspondence was established between the values on which the institutional structure 
of the state was based and the value content of culture, the state could further 
consolidate its legitimacy. On the side of the citizens this would lead to a voluntarily 
acceptance of the obligations imposed by the Kemalist state since it would derive its 
legitimacy from culture and tradition. 20 Yet, no extra-societal institution, including the 
state, was entitled to impose rational models on the spontaneous creative cultural 
evolution of the society. Moreover, it was not the intellectual, in traditionalist-
conservative vocabulary, "who would bestow the power of progress to the nation," but 
on the contrary, it was the intellectual "who would lean upon this power."21 
Communal identity of citizenship had to represent a national personality whose 
characteristics could be derived from national tradition and culture. In Baltac10glu' s words: 
18 Baltac1oglu, "Toprak Kanwiu." p. 2. See also Agaoglu. Devlet ve Ferd (The State and Individual) (lstanbul: 
Sanavi-i Nelise Matbaas1, 1933), pp. 59-60. See also Twi<;, "Devlet ve Millet." 
19 Safa, '"Eski ve Yeni Hiirriyet,"' (Old and New Freedom) Tasvir'i Elkar. (July 17, 1941); Tun~. ·'Gem;:lik 
Nereye Gidiyor." Also see Safa, "DOnya da i:nsan Var Mi?" p.4, "insan Yok Millet Var,"' (There is No Man But 
Nation) CmaraltI. 4 (August, 30, 1941), p.5, "Fikir Hiirriyeti," (The Freedom of Thought) CmaraltI. 8 
(September 27, 1941 ), p. 5; Olken "Ferd ve Cemiyet," pp. 57- 65, "Fransiz ihtilali ve Eski Rejim," (French 
Revolution and the Ancient Regime) lstanbul. (August 1, 1946), pp. 3- 5. 
20 Baltac1oglu, "Milliyet Terbiyesi," (Education of Nationality) Yeni Adam. 228 (May 11, 1939), p. 14: Safa, 
"Milli Cemiyetlerde ideal," (The Ideal in National Societies) CmaraltI. 48 (August 22, 1942), p. 5. 
21 Baltac1oglu, "Maarifte Siyaset," (Politics in Education) Yeni Adam. 322 (February 27, 1941), p. 16. 
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Training man. creating a body of reason. creating an emotional universe, creating a basis 
of \\ill. creating an entire national personality ... However, this is not the same either with 
a material work or a surgical operation: it is a work of evolution containing measures 
..,.., 
which require a great period of time. --
Still, m their criticism of rationalism, traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals, followed a conciliatory strategy. They drew examples from the 
leading figures of Western political and social theory, as in the case of Safa' s 
Felsefi Buhran (The Philosophical Crisis), to support the argument that the age of 
radical positivist "revolutionism," which had adopted abstract rationalism, had also 
come to an end in the West. 23 Safa, in Avrupa'daki Haklarzmzz ve Vazifelerimiz, 
(Our Rights and Duties in Europe) had pointed out that Turkish state elites faced 
two alternatives in the heyday of the Revolutionary era: either to westernize or to 
become history. They judiciously chose the former since they felt that they had no 
other choice. After all, they modeled the Revolution to a positivist-rationalist 
vision of West. However, this model civilization had already started to collapse in 
its heartland. Severe challenges were raised against the rationalist ideals of Western 
civilization within the Western world which was deeply shaken by economic and 
political crises and revolutions. Though the faith of the Turkish revolution, for 
Safa, was linked to the future of West, there was no unique West to be taken as a 
model of modernization. 24 
In a similar vein, Ulken in his Fikir Ananesi (The Tradition of Thought) and 
Descartes and Skolastik (Descartes and Scholastics), had argued that even though 
mechanistic rationalism.., which was later associated with Descartes' philosophy, had 
important consequences earlier, such as the elimination of medieval scholasticism, it 
had long been challenged by rising relativist and historicist philosophers. This new 
22 Ibid., p. 2. Also Baltac1oglu, "Halk ve Biz," (People and Us) Yeni Adam. 307 (November 14, 1940), p.3. 
23 Safa, Felsefi Buhran (The Philosophical Crisis) (Ankara: Recep Ulusog.lu Matbaas1, 1939). Also Safa, "Bu 
Harpten Dogacak Killtilr Dilnyas1," (Cultural World to Emanate from This War) Haber quoted in Yeni Adam, 
546 (June 14, 1945), p.10, TOrk Inlalabma Baktslar. pp. l ll-31; Baltac10glu, "0manizma," (Humanism) Yeni 
Adam. 241(August10, 1939), p. 2, "Garba Dogru," (Towards the West) Yeni Adam. 493 (June 8, 1944), pp. 2. 
ll, "time Dogru," (Towards the Science) Yeni Adam. 494 (June 15, 1944), pp. 2,11. 
24 Safa, "Avrupa'daki Haklannuz ve Vazifelerimiz," (Our Rights and Duties in Europe) Tasvir'i Etkar. (January 
26, 1942). See also Baltac1oglu, "Kil.ltilr ve Medeniyet," (Culture and Civiliz.ation) Yeni Adam. 495 (June 22, 
1944), p. 3, "Medeniyet Nedir'?" (What is Civilization?) Yeni Adam. 622 (November 3, 1949). p. 2, "Bauya 
Dogru," (Towards the West) Yeni Adam, 568 (November 15, 1945), pp. 2,ll; Olken,"Hangi Bau?" (Which 
West?)~ 1, 3, (June 15, 1938), pp. 185-6. 
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tradition of thought, for Olken, was based on Vico's philosophy of history. 25 
Moreover, in his Fransrz ihtilali ve Eski Rejim (French Revolution and the Ancient 
Regime) by referring to book L 'Ancie11 Regime et la Revolution, by a prominent 
conservative Alexis de Tocque"ille, Olken further deepened his criticism of rationalist 
universalism and abstractionism because of their inherent transcendentalism in politics 
as well as ethics. 26 Consequently, in islamiyette Eski Di11/eri11 i=feri (The Traces of Old 
Religions in Islam), Olken, as Safa pointed out in his Diinya 'da insan Var Ail? (Is 
There Man in The World?) laid down his doubts about the radicalism of world 
revolutions. In his words: 
I will dwell upon the extent of the disadvantages that the preceding institutions caused to 
the French revolution, despite the new era it brought forth, and that it was also nourished 
by the remnants of the ci\'ilizations that it destroyed. All these comparative analysis 
confirm the enormity of the difficulty in destroying the consolidated institution and 
actualizing revolutions. and that it was never fully successful in this. 27 
Safa also held a characteristic stand in his traditionalist-conservative criticism of 
rationalism. In Yeni Bir Di.inyaya Hasret (Longing for a New World) he declared the 
end of rationalist revolutions and added that 
new world means a new society, new civilization and new man. Can we claim that the 
term "new" in this respect possess the same meaning as in new shoe, new shirt. new 
jacket, new curtain? Is a new civilization the same with a new shoe which can split man 
from the preceding one immediately, and of which all parts are so lifeless and non 
resistant and solid? In other words, is it possible to create a new world, a new society, a 
new civilization by getting ridding of the preceding onesf3 
Safa concluded that rationalism, which resulted in vague positivism, was 
responsible for the alienation of mankind to his conditions of existence because of 
its disqualification of human creativity and initiative. 29 Tun~, in a series of articles 
tried to show that intellect [read reason], which was based on the concepts of 
uniformity, quantity, unity, immobility, existence, absoluteness, causality and 
25 Ulken, "Descartes ve Skolastik," (Descartes and Scholastics) Istanbul. (May l, 1946), pp. 6-8. See also Olken, 
"Fikir Ananesi," (The Tradition of Thought)~ 1,4 (July 15, 1938), p. 282, --Ferd ve Cemiyet," pp. 57-65. 
26 Olken,"Fransiz ihtilali ve Eski Rejim," pp 3-5. 
27 Safa, "Diinya'da lnsan Var MI?" p.4; Dlken, ·'lslamiyette Eski Dinlerin izleri," (The Traces of Old Religions 
in Islam) istanbul, (July l, 1946), p. 5. 
28 Safa, "Y eni Bir Diinyaya Hasret." 
29 See Safa, Felsefi Buhran. For the significance ofNietz.che's irrationalism., see Safa, "Hakikat Buhram," (The 
Crisis ofTruth) Her Ay, (March 20-April 20, 1937), pp.60-73. See also Safa, ·-ideaisiz Adami <;:eviren Bo~luk," 
(Hollowness Surrounding the Man Without an Ideal) Cmaralti, 47 (Augwt 15, 1942), p.5, "Diinyarun Muht.acr 
Oldugu Nizam," (The Order Which World is in Need of) Cumhurivet. (October 11, 1939), "Milliye~iligin 
Birkatt Hakikatl," p.5, "Vatan ve Ahlak," (Homeland and Morality) Cmaralll. 34 (March 21, 1942), P- 5. 
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necessity, time, space, and essence, could be not infused to the deep layers of 
becoming. 30 
Traditionalist conservative circles attempted to show that a new 
consciousness on the dynamics of Western civilization was also emerging in the 
Western countries from the criticisms of positivism and rationalism. In this respect, 
Olken argued that the old rationalist conception of science, which was developed 
by the nineteenth-century positivist and later came to be considered as part of the 
governing human ethos by acquiring greater authority through discoveries in 
natural sciences, had come to an end in the West. 31 There was a new West 
emerging from criticisms of rationalism and scienticism which also promised for 
rebirth and renewal. The old West, which had been characterized by scienticism 
was challenged because it reduced human reality to an epiphenomenon and a 
creature of Reason. 32 
Focusing on the concepts of plurality, quality, change, dynamism, mobility, 
becoming, real and experienced time, possibility, freedom, latent potentiality, 
power, and self, as constitutive-terms of a philosophico-political perspective, 
traditionalist- conservative intellectuals aimed to provide a genuine radical 
"nationalist-culturalist" stand in Kemalist modernism. Nationalist-culturalist 
approach, as reflected by Safa in his Turk Inkzlabma Bakz#ar (Glances at the 
Turkish Revolution) would save Kemalist modernism from being a pure model of 
Westernization. 33 According to the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, none of 
the models of modern society, be they based on economic industrial organization, 
30 See Tunir, ''Alu! Romantizmi,'' "Alu! ve Hayat" (Reason and Lite) Cumhurivet, (July 12, 1942), "Alu! ve 
Ilim" (Reason and Science) Cumhuriyet, (July 19, 1942), "Aki! ve Sezgi," (Reason and Intuition) Cwnhuriyet, 
(July 26, 1942), .. Alulc1hgm Kuvvet ve Zaaflan." 
31 Oiken,"Hangi Batt?" pp. 185-6, ·'fikir Ananesi," pp. 281-4. 
32 Olkcn "1nsam Vatanc1hk." (Humanist Patriotism) Millkiye. 1-9 (December, 1931), p. 7. Also see 01.ken, 
·'ilim BitarafM1drrT (ls Science Objective)) insan, 1,7 (December I, 1938), p. 458; Safa, ''Biz Avrupah M1y1z?" 
(Are We European?) Cmaralt1. 59 (November, 7, 1942), p. 4, "Bu Dilnyamn Derdi Nedir?" (What is the Problem 
of this World?) Cumhuriyet. (August 31, 1939). See also Safa, ''Sezi~. Tahlil ve Riyaziye," (Intuition, Analysis 
and Mathematics) Ktiltur Haftas1, 13 ( April 8, 1936), pp. 247-258, "Ast! Harp," (The Real War) Hafta. 
(December 26, 1934), "Ilim ve Devlet" (Science and State) quoted in Yeni Adam, 576 (January IO, 1946), p.IO; 
Tunir. "Neden Yanihyoruz,'' (Wny are We Mistaking?) Cumhuriyet. (December 14, 1941 ); Baltac1oglu, 
"Maarifte Tiirke Dogru.," (Towards the Turk in Education) Yeni Adam, 382 (April 23, 1942), p. 2, "Bat1ya 
Dogru.·· (Towards the West) Yeni Adam, 568 (November 15, 1945), pp. 2, 11. 
33 Safa., TOrk Inkilabma Bak1slar. pp. 90-103 
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political structures, and artistic values, could be derived or imitated from Western 
prototypes. 34 Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals wished to free Kemalism 
from being merely an "ideology of the new." Kemalist modernism had to be re-
evaluated in the light of a coherent philosophical system. Thus, in order to prevent 
alienation, traditionalist-conservative intellectuals tried to formulate a holistic 
approach to the questions of religion, morality, civic education, politics, economy, 
law and science. 
Nevertheless, without any exception, traditionalist-conservative intellectuals 
had already accepted the Kemalist nation-state rather than a state based on the 
universal brotherhood of the Muslim communities. They also embraced most of the 
cultural policies of the Kemalist state, at least those which showed the willingness of 
the ruling elites to find historical roots for their vision of modernity. In this sense, 
traditionalist-conservative creed to conserve aimed to preserve the existing institutions 
shaped in the structures of modernity, namely the nation state and capitalism. 
Reactionary Islamism, liberal cosmopolitanism and socialism were perceived to be the 
explicit threats to the existing Kemalist nation-state. 
• 
Hybrid Organicism 
In order to ground varying responses of the traditionalist conservatives against the 
politics of rationalism of the Kemalist scientific state, we must consider the impact of 
vitalist-organic metaphor within Bergsonian framework on their 
thinking. 35 Dlken in his V arllk ve 01~ (Being and Becoming) pointed out that in his 
books A~k Ah/ala (Piety Ethics) and insani Vatanperver/ik (Humanist Patriotism) he 
34 Ibid., pp. 185-231, Also Baltac1oglu, Tilrke Dogru (Towards the Turk), 3rd ed. (Ankara: Atatiirk Koltilr 
Merkezi Yaymlan, 1994 [1942] ). The book was compiled from various articles published by the beginning of 
the 1940s. See also Tunir, "Yeni Medeniyetle Tarih Arasmda," (Between New Civilization and History) Fikir 
Sohbetleri (Intellectual Conversations) (lstanbul: Olku Basunevi, 1948), pp. 167-203. Also Olken, "Tanzimata 
~t," (Against the Tanzimat) lnsan. 1,1(April15, 1938), pp. 20-8, "Tanzimat ve HUmanizma," (The Tanzimat 
and Hwnanism) insan, 1, 9 (February l, 1939), pp. 689-94. 
35 Baltactoglu, "Felsefenin Metodu," (The Method of Philosophy) 155 Yeni Adam, (December 17, 1936), p.14, 
"Psikoloji," (Psychology) Yeni Adam 492 (June I, 1944), pp. 2,11. For a short note on the significance of 
Durkheim and Bergson, see Baltac1oglu, "Bir Burjuva Alimi hni~ Emile Durkheim," (Emile Durkheim Was Said 
to Be a Bourgeois Scientist) Yeni Adam. 122 (April 3, 1936), p.3. See also Olken, "Sosyolojinin Mevzuu ve 
UsulU," (The Method and Subject Matter of Sociology) Oil. Tarih ve Cografya Fakiltesi Dergisi. 1,1 (1942), pp. 
6-11, Umumi ictimaiyat (General Sociology) (lstanbul: EbU.'z Ziya Matbaas1, 1931); Safa, "Felsefe ve 
Milliyet~ilik," (Philosophy and Nationalism) <;maralti. 41 (July 4, 1942), p.5, "Sosyoloji ve Milliyetirilik," 
(Sociology and Nationalism) <;maraln. 35 (May 23, 1942), p. 5. 
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was interested in epistemology to provide a pluralist conception of universe. 36 In these 
works he reflected a kind of psychologism and took passions as the basis of knowledge 
and truth.37 By the mid-l 930s. he realized the shortcomings of psychologism in 
philosophy and started to tum to phenomenology and theories of probability. The 
effects of the former could be seen in his insani J atanpen1erlik. By the mid- l 940s, he 
held a closer stand to the philosophies of Schelling and Husserl. 38 Although, Olken 
was heavily inspired by phenomenology, Baltaetoglu was inspired by Durkheimian 
sociology while controversially remammg Bergsonian m his philosophical 
commitments. 39 Among the traditionalist conservatives, as noted before, only Turn; 
was an adherent of a pure Bergsonian framework while Safa adopted it as a 
philosophical horizon for his conservative literature. 40 
Tun9's Bergsonian contention was imported into traditionalist-conservative 
vocabulary to depict the vital creative forces responsible for changes in society.41 
Organic analogy, for which Tun~'s Yarat1c1 irade Meselesi stands as an example, was 
linked to questions of vitality, dynamism, creativity and to the role of folk spirit in 
maintaining this creativity and dynamism.42 Tun~ illustrated the distinctiveness of his 
organism from the pure organic theories as follows: 
Nature, which is conceptualiz.ed as an organism is not the same with what the precedents 
conceptuali7.ed as an already constructed being; it is a living being which progresses with 
its own means. The sphere of history benefited from such a change in the 
conceptualization of nature, more than the sphere of nature. In this respect, history takes 
place not by shakes but by a calm march, not by artificial thinking but by unconscious 
compulsions, and not by the actions of individuals but by the force of a whole. The 
36 Olken, Varlik: ve Olus (Being and Becoming) (Ankara: Ankara Dniversitesi Basunevi, 1968), p. I. 
37 Idem. He stated that he adopted a kind ofpsychologism in Umumi Ruh~val (General Psychology) and Cemiyet 
ve Marazi $uur (Society and the Pathological Consciousness) which were published in 1928 and 1930, respectively. 
38 .. .. . 
Ulken, Varlik: ve Olus. pp. l-3. Also see Ulken, Ask Ahlaki (Piety Ethics) (Istanbul: Ekpress Matbaas1, 
1931 ), insani Vatanperverlik (Hwnanist Patriotism) (istanbul, Gtin~ Matbaas1, 1933). 
39 See Baltac1oglu, «Yeni Tefrikanuz,·' (Our New Feuilleton) Yeni Adam, 225 (April 20, 1938), p. 2. 
~ For an analysis of Bergsonism in the pre-Republican era, see Dlken, To.rkiye'de Cagdas DUstince Tarihi 
(History of Contemporary Thought in TW'key), 3rd ed. (1stanbul: Olken Yaymlan, 1992), pp. 375-82. See aslo 
Tune;, Bergson ve Manevi Kudrete Dair Birkac Konferans (Several Conferences on Bergson and the Spiritual 
Will) (istanbul: A. Halit Kitabevi, 1933). Also Henry Bergson, Yarattc1 Tekamiil (Creative Evolution), trans. by 
Tune;, (istanbul: Milli Egitim Bas1mevi, 1947). For two books written under the influence of Bergsonian 
metaphysics, see Tune;, lnsan. Ruhu Uz.erinde Gezintiler (Voyages on Human Spirit) (lstanbul: Cumhuriyet 
Bas1mevi, 1943 ), Fikir Sohbetleri. 
41 See Tune;, ··Yarallct irade Meselesi," pp. 44-8. See also Olken, "Ferd ve Cemiyet," pp. 57-65. For tilken's 
evaluations on the significance of Bergsonian criticism of mechanism, see Olken, "Bergson' a Dair Y eni Bir 
Kitap," (On a Book On Bergson) insan, 2, 12 (May 8, 1939), p.1006. 
42 Tune;, "Yarallc1 irade Meselesi;' pp. 44-8. See also Olken "Tanzimat ve HUrnanizma," pp. 689-94. 
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extension of this approach to state. law. language, etc .. provided a purer, more prolific 
and wider positivity about the totality. and formed a tighter and calmer contact between 
man and existents. Hence. due to the need to internalize the thing rather than to dominate 
it the tendency to perceive law as a product of national spirit rather than to inculcate law 
h "edede ·B as gam er nee. 
Tun9 also pointed out parallels between mechanist conception of nature and atomistic-
rationalist individualist conception of society and added that 
... struggle against organicist theory comprises the principal factor of leaps towards 
freedom and lucidity. Because the imperative of the life of new times is to give freedom to 
the individual in economic and political spheres. England leads the way in this 
movement. It seems that England. which has thus conceptualized life directly on the basis 
of individual. is certain of her future progress. \\<ith respect to power, reason and truth. 
Here. all interactions among man are perceived as the works of individuals and the 
legitimacy of this action is assumed to be based on individual consent. This means that 
we really departed from organicist theory. Mechanical explanation of nature in the new 
times is in this way. The importance of the preceding artistic worldviews became 
incomprehensible ... This mechanical perception is in both conscious and direct contrast to 
the preceding style of thinking. Because it takes parts as the essence and aims to construct 
everything on them; it distinguishes the continuity provided by space, time and movement 
in clear amounts and only by this way gives a clear understanding of events. 44 
In these quotations a typical traditionalist-conservative reasoning reveals itself models 
deduced from positive sciences, which govern the material world, could not be 
employed to understand the organic nature of society. 45 
Traditionalist-conservative and progressive/rationalist controversy in the early 
Republican era was mostly observed in newly developing fields of philosophy and 
human sciences. This controversy had also had severe political repercussions. 
Philosophy, as compared to positive sciences, gained a privileged stand, m 
traditionalist-conservative vocabulary. It was celebrated as the "knowledge of 
knowledge."46 In Baltac1oglu's words: 
Philosophy emerges when we ask "what is?" instead of "how it happens?" The aim of 
philosophy is not to find the laws of reality but to find the absolute being of reality. 
Science utilizes mathematical logic, here in philosophy, artistic logic works. Work of 
43 Tun9, "Mekanik ve Organik Davalanrun Yeni Zamanda GC9irdigi Sathalar," (The Stages of the Questions of 
Mechanics and Organic in Modem Age) Cwnhuriyet, (September 20, 1942); Safa, ''Felsefe ve Milliyet'<ilik," p. 
5, "Sosyoloji ve Milliyet9ilik," p. 5. See also Tun9, "Yarat1c1 irade Meselesi," p. 47. 
44 Tun9, "Mekanik ve Organik Davalan," (The Questions of Mechanics and Organic) Cwnhuriyet, (September 
13, 1942). 
45 For an account of the organic relations in society, see Balt&..·10g!u, "Y0netim Kor.mu," (Administrative Theory) 
Yeni Adam, 441 (Jtme IO, 1943), p. 2; TW!'<, .. Mekanik ve Organik Davalannm Yeni Zamanda G~irdigi Sathalar," 
Mekanik ve Organik Davalannm Kiymetleri ve Bunlardan Almacak Dersler," (The Value of the Questions of 
Mechanics and Organic and the Lessons to be Dra\W From These) Cwnhuriyet. (September 27, 1942), 
"'Hakikatte H~yin Ma<lde Oldugu iddias1," (The Claim that Everything is Matter in Reality) Cwnhurivet. 
(December IO, 1944 ); Safa, "Felsefe ve Milliyetyilik," p. 5. Dlken claimed that society was not a rational 
artifact, see CJlken ·'Hurltlk ve Mesulluk," (Freedom and Responsibility) istanbul. (October l, 1946 ), pp. 2-4. 
46 See Tun9, "Felsefe,'' (Philosophy) Felsefe Ytlhg1. l (1932), pp. 131-6. 
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abstractionism which is pursued by the mathematical intelligence of the scientist is 
named as "law". Work of ~nthesis which is pursued by the philosopher is called as 
system. Science is the knowledge of laws which are derived from reality: philosophy is a 
-H 
system of knowledge founded on la\\-S. 
It was through philosophical inquiry that the Republican secular metaphysics of life 
would be drawn up. Thus, Baltac1oglu pointed out that the objectives of philosophy 
were to understand the whole: to harmonize the tensions; to view reality as an 
organism, and to provide answers to "what" questions. The relevant method for 
modem philosophical inquiry, for Baltacmglu, as well as Turn;: and other traditionalist-
conservative figures, would be intuition in the Bergsonian sense . .is Tuny referred the 
same point in his Fikir Sohbetleri (Intellectual Conversations) and in Akli ve Sezgi 
(Reason and Intuition).49 
Philosophy, as a new form of Republican metaphysics, gained much of its 
importance in traditionalist-conservative vocabulary since it represented Man's free 
attempt to reconstruct and to understand the human world without referring to an 
eternal holy source. so Indeed, Baltac1oglu in his Felsefenin Mevzu Nedir? (What is the 
Subject Matter of Philosophy?) pointed out that the subject matter of philosophy was 
Man's place in the universe. Accordingly, human being was a synthesis of material, 
spiritual, psychological and social phenomena. To understand human being was also to 
understand the organic whole, the universe. 51 In other words, ontology, as detailed in 
Ulken's Varlzk ve Olu~, which stands for mankind's distinctive existence in universe, 
was the legitimate subject of Republican philosophy. s2 Baltac1oglu and Ulken tried to 
demonstrate that the development of philosophical analysis- as a secular mode of 
thought - also strictly depended upon human being's capacity to free himself from 
47 Baltac1oglu, "Felsefeye Dogru," (Towards the Philosophy) Yeni Adam, 499 (July 20, 1944), pp. '.UL See 
also Baltac1oglu, Felsefe (Philosophy) (istanbul: Sebat Basrmevi, 1938). 
48 Baltac1oglu, "Felsefe Nedir?" (What is Philosophy?) Yeni Adam. 152 (November 26, 1936), p.14; Twu;:, 
·'Felsefe ilirn Arasmda," (Between.Philosophy and Science) Fikir Sohbetleri, pp. 53-9. 
49 Tun~, ·'Mad£1e ve Ruh Arasmda," (Between Matter and Spirit) Fikir Sohbetleri, pp.161-6. For an earlier note, 
see Tun~, "Alai ve Sezgi." · 
so Baltac1og.lu, '"Felsefenin Problemi," (The Problem of Philosophy) Yeni Adam. 159 (January 14, 1937), p.14 
51 Baltac1oglu, "Felsett:nin Mevzu Nedir?" (What is the Subject Matter of Philosophy?) Y eni Adam 154 
(December 10, 1936), p. 14. See also Dlken, "Zaman ve lnsan," (Time and Man)~ 2, 12 (May 8, 1939), pp. 
989-92. 
51 .. 
- See Ulken, Varllk ve Olus, pp. 94-111. 
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scholasticism, 53 for which the new Republic stood as its monument. In Baltac1oglu' s 
words: 
Like Koran. religious books pro\·ided assumptions on the quality of life. its beginning. its 
end. nature of man. Are Mohammed. Christ. Moses not philosophers? Answer : No. 
because their thoughts are not the work of thinking but of religious faith.~~ 
In this respect, philosophy meant human capacity to grasp the universe and its organic 
totality, dynamism, mobility and creativity. 55 Originality, irrationality, and intuition, for 
Baltac10glu, were the characteristics of the organic totality implied by culture, or what 
the German romantics called as Volksgeist, on which the worldly perspective of 
Republican philosophy would be grounded. Then, in his words, 
. . . National renaissance will start by the time this essence of national philosophy is 
found... Philosophy of life of the people is among the inexhaustible sources national 
philosophy as traditions. 56 
In a similar vein, Tun~ praised philosophy as a means of finding out the creative 
essence of culture, namely the folk spirit. 57 Folk spirit implied quality against quantity; 
creativity and spontaneity against durability; and freedom against enslavement. 
Baltac10glu had further elaborated this point of view in Ha/ledilecek En Buyiik 
Problem/er (Major Problems to be Solved) Accordingly, 
for centuries we accumulated fragments of philosophy from Greece, Arabia and Europe. 
This philosophy of intellectuals has never extended into the people... Again, when this 
people lived, won, created, it utiliz.ed not the literary philosophy of intellectuals. but the 
living, collective philosophy of the congregatists and gained victory. When will we begin 
to search for this philosophy of people of which origin is as old and eternal as nation? Is 
not the fact that our mythologies, fairy tales, epical heroes are sufficiently alive to provide 
our national philosophy enough to comprehend evolution? 58 
53 Baltac1oglu, "FeylozofKimdir?" (Who is a Philosopher?) Yeni Adam. 153 (December 3, 1936), p. 14; Ulken, 
"'tnsan Sevgisi," (Philanthropy) tnsan, 2, 15-7 (August 15-17, 1941), pp. 1-3. 
54 Baltac1oglu, "FeylozofKimdir?" p. 14. See Tum;: "Felsefo," pp. 131-6. 
55 Tum;, "Akll ve Sezgi;' "Tfirkiye·de Felsefo," (Philosophy in Turkey) 1§. III/2 (1937), pp. 25-34. See also Safa, 
"Sezi~, Tahlil ve Riyaziye," pp. 247, 258, "Felsefe ve Milliyet~ilik," p. 5; Baltac1oglu, "Felsefe Nedir," p. 14, 
·'Feylozof Kimdir!" p. 14, ·'felsefonin Mevzu Nedir'?" p. 14, "Felsefenin Metodu," p. 14, ''Feylozof ve 
Sosyetesi," (Philosophy and His Society) Yeni Adam. 156 (December 24, 1936), p.14, "Felsefe Doktrinleri," 
(Doctrines of Philosophy) Yeni Adam. 157 (December 31, 1936), p.14, "Felsefenin Problemi," p.14, "Felsefenin 
Tarihi," (History of Philosophy) Yeni Adam. 161(January28, 1937), p. 14, '"Bilgi Teorisi IX," (Epistemology 
IX) Yeni Adam. 162 (February 4, 1937), pp. 14-5, ·'Bilgi Teorisi X," (Epistemology X) Yeni Adam, 163 
(February 11, 1937), pp. 14, 15, "Bilgi Teorisi XI," (Epistemology XI) Yeni Adam, 164 (February 18, 1937), p. 
14, "thne Dogru," p. 2, "Felsefeye Dogru," p. 2. 
56 Baltac1oglu, "Felsefede Tilrke Dogru," (Towards the Philosophy in Turkey) Yeni Adam. 367 (December 8, 
1942), p.2. 
57 Tun~, ''Tfirkiye'de Felsefe," pp. 25-34. 
58 Baltac1oglu, "Halledilecek En Biiyii.k Problemler," (Major Problems to be Solved) Yeni Adam. 379 (April 2, 
1942), p. 2. 
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Safa, T un9, Baltac1oglu and Ulken all adopted in varying degrees, what can be 
called as a 'hybrid organic metaphor' to serve conservative aims against positivist 
scientism which penetrated many fields of inquiry, such as history and sociology, as 
well as philosophy studies in the early Republican era. 59 As noted beforehand, early 
organic themes in traditionalist-conservative works had been inspired from Bergson's 
life philosophy and developed in opposition to the triumph of radical positivist scientist 
Kemalist We/tanshauung. Turn;:, in line with Ulken, and Safa, had pointed out the 
logical consequences of Kemalist rationalism. 60 Accordingly, modem liberal 
democracies were ultimately based on atomistic philosophies which saw society as an 
aggregate of free rational agents. It meant that society would be reduced to an artifact 
constituted on a rational social contract between the free rational individuals.61 Safa 
backed Tun9's criticism of individualism and explained vitalist organism. In his words: 
We witness the victories ofthis approach (vitalist) also in social revolutions. Mechanical 
approach of individualistic liberalism, which perceives societies to be comprised of 
mathematical collectivity of individuals and which is based on a principle of quantity is 
being destroyed; and the comprehension of societies not as artificial constructs of parts 
formed by human will which is the case for machinery, but as natural beings of which 
parts come into being simultaneously as organs and progress under the command and in 
the direction of the whole. 62 
Thus, Kemalist Revolution, for the traditionalist-conservative intellectual, had to be 
based on different precepts on society than that of liberal-individualist W estem 
societies. For Tun9, organic metaphor had a significance to understand Kemalism since 
it referred to the "totality," in contrast to the "particularity;" Thus, Tun~ illustrated the 
distinctiveness ofKemalism as follows: 
59 See Dlken, "Tiirkiye'de ldealizm Tema~iilti," (The Trend of Idealism in Turkey) lnsan. 2, 12 (May 8, 1939), 
p. 935. For dynamic organism, see OU::en, "Ferd ve Cemiyet," pp. 61-5; Safa "Sosyoloji ve Milliyet\:ilik," p. 5, 
"Felsefe ve Milliyetirilik," p. 5. 
60 Tuniy, "Milliyet ideali ve Topyekun Milli Terbiye,"' (The Ideal of Nationality and National Education in All) 
Cumhurivet. (April 5. 1943). 
61 Idem. See also Safa "Vatan ve Altlak," p. 5, "Felsefo ve Milliye~lik," p, 5. For Dlken's criticisms of social 
contract theories, see Dlken ,"Hiirltik ve Mesulluk, "p. 2-4. 
62 Safa, "Felsefe ve Milliyeti;ilik.," p. 5~ Dlken, "Biz.de TUrk\:Ulogu Gecil.."tiren Sebepler - Do~u - Buyuytilju" p. 
3. Dlken views liberalism as a philosophy of anarchy. See also Dlken, "HUrlo.k ve Mesullo.k," pp. 2-4. According 
to Baltac10glu ··a sociecy" is "'a separate living entity fonned hy human communities which both have unity of 
culture and civiliz.ation." See Baltac1oglu, Sosyoloji, p. 15. Also Baltac10glu, "Dunna, Yarat," (Do Not Stop, 
Create!) Yeni Adam. 348 (August :!8. 1941 ), p.2. According to Tun\:, Kemalism rejected atomistic individualist 
conception of society and atTmned that society was an organic totality, see Tunir, "Milliyet ldeali ve Topyekun 
Milli Terbiye." Also see Tun\:, "'Yarat1c1 irade Meselesi," pp. 44-8. 
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After revolutions of Communism, Kemalism. National Socialism and Fascism had paved 
the way for perceiving democratic societies not as "compiles of atoms" but as "indivisible 
totality". "unique organ" and for realizing regime and ideals accordingly. it was natural to 
observe differences in the educational system. Because a world which was divided into 
"particularistic" and "holistic" parts had come into being and at the same time in the face 
of a materialistic humanism. a series of sizable collectivities which had not yet found their 
national personalities tended first to realize maturity and then to participate in the 
international cooperation securely. 63 
Yet, Tum; like Safa did in Gazete, Halk ve HiikUmet (Daily, People and the 
Government) also pointed out the pathologies of pure and vulgar organicism which 
could result in the enslavement of men and loss of their liberties as follows: 
However. we pointed at the fact that organicist theory which is perceived to be more 
appropriate in our time, especially for society. has also some parts which should be 
considered in detail. This theory aims to inculcate an ethical character into social life: 
however while pursuing this aim it is prone to the risk of comprehending ethical 
character as something static which may lead to the tendency to perceive free and original 
activities as unnatural. Hence. it should be repeated that new organicist worldview should 
be conscious. intelligent and creative and consider social justice with special care. 64 
In a similar vein, Safa added that 
For the writer who perceives national unity as a social organism, while avoiding vulgar 
organicism (i.e., not identifying human society with human body) ... there is no 
recognition of clash of principles between the people and the government... By 
• 
metaphorical thinking they can be perceived as bound by the laws of the functional unity 
between the body and head of the social structure. 65 
Safa has further questioned individualist ethos behind liberalism, which, for him, turned 
society "into a mechanical mass but not to an organic totality. A mass solely behind the 
ideals of earning money and living in luxury .... '766 Tum; affirmed that economic and 
political freedoms and rights were the pillars of the modem life. However, classical 
organism, which grants priority to the totality before its parts, had to be reevaluated 
while retaining its solidarist and communal spirit. 67 Moreover, Safa, in line with Tun~ 
and Ulken, as it had been revealed in Yirminci Aszr Filozoflarz (The Twentieth Century 
Philosophers) pointed out that vulgar organism tended to see the society as an entity 
63 Tum;, "Milliyet tdeali ve Topyekun Milli Terbiye," See also Olken, "Hiirliik ve Mesulluk," pp. 2-4. For 
Safa·s criticisms of liberalism, see Safa, ··DOnyarun Muhta~ Oldugu Nizmn," "Bu Dilnyarun Derdi." 
64 Tum;, ··Mekanik ve Organik Davalanrun Klymetleri ve Bunlardan Almacak Dersler." For Tunry·s assessment 
on the creative nature of We, see TW)\:, "Yarat.Ic1 irade Meselesi.," pp. 44-8. See also Safa, "Gazt:te, Halk ve H!lkUmet," 
(Daily, People and the Government) Tasvir'i Etkar. quoted in Yeni Adam. 414 (December 2, 1942), p. 9. 
65 Safa "Gazete, Halk ve Htikilmet," p. 9 Also Safa, "insan Yok, Millet Var," p.5. 
66 Safa, "Milli Birlik ve Ahlak,"' (National Unity and Ethics) Ctnaraltl. 60 (November 14, 1942), p. 4. See also 
Safa, ·•Milli Cemiyetlerde ideal," p.5, "Milli Ahlak,"' (The National Ethics) Cmaralti. 42 (July 11, 1942), p.5, 
"Ekonomi ve Milliyett;:ilik," (Economy and Nationalism) Cmaralt1. 36, (May 30, 1942), p.5, ··i~da!m ve 
Kahraman" (The Businessman and the Hero) Cmaralt1, 43 (July 18, 1942), p.5, "insan Yok, Millet Var," p.5. 
67 Tun~. "Mekanik ve Organik Davalanrun Ktymetleri ve Bunlardan Almacak. Dersler." 
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subject to "laws of nature. "68 He added that he was not among those who tended to 
think that the laws of biology, which became a source of inspiration for the classics of 
the organic school, could absolutely be applied to understand social dynamics. 69 
Though historically, organism was a vigorous challenge raised against mechanism, 
"vulgar organism,'' for Safa, provided a philosophical prologue for authoritarian one party 
regimes. 70 He followed a strategy of reconciliation and made emphasis on "functions" to be 
performed by different parts of an organism [read society]. Accordingly, 
functionalist approach perceives society neither as a machine nor an organ. Accordingly, 
society is a system of mutual interaction among individuals. However. it is also a genuine 
whole. over and above individuals. In contrast to what mechanists assume it is not the 
mechanical and mathematical sum of individuals. This group has less agreement \\'ith 
. . 71 
orgamc1sts. 
This functionalist emphasis assumed to provide a middle way since it supposed to 
eliminate the extremes of organicism and mechanist-liberalism which would either lead 
to authoritarianism and/or totalitarianism and anarchy, respectively. 72 
Generally, traditionalist conservatives adopted a hybrid vocabulary of 
organicism to show that society was not a rational construct. Yet, they were aware of 
the fact that pure organicism would also hinder the self-realization individual as in the 
case of Gokalp's solidarism. Hybrid organicism, on the one hand, implied that society 
has its own potentials of spontaneous creativity and vitality. 73 Moreover, moral 
freedom of the individual could not also be defended through mechanist-determinist 
approaches to life. 74 In this traditionalist-conservative way of reasoning, organic-
68 Olken, Yinninci Asrr Filozot1an (The Twentieth Century Philosophers) (1stanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1936), pp. 
357-74. 
69 Safa, "Biyoloji ve Milliyet'rilik," (Biology and Nationalism) Cmaralt1. 38 (June 13, 1942), p.5. 
70 Safa, "Felsefe ve Milliyetryilik, '' p.5. 
71 Safa, "Sosyoloji ve Milliyet'rilik," p.5, '·Ziya Gokalp ve Durkheim," (Ziya GOkalp and Durkheim) 58 
CmaraltI, (November 31, 1942), p. 4. 
72 Safa, "Ziya Gokalp," Cmaralti. 12 (November 23, 1942), p.5. For his criticisms of Gokalp's societalism, see 
Olken, Ziya Gokalp (tstanbul: Ahmet Said Matbaas1, 1942), "Destan ve insan," (M~th and the Human Being) 
insan, 22 (April, 1943), p.5. See also Baltac1oglu, "Cevaplar:' (Answers) Yeni Adam, 400 (August 27, 1942), 
pp. 1 I. Also see Baltac10glu, Ziva Gokalp (istanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1966); Tunry "Uim Bakundan Ahlak," 
(Morality in Tenns of Science) Cumhuriyet, (June 23, 1942). For characterization of life as a bulk of tensions, 
see Tunry, "Bergson'un Gtilme Nazariyesine Dair," (On Bergson's Theory ofLaughing) Cumhurivel (March 15, 1945). 
73 Ulk- kl . 
·en, "Descartes ve S o astik," pp. 6-8. 
74 See Tun'<, "t~ Ben ile D1~ Ben Arasmda," (Between Inner Self and Outer Self) Fikir Sohbetleri. pp. 129-38. 
Also see Tun~, "Zamanumzda Ahlak Meselesi," ''Eski ve Yeni Diinya Go~lerimiz," "Ahlakhhgm <;e~itleri ve 
Zamarurmzm Ahlak1," (Types of Virtue and Ethics of Our Age) Cumhuriyet, (March 28, 1943 ). For Olken · s 
assessment on freedom and tolerance, see Olken "Demokratik Cemiyetlerde ileri Geri," (Back and Forth in 
Democratic Societies) lstanbul, (July 15, 1946), pp. 3-4. Also Olken, "Tiirkiye'de idealizm Temaytilii," p. 932. 
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vitalist ideas inspired from Bergsonism were not restricted only to challenging the 
positivist mechanism. In certain instances, they were employed to counter religious 
orthodoxy and metaphysics which in turn confirmed the legitimacy of the traditionalist-
conservative discourse on the side of Kemalism. 75 Turn;: further elaborated the 
question. In his words: 
Sciences of the Middle Ages. called as theology. had been content that it had constructed 
a world order on the basis of reason which could be considered as literary. Rationalist 
philosophies are also content \\'ith the prerequisite that the worldview they formulated 
should be literary. Titus. the common characteristic of all rationalist is found in their 
replacement of life by reason. However. life and reason are not identical. Life is directed 
not by holy concepts and reason. but by its own laws. 76 
Against the religious Islamic orthodox tradition that privileged Being over Becoming, 
unity over multiplicity, traditionalist-conservative vocabulary affirmed creative and 
multiform power oflife, which spontaneously gave rise to new cultural forms. 
This type of organic-vitalism imported in traditionalist-conservative discourse 
was also attractive to Kemalist secular progressives since it emphasized the necessity to 
mobilize culture. By defining life as a process of continuous and dynamic flux, 
traditionalist conservatism appeared to support the reform of old religious institutions. 
Thus, Ulken made a distinction between religion experienced in life and that of 
formulated in the book. He adopted a critical stand against orthodox Ke/am tradition 
which degraded the experienced religion. 77 Indeed, this kind of traditionalist-
conservative radicalism provided new grounds for Kemalist secular progressives who 
aimed to overthrow the decayed religious and social, political and economic 
institutions of the Ancient Ottoman regime. 78 Kemalist revolution, in Safa' s words, 
was "born from a hundred percent national exigencies,"79 and would be based on 
different ethical, political and economic principles, as compared to the preceding 
75 For a typical example, see TUI}\, "Kader ve KanUil." Also see TUil<;:, "Hakikatte Hen;eyin Mailiie Oldugu 
iddias1." See also Olken, ''Tiirkiye'de Pozitivizm Temaytilii," (The Trend of Positivism in Turkey) insan. 2, 11, 
(April 8, 1939), pp. 849-53, "Til.rkiye'de idealizm Temaytilii," pp. 929-38. 
76 TUil<;:, "Aki.Ive Hayat." See also Safa, "Hiimanizma ve Antigone," (Humanism and Antigone) Cmaralh. 46 
(August 8, 1942 ), p. 5. 
77 Ulken, ·'islmniyette Eski Dinlerin izleri,'' pp. 4-5. 
78 See Baltac10glu. 'Talim ve Terbiye'de Inlalap," (Revolution in Training and Education) Yeni Adam. 312 
(December 19, 1940), p. 2. 
79 Safa, Tiirk Inlalabma Baluslar, pp. 187-8. 
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Ottoman Regime. Baltac1oglu characterized the new society and its constitutive ethical, 
political principles as follows: 
Various characteristics distinguish Turkish society: 1. Laicism. 2. nationalism. 3 
industrialism. ~. populism. 5. statism. These thoughts are not dictates which grew out of 
the imaginative powers of a formulator of system. but the very self of our new life. Since 
ethical society imposes rules of life on individuals to sustain its living, our new society 
also requires a genuine new ethics. Revolution has to put forth the rules of this new ethics 
in all spheres and by all means. and to fight against its enemies. This imperative for its 
welfare and ultimate success: new mentality against the old mentality. new values against 
the old ones. new techniques against the old techniques; for me this is the holiest struggle 
of ethics of revolution. so 
Thus, traditionalist conservatism, which developed through Baltac1oglu's social-
psychology, Tun9's Bergsonian philosophy, Safa's conservative literature and Dlken's 
sociological approach, placed an interest in moral values as the ends of its ideological 
spectrum. A novel form of spiritualism, or at least a rejection of mechanistic-positivism, 
sketched by Olken in Tiirkiye 'de Pozitivizm Temayiilii (The Trend of Positivism in 
Turkey) was incorporated into traditionalist-conservative discourse.81 
Towards a Politics of Affection 
During the 1930s and 1940s, traditionalist conservatism was a broad intellectual 
tendency at the crossroads of competing intellectual traditions, such as idealism, 
pluralism, Bergsonism, vitalism, organicism and personalism. Yet, these intellectuals 
tried to offer a new vocabulary to Kemalism and to reconcile the deeply-rooted 
controversy between positivism and religious orthodoxy. 82 This peculiar traditionalist-
conservative position between the two opposing ideologies accounted for the 
complexity of their conception of the new moral national order. Ulken in Tiirkiye 'de 
Positivizm Temayiilii and Tiirkiye 'de jdealizm Temayiilii (The Trend of Idealism in 
Turkey) illustrated that Turkish intelligentsia was mainly divided into two opposing 
camps. 83 On one side, there was a scientific humanist approach imported by the 
rationalist ideals of the French Revolution. Proponents of this tradition advanced 
80 Baltacmglu, ·'Yeni Ahlak Yeni Fikirde Degil, Yeni Sosyetedir," (New Morality Lies not in New Idea But in 
New Society) Yeni Adam, 118, (April 2, 1936), p. 2. Baltac1oglu, "Felsefenin Problemi," p. 14, '·Eski ve Yeni, 
Olli ve Diri," (The Old and the New) Yeni Adam. 340 ( 3, July, 1941), pp. 2, 8-9; Twiy, "Zamarurmzda Ahlak 
Mesclesi." Safa, "Milli Ahlak,·· p.5. 
81 01.ken, "Tiirkiye'de Pozitivinn Temaytilu," pp. 849- 53. 
82 Ibid., p. 852. 
83 Ibid., pp. 849-53, ··rnrkiye'de tdealinn Temaytilu,·· pp. 929-38. 
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naturalistic positivist understanding of the society.84 On the other side, there was the 
religious orthodoxy aiming to preserve or reconstitute the spiritual heritage of the 
traditional Islamic cosmology. Turkish spiritualism, as labeled by Olken, was a latent 
ground for the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals who aimed to formulate a new 
philosophy of creation and to recapture the essential cultural norms and values 
responsible for the durability of the nation as a cultural-moral totality. 85 Safa further 
asserted that the possibility to revive a new Turkist spiritualism depended upon the 
defeat of the traditional Islamic orthodoxy which had been identified itself with the 
Ke/am school.86 Scientific humanism and religious orthodoxy in traditionalist-
conservative vocabulary, also denied the moral freedom of the individual. 87 Moral life 
of the nation could not be reduced to a system of external formal structures to be 
imposed on society, as in the cases of orthodox Islamism and/or vague positivism, 
since "there are not any refined concepts and logical laws which govern life but of only 
its own laws. "88 
Basing on the Bergsonian distinction between open and closed morality and 
static and dynamic religion, traditionalist-conservative circles strove to give an 
historical account of religion and morality.89 Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals 
aimed to formulate a purely philosophical understanding of a dynamic conception of 
84 See Safa, Tfirk lnkilabma Bakislar, pp. 208-12. See also Olken, '"llim BitarafMidrr?" pp. 458-62. 
85 See Olken, "Tanzimat ve Hiirnanizma," p. 691. Also see Olken, Tilrk Tefekkfir Tarihi (History of Turkish 
Thought), 2 vols. (Istanbul: Ebiiz'ziya Matbaas1, 1932, 1933), Tilrk Mistisizmi'ni Tetkike Giris (Introduction to 
the Study of Turkish Mysticism) (lstanbul: Ak~ Matbaas1, 1935), Tilrk Kozmolojisi, Tilrk Mitolojisi. Tfirk 
Hikmeti, Teknik Tefekkfir (Turkish Cosmology, Turkish Mythology, Turkish Wisdom and Technical Thought) 
(Ankara: ~vekalet Mudevvanat Basunevi, 1935). See also Ulken, Ahlak (Ethics) (Istanbul: Sadik Kagi.~1 
Basunevi, 1946), Tasavvuf Psikolojisi (Psychology of Sufism) (istanbul: Kenan Kitabevi, 1946). Also Dlken, 
"Bir Omilr Mii, Bir Jest Mi?" (A Life or a Gesture?) istanbul, (May 15, 1946), p. 3. For Baltac1oglu's emphasis 
on spiritualism, see Baltac1oglu, "Yeni Ahlak Yeni Fikirde Degil, Yeni Sosyetededir," p. 2, "Umanizma" p. 2. 
For a later assessment, see Baltac1oglu, "Uluslar-Dinler," (Nations-Religions) Y eni Adam, 640 (March 9, 1950 ), 
p. I For similar elaborations, see Safa, Tilrk inlalabma Baklslar, p. 188. Also Safa, "Milli Ahlak," p. 5. 
86 Safa, '"ilim ve Nazariye ~anhg1," (Enmity Against Science and Theory) Cmaralu. 55 (October 10, 1942), p.5. 
87 Baltac1oglu, Sosvoloji, pp. 117-22. For a later assessment, see Baltac1oglu, ''Alevilik ve Tilrklilk.," (Alawism 
and Turkishness) Yeni Adam, 640 (March 9,1950), p. 2. For an account on the question of human freedom in 
modem society, see Twu;:, "Bugiinkti Amerikan ~tincesi ve Dtinya Kurtul~u Tasavvuru," (Contemporary 
American Thought and the Imagination for the Liberation of the World) Cumhuriyet. (April 18, 1943). See also 
Safa, ··nim ve Nazariye Dti~manhy,'' p. 5; DI.ken, ''Tilrkiye'de ldealizm TemayillU," pp. 929-38. 
88 Turn;, "Akll ve Hayat," "Mekanik ve Organik Davalanrun K1ymetleri ve Bunlardan Almacak Dersler." 
89 For open and dosed morality, see Henry Bergson, The Two Sources ofMoralitv and Religion, trans. by R.A. 
Audra, C. Breton and W.H., (New York: Henry Holt, 1935). 
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morality. It can be seen as an attempt to shed light on the historical and psycho-social 
origins of morality and religion in modem society. This focus on the sources, nature, 
and development of morality and religion was also linked to the changing nature of 
obligations and social order in the transition from traditional community structure of 
the Ottoman era to the modem social structure of the Republic. Tuny in Ahlakhhgm 
(~e~itleri ve Zamamm1z Ahlak1 (Types of Virtue and Ethics of Our Time) said 
we comprehend that our ethics does not have to remain as an ethics of tradition and habit. 
and that we face with the responsibility of living and sustaining a voluntary ethics on the 
basis of the ideals and needs of the present time .... Thus. the ethics of the superior man is 
that which not only complies 'With the existing order. but also proposes death for the sake 
of ideals. This ethics which was exceptional, has become general and became an 
avoidable power which is represented by all the masses of people in the present world of 
revolutions... Current ethics aims to be creative. and to put justice and security over and 
above all values; it finds right in responsibility, and responsibility in the service to the 
public. It perceives work as the responsibility of everybody. 90 
What the traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia was trying to do was to 
understand the nature of new national ethics in constituting the moral content of 
citizen's obligations towards the nation state and the nation.91 Traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals emphasized both the uniqueness of cultural-moral order and 
social obligations without sacrificing freedom and free will. Distance from rationalism 
also shaped traditionalist-conservative conception of social obligation. Social obligation 
was seen as a form of belongingness where the national moral symbols would be 
cultivated. 92 Obligation was seen as the very social form of individual sense of 
belongingness and as the social bond primarily experienced by the members of the 
nation in their private lives. The nature of individual liberties and rights depended upon 
the means and methods through which social obligations were imposed by social and 
90 Tun\:, "Ahlaklibgm <;~idleri ve ZamarutillZlll Ahlala," "Mekanik ve Organik Davalanmn Kiymetleri ve 
Bunlardan Ahnacak Dersler." Also see Tun\:, "lnsanla ~ytan Arasmda," (Between Man and Devil) Fikir 
Sohbetleri, pp. 22-8. For Tun\:'s assessment on the societies' transition from closed to open moral systems, see 
Tun\:, "Yarat1c1 iiade Meselesi," p. 47. See also Dlken, "Bir Omilr Mu, Bir Jest Mi," pp. 3-4, "!slamiyette Eski 
Dinlerin izleri," pp. 4-5, "llimde Metod, ~tlnce de Aloi, Ahlakta Vicdan Dogru Yo! Gostericidir, Denir. Fakat 
Vicdan i\:in 01\:il Nedir?" (It is Said that Method in Science, Reason in Thought and Conscience in Ethics Show 
the Right Way. But What is the Criterion for Conscience) istanbul. (June I, 1946 ), pp. 3-4. 
91 Baltac1oglu, ·'Ahlakta Tilrke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Morality) Yeni Adam. 372 (February 12, l 942), p. 2, 
"Ahlak Vicdaru Nastl Dogar ve Ne l.aman Dogat!" (How and when Moral Conscience Emerges?) Y eni Adam. 389 
(June 11, 1942), p. 2, "Ahlak Buhraru," (The Crisis of Morality) Yeni Adam. 408 (October 22, 1942), p.2, "Tilrk Ahlak 
Gdenegi," (The Turkish Ethical Tradition) Yeni Adam. 434 (22 April, 1943), p.2, "Milli Ahlak Problemi," (The 
Problem ofNational Ethics) in TOrke Dogru, pp. 375-7. See also Olken "Hilrltik ve Mesulluk." pp. 2-4. 
92 .. .. .. 
For a typical conservative assessment, see Ulken '"Bir Omilr Mu, Bir Jest Mi," pp. 3-4. Also see Ulken, 
·'Hilrhik ve Mesulltik," pp. 2-4 
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political institutions. Social obligations, either imposed and legitimized in a religious 
framework or as universal standards of good imposed by the State, would have a limited 
effect on citizen if they were not voluntarily internalized by the members of the nation. 9' 
Traditionalist conservatives were critical of the justification of the obligations 
[read the new social order] purely on rational grounds, since some institutions, such as 
the state, which claimed to be the representative of reason, would remain purely a 
formal loyalty prioritizing institutions before the society and the individual. Here, the 
basic conservative concern becomes apparent: to prevent the consolidation of an 
enlightened egoism which would further pave way to the isolation of the state from the 
individual and society. Rationalist justification of national ethics, in traditionalist-
conservative vocabulary, would tum social obligation into a standard to be imposed on 
individuals from outside by state and/or other institutions. Rather than emphasizing the 
legality of the institutional structure that was based on the new ethics, they sought a 
pattern of leadership which would provide a model of action for the nation and 
individual, and would ultimately serve to display the new social and political good to be 
voluntarily and spontaneously internalized by the citizens. 
In this respect, charisma and charismatic leadership also emerged as a model of 
moral justification for social and/or political action. Charismatic leadership was held 
responsible for the development of a "morality of affection" since it derived its 
legitimacy through mirroring the public opinion. As mentioned earlier, charisma, which 
ultimately depended on a sense of affection but not on reason, was praised as the 
refined form of intuitive bond between the ruler and the ruled. 94 Charisma and the 
ethical bond, which it stood for, were the products of folk spirit in traditionalist-
conservative vocabulary, and were assumed to be the pillars of the new national order. 
In this line, unique national and authentic symbols of charisma and power, morality, 
93 Baltac1oglu, "Tilrk Inkdabiru Ni~in Severim?" (Why I Like the Turkish Revolution?) Yeni Adam, 247 
(September 21, 1939), p. 2, "Tilrk Nedir?" (What is Turk?) Yeni Adam, 364 (December 18, 1941), p.2, "Ahlak 
Vicdaru Ne Zaman ve Nasil Dogal'?" p. 2. In his Felsefi Buhron, Safa reforred to Neitzsche, Dilthey, Sinunel, 
Kcist.-rling and Husserl to outline his ~'riticisms of the philosophy of rationalism. See Safa, Felsefi Buhran. For 
Safa's point on the centrality of morality, as a sense of belongingness, see Safa, "Ayakiisti1 Cevap." 
94 For an assessment of public opinion, see Olk.en, ''himde Metod, ~once de Akil, Ahlakta Vicdan Dogru Yol 
Gostericidir, Denir. Fakat Vicdan i~in O!l;:u Nedir?" pp. 3-4. 
291 
and obligation were assumed to lead to a particular kind of national development. It, in 
fact, opened up the way for pushing religion and morality to a kind of nationalism and to a 
model of unique national development which could be tolerable by Kemalist state elites. 
Heroism and Appeal to Charisma: Politics in the Traditionalist-Consen1ative Agenda 
Bergsonism, for the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals in the Republican era, 
became the principal catalyst for the transformation of new national sensibilities and 
appropriation of a new modem reality as well as for understanding the nature of the 
new power relationship between the rulers and the ruled. 95 By the emergence of 
modem nation state and abolishment of the former Ottoman state, traditionalist-
conservative intelligentsia realized that a new world was emerging and placed a faith 
on this new order. 96 This nationalist and in some tones romantic sentiment was 
portrayed by DJ.ken as follows: 
Our freedom, happiness. art and morality are not an ideal thrown into an indeterminate 
emptiness. we are realizing the beauty, just, good in this soil.... There is no place for the 
enemies of the revolution and civilization as well as those currents in this nation. which 
will dissolve, break up and spoil the unity of culture. 97 
Ulken, who was affiliated with the Anatolist group in the 1920s, made fresh emphasis 
on the uniqueness of Anatolian Turkish culture. In his Destan ve insan (Myth and the 
Human Being), he implied this as follows: 
I have preferred to find out the humanity in Anatolian myths; to look at the ideal of 
present man through the lived experience, in other words, to deduce the abstract from the 
concrete against any kind of utopianism, abstract formalism or Don Quixotism. I have 
also succeed to rescue myself from the Don Quixotisms of "Islamic Unionism" 
Turanianism and even Ottomanism and Europeanisms, the keepsakes of the 
Reformation. 98 
In this context, Bergsonian philosophy not only provided an answer to the intellectual 
problems and disturbances of the traditionalist cooservatives by its criticism of abstract-
95 See Baltac1oglu ''Koy Egitmenleri ve Ogretmenleri," (Village, Instructors and Teachers) Yeni Adam. 240 
(August 3, 1939), p.16, "Milliyet Terbiyesi," (Education of Nationality) Yeni Adam. 229 (May 18, 1939), p.19, 
"Tabiat ve insan," (Nature and Human Being) Yeni Adam. 266 (February I, 1940), pp. 2,19, '"Ttirke Dogru," 
p.2, ''Tiirke Dogru Ve Milli Tiyatro Problemi," (Towards the Turk and the Question of National Theatre) Yeni 
Adam. 387 (May 28, 1942), p. 2. For Baltac1oglu's nationalism, see Dr. Bedi Ziya Egemen, '"Tiirke Dogru," 
(Towards the Turk) Yeni Adam. 430 (March 25, 1943), pp. 8-9,11. Olken pointed out that Bergson's basic 
concepts stimulated the development of new sensibilities among the Republican intellectuals. See Olken, "llim 
BitarafMldu?" pp. 460-1, "Biz.de Tiirk~iilugu Gecik1iren Sebepler-Dogu~u-Biiyii~ii," p. 3. 
96 For Bergsonian nationalists, see Olken. "Ycni ve Eski Mecmualar," (Old and New Journals) insan, 1,3 (June 
15, 1939), ·pp. 272-4. 
97 Olk.en, "Tiirk<;iilUk Anlayu~1rmz," (Our Understanding ofTurkism) istanbul.(March 15, 1946 ), p. 3. 
98 .. . 
Ulken, "Destan ve Insan," p. 5 
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rationalism but also gave a full and privileged place to the creative future imagination 
which had a crucial importance for the nation and state-builder elites aiming to secure 
the authenticity of the nation. 
Tum;: in line with his general traditionalist-conservative contentions, stressed 
that the political needs of the nation could not depend upon the "rational 
calculations"99 of the enlightened intelligentsia. Thus, he maintained that "the thing which 
the ruler and power will pay attention is to closely observe the conditions and necessities of 
the time and to act accordingly, in short to walk with the creativity of the life." 100 In a 
similar vein, Baltac10glu characterized the legitimate creative statecraft as follows: 
The dominant quality which makes the intellectual disposition of our National Chief 
arresting is this: this great man. when thinks on an economic, political and technical 
issue ... do not reduce the reality to simple abstract schemes .... on the contrary, he grasps 
the full reality .... This quality is the exclusive possession of great realist minds which 
have the capacity to manipulate the social life. We can call this .... realist mind. IOI 
This realist mind, for traditionalist-conservative intellectuals was a characteristic of the 
essence of Turkish folk spirit and the ruler had to mirror it. Accordingly, 
Lets research on the national characteristic of Turkish nation which mostly persists to the 
cataclysms of the time and space. What are these? 1) Realism in the world of reason 
Pantheism in the world of spirit 3) Creativity in the world of Will. I02 
In a similar vein, Safa assured the necessity to go beyond the models and procedures of 
law, administration and economics in order to create a new dynamic society. I03 Tune;, 
in line with Baltac10glu, argued that this realist mind was an antidote of abstractionism, 
formalism, and rationalist radicalism. Basing on examples drawn from the English case 
for realist politics and anti-radicalism, he added that 
this country (England) wants to stay aloof from the rigidity . . . Its opposition to rigid 
regimes and avoidance of making plans beforehand and adopting life to rational and 
abstract formula stems from this aloofness... There is an extensive belief in that English 
foresee the coming five decades in politics. Even if they have such an anticipation they do 
not follow this as the only method of work. They employ all their means only after they 
99 Twii,:, "Yaratlc1 trade Meselesi," p. 46. Baltac1oglu, "'Erkek ve Kadm,"' p 2, See Baltac10glu, "Demokrasisiz 
Vatan, Vatansiz Demokrasi,'' (Fatherland Without Democracy and Democracy Without Fatherland) Yeni Adam. 
626 (December 1, 1949), p. l. 
100 Tum1, ""lngiliz Karakteri," (The British Character) Cumhuriyet. (March 4, 1945). See Tun~, "Yarat1c1 trade 
Meselesi,'' p. 45. For criticism of radical rationalism, see Olken "Fransiz ihtilali ve Eski Rejim," pp. 3-5. 
IOI Baltac1oglu, "'lnonu'niin ~ahsiyeti," (inonii's Character) Yeni Adam. 265 (January 25, 1940), p.2. 
102 Idem., For similar assessments, see Tun~, ''Yaratlc11rade Meselesi,'' p. 45. 
103 Saia, "Bu Bir ihtilal Harbidir,'' (This is a Revolutionary War) Tasvir'i Eikar. (February 28, 1941 ). 
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experience actual occurrences. They perceive living in past as pedantry and living in 
future as fancy: and gather all their means in the state ofbeing. 104 
For the traditionalist conservative, creative statecraft derived its legitimacy from the 
creative spirit of the nation and would be based on realism and creationism in politics. 
Political leadership, for the traditionalist conservative, would act as the mirror 
of folk spirit. 105 Creative statecraft impied the need for effective leadership and 
charisma. The right to rule derived from the capacity of the charismatic leadership to 
represent the folk spirit. 106 Charismatic leadership was assimilated as a political 
technique as a means of reconciliation of individualism and societalism. This point had 
been illustrated by Safa as follows: 
Is the Great Man a God or a puppet? Neither God nor puppet! Is the Great Man a God or 
a puppet? Neither God nor puppet! Great man directs its ship to the horizons with the 
wind of history; in harmony with the waves of history preceding him he transcends them. 
Individualist approach which accrues all will to the captain ignores waves. extremist 
collectivist approach which accrues all will to waves ignores the captain .. 107 
In this respect, Baltac10glu typified the rule through charisma as follows: 
Who is the greatest statesman, who is the greatest revolutionist? According to me he is 
the one who intuitively knows, displays and conceptualizes the tremendous substance of 
the people which live in secrecy and unconsciously. Thus, regard of the Turkish Nation to 
its leader is not in the manner of the obedience of a timid mass towards a crude dictator. 
This regard is in the form of sympathy and respect of novel nation which possesses 
ethical values in its conscience to ethical authority. Despotism gives birth to fear; 
authority creates spiritual superiority. 108 
All in all, Atatiirk's charismatic leadership and inonii's National Chief cult embodied 
the patterns and language of political leadership for the traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals. Primary importance was granted to charisma since it also stood for the 
best form of experience and manifestation of intuitive knowledge in power game. Tun~ 
further illustrated this characteristic of charisma as follows: 
Reason is more restrictive. experimentalist and totalist. Experience awaits and breaks into 
pieces~ it proceeds step by step, avoids leaps. It is only intuition which proceeds with 
sudden bun;ts. and aims at transcending great periods of time in each leap forwards. 109 
104 T ·1n· ·1· Karak .. , un<;:.. g1 IZ ·ten. 
105 For evaluations on creative leadership and organic nature of the society, see Baltactoglu, "D\inyarun 
Ol~lan," (Becomings of the World) Yeni Adam. 503 (August 17, 1944), p. 2. See also Tun<;: ·'Yarahc11rade 
Meselesi," pp. 45- 6. 
106 T .d un<;:, 1 em. 
107 Safa, ''Biiyiik Adam," (The Gre-.it Man) Yeni Mecmua. (July 18, 1942), p.4. 
108 Baltac1oglu, "Talim ve Terbiye'de Inkllap," p. 2. 
109 Tun<;:, "Zaman Fatihleri," (Conquerors of Time) Cwnhuriyet. (June 15, 1942); Safa, "Milliyet<;:iligin Birka<;: 
Hakikati," p. 5. 
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Charismatic power structure, on which the Kemalist legitimacy had been consolidated, 
prm ..ided the best means to translate demands of people to coherent social and political 
programs. 
Charismatic leadership, which ultimately rested on an "'ideology of heroism,'' 
would ultimately serve to make a synthesis of the traditional values and necessities of 
present day. 110 Safa characterized the ideology of heroism as follows: 
Since steam machine was invented businessman has begun to represent the ideal type in 
the Anglo-Saxon world By the progress of industrial capitalism heroes of the antiquity 
and saints of the Middle Ages are being replaced by petroleum riches. coal riches and 
automobile riches. It was not a coincidence that utilitarian philosophy emerged and 
became popular in England from Bentham to J.S. Mill after the invention of steam 
machine. It is also not surprising that pragmatic philosophy which replaced truth \\<ith 
success. gained credence in the United States. This philosophy of freeholding which puts 
knowledge in the service of utility, replaces the concept truth with the concept of profit 
and makes interest a principle of right and ethics, is an Anglo-Saxon way of thinking and 
for a century and half it has vigorously been proceeding to change the ever-existing 
. fh . Ill meanmg o ero1sm 
Political leadership would enforce the ideology of heroism and self-sacrifice as a model 
of virtue and political comprehension. Tum;: and Safa affirmed that a new morality of 
self-sacrifice and heroism had to be consolidated to prevent the degeneration of 
increasing dominance of self-egoism by further expansion of what he called "machine 
civilization." Thus, Safa pointed out that the development of liberalism and liberal 
politics of the machine civilization would lead to the emergence of a sense of 
selfishness. He formulated the basic traditionalist-conservative affirmation as follows: 
National ethics which provides the will to sacrifice self for the sake of the salvation of the 
collectivity instead of ego-centric ethics; nationalist economy which puts ownership in the 
service of national interest without eliminating it as proposed by socialism, instead of 
individualist economy; labour instead of gold; pious man instead of usurer; mother 
instead of whore; hero instead of drunk. gambler. I I:! 
This new ethics of self-sacrifice, as also implied by Tum;:, would be based on a sense of 
affection for the charisma of the political leadership. 113 Thus, modem political 
110 Baltac1oglu, "Talim ve Terbiye'de Inl.:ilap,''p. 2, "Milli ~efimiz ve Maarifimiz," (Our National Chief and 
Education) Yeni Adam, 255 (November 16, 1939), p 2, "inonifniin ~ahsiyeti," p. 2, "Tabiat ve insan'' pp. 2,19, 
'·Kahramanlar," (Heros) Yeni Adam. 333 (May 15. 1941 ), p.2, "Turk Ahlak Gelenekleri," p.2, "ldarenin Srrn," 
(The Sel-1et of Administration) Yeni Adam. 579 (January 31, 1946), p. 2. 
111 Safa, ··i~danu ve Kahraman,'' p. 5, ''Yannki Diinyarun Ahlaki," (Ethics of the Future World) Tasvir'i Efkar, 
!December 23, 1941 ). 
I I:! Safa, ""Yannki Diinyarun Ahlaki." 
113 Tww, ·'Ahlakhhgm <;:~itleri ve Zamanmuz Ahlaki." For a similar assessment, see Safa "Vatan ve Ahlak," 
p.5, "i~danu ve Kahraman," p.5, "Canavar ve Kahraman," p.5. 
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leadership would think and act intuitively to recognize the needs of citizens and would 
act creatively in breaking through outdated habits and decayed tradition. 
In traditionalist-conservative discourse, the focus of political analysis shifted to 
the human center because, as pointed out by Olken "today's human being is not a 
given but a puzzle."114 Paradoxically, this shift to human problem was the most 
essential modernist component of traditionalist-conservative ideals m society's 
transition from the "subject culture" of the preceding Ottoman era to '"inherent 
individualist culture of capitalism." Though they emphasized the emergence and 
significance of individual, as a reality in modem world, they still held a distance from 
liberalism since it fostered materialism and selfishness. T unv elaborated this as follows: 
In this respect, although neither concept of life nor the concept of substance have 
been clarified by modern physics as Descartes expected, the increase in materialist 
tendency for a century is not the victory of science, but a product of the continuity of 
the dominance of industrial and economic life over the faith of men. If the right to 
life is given priority over the right to ownership and capital in the way towards 
social Justice, a great revolution \\'ill be experienced in the worldviews of men and 
materialist tendency will not be able to preserve its credence. 115 
The aim of politics, the means to be employed in the political game, and the need to be 
satisfied through politics, were analyzed from the viewpoint of the new human center, 
which characterized the traditionalist conservatism as a personaJist resistance to any 
kind of societalisms. The shift of focus to the human center had also manifested itself in 
traditionalist-conservative conception of religiosity as a subjective individual disposition 
of the sacred. 116 
In this respect, traditionalist-conservatives tended to see the ultimate aim of the 
"governmental rule" as not preventing individual creativity and initiative. "Just rule,'' in 
Ulken' s words, would be maintained by 
organizing the municipalities, strengthening of wakfs. increasing of occupational unions 
can be realized by working out all the ways which will provide men with the habit and 
esteem to pursue on themselves and use their will. 117 
114 Dlken, "Zaman ve insan," p. 987; Safa, "Havaya U<;an ideolojiler." 
115 TWli;, "Hakikatte Her~yin Madde Oldugu lddias1." 
116 See Tww, "Madde ile Ruh Arasmda Sallanan Oti.nyamiz," (Our World That Sways Between Matter and 
Spirit) Cumhuriyet. (May 20, 1945). 
117 Olken, "Htirltik ve Mesulltik," p 4. 
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Real dichotomy did not rest on the antagonism between Republicans and Democrats in 
the late 1940s or between the "liberals" and "etatists" in the 1930s. The real conflict 
for the traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia was between the bureaucracy and 
creative forces in society. 118 
Increasing dominance of bureaucracy in politics by the beginning of the 1940s 
had further widened the distance between the traditionalist-conservative cultural elites 
and the ruling statist elites. inonii maintained a strict control over the party 
bureaucracy, military and civil bureaucracy. These three pillars of the Kemalist regime 
had brought him to power as Atati.irk's political inheritor after his death. By the mid-
l 940s leadership charisma was supplemented by the power of the bureaucracy. The 
cult of National Chief had been invented to secure a sense of continuity in the pattern 
of leadership. Thus, the ruling statist center tried to restore the support of the 
traditionalist-conservative figures. By the encouragement of inonii, Baltacmglu was 
elected to the Parliament as a Republican member in 1942 and remained in the 
Parliament until 1950. inonii also tried to develop his personal relations with Safa. He 
was even called in by inonii to be a Republican member of the parliament from the 
province of Bursa in 1950 elections. The newly emerged interest in the outsiders, 
namely the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, was due to a major shift in the 
revolutionary policies of the Republican People's Party. In its 1947 Congress, 
Republican People's Party gave up its fonner radical revolutionism and adapted a more 
evolutionist "liberal" approach in its social, economic and political policies. It meant 
that party would be more responsive to the social and political demands. Consequently, 
it aimed to widen the intellectual support among the intelligentsia by further 
incorporating the well-known traditionalist-conservative figures into its ranks. 
For traditionalist conservatives, diversity in society did not come to mean 
degeneration. On the contrary, diversities emerged from social, political and economic 
tensions which arose from society's natural growth towards more differentiated forms 
118 For a short note on the tension between bureaucratic rule and creativity and initiative, see Safa, "Yatalak 
Cemiyetlerin Gem;ligi," (The Youth of Crippled Societies) CmaraltJ. 49 (August 29, 1942), p. 5. 
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of organization. If bureaucracy tended to control and manipulate this creative growth 
then it would hinder the expression of free will of human personality. In this respect, 
Bergsonian emphases on freedom, free will, creativity, individuality, tension, and 
evolution created a sense of politics which ultimately provided a ready-made corpus for 
RPP during its transformation from early radicalism to evolutionism. Moreover, liberal 
(hiirr~vetperver) opponents of the regime utilized the "personalist" approach, in 
varying tones, which had been developed by traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia. 
Traditionalist-conservative vision of politics based on Bergsonian premises was 
employed as a means of reducing tensions and conflicts in public life and as a means of 
promoting the development of democratic competitive politics in essence. 
Kemalist Revolution had a decisive impact on shaping the agenda of 
traditionalist conservatism. It gave birth to their political consciousness, forcing them 
to engage in the issues of the day and making them aware of political possibilities 
beyond the model envisioned by the bureaucratic rationalist reading of Kemalist 
politics. Without exception, traditionalist-conservative figures applauded the 
Revolution as the beginning of a new age and they were the supporters of the Kemalist 
political ideals such as the national sovereignty, equality of citizens, and supremacy of 
parliament. Still, Agaoglu was a lasting opposition figure of the statist economic 
policies of the Revolution. Safa turned to be critical of one party rule following the 
death of Atatiirk in 1938. In 1953, the year when he met with Democrat prime minister 
Adnan Menderes, bureaucratic privileges and degenerative effects of Revolutionary 
fanaticism were his primary intellectual concerns. By the mid- l 950s till his death in 
1961, he became one of the spokesmen ofDemocratic Party against the Republicans. 
Although traditionalist conservatives were Republicans in the 1930s and 1940s, 
they were not like the tough-minded revolutionaries represented by the Peker clique in 
the RPP. 119 Like so many of the Republican moderates, traditionalist-conservative 
intelligentsia believed that the main dangers to the novelty brought about by the 
Revolution in Turkey were fanatic revolutionaries and bureaucratic intelligentsia 
119 See Safa, "Yeni Bir Dilnyaya Hasret.·• 
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themselves. Indeed, for traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, the Republic demanded 
a new ethics and new standards of good and wisdom among its citizens. But it was not 
possible to expect these in Turkey, given the imitated nature of Westernization through 
the dominant bureaucratic rationalist reading of Kemalist practices. 
In the 1930s, traditionalist-conservative intellectuals were located in the 
intellectual stratum but they were not included in the political center. Still, it is not 
misleading to see them as part of the new Republic's cultural elites, who, as noted 
before, acted as moral innovators of the nation. Politicization of the traditionalist-
conservative vocabulary, -- its allegiance and resistances, appropriation of these 
themes by the ruling elites during the radical reformism era -- had important 
repercussions since it led to the emergence of a conservative milieu within the 
ruling Kemalist center. Moreover, by further elite fragmentation in the ruling 
center, which resulted in transition to multi-party politics by the mid-1940s, 
traditionalist-conservative discourse began to be widely utilized purely as a new 
political framework by the newly emerging political elites. In fact, traditionalist-
conservative political discourse, which was being exploited either by Republicans 
or Democrats by the mid of 1940s, served neither the rule of Democrats and 
Republicans but to legitimize the rule of the nation-state. 
From Religious Community to the Nation: Changing Functions of Ethics, Religion 
and Obligations 
Transformation of community from the closed religious-bound Millet system of the 
Ottoman period to the differentiated modem urban society was linked with the 
changing functions of ethics and religion. 12° Changing function of ethics and religion 
was related to new conceptions on the nature of social obligations of the new subject, 
namely the citizen. 121 While the institutional structure of modernity grew into maturity, 
traditionalist conservatives became engaged in promoting new standards for the moral 
life of the citizen. Traditionalist-conservative illustration of good life was strictly limited 
120 Baltac1oglu, Sosyoloji, pp. l 00-1. 
121 For changing conceptions of ethics in transition to modernity, see Ross Poole, Modernity and Morality 
(London, N .Y.: Routlage, 1991 ). 
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to the domain of the spiritual world of the citizen, his powers and limitations in a new 
world characterized by Kemalist modernism. 
In line with its societalist ethical aspirations derived from Gokalp, the 
Republican state upheld social obligations based on citizenship as a value in 
themselves. 122 But since they objected to Gokalp' s solidarism, traditionalist 
conservatives were not sympathetic towards this conception of social obligation. They 
defined obligations in relation to their internalization by the citizens as part of their 
daily life voluntarily. 123 In this respect, tradition had to be reemphasized, since the 
social obligations of the citizens, which awaited for new ethical justification in this new 
era, were partly rooted in traditions. Baltac1oglu's theorizings of tradition and morality, 
as the product of History, was not in contradiction with the thinking of the Republican 
intelligentsia. Referring to a speech delivered by the Prime Minister of the time, Dr. 
Refik Saydam, he further tried to maintain that his conception of tradition, as the 
constitutive element of the nation as a moral community, was not at odds with 
Kemalist contentions. In this respect, Baltac1oglu stated 
I have found the words of Prime Minister in his reply to the criticism of Kazim Nami 
Duru very important for all our citizens and especially for my nationality thesis: Dr. 
Saydam says: "Turkish nation, Turkish community has tradition of its own.. It has 
an ethical conception that relied on this tradition. If a little deviation is observed 
from this, either people, who carry the responsibility on their shoulders, or you, 
never hesitate for a moment to take the measures necessary for avoiding the 
deterioration of this tradition. I have found these words very important. Because to 
spell out these words is worth of claiming this: "Nationality is a tradition: Tradition 
of taste. law, morality, language. There is not a nation without a tradition. If 
tradition is decayed then the nation collapses. State interferes when it is seen that 
tradition is aimed to be deteriorated. 124 
He added that the idea of "nation constituted in tradition" was also one the cardinal 
motives of his book which was written for the General Secretariat of the Republican 
122 See Taha Parla, Ziya GOkalp. Kemalizm ve Tilrkiye'de Korporatizm (Ziya Gokalp, Kemalism and 
Corparatism in Tmkey) (1stanbul: ileti~im Yaymlan, 1989). 
123 Baltac1oglu, Sosvoloji, p. 125. For Baltac1oglu's criticism of GOkalp conception of obligation, see 
Baltac1oglu, Sosyoloji, pp. 125-7. For a similar evaluation, see 01ken, "Dogu ve Bat.I," (East and West) Millet 
ve Tarih Suuru (Nation and the Consciousness of History) (1stanbul Pulhan Matbaas1 1948), pp. 102-3. See also 
Baltacroglu, "Gelenek," (fradition) Yeni Adam. 417 (December 24, 19842), p. 2. Safa in Turk lnlalabma 
Bak1~lar tried to show that Kemalism was not at odds with tradition. See Safa, Turk Inkllabma Baloslar. pp. 
107-10. See also OJ.ken, Veraset ve Cemivet (Inheritance and Society) (lstanbul: Kutulm~ Matbaas1, 1957 
[1924] ), pp. 200-1. 
124 Baltac10glu, "Ahlak1a Tilrke Dogru," p.2. For a similar criticism of pure reason as the ultimate 1..Titerion of 
"good action," see Tum;, "Alai Romantizmi." 
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People's Party. 125 Ultimately, Olken pointed out that nationalist aspirations necessary 
to transform religion and morality towards national development would be derived 
from the realm of culture, namely the irrational realm of social experience. 126 
Historical transformation of Turkish society from an Islamic cosmology to a 
modem secular one led the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals of the time to 
formulate an alternative conception of morality and religion with reference to the new 
meanings attributed to human being, society, morality, obligation, and Kemalist 
modernism. 127 This radical transition was characterized as a historical move from a 
closed community structure, which had been characterized by absolutism in politics, to 
more open mobile urban society characterized by a secular ethics and democracy. 128 
Modem political, social and economic activities could flourish through further 
consolidation of a social ethics which would also guarantee the preservation of moral 
ideals in the ambivalent world created by Kemalist modernism. 129 This traditionalist-
conservative contention was illustrated by Tun~ as follows: 
Every epoch has its own conception of morality ... Because, morals. which is one of the 
social functions, like all other social functions, depends upon the values created by human 
interaction in the society and civilization in which it was born. It is because of this 
reason ... closed morality is seen in closed societies and civilization and open morality in 
open (societies and civifuations). 130 
For Tun~, as well as for Viken, the basic problem was to understand the changing 
functions of religion and morality in transition to open society from the closed 
community structure of the preceding era. 131 Baltac1oglu displayed how Republic 
smashed the institutional Islam, which functioned as the ultimate criteria of "good" 
and "right" for religious community for centuries. Religion was also once the only 
source of "education" [read socialization] and the Republican system undermined 
125 Baltac1oglu, ibid., p. 2. Also Olken, Milletlerin Uyarus1 (The Awakening of the Nations) (istanbul:Marmara 
Kitabevi, 1945), 'Tarih ~uuru ve Vatan," (Consciousness of History and the Fatherland) Millet ve Tarih 
Suuru,pp. 210 - 28. 
126 See Ulken Veraset ve Cemiyet, pp. 204, 200. For Safa religious revival was a universal phenomenon, see 
Safa, "Allah'a Dogru Yoneli~ler." 
127 See Olken, "Bizim Terbiyemiz," (Our F.ducation) Millet ve Tarih S~" pp. 193-9. 
PS 
- See Safa, Tork Inlo.labma Bakislar, pp. 181-90. 
129 For a similar evaluation, see Olken, Milletlerin Uyarus1, pp. 37, 85. 
130 Tun~, "Zamanumzda Ahlak Meselesi." Baltac1oglu, Sosvoloji, pp. 124-5. Olken, «J:>oAu ve Batt," pp.99-103. 
131 Tun~. ibid. See also Olken, ibid., pp. 99-103. 
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the institutionalized religion and replaced the secular metaphysics with the 
religious foundations of ethics and education. In his words: 
By the abolishment of the religion in education. the old foundation of the ethics that relies 
on this is also eliminated. For a long period of time. religion had functioned as a sanction 
for ethics. Vinue. in a sense. meant religiosity. Now this belief and sanction are lifted. 
But people have not remained immoral and unconscience ..... When religion is no longer 
form the foundation of culture. then a thought. namely metaphysics. remains groundless. 
Religion.. in congruity to its nature. once raised more or less plausible answers to a lot of 
questions. such as. what is life? why do we live? what will happen at the end? ... what is 
the universe? and (it) silenced all hesitancies. Yet, when religion lost its capacity to 
answer (these questions), will we give up concerning these? What will answer? Again ... 
metaphysics ... Then. one of the foundations of secular education policy is . . . to armor the 
teacher with a strong (sense of) metaphysics .. 13:! 
No state could be constituted in vacuum. The public spirit envisioned by the state 
and enforced through law, as a system of social sanctions, had to be in conformity with 
public morality if the Kemalist state was willing to be the people's state in the real sense. It 
was the public morality which was refined in and transmitted by traditions. Republican laws 
would be internalized as moral sentiments if this correspondence was maintained. Thus, the 
state had to be re-traditionalized in line with value content of the living tradition which was 
seen as the source and carrier of the historically accepted habits of virtue. 133 
Traditionalist-conservative interest in ethics was derived from the necessity to 
contextualize Islamic religion as a system of morality. 134 Historical concreteness of 
national ethics most vividly manifested itself in the living traditions and commonly 
accepted forms of customary behavior. 135 Consciousness and conscience, which in 
Islamic theology were seen as God-given-attributes of mankind, gained a new 
emphasis in traditionalist-conservative vocabulary as historical virtues that revealed 
132 Baltac1oglu, "Laik Terbiyenin Kendisini istiyoruz," (We Demand the Secular Education Itself) Yeni Adam. 
68 (April 18, 1935), p.2, "Cumhuriyete tnaruyorum," (I Believe in Republic) Yeni Adam. 357 (October 30, 
l 94 l ), p. 2, "Tilrk Nedir?" p. 2, "Ahlak Vicdam," p. 2. "Devleti SaylillZ," (Respect the State) Yeni Adam. 411 
(November 12, 1942), p.2, "Soysuzlar," (The Degenerates) Yeni Adam. 412 (November 19, 1942), p.2. Safa, 
"Kendi Kendimiz Olmakta Israruruz," (Our Insistence on Being Ourselves) Tasvir'i Efkar. quoted in Yeni 
Adam. 344 (July 31, 1941), p.13; Dlken, Ask Ahlak1, pp. 123-30, "ilirnde Metod, ~cede Aki!, Ah1akta 
Vicdan Dogru Yol Gostericidir, Denir. Fakat Vicdan ivin Olvii Nedir?" pp. 3-4. 
133 Baltac1oglu, "Milli Anane," (The National Tradition) Yeni Adam, 366 (December I, 1942), p.2, "Ananecilik 
ve Muhafazakarhk," (Traditionalism and Conservati~m) Yeni Adam. 370 (December 29, 1942), p.2, ''Gelenek," p.2. 
134 For an evaluation on the realness of the nation. see Olken, "Millet Nedir, Ne Degi.ldir?" (What is nor nOt Nation?) 
Millet ve Tarih SUl.Dll, pp. 177- 92, "Millet ve Yunl," (Nation and Fatherland) Millet ve Tarih SuYm, pp. 200-9. 
135 Baltac1oglu, "Deger Buhraru," (The Value Crisis) Yeni Adam, 372, (February 19, 1942), p.2. See also Tuny, 
''Tilrkye'de ilk Ahlak Tarihi," (The First History of Ethics in Turkish) Cumhuriyet (May 30, 1943). For a similar 
elaboration, see Safa, ''Hfimanizma ve Antigone," p.5, "ilirn ve Nazariye ~manltgi," p, 5. See also Tuny, 
''Genvlik Nereye Gidiyor," p.3; Safa, '"E<lcbiyaturuzm Fikirsizligi," (The Thoughfulness of Our Literature) 
Kultilr Haftas1. 7 (February 26, 1936), p. 121. 
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themselves in the national tradition. The ethical principle for the moral development of 
the Turkish personality could be derived from the codes of virtue transmitted through 
folklore, myths, fables which were seen as the backbone of the cultural identity. This 
concern to promote the moral development of Turkish personality became part of 
traditionalist-conservative willingness to reform religion in order to push it towards a 
national path of development since it was too late to reform Islam without considering 
nationalism. 136 
Seen from this perspective, traditionalist-conservative modernism is of 
particular interest. Contrary to Kemalist positivist modernism, which asserted the 
claims of the future over and above the historical tradition, 137 traditionalist-
conservative modernism, sought to revitalize the spiritual life of the nation that linked 
the past and future through essential cultural meanings in present. Olken illustrated the 
basic motives of this traditionalist-conservative modernism, which aims to promote the 
development of national forms of ethics and politics, as follows: 
nation is based on a homeland whose borders were ordered in history. It is a conscious 
mass of people that establish a unity of culture on same feelings and language or united 
as a body in state ... Events showed us that it is necessary to ... get rid of the dominance of 
individual (rule) and dynasty which violate the rights of the public; to free from 
reactionary mentalities which impede all attempts of becoming civilized and westernized.; 
to be revolutionist, in the full sense, in the road of westerni7.ation; to bank up the return of 
the theological mentality which prevents the progress of the people .... ; and to separate 
religious and worldly affairs, in principle.... For this reason, nation, in the sense we 
understand, can emerge with all its capacity, and gain its own authenticity when it 
becomes republican, populist, secular, revolutionist and statist. 138 
Basing his argument on criticism of rationalism, Baltac1oglu objected to the 
deliberate actions of the state institutions to formulate rationalist ethics for its citizens, 
since he "did not believe that government and security forces would have a positive 
role in moral issues."139 He added that "the definition of morality reveals that it is a 
realm whose sanction is not derived from punishment but from people's 
136 See Olken, "Tiirk9Uliigiin Tekami.ili.i (1) Gecilctiren Sebepler - ~u - Bi.iyii~i.i," (The Evolution of 
Turkism ( 1) Reasons of its Belateness - Birth and Development) Millet ve Tarih Su!!!J!, p. 148, Ask Ahlala, pp. 
50-140, "lmporatorlugun Tekami.ilii," (The Evolution of the Empire)~ 1,3 (June 15, 1938), pp. 241-59. 
137 Olken, "Tiirk9i.ili.igiin Tekamillfi (l) Geciktiren Sebepler-Dog~-Bilyilyii~i.i," pp. 140-8. 
138 Olken, ''Milliyet9ilik, Irk91hk, Turanc1hk,'' (Nationalism, Racism and Turanianism) Millet ve Tarih Su!!!J!, 
pp. 169-70. See Ziyaeddin Fahri, "Tabiat ve Ahlak l" (Nature and Ethics l) Cumhuriyet. (July 4, 1942), 
"Zarnanuruzda Ahlak Meselesi." 
139 . . 
Baltac1oglu, ''Ahlakta Tiirke Dogru" p. 2: Tun9, "Alai," (Reason) Mfilkiye. 29 (August 1933), pp.1-3. 
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conscience."140 "Morality," for Baltac1oglu, "was an active process and the basic 
values of any moral system could not be understood by pure Reason. " 141 This 
traditionalist-conservative criticism was expected to prevent the "bureaucratic 
scientific state" from being an alien institution over society by maintaining order solely 
by means of "coercion." Indeed, Safa posed that there were two means to consolidate 
the new Republican order: one of them was force and coercion and the other was 
morality. 142 Kemalist state had to choose the latter to consolidate its own vision of 
state-society relations. 
For traditionalist conservatives, though religion could partly serve as a model of 
virtue, such a model of virtue could not be derived from the values upheld by institutional 
structure of religion. It was the living tradition which had to be comprehended as the 
carrier of a set of values and norms which spontaneously formed the natural order of 
society. Traditionalist-conservative concern with essential moral values let them to search 
for a refined form of folk religiosity, as part of national tradition, and this search had far-
reaching consequences. First, it aimed to shed light on the meaning and changing functions 
of religion as part of national tradition in the transition to a mobilized and differentiated 
society. Second, religiosity was treated as a "social" phenomenon, and became a channel 
through which the modern human being came into contact with the divine and spiritual in 
modern societies. The social function ofreligion, which would act as a cohesive factor, was 
exploited in the age of nation-building. In this respect, Baltac1oglu, Tun~, and Dlken gave 
complex readings of religiosity. 
Religiosity: The Mystical-I"ational Experience of the Sacred in the World of Modernity 
Religious motivation in society, which was part of the living tradition faced the possibility 
of being destroyed by the imposition of the rational principles of Kemalist westernists. 
Traditionalist-conservative ethics endowed with nationalism implied that national emotions 
140 Baltac10glu, idem. Also see Baltac10glu, "Din Zorbahg1," (Religious Despoticism) Yeni Adam, 627 
(December 3 1949), p. I. 
141 Baltac1oglu, "Tilrk Ahlak Gelenekleri," p.2; Tun~ "Alo.I Romantizmi," '"Alo.lc1hgm Kuvvet ve Zaaflan," 
"'Tecriibeciligin Kuvvet ve Zaaflan," (The Power and the Weaknesses of Empiricism) Cwnhuriyet, (September 
6, 1942). For an assessment on intuition, see Safa, "Sezi~, Talllil ve Riyaziye," pp. 247, 258. 
142 Safa, "Ayakllst11 Cevap." 
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had to be derived from culrure so that they could also generate intellectual representations 
and moral rules. 143 Traditionalist-conservative conception of national ethics was an 
attractive force for Kemalists. It was not formulated as the end-product of a social pressure 
exerted by a particular social group which sought to shape the order of society in 
accordance with its own particular conception of "good" that had been justified on the 
basis of "rationality," or "utility." It implied that national ethics would be grounded on 
culture and on the new ideals of the Revolution. As revealed by Baltac1oglu morality in 
modem world was based on desires and aspirations rather than sanctions and burdens. 144 It 
implied feelings or higher emotions which could be grasped intuitively and experienced 
mystically rather than by reason. In Baltaetoglu' s words: 
Unlike science which derives its strength from experience, morality from custom. law 
from rules, arts from beauty, religion directly derives its strength from the so-called 
""illegitimate," mysterious source. Religion is an ideal which embraces not man·s reason. 
soul (or) passions but all his personality; religion is the most mystical one of the ideals. 145 
The foremost ambition of the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals was 
nothing less than the revival of the mystic-essence of the religion refined in folk 
religion. Indeed, Oiken assured that "we can not talk about an abstract religion but a 
living religion as experienced by a particular society, (or) a civilization perceived and 
experienced by a society."146 They, especially Safa and Tun~, had also devoted 
themselves wholeheartedly to this idea in their writings. In a two-decade period, this 
endeavour had resulted in the appearance of Tun~'s Bir Din Felsefesine Dogru 
(Towards a Philosophy of Religion) where he tried to formulate an original philosophy 
of religion. 147 Safa, in his novels tried to recover the emphasis made on intuition 
where he later presented it as the means to feel the "spiritual" in reality. In his Din 
Kar~zsmda Dev/et (State vis-a-vis the Religion) Baltac10glu saw new Kemalist 
conception of Islam as a key to the cultural and political rebirth of modem Turkey, 
provided that it was complemented with metaphysics derived from the essential values 
143 Baltac1oglu, Sosvoloji, p. 126. See also Olken, "Millet Nedir, Ne Degildir'?" p. 183. 
144 Baltac1oglu, ibid., p.125. 
145 Baltac10glu, "Din Zorbahgi," p. I. 
146 Olken, "Tfirk~ulugun Tekamillll (I) Geciktiren Sebepler-Do~u-Bfiyll~u;' p. 143. 
147 Tum;, Bir Din Felsefesine Dogru (Towards a Philosophy of Religion) (Ankara: Tfirkiye Yaymevi, 1959). 
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secluded in religion and carried by living national tradition. 148 Thus, he later initiated 
the publication of a religiously-oriented journal, Din Yalu, where various articles of 
Tun~, Safa and Olken frequently appeared. In his A~k Ahlak1, insani Vatanperverlik 
and Tiirk Mistisi=mini Tetkike CiriJ, (Introduction to the Study of Turkish Mysticism) 
Olken detailed his views on new Turkish mythology. 149 Nothing more aptly revealed 
the importance of religion as a synthesis of materiality and spirituality for the 
traditionalist conservatives than Safa's article, insamn Yeni A1anas1 (The New 
Meaning of Human Being) published in his journal, Turk DiiJiincesi. 150 
Traditionalist conservatives reinterpreted mystical experience of religion to 
construct a coincidence between "religion as the source of morality" and "morality as 
the source of new order."151 According to traditionalist-conservative vocabulary, only 
through shedding light on the experience of the spiritual, which revealed itself in 
tradition, morality, and religion, could one move towards national lines of 
development and might act as a source of social cohesion in modem world. 152 This 
mystic essence could be derived from folk religion. In this respect, Baltacioglu stated that 
The only unalterable component in the Islamic religion is the book. However, it is the 
national spirit which grants all characteristics and individuality, all affection and color to 
the concepts of religion and religious beliefs. A mosque, a tomb, a ritual is the full child 
of national taste, national religion, national ethics as much as the religion. 153 
It was not accidental that Baltac1oglu referred to religion, which was one of the 
constituents of national tradition, as the backbone of a society that upheld its natural 
order in its transition to national fonns. 154 It was in tradition, which also covered 
148 Baltac1ogJ.u, "Din Kar~1smda Devlet," (State vis-a-vis the Religion) Yeni Adam, 621 (October 27, 1949), 
p.2, "Din ZorballgJ.," p. 1. 
149 For a later assessment, see Olken, islam Dilsfincesi (The Islamic Thought) (istanbul: Riza C~kun Matbaas1, 
1946 ), islam Felsefosi T arihi (History oflslamic Philosophy) (istanbul: Osman Yal~m Matbaas1, 1957). 
150 Safa, "lnsarun Yeni Manas1," (The New Meaning of Human Being) Tiirk Diffilncesi. 1,3 (February 1, 1954), 
pp. 161-4. Safa tried to show the similarities and divergencies between Western and Eastern scholastics. See also 
Olken, "Tarih Boyunca insan ideali," (The Ideal Man in the Course of History) Turk DU§iincesi. 1,3 (February 1, 
1954 ), pp. 165-72. For a sitnilar view, see Baltac1oglu, "Din Softalan, Bihm Softalan," (Religious Bigots and 
Bigots of Science) Tiirk Dilsfincesi. 1,1 (December I, 1954), pp. 17-9. Safa, "Madde Sizlere Omiir," (Matter is 
Dead) Tasvir'i Efkar. (October 27, 1945). 
151 This conception, namely morality as the source of order, revealed itself in Olken' s conception of stratified 
society (meratip cemiyet) which had been characterized in his A~k Ahlakz. See Olken, Ask Ahlalo, pp. 106-30. 
Also Olken,,, Bmm T erbiyemiz," p. 195; Baltac1oglu, "Mistik," (Mystical) y eni Adam, (February 25' 1942 ), p. 3. 
152 Baltac1oglu, "Din Kar~1smda Devlet," p. 2 
153 Idem. Also Baltac1oglu, Tarih ve Terbiye (History and Education) (istanbul Suhulet Matbaas1, 1933), p. 54. 
154 Baltac1oglu, "Din Kar~1smda Devlet," p. 2, "i~timaiyat," (Sociology) Yeni Adam. 75 (June 6, 1935) p.13. 
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religion, that citizens could develop their individuality, uniqueness and promote their 
sense of nationality. 
Traditionalist conservatives were simply formulating a new philosophy of 
religion as the source of new secular metaphysics of religiosity. By emphasizing 
spirituality, traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia aimed to recover the role of 
religiosity [read metaphysics] in modem society after the dissolution of the old 
institutionalized religious forms. If religiosity was recovered then the dissolution of the 
old religious forms would not disrupt the new social order. Emphasis on religiosity had 
also implied the changing functions of religion parallel to the new functions attributed 
to other institutions, such as the state, family or market. Mystic-experience of the 
sacred, which in the real sense implied traditionalist-conservative emphasis on 
religiosity rather than religion, would contribute to the consolidation of the new order. 
They were aware of the fact that the standards of virtue in modem society had 
drastically altered as compared to the preceding Ottoman era. New forms of 
experiencing the sacred had to be found since religion as a social institution had an 
overwhelming impact on shaping the private lives of individuals and maintaining social 
order. For Baltac10glu, 
religion has an effect on the structure of the society. Either through its images or rituals, 
religion is an institution related to the solidarity of the society and consequently to the 
shaping of individuals by the society ...... Once moral rules are consolidated, then they do 
not only regulate the moral conscience of individuals but also life styles in 
family,. .. village, city ... Pattems of morality in Twkey are changing. 155 
Once the problem was formulated as on the "changing patterns of morality," then 
traditionalist-conservative interest was focused on finding the values and spirituality 
behind modem religiosity. Accordingly, religion, as part of the tradition, shaped 
human behavior and national characteristics and historically laid down some standards 
of virtue in societies which steadily moved towards new forms of organization. 
Religion, like other elements interfused in tradition, such as language and art, was an 
historical institution. Religion, as a social and historical institution, did not only 
provide a set of shared values but also shaped the customs through which men conduct 
155 Baltac1oglu, "irytimaiyat," p.13. See also thken, "Bizim Terbiyemiz," pp. 196-7. 
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their relations with each other. It also contributed to the maintenance of uniformity 
among the population. 156 Still, it had to be valued as a historical institution and as a 
constitutive factor for national characteristics. Traditionalist conservatives aimed to 
take advantage of this sense of religiosity in the name of those ruling elites who were 
willing to consolidate a sense of belonging and uniformity in beliefs and actions of the 
citizens. In modem society new function of religion, which had been conceived as a 
social institution, was to support the religiosity among the citizens. 
Thus, religion, in conformity with its new function, had to be reinterpreted to 
accustom people towards the development of a new spirituality in national lines. As 
implied by Safa, social institutions played a greater role in shaping individuals more the 
government. Social institutions taught man to accept the commonly shared values and 
actions. 157 Common good and norms of virtue, partly internalized through common 
religious experience, was a reasonable method by which right and good action for the 
Republican citizen could be produced. Manners and beliefs were as important as those 
laws of the state. Rationalist radicalism could corrupt this system of manners and could 
"replace a bloody and abstract world with the living world."158 
Traditionalist-conservative conception of religion as an integrative part of 
culture and history was not a reaction to the secular trends in Kemalist radicalism. 
However, it was not also a return into Islamic formalism and orthodoxy. We must 
characterize the traditionalist-conservative emphasis on religion as a reconciliatory 
strategy. As it is shown, religion, for traditionalist-conservative intellectuals, gained its 
emphasis as part of the national tradition. Still, religious faith could be used to support 
modem political conventions such as liberty, equality, and tolerance. The problem 
facing the traditionalist conservatives was to reconcile the political ideals of the 
Revolution and religious sentiments, which were not necessarily orthodox Islamic 
156 See Tuniy, "Milliyet Metkuresi Nedir'?" (What is the Ideal of Nationality?) Milli Mecmua, 7 (January 24, 
1924), pp. 99-101 in Atatiirk Devri Fikir Hayat.t (Intellectual Life in Atatiirk's Era), Melunet Kaplan, 1nci 
EnginUn,et. al., eds., vol. l (Ankara: Kiiltiir Bakanhg1 Yay., 1992), pp. 102-9. See also Agaoglu., "Milliyet~ilik 
Ct..'Teyanmm Esaslan," (The Principles of the Trend of Nationalism) Hakimiyet-i Millive. (September 6, 1925), 
in ibid., pp. 115-27. See also Baltac1oglu, Sosyoloji, pp. 122-42. 
157 Safa, ·'Yeni Bir Donvava Hasret:' 
158 Idem. . -
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beliefs and rituals, and to counter the materialism and egoism assumed to be derived 
from abstract rationalism. 159 The best means of achieving both these ends seemed to be 
a revival of religiosity, a new ci\-ic religion or mythology. This would popularize and 
would also give a spiritual sanction to the modem political ideals of liberty, equality, 
and tolerance. It would also provide a counterweight to egoism and materialism. In 
characterizing this civic religiosity Baltac1oglu stated that 
freedom of religious beliefs. legal equality of men and women.... hostility towards 
religious fanaticism are the basis of this secular egalitarian .... ethics ...... These are also 
the fundamental values of new societies. It is not possible to call (a society) ""modern:· or 
even to live in a society which do not recognize the equality of men and women. respect 
for profession and work, and freedom of religious beliefs. 160 
Thus, traditionalist-conservative conception of morality aimed to bridge the gap 
between political ideals of the Republic and religious aspirations dominated the private lives 
of the citizens. If the ideals of the revolution were as.5umed to shape the public identity and 
beliefs, they would as.5ume a more popular and spiritual form. This could be achieved 
through the formulation of a new mystic national and spiritual interpretation of religion. 
Religion, as part of the national tradition, was expected to be valued as much as language 
and customs. New national religious spirituality, in the case of Olk.en's A§k Ah/ala, would 
reveal the secluded historical national truths. It was this stimuli which was behind Olk.en's 
attempts in his Turk Mistisizmini Tetkike Giri§, Turk Kozmolojisi,, Turk Mitolojisi, Turk 
Hikmeti ve Teknik Tasawur (Turkish Cosmology, Turkish Mythology, Turkish Wisdom 
and Technical Thinking) and Tasawuf Psikolojisi (The Psychology of Sufism~ 
Political motivation behind the traditionalist-conservative emphasis on religiosity 
could be understood when the rationale of Kemalist secularism is also taken into account. 
Traditionalist conservatives based their ideas on the duality created by Kemalism between 
the clerical and folk Islam. The new civic Islam of the Revolution was regarded as a moral 
system of virtue. Olken and Safa argued that Kemalism had freed the essence of religion 
from the dogmatism and scholasticism of the Islamic clergy. 161 In a similar vein, 
159 Baltac10glu, "'Dinliler, Dinsizler, Softalar" (Believers, Atheists and Bigots) Yeni Adam, 618 (October 
6,1949) p. I; Safa, "'insan Yok, Millet Var!" p.5, "Yannki Dilnyanm Ahlaki." 
160 Baltac1oglu , Sosvoloji, pp. 136-7 Also see Safa, '"Havaya Ui;an ideolojiler," (Ideologies Scattering Arowid) 
Tasvir"i Efkar. (August 14, 1945). 
161 0 lken, "Descartes ve Skolastik," p. 6-8. 
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Baltac1oglu assured that the reactionary stand of Islarnists emerged as a result of their 
ambition to dominate all social. political, and cultural institutions through religion. For him, 
the ideal of maintaining "religious domination" was the violation of the flow of history. 162 
Hence. there was no need for an intermediary religious class of interpreters in Islam. Thus, 
Baltac1oglu pointed out that if religion became a tool for religious fanatics, then those 
characteristics of religion, which had no chance to survive and thus clung to fossilized 
customs, would hinder life in progress. Thus, he assured that "the new state, nation state 
can not tolerate this religious fanatics to exploit religion for their own interests."163 Lived 
religion that had been transmitted by national tradition secluded the essential values of 
religiosity which united the spirit of the citizens. 164 Thus, Safa assured that the new state 
was not hostile to living traditions, be they religious or not. On the contrary, by announcing 
former religious holidays as official holidays, the new national state also granted a new 
status to religion in the Republican era. 165 
Progressive aspects of the traditionalist-conservative conception of religion was 
related to their attempt to promote philosophy as a mode of secular metaphysics that 
would lay down the new standards of virtue [read religiosity]. For Ulken 
"philosophy" had a crucial importance to lay down the standards of virtue since it 
"would reach the truth, from it to morality and from morality to politics. " 166 A 
mystical essence would be derived through philosophy that had been praised as a new 
mode of secular life metaphysics. 167 Indeed, for Turn;, "everywhere and every time it 
is mysticism which forms the essence of religion."168 In the context of radical 
Republican secularism, the new traditionalist-conservative doctrine of religiosity had 
radical social and political implications. 169 
162 Baltac1oglu, "Dinliler, Dinsizler ve Softalar," p. l. 
163 Baltac1oglu ... Din Kaq1smda Devlet," p.~. 
164 Idem. 
165 Safa, Tiirk Devrimine Bak1slar, pp. 107-10. 
166 u··1k ·o 11 B " lo,, 
·en. · oi;u ve all, p. -· 
167 For an assessment on religious metaphysics, see Tum; "Hakikatte Heqeyin Madde Oldugu lddiast." See also 
Tum;, "ii; Alemi Tetkik," <Studying of the Inner World) Cumlmriyet. (September 14, 1940) For a note on 
mysticism, see Tlllll(, ·'Riiya ve Mistik DOnya." (Dream and the Mystical World) Cwnhuriyet, (Sqxember lO, 1941 ). 
168 Tum;:, "Kadm ve Sanat," (Woman and Society) Cumhurivet. (December 22, l941). 
169 See Baltac1oglu, Sosyoloji, p. 136. 
310 
This new mystical philosophical metaphysics was humanistic in terms of taking 
an interest in the living human being, and undermined the old orthodox conception of 
the clergy, which reduced the human being to merely a subject before God. Thus, 
Kemalist state elites tolerated the free circulation traditionalist-conservative ideals. 170 
Emphasis on authenticity, and on new mysticism complemented the Kemalists 
attempts to neutralize Islamic orthodoxy. Traditionalist conservatives viewed the 
Kemalists attempts to create a civic religion as a progressive attempt for reforming 
Islam. Since the beginning of the Revolution, a new civic conception of Islam became 
the source for traditionalist-conservative emphasis on religiosity. The new 
traditionalist-conservative metaphysics was also attractive for Kemalists since it 
supported their overall project of Turkification of religion. 
Traditionalist-Conservative Conception of Order: A Synthesis of the Forces of Rationality 
and l"ationality 
The Bergsonian background of traditionalist-conservative intellectuals was responsible 
for their faith in secular progress. Traditionalist-conservative vocabulary had also had a 
resonance among the early Republican generations who were caught up between the 
conflicting claims of religion and positivist scienticism in formulating the legitimate 
terms of social and political practices. Traditionalist conservatism appeared as a 
philosophico-political stand with the claim to resolve the conflict between them. 
Traditionalist-conservative attitude towards questions of science and religion explicate 
this historical synthesis. 
This resolution had important repercussions for the situation m early 
Republican era where the clash between positivist scientism and spiritualism of the old 
religious cosmology was coupled by concurrent developments in politics. Secular 
Republican government had already overthrown the last remains of the old religious 
order by the end 1920s when the traditionalist conservatives established the Turkish 
Philosophy Association in 1927. Beginning from mid-1920s, armoured with science 
170 Baltac10glu, "T11rk Rejimini Nii;in Severim?'' (Why I Like the Turkish Regime?) Yeni Adam. 247 
(September 21, 1939). p. 2. "MaarifVekilinin Genelgesi Ozerine," (On a Circular of the Minister of Education) 
Yeni Adam, 486 (April 20, 1944), p. 9. In his comment made on a speech delivered by Hasan Ali Yucel, 
Minister of Education in 1941, Baltac1oglu stated that there was a parallelism between the Kemalist principles 
and his approach. It was <.he to lhe fact that there was a necessity to fonnulate the preliminary tenns of a 
Kemalist political idea which could compete wilh alien ideologies. 
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and positivism, Republican government provoked extreme religious opposition by p~g a 
series of laws that imposed new restrictions on religious institutions, closed down religious 
educational establishments, and ended the old religious practices. Appearing at a time of 
acute ideological conflict, traditionalist-conservative attempts might be interpreted as an 
endeavour to exploit the potential of Bergsonism to mediate between spirirualism and 
militant scienticism of the Republic and thus to resolve the continuing struggle between 
religious orthodoxy and secular Turkish state in favour of the latter. Traditionalist-
conservative enterprise, by proposing religiosity as the subjective experience of sacred in 
modem world had raised support to Republicans to expel religion [read Islam] from 
the public realm of the nation to the conscience of citizens, without sacrificing the 
value of the sacred. Indeed, adopting a critical stand against militant scienticism as a 
fonn of materialist atheism Safa had proclaimed the ultimate aim of the Revolution as 
freeing the minds from Islamic scholastics. 171 
Traditionalist-conservative search of a middle-way between sciences and 
spirit can be derived from their criticism of mechanism and formalism and 
nominalism. Accordingly, positivist theories of evolution was essentially a 
consequence of mechanist philosophies. 172 Likewise, formalism and nominalism in 
the Eastern world, as referred by Olken, which identified the reality with stasis 
rather than a dynamic process, was consolidated by the domination of the 
traditional Ke/am school in Islamic thought. 173 Indeed, Safa and Olken linked the 
questions of fonnalism and nominalism to the dominance of Ke/am school in 
Islamic theology. Referring to a chronological study of Edward Sachau on El-
Biruni, Safa maintained that 
4th century is a turning point in the Islamic history of thought. Consolidation of orthodox 
faith around the date of 500 had closed the means for autonomous questioning (gate of 
interpretation - i~tihad kap1s1) until the end of time. 174 
171 Safa, "!stenilen Bir Edebiyat," (A Desirable Literature) Cumhuriyet. (June 19, 1933). 
172 See Tun-r, "lnsan," (Human Being) MiUkiye, 34 (January 1934), pp. 1-2. For critical assessment of 
positivism, see OUcen, "TOrkiye'de Positivizm TernayUl6," pp. &49-53 For a note on the significance of 
Bergsonism, see Dlken, "TOrkiye'<le tdealizm Temaytil6," pp. 929-36. 
173 OUcen, "Tanzimata Kar~," Millet ve Tarih Suuru, pp. 22-30. See also OUcen., "Dogu ve Bab," 99-104. 
174 Safa, "him ve NllZBriye ~hgt," p.5. See also Safa, '1stenilen Bir Edebiyat" See Dlken, "fslamiyette 
Eski Dinlerin tzleri," pp. 4-5. See also Dlken, "Fikir Ananesi." p. 283, "him BitarafMidu1" pp. 458-<>2. 
312 
Olken also pointed out that Islamic orthodoxy had reduced human beings to the 
category of subject and "rationally" set the limits for human creativity and freedom. It 
hindered the role of human creativity at various states of becoming. 175 Tune; 
characterized this religious onhodoxy as follows: 
There are three distinctive features of the world view of the Middle Age: l) God. the 
creator of every1hing 2) A spirit which is a part of it (God) 3) And the physical world 
namely the nature and our materiality which \\-ill be the cause of a testing for this spirit. 176 
Religious orthodoxy framed human freedom with materiality and nature which was seen as 
manifestations of the divine will. However, traditionalist conservatives reconceived the 
divine as a creative spirit that constantly realized itself progressively in the natural order. 177 
Traditionalist conservatism of the time had to compete with all other 
interpretations of Kemalism as well as with those of Islamic traditionalists who were 
motivated by religious orthodoxy. Traditionalist-conservative reappraisal of the spirit in 
modem society, as one of the manifestations of creative Will, had distanced them from 
the religious orthodoxy. Though the Republican progressives sympathized with 
traditionalist-conservative themes of creativity and spirituality, there was those among 
them, as we referred elsewhere before, like the Kadro intellectuals, who dismissed the 
notion of elan vital, the first cause of spirituality and creativity, as a pseudo-mystical 
concept. Hence, the traditionalist-conservative synthesis was seen as an unstable 
compound in terms of reconciling opposing themes, such as "religion and science," 
[read spiritualism and naturalism] "East and West" [read again spiritualism and 
rationalism] "Kemalism and tradition," [read rationalism and irrationalism] etc. Kadro 
intellectuals had treated this as a suspicious compromise. Nonetheless, traditionalist 
conservatives extended this unique synthesis of spiritualism and rationalism into the 
sphere of social relations and projected a vision of national culture that integrated the 
religious ideals of the past with the secular hope of a unified national community. 178 In 
17' .. 
- Ulken, ''Hiirluk ve Mesulltik," p. 2. 
176 Turn;:, "Eski ve Y eni Dunya Go~lerimiz." 
177 See Tum;, "Zamamrruzda Ahlak Meselesi," Also see Turn;, ·'Taassub ve Milsamaha Arasmda," (Between 
Tolerance and Fanaticism) Fikir Sohbetleri, pp. 115-20. Sec Safa, "Sosyoloji ve Milliyet\:ilik,'' p. 5, '"ilim ve 
Nazmiye Dfi.?manhg1," p. 5. 
178 For an example, see Baltac1oglu, ·'Eski ile Yeni," pp.2,8-9. See also Baltac1oglu, "Din ve Milliyet," 
(Religion and Nation) Tlirke Dogru, pp. 179-84; Ulken, "Fransiz thtilali ve Eski Rejim," pp. 3-5. 
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this respect, traditionalist-conservative emphasis on the vitality of life, creativity, 
evolution, Will, individual, individualism, morality, religion and religiosity and their 
place in understanding the human experience in the new world had created a vision of 
modernity which had special importance for our purpose. The genuine traditionalist-
conservative modernism that sought to put the "traditional" into its proper place in the 
turbulent world of modernity was inspired by many sources, varying from religious 
sufism, to the triumph of science over nature, from dialectics as in the case of Safa, to 
mystic-moralism, as in the case ofDlken in the early 1930s. In their quest to illustrate a 
new vision of modern society, Bergsonism became a source of inspiration for the 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals of the 1930s and 1940s. They owed a lot to it in 
understanding the social and political repercussions of radical revolutionary rationalism 
in transition to a national society. Articulating some newly introduced concepts, such 
as vital force, traditionalist-conservative discourse provided a fresh account for the 
problems of adaptation, growth, regeneration, and repair of the culture in the 
revolutionary era. It also represented a secular faith of progress and an optimistic 
perspective which stands for secular progressivism. Clearly, the popular appeal to a 
secular faith in progress was tolerated if not backed by the positivist Weltanshauung of 
the Republic. 
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CHAPTER 8 
AGAINST THE POLITICS OF /lVDIVIDUALISM 
Distaste of Afarket Ethics, Egoism and Pursuit of Self-Interest 
"Liberal sentiments" gained a new impetus by the mid-l 940s. Traditionalist-
conservative criticism ~f the politics of individualism essentially derived its inspirations 
from the challenge of rational man argument of classical liberalism which envisaged an 
interest-seeking individual as the prototype of man in modem society. Still, 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals were aware of the fact that a new set of market 
relations was being born under the political and economic constraints of capitalism. 1 
These new economic relations were based on a new division of labour in society. 
Nevertheless, traditionalist-conservative circles, as best disclosed in Safa' s novels, were 
more interested in the degenerative effects of the new economic rationale on human 
spirituality and cultural harmony. 
In the preceding chapters, it was argued that traditionalist conservatism, with its 
overemphasis on folk spirit and tradition, paid more attention to culture and dynamics 
of cultural creation/renovation than the reasons for economic development. Though an 
emphasis was made on the necessity of industrialization, modem capitalism, when it led 
to the growth of individualist aspirations, was also held responsible for the emergence 
of a materialist-utilitarian culture which would erode even essential cultural values. 
This traditionalist-conservative criticism of utilitarian and instrumentalist ethics of 
modem capitalism did not result in any claim to preserve the traditional economic 
structures of the Ottoman Regime. On the contrary, Safa in his Turk Devrimine 
1 1smail Haklo Baltac1oglu viewed the property right as one of the fundamental principles of a democratic 
society. See Baltac1oglu, "Toprak Kanunu," (The Land Law) Yeni Adam, 544 (May 31, 1945), p.2. For about a 
decade ago, Baltac1oglu pointed out that the distinctive feature of the new party's program was its empha5is on 
the instinct relationship among private property, order and disciple. Baltac1oglu, ''Halk Partisinin Yeni Progratru 
Uzerine," (On the New Program of the People's Party) Yeni Adam, 72 (May 16, 1935) p.2. See also Mustafa 
~ekip Tun\:, ''Zamane Adami," (ContemporaIJ· Man) Cumhuriyet. (November 13,1940), "Devlet ve Millet," 
(State and Nation) Cwnhuriyet. (August 8, 1942), "Para Hrrs1 ~smda Millet ve Devlet" (Nation and State 
Against Ambition for Money) Cwnhuriyet. (November, 15, 1942). Peyami Safa, "Statikten Dinamige," (From 
Static to Dynamic) Cwnhuriyel (July 31, 1933), ·'En Brurta Milli Menfaat," (National Interest in the Fin."t Place) 
Ta..wir-i E!Kar. (March 12, 1941); Ulken, "Hurltik ve Mes'ulltik," (Freedom and Responsibility) istanbuL 
(October I, 1946), pp. 2-4. 
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Bak~Jar (Glances at the Turkish Revolution) had pointed out the necessity for 
urbanization and Baltac1oglu in most of his writings had characterized the basic 
objective of the new state as one of maintaining industrialization. 2 
Nevertheless, traditionalist-conservative intellectuals were sensitive to the 
decline of the sense of self-sacrifice, individual isolation and alienation for which thev 
held the utilitarian materialist ethics of modem capitalism responsible. Turn~ in his 
Sefalet Kalkamaz !vii? (Can't Poverty be Abandoned?) Baltac1oglu, in Demokrasi i:e 
Sanat (Democracy and Art) and his article Diinyamn Olu#an (Becomings of the 
World), written a decade later, saw, for instance, the rise of the individual self-interest 
over and above the general interest of society as the source of all social and political 
evils which, would ultimately result in moral degeneration of the very individual. 3 In 
order to prevent the degenerative effect of self-interest seeking excessive individualism, 
Baltac1oglu assured that "technical advancement and comfort are different from luxury 
and debauchery. Every man has the right to comfort but never to debauchery.',.. In a 
similar vein, Safa blamed modem forms of materialism for the decline of spiritual 
values. 5 For Safa, people failed to understand their inner selves and their spiritual and 
moral place in the universe. 6 Yet, Baltaetoglu, Safa, Tun~ and Olken were still aware of the 
relationship between modem economics and the development of new cultural practices. 7 
Thus, traditionalist conservatives emphasized work and/or labour since they saw it as a 
2 Safa, Tfirk Devrimine Baktslar (Glances at the Turkish Revolution) (istanbul btiiken Ne¢yat A!>., 1990 
[ 1938]), pp. 181-90. T~ "Sefalet Kalkamaz Mi?" (Can Poverty Not Be Abandoned?) Curnhuriyet. (August 18, 
1942). For Safa, Republic has to adopt a smooth political approach in which the right to private property, 
competition and freedom would not be in cont1ict with general interest. See Safa "Ekonomi ve Milliyetyilik," 
(Economy and Nationalism) Cmaraltl, 36 (May 30, 1942), p.5. Also Baltac10glu, "En Biiyfik Devlet Siyaseti 
Nedir?" (What is the Greatest State Policy?) Yeni Adam, 77 (June 20, 1935), p.2. For Olken's assessment on 
work organi7.ation, see DJ.ken, "1¥timai Te~kkiiliin Temeli, ~,"(The Basis of Social Organi7.ation, Work) lnsan. 
2,8 (January I, 1939), pp. 671-6, ~j!? Hakkmda," (On Work) !nsan. 2,10 (March I, 1939), pp. 823-31, ··4·e 
Dair," (About Work) insan. 2,12 (May 8, 1939), pp. 997-1002. Also see DJ.ken, ''Sosyolojinin Mevzuu ve Usulii," 
(The Subject Matter and the Method of Sociology) Dil. Tarih ve Cografva Dergisi 1,1 ( 1942), 15-26. 
3 Baltactoglu, "Dilnyarun Olu~lan,'' (Becomings of the World) Y eni Adam, 503 (August 17, 1944 ), p.2. Also see 
Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat (Democracy and Art) (istanbul: Sanayii Nefise Matbaas1, 1931 ). 
4 Baltac1oglu, "Diinyarun Ol~lan," p.2. 
5 Safa, "Milli Birlik ve Ahlak," (National Unity and Ethics) Cmaralt.1, 60 (November 14, 1942), p.4 
6 Ibid. St..-e also Tuny, ''Zamane Adami," ··Para Hrrs1 K~1smda Millet ve Devlet." Dlken, "Bir Omiir mil Bir 
Jest mi?" (A Life or a Gesture?) Istanbul. (May 15, 1946), p. 4. 
7 See Baltac1oglu, Sosyoloji (Sociology) (istanbul: Sebat Bas1mevi, 1939), pp. 198-233. 
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realm where individual would realize himself as a part of greater collectivity and would 
realize its development as part of it. However, they were cautious that the development of 
moral personality would be hindered because of the emphasis on individual creati\ity and 
enterprise which could easily be turned into a kind of selfishness, egoism, and self-interest. 
It can be said that it was this selfish attitude, search for materiality and self-interest, 
which was responsible for traditionalist-conservative timidness towards a middle-class way 
oflife. Indeed, Berna Moran has noted that the "westernized, civilized characters" in Safa's 
novels, repeatedly illustrated until 1939, were either the son of a wealthy Ottoman family -
usually the father was a high-rank bureaucrat - or a character - who exemplified the life-
style of the middle classes. 8 This westernized-modern personality, who signified the life-
style of wealthy middle classes, who mostly engaged in trading activities. He was 
passionate, active, as well as selfish, egoist and untruthful in his daily life.9 Thus, Safa, 
besides his novels until 1939, also in his articles which appeared in various newspapers and 
journals, blamed the individualist aspirations stimulated by the classical liberalism for the 
destruction of the mores of heroism. For Safa and well as Turn;, classical liberalism of the 
middle classes forced the individual to adapt an interest-seeking behavior. Thus, the unity of 
mind and soul, materiality and spirituality was dissolved. 10 Tun~ critically illustrated this 
new personality as follows: 
he does not act with his real values and qualities; adoring himself as an aim itself, he 
strives on a passionate drive to transcend these with all the means and to occupy a higher 
position ... In most of them the values of humanity have been blunted or ... vanished They 
were indifferent even to their close circle. They are mostly not being disturbed for the 
disasters they cause in family and society. They follow their own individual aims ... 11 
8 Berna Moran, Tllrk Romaruna Elestirel Bir Babs (A Critical Glance at the Turkish Novel) (1stanbul: Ueti~im 
Yaymlan, 1983), p. 187. 
9 Idem. For Safa public interest regulates the private interest. See Safa, "Ekonomi ve Milliyet-rilik," p.5. See 
also Baltac10glu, Gender icin En Buviik Tehlikeler (Greatest Dangers for the Youth) (istanbul: Sebat Matbaas1, 
I 939), pp. 27-33. 
IO Safa "Milli Ahlak," (National Ethics) Cmaralt1, 42 (July 11, 1942), p. 5, Also Safa, "Milli Cemiyetlerde 
ldeai." (The Ideal in National Societies) Cmaraltt, 48 (August 22, 1942) p. 5. For Safa, science of mechanique 
sociale was developed from nineteenth century onwards. Then, sociologists, pyschologists, biologists and 
statisticians adapted models on the principles of natural sciences to understand the dynamics of society and human 
world, see Safa, "Sosyoloji ve Milliy~" (Sociology and Nationalism) Cmaraltl, 35 (May 23, 1942), p.5. 
11 Tun-r. "Zamane Adanu." See Baltacioglu, "Altl Umdeye GOre Terbiye-V Milliyet Terbiyesi," (Education According 
to the Six Principles-V Education of Nationality) Yeni Adam. 227 (May 4, 1938), p.14. See also Olken, Umwni 
lctimaivat (General Sociology) (istanbul: Ebu'z Ziya Matbaasi, 1931). Also see Olken, "Millet Tipleri;' (Types of 
Nation) Millet ve Tarih Suuru (Nation and the ConsciffiNless of History) (b'tanbul: Pullian Mad:masi, 1948), pp. 117-22. 
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The traditionalist-conservative intellectual wanted the people not to fall into a fetishism 
of materialism. It was what Safa was critical of in his novels until I 93 9. Safa demanded 
the individuals to pay attention to the unity of material and spiritual aspects of their 
inner worlds which constituted them as unique moral entities. I:! 
In general, Safa and Baltac1oglu, and to a considerable degree Olken, stressed that 
the work organization or the organization of labour was the basis of modem societies. 
Baltac1oglu also posited that nation was an urbanized society based on a new functional 
division of labour. In this respect, Baltac1oglu argued that the most important aspect of the 
Kemalist state policy was to pave the way for the spontaneous economic development of 
this functionally divided society. The most vivid form of modem economy was industrial 
economy. 13 In a similar vein, Tuny further maintained that "industrial plants were basic 
units of organization of the modem society."14 The important point for them, however was 
also to show that the degree of national cultural development also depended upon the 
deepening of functional division of labour, differentiation of interests, hardening of 
economic tensions, increasing urbanization and rationalization and expansion of state 
authority in economic matters, as well as its legal and political control over the society. 15 
Indeed, it was what Tum; had in his mind in the 1940. For him, 
in today's economic system there is an ongoing clash and antagonism between the in~ of 
the consumers, producers and cmners of property /investors. Thus, since all nations are 
constituted of these economic institutions all those nations in today's economic system 
experience/suffer from the clash of interests. 16 
12 For Safa lite was not an arena for the satisfaction of material interests and benefits. Tue hedonistic ethics, 
which symbolically based on materiality, was seen as the source of moral degeneration in society. See Berna 
Moran, Ttirk Romaruna Elestirel Bir Bakts. pp.167-80. See Tum;, ''ii; Ben ile D1~ Ben Arasmda," (Between Inner 
Self and Outer Sell) Filcir Sohbetleri (Intellectual Conversations) (istanbul: 01ku Basunevi, 1948), pp. 131-8. 
See also Tuni;, Ruh AJerninde (In the Spiritual World) (istanbul: Dllru Kitabevi, 1944 ). For characterization of 
this middle class personality, see Safa, Fatih Harbiye, 3rd ed. (istanbul: Oto.ken Yaymevi, 1973), p. 47. 
13 See Baltac1oglu, "En Bilytik devlet Siyasas1 Nedir?" p.2, ·'Alu Umdeye Gore Terbiye VI, Milliyet Terbiyesi," 
(Education According to Six Principles-VI Education of Nationality) Yeni Adam. 228 (May 11 39), p. 14. For 
criticism of Gokalp's definition of nation, see Olken, Ziya Gokalp (h"1anbul: Ahmet Said Matbaas1, 1942), pp. 7-
37. For a later assessement see, Baltac1oglu, Ziva Gokalp (istanbul: Y eni Matbaa, 1966). 
14 Tuni;, ·'Kiltie Ruhu;' (Mass Spirit) Cumhurivet, (November 12, 1941 ). 
15 See Safa, "Milliyet\:iligin Birka\: Hakikati," (Some Truths about Nationalism) Cmaralti. 32 (March 14, 1942), 
p.5; Baltac1oglu, ''Tezat," (The Contradiction) Yeni Adam, 3 (January 15, 1934), p.l, "Demokraside Terbiye," 
(Education in Dem<X,1acy) Yeni Adam. 4 (January 22, 1934), p.2, ''Inktlab Edebiyan Ne Olabilit?" (What Can the 
Literature of the Revolution Be'.') Yeni Adam, 6 (February 5, 1934), p.7; Olken, "i\:timai T~iln Temeli ~."pp. 
671-6, ··~ Hakkmda,"pp. 823-31, "'4'e Dair," pp. 997-1002. Also Olk.en, "Sosyolojinin Mevzuu ve Usulii,"pp. 15-26. 
16 Tuni;, '·Para Hirs1 Kar~1smda Millet ve Devlet." 
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He further detailed the question as follows: 
Today there is a duality between economy and politics. The state has dominance over 
the towns and metropolises since it -as an institution- precedes their 
emergence/formation. On the other hand. the economic institutions and the 
accumulated capital of the commercial and industrial classes continue their interest-
seeking pressures on the state. This results in a duality between economics and 
politics. And the necessary conciliation between these two spheres has not been 
h. d 17 ac 1eve yet. 
This was also how Baltac1oglu characterized modern society in his Demokrasi i-e Sanat 
and So.\yoloji (Sociology) and Ulken in his Sosyoloji (Sociology). Accordingly, nation 
was an urbanized society where a degree of economic division of labour among 
various groups had been achieved. 18 This totality had also carried the risk of self-
destruction because of the increasing claims of middle classes merely to convince their 
particular interests. Traditionalist conservatives were cautious about the fact that 
modem economic relations could reduce life to a set of mechanisms based on 
individual's will to satisfy his selfish needs. 19 But "the idea of life," in Tun~'s words, 
was "not an abstract concept, an empty cap .... What fills this, is (different) ways of life, 
historical traditions, traditionalized customs, habits, and a common conception of 
morality."20 Traditionalist conservative tried to point out that hedonism of classical 
liberalism which exposed an idea of economic system solely designed to create 
fetishism of matter, would eventually dehumanize the individual and so the society. 
Indeed, Tun~, like Safa, affirmed that the need to establish a balanced and harmonious 
relationship within classes and newly emerged groups had urged the consolidation of a 
"morality of sacrifice." From this perspective, the veiled cult of heroism, which 
17 T~, ·'istikbal iirinAnman Yeni Ufuklar,'' (NewHorizoos for the Future)Cumhuriyet (June6,l943). 
18 Baltactoglu, "i* BolOmtine Dogru," (Towards the Division of Labor) Yeni Adam. 507 (September 14 1944) 
p.2, ··Deger Karga~1·· (The Value Disorder) Yeni Adam, 583 (February 28, 1946), p. 2. 
19 Safa., ·'i~ ve Kahraman," (The Businessman and the Hero) Cmaralt1, 43 (July 14, 1942) p. 5. For 
Baltac1oglu we live in a machine age. This age was characterized by functional division of labour and increasing 
urbanization. See Baltaetoglu, "Halk Partisinin Yeni Progranu Ozerine," p.2. 
20 Tun<f, "~t.," (Bravery) Cumhuriyet. (November 25, 1941). Also Safa "1nsan Yok. Millet Var!" (There is 
No Man, But Nation!) CmaraltI, 4 (August 30, 1941) p.5. Safa claimed that modern age was an age of radical 
criticism of the ·'rational-abstract models" of man and society. He added that "abstract theories on rights of man" 
was also challenged in the Western world. 
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revealed in the traditional conservative conception of just rule, acquired a new sense in 
traditionalist-conservative criticism of individualism of civil society. 21 
The ultimate aims of Turkish modernization were to achieve a sense of 
authentic culture to free individual creativity from religious prejudices and to 
ensure economic prosperity. Indeed, Tumt exposed that there was no legitimate 
reason to resist this ideal, 22 but he also warned that this ideal may lead to 
cataclysm in society. Tunv argued that urbanization and functional division of 
labour set everything in modem world. 23 However, the reign of cities and urban 
way of life, for Tunv, also gave way to moral poverty and spiritual decay of 
individuals. 24 This grand movement of freedom from the restraints of traditional 
society proceeded according to a positivist model of civilization would easily be 
resulted in the enslavement of the people to technologism and a civilization of 
materiality. Tunv posited that the reason for cultural poverty was the uneven 
development of the capitalist market system and the imbalance between economics 
and politics. The hypothetically invented imaginary "system of economics" of 
modem individualist capitalism was responsible for the enslavement of man to the 
material values. In his words: 
According to this abstract system (liberal economics) the property/good is valuable 
so long as there are consumers. Without consumers the good is of no value: and it 
should either be dispensed or stocked for higher profits in the future. However, the 
real value of the good lies in the existence of the consumers willing to buy it and in 
the price they offer, as well as in those who are in need of the good but cannot afford 
it. Since this abstract science of economy only takes the market into consideration 
regardless of the humans, the industry constructed on this basis is "inhuman" and 
continues excessive production. The basic goal of production should be responding 
21 Baltac1oglu, "Kahramanlar," (Heros) Yeni Adam, 333 (May 15, 1941), p.2; Tun9 "Ahlakhhgm <;e~itleri ve 
Zamanumz Ahlaki," (Types of Virtue and Ethics of Our Age) Cwnhuriyet. (March 23, 1943), "Gen9lik Nereye 
Gidiyor?" (Where is the Youth Heading?) Cmaraltl, 38 (June 13, 1942) p.5. For Tww, emergence of nations, as 
new political units, and nationalism were the symptoms of the development of the cult of heroism and self-
sacrifice. For similar evaluations, see Safa, "idealsiz Adanu <;:eviren Bo~luk," (Hollowness Surrounding the Man 
Without an Ideal) Cmaralll. 47 (August 15, 1942), p.5, "Milliyetiriligin Birkair Hakikati," p.5, "Buyiik Adam," 
(The Great Man) Yeni Mecmua. (July 18, 1942), "Milli Birlik ve Ahlak," p. 4, ''Milli Ahlak," p. 5 . 
..,.., 
-- Turn,~, "'Sefalet Kalkamaz Ml?" Also Tunir, .. Yeni Medeniyetle Tarih Arasmda," (Between New Civilization 
and History) Fikir Sohbetleri, pp. 167-202. 
,_ 
-~ Tum;, "istikbal iirin Yeni Ufuklar." Also see Baltac1og!u, "En Bilyiik Devlet Siyaseti Nedir?" p.2 For 
evaluations on division of labour, see Baltac1oglu, "50 Milyon Olahm!" (Let's Be 50 Million!) Yeni Adam. 319 
(februarv 6, 1941), p.2, .. Nufus Ronesans1:· (Population Renaissance) Yeni A<lam, 456 (September 23, 1943), 
p.2, "Nufosa Dogru," (Towards the Population) Y eni Adam. 497 (July 6, 1944) p.2. 
24 Tww, ·'lstikbal i4'in Yeni Ufuldar." 
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the needs. The economic theories and economic order should be built along this 
"~ line. --
Safa illustrated modem man as a prototype personality who had been alienated 
from the traditional and higher values of his authentic culture. T un9 and Safa had 
further claimed that this prototype modem man was the outcome of utilitarian ethics of 
modem economy. But for Tun9, it was not only an individual problem but a social one 
since modem economy also provided an institutional framework for the consolidation 
of this selfish ethics. 26 Basing on these traditionalist-conservative contentions, Safa 
delineated the ultimate aim of the Turkish Revolution as "to eliminate the individual 
ideals to earn money and to build buildings, luxury and comfort and to substitute it for 
self-sacrifice for the devotion to community."27 
Furthermore, Baltac1oglu assured that egoism generated in economic field had 
tended to dominate the social and political realms.28 As noted before, traditionalist-
conservative criticism of utilitarian-rationalist justification of ethics stemmed from their 
general critical stand against rationalist-individualism. Justification of new citizen ethics 
in rational-utilitarian lines would also result in intellectualism, which, in traditionalist-
conservative vocabulary, was also seen as a symptom of alienation from history and 
culture. The utilitarian answer to the question of 'how to behave' could only be 
appropriated by confirming to particular group devotions but not to the national 
general one. Utilitarian ethics, though emerged to justify the group-based interests 
norms and actions, could not explain general interest. 29 Competition of particular 
group-based ethics together with general national ethics could deteriorate the national 
motivational aspirations necessary to consolidate the authentic Turkish personality and 
25 Tlll~, ··sefalet Kalkarnaz Mi?" 
26 Tum;:, ·'Para Hrrst Kar~1smda Millet ve Devlet." 
27 Safa ... Milli Birlik ve Ahlak," p. 4. 
28 See Baltac1oglu, "inkilap Nasti Adam ister?" (What Kind of a Man Does the Revolution Demand?) Yeni 
Adam. 146 (October 17, 1936), p.2 "Alli Umdeye Gore Terbiye V Cwnhuriyet Terbiyesi," p.14, "Ahlak 
Buhrant," (The Moral Crisis) Yeni Adam. 408 (October 22, 1942), p.2, "'Ahlakta Tilrke Dogru," (Towards the 
Turk in Morality) Yeni Adam, 372 (February 12, 1942), p. 2, ''Ahlak Terbiyesi," (Moral Education) Yeni Adam, 
394 (July 16. 1942), p. 2~ Olken, Ask Ahlakt (Piety Ethics) (istanbul Ekspres Matbaast, 1931), pp. 141-52, 
insani Vatanperverlik (Humanist Patriotism) (istanbul: Giin~ Matbaas1, 1933). See also Olken, Ahlak (Ethics) 
(istanbul: M. Sadik Kag1ti;:1 Matbaas1, 1946 ). 
29 See Baltactoglu, "Bu Yo! ~ye Gider," (This Road Goes to Anarchy) Yeni Adam. 608 (August 22, 1946) p. 2. 
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culture.30 Particularistic ethics, as illustrated in Dlken's A~k Ahia/a (Piety Ethics) could 
never give way to the development of an ethics which would enforce the brotherhood of 
citizens. However, it might generalize group experience, which in the last analysis, was a 
kind of reductionism and it had to be avoided in the age of nation-state building. Thus. Safa 
illustrated the development of civil society and the its particularistic egoist ethics as follows: 
Closed economies were replaced by a world\\ide e:-.,,loitation sphere whereby the basic 
incentive was the profiteering of private initiative. restricted by no national boundaries. 
Such a replacement had two aspects : Theoretically, it voiced up the ideal of individual 
freedom as a natural outcome of the destruction of feudal and monarchical dominance. 
Morally, it put the individuals under the domination of their selfishness and led them to 
sacrifice common interest to the advantage of their individual interests. even to that 
extent to perceive all values as a means for profiteering. It is the money which is the 
gauge of everything: This idea has no dignity at all. 31 
In a similar vein, Baltac1oglu his article Yoksullugun Oviilmesi (Appraisement of 
Destitution) pointed out that "personality meant the development and integration of 
man's moral entity under the influence of the institutions of the society. Yet, it was not 
possible to be "autonomous and free for a man who becomes a slave and subject to the 
material world for money, (and) post."32 Traditionalist conservatives did seem to think 
that neither egoism nor selfishness could be regarded as those terms where the 
legitimacy of the new political order would be sought. Thus, Baltac1oglu affirmed that 
people would probably be happier if passions and will for money, goods, property, 
fame and power were all abandoned. 33 Thus, for traditionalist-conservative intellectual 
30 Dlken's conception of ethics reflected his criticisms of "political particularism·' represented by the rising 
Democratic Party. N.H Atay, who referred Dlken's discussions on ethics, accused Bayar of being a politician 
without an ethical concern. For him, Bayar and his close Democrat circle of was a "group of man" aiming to 
substitute the "ethics of particularity" with the "ethics of whole." Democrats envisioned a political system where 
peasantry, industrialists, workers and traders would live in their isolated conceptions of ethics. It was a fonn of 
primitive materialism. See N.H. Atay, "Bir Omiir mti, Bir Jest mi? (A Life or A Gesture?) lstanbul, (May 15, 
1946), p. 3. See also Baltac10glu, "Yeni Bir Parti Kuruluyor," (A New Party Being Established) 572 (December 
13, 1945), p.l, "Partiler," (Parties) Yeni Adam. 594 (May 16, 1945), p. 2, 11, "C.H Partisi," (R.P. Party) Yeni 
Adam. 595 (May 23, 1946), pp. 2, 11, "Partilerin Yap1s1," (The Structure of the Parties) Yeni Adam. 597 (June 
6, 1946), pp. 2,11, "Her~in Dsttinde Vatan Var," (There is Homeland Above Anything Else) Yeni Adam. 598 
(June 13, 1946), p. 2, "Demokratlar <;ocuk Gibi Kom.~yorlar," (Democrats Speak Childish) Yeni Adam. 609 (August 
9, 1946), pp. 2,11; Sa.ta. "Celal Bayar'm itirafi," (Confession ofCelal Bayar) Vakit quoted in Yeni Adam, 605 (August 
I, 19461, p.10, "Billur Hakikat," (The Pure Reality) Vakit quoted in Yeni Adam. 610 (September 5, 1946), p.10. 
31 Safa, "Milli Ahlak," p.5, "4 Adami ve Kahraman," p.5. 
,,, 
"'- Baltac1oglu, ''Yoksullugun Ovillmesi," (Appraisement of Destitution) 475 Yeni Adam, (February 3, 1944) 
p.2; Safa, "Sosyoloji ve Milliyel\:ilik," p.5; Baltac1oglu, Sosyoloji, pp.13-28. See TWii;:, "Mekanik ve Organik 
Davalan," (Questions of Mechanics and Organic) Cumhuriyet. (September 13, 1942); Dlken, "Ferd ve Cemiyet," 
(Individual and Society) 1nsan. l, 1 (April 15, 1938), pp. 57-65. 
33 Baltac1oglu, "Yoksullugun Ovulmesi," p. 2. See also Safa, ''Yannki Dtinyanm Ahia.la," (Ethics of the Future 
World) Tasvir"i Etkar. (December 23, 1941 ). 
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ultimate aim of Kemalism had to be the creation of a modem society which would 
ultimately satisfy the moral needs of its citizens. The new public sphere created by the 
Kemalist nation-state could not be exploited to satisfy the particular interests of groups. 
These groups, mostly within the ranks of the middle classes, when solely engaged in 
satisfying their particular interests, would also be alienated from their real national 
identity. As also referred by Safa, in Milliyetr;iligin Birkar; Hakikati (Some Truths 
about Nationalism), loss of this sense of belonging and responsibility towards the 
nation would entail the loss of real individuality. 3-l 
Safa in his i~z ve Kahraman (The Businessman and the Hero) provided one of 
the explicit critics of utilitarian ethics of the middle classes.35 Olken's contribution on the 
issue could not also be underestimated. As reflected in his A$k Ahia/a or insani 
Vatanperverlik (Humanist Patriotism), both written in the early 1930s, neither materialism 
nor quest for a better material life could be taken as the source of ethics as though they 
were also the products of modem society. 36 In the world of isolated and alienated 
individual, everything became devoid of spirit, but the "life span of an human being is not 
his personal property only. It is also a property of the society. The conscious and 
subconscious of the society?'"7 Thus, sensibilities of the individual could only be realized in 
its sociability in nation. Traditionalist-conservative emphasis on culture and tradition re-
asserted itself at this point since these individual sensibilities could be gained when tradition 
and culture were valued as essentials of this sense of sociability. 
Traditionalist conservatives still affirmed the role of economics and primacy of 
private initiative and property and acclaimed that in its primary aim of creating a new 
society the Kemalist state intended to stimulate industrialization and urbanization. Safa 
revealed this basic contention by announcing that the ultimate Republican policy 
objective had to be the acceleration of urbanization and rationalization; whereas 
34 Safa, ''Milliyet.;:iligin Birka.;: Hakikati," p. 5. 
35 Safa, "4 AdaJm ve Kahraman," p.5. See also Baltac1oglu, Sosvoloji, p. 211. 
36 See also Olken, "Fakat Vicdan t.;:in 01.;:ii Nedir?" (But What is the Criterion t0r Conscience) lstanbul, (June 1, 1946), 
pp. 3-4. 
37 Ib"d 4 1 ., p .. 
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Baltac1oglu, Olken and Tun~ referred to these ideals as industrialization and 
development of urban society. Agaoglu had always remained within the confines of 
smooth etatism functioned as a shield for private property and initiative. They were 
aware of the fact that what was worth conserving were those things that had to serve 
to further the consolidation of the new, urbanized Turkish society. 
"Hybrid Organicism" and State As a Nationalized and Re-Traditionalized Institution 
Traditionalist conservatism's peculiar break from any kind of mechanical rational 
reading of the revolutionary state practices could best be illustrated by 
traditionalist-conservative vision on society and state. As noted in the preceding 
chapters, in traditional conservative vocabulary, national history shaped the present 
day structures of the society. Preexisting institutions and experiences had an effect 
on the nature and characteristics of modern Turkish society. Turkish society was 
not the product of a scientific-bureaucratic state. Traditional forms and practices 
had always manifested themselves in the existing political, social, and political 
institutions of Turkish society. For the traditionalist-conservative circles to found a 
society upon untraditional bases was impossible and Tuny pointed out this as 
follows: 
The conviction that it is possible to reach the truth only by the use of reason is the 
infirmity of reason. Hence. when the power of reason is perceived as absolute the real 
man, his value. the limits of his/its real power become meaningless ... Thinking and living 
become totally abstract and artificial... This infirmity is most conspicuous when the 
history is conceptualiz.ed on totally speculative grounds. 38 
Preceding historical determinants, which were embodied m ethics and laws, 
combined with existing circumstances to determine the particular nature of the 
society at a particular time. Indeed, Baltac1oglu' s "traditionalism;" Safa' s focus on 
"living tradition," which had been employed to distance him from Islamic 
traditionalism supposedly aimed to revive the dead religious traditions and 
practice; Olken's emphasis on "culture and tradition" as the essence of the 
"Turkish renaissance," and Tun~' s interest in state, nation, organicism, mechanism, 
38 Turn;, '"Akilc1hgm Kuvvet ve Zaatlan," (The Power and the Weaknesses of Rationalism) Cwnhuriyet, 
(August30, 1941). 
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rationalism, and empiricism, 39 can be seen as the symptoms of traditionalist-
conservative sensibility to elaborate a peculiar understanding of tradition, 
organism, Reason, and society. 
Baltac1oglu's "traditionalism" was based on the premise that national character 
was historical. Ancient institutions and national ethics, which were seen part of living 
and experienced culture, were seen as the irrational layers of national consciousness 
even those ancient institutions, prejudices and customs themselves ceased to exist 40 As 
also revealed in Olken's Veraset ve Cemiyet (Inheritance and Society), History, above 
all tradition, led societies to adopt themselves to new circumstances.41 Contemporary 
problems of society and feasible solutions to them could only be found in reference to 
customs, tradition, and History. 
As already shown, traditionalist-conservative inspirations from Bergsonism 
which resulted in a timidness towards the destructive effects of any kind of a priori 
imaginary constructs, such as "Reason," also created a distance from the mechanic 
and/or rationalist conceptions of state-society relation since, as revealed by Safa, 
society was an unquestionable living supraindividual entity.42 However, pure organic 
metaphors derived from biological sciences were also disapproved by the traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals, as in the case of Safa's Biyoloji ve Milliyetfilik (Biology and 
Nationalism) or Dlken's Yirminci As1r Filozojlarz (The Twentieth Century 
Philosophers), as another variant of reductionism, like atomist individualism. 43 The 
39 Tun~, "Mekanik ve Organik Davalan," "Mekanik ve Organik Davalaruun Yeni Zamanda Qe\:irdigi Sathalar," 
(The Stages of the Questions of Mechanics and Organic in Modem Time) Cumhuriyet, (September, 20, 1942 ), 
"Mekanik ve Organik Davalanrun Kl)1Detleri ve Bunlardan Almacak Dersler," (The Value of the Questions of 
Mechanics and Organic and Lessons to be Drawn From These) Cwnhuriyet. (September 27, 1942). 
40 Baltac10glu, "'Miirteci Kimdir?" (Who is Reactionary?) Yeni Adam, 97 (November 7, 1935), p. 3, "MOrteci 
imi!?im!" (I was Said to Be a Reactionary!) Yeni Adam, 139 (August 27, 1936), p.2, "Tilrk In1alab1," (The 
Turkish Revolution) Yeni Adam, 146 (October 17, 1936), p. 2, "Tilrk Rejimini Ni~in Severim," (Why I Like the 
Turkish Regime?) Yeni Adam. 247 {September 21, 1939), p.2, "Cumhuriyet inaruyorurn," (I Believe in 
Republic) Yeni Adam. 357 (October 30, 1942), p.2, "Ananecilik ve Muhafaz.akarhk," (Traditionalism and 
Conservatism) Yeni Adam, 370 (January 29, 1942), p. 2. 
41 Olken, Veraset ve Cemiyet (Inheritance and Society) (lstanbul: KutulmllJl Matbaas1, 1957), pp. 6-25. The 
book was written in 1924 but published in 1957. 
42 See Safa, "Sosyoloji ve Milliye~lik" p.5 For further criticism of mechanism, see Safa, "Felsefe ve Milliy~" 
(Philosophy and Natiooalism) Cmaralt:J. 41 (July 4, 1942), p.5; T~" Mekanik ve Organik Davalan." 
43 See Safa, "Biyoloji ve Milliyet9ilik," (Biology and Nationalism) Cmaralh. 38 (June 13, 1942), p.5. Also see 
Dlken, Yinninci Asrr Fi1oz.otlan (The Tw~~ntieth Century Philosophers) (tstanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1936), pp. 357-4. 
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appeal to hybrid-organism, a term which I have coined to imply their personalism, did 
not result in a pure organic conception of society. 44 Nevertheless, traditionalist-
conservative vision of a self-creating society as the lacuna of culture, when coupled 
with their specific view on Kemalist paternalistic state, resulted in a peculiar 
traditionalist-conservative design for the contextualization and re-traditionalization of 
universal state institutions in reference to tradition and culture. Self-sufficient society, 
with its authentic and genuine cultural structure would be protected by the paternalistic 
Kemalist state. State's capability to maintain unity and stability depended upon its 
responsiveness to authentic culture. 45 
Despite traditionalist-conservative appeal to the ideas that emphasized the organic 
nature of society, they were still nuances in respect to their conception of organicism and 
mechanism. Tum;: held Aristotle responsible for the invention of the terms "mechanical" 
and "organic." However, these terms acquired a specific meaning in Descartes' mechanical 
rationalism. Aristotle employed the term "mechanics" only to imply "technics" and "science 
of invention." Until modern times, including the Middle Ages, the term came to denote 
"scientific technics employed to produce machines." In Descartes' vocabulary, for Tum~, 
there emerged a shift in the meaning of the term. By the rise of Cartesianism, the term came 
to denote a general approach towards the functioning of nature and life. Nature was seen as 
the big governing machine. In Tun~'s words: 
According to this theory nature is compared to a machine. Thus, similar to a machine 
which is built up of parts with a capacity of motion, nature is also composed of separate 
parts. Thus, the difference between nature and a machine is not one of quality, but 
quantity. It is to that extent that the theoreticians in this strand proposed the rewording of 
nature by machine of universe. According to Descartes machinery resemble the machine 
of nature as they become smaller. Later naturalists employed the term mechanical for the 
explanation of objects on the grounds of their shapes and motion. Here mechanical is 
"al 46 synonymous to maten . 
44 Baltacmglu, "idarenin Sim," (111e Secret of Administration) Yeni Adam, 579 (January 31, 1946), p.2. 
45 Idem. See also Baltac1oglu, "Gelenek," (Tradition) Yeni Adam, 417 (December 24, 1942) p.2, "Zavalh 
Gelenek," (Poor Tradition) Yeni Adam, 484 (April 6, 1944), p.2; Tunty, "Mekanik ve Organik Davalan," 
'"Mekanik ve Organik Davalannm Yeni Zamanda Geyinligi Sathalar," "Mekanik ve Organik Davalanrun 
Ki~metleri ve Bunlardan Almacak Dersler," "lstikbal i.yin Aranan Yeni Ufuklar." For criticism of"mechanism," 
see Safa "Sosyoloji ve Milliyet.yilik," p. 5. 
46 Tunty, "Mekanik ve Organik Davalan." For Sata·s discussion on Descartes, Hobbes, Spino?B and Leibniz as 
the founding figures of mechanism and rationalism. see Safa, "Sosyoloji ve Milliye~ilik" p.5. 
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In this respect, traditionalist-conservative distance from mechanism was ultimately 
coupled with an equal distrust towards materialism, formalism and rationalism. As 
emphasized by Safa and Tune;, in modem times, rationalism and mechanism were 
extended to human affairs by Leibnitz's monadism and Spinoza's rationalist ethics. 
Consequently, all kinds of human products, be they visible institutions such as state or 
family, and all kinds of human disposition, be they ethics, aesthetics, and justice, came 
to be explained as the universal disposition of rational human machine which 
categorically transcended all cultural and historical differences among societies and 
even the natural differences between individuals. 47 
For Tune;, the term "organic," until German Romantics, was first used by Aristotle 
to emphasize the priority of the whole to its parts, vitality and mobility to the statis. It was 
what Safa discus.sed in his Sosyoloji ve Milliyet9ilik (Sociology and Nationalism). Referring 
to Sorokins' classification of organist schoo~ Safa stated that contemporary organicism 
could be understood as a challenging philosophical, psycho-social, bio-organical 
perspective raised against liberal mechanism. 48 In fact, what was appealing in organism was 
its philosophical openings offered on society and man. In Safa's words, 
Philosophical organism perceive society as superior and external to the individuals. 
However, it does not compare society with any biological being and/or organ. It rejects 
mechanical conception of society. In contrast to the liberals, philosophical organism does 
not accept that society is a mechanical and artificial entity which emerged out of human 
will and by a "social contract. "49 
In Middle Ages organicism supplemented religious metaphysics. Politically, "the 
Whole" represented the Church or Christian Community in the Western context 
whereas it was umma in the Islamic world. 5° From the eighteenth century onwards 
German romantics secularized "organic metaphors." German Romanticism, for Turn;, 
47 Tum;: viewed Descartes as the founding figure of mechanism, and Democritus as his advocator among the 
ancient Greek philosophers. For him, modern criticisms of mechanism, as developed by Berkeley, were in a 
pitfall of mechanism. Mechanism could provide explanations about the forms and laws of "process" but what 
was lacking was those means of widerstanding multiple complex processes of ··becoming.·· See Tt~, .. Mekanik ve 
Organik Davalan," ''Mekanik ve Organik Davalannm Yeni l.amanda Gel;:irdigi Sathalar," ''Mekanik ve Organik 
Davalanrun Ktymetleri ve Bunlardan Ahnacak Dersler." Safu viewed Spinoza as one of the protoganist of mechanimi in 
ethics. See Safa, "Sosyoloji ve Milliy~ilik" p. 5. Also see Olken, ''Ferd ve Cemiyet," pp. 57-70. 
48 Safa, idem. 
49 Tuner, '"Gencrlik Ncreye GidiyorT p.3. 
50 Safa, "Sosyoloji ve Milliyet~ilik'' p.5; "Biyoloji ve Milliyetcrilik," p.5,. 
327 
represented the great endeavour for the "reorganization of society"51 towards 
achieving nationalism. Thus, the organicist approach towards the state, society, law 
and history was devoid of any religious connotations and was used as an antidote for 
religious metaphysics. Society and its parts, namely the individual, also gained heavy 
emphasis in modem and secularized version of organisms. In this respect, Turn;: 
highlighted the reasons for traditionalist-conservative appeal to secular vocabulary 
designed in reference to "the metaphor of hybrid-organism." Tune; characterized this 
transformation in the meaning of the term as follows: 
... However. it should be noted that in philosophical organism, nature which is perceived 
as an organism. is not identical to a nature which had fulfilled it becoming; but a living 
organism which is on a path of constant progress. This change in the conceptualization of 
nature was reflected especially on the sphere of history. Accordingly, history is conceived as a 
being of an evolutionary process. rather than breakthroughs. of WICOnscious instincts. rather 
than artificial theorizing, and by a power of the whole, rather than a rational individual. 52 
He further added that 
As far as the practical sphere is concerned organicist theory also affected scientific 
methodology. In practice it induced incorporation of the individual into the whole, to that 
extent that during the heydays of this theory the amelioration of the individual depended 
on the whole. At the same time the individual was attributed with the self-consciousness 
that he is an indispensable part of whole. In this respect the indi~idual is not just a part 
of a whole, but also a member of it. Thus, there is an organic solidarity between the whole 
and its parts. In other words, the whole is identified with a body.53 
In this context, modem nation-state was viewed as a function of national culture that 
had been conceived as an organic realm in which the universally-sanctioned institutions 
of the state would further be nationalized and contextualized. Only a nationalized state, 
which was an organic part of the national culture and tradition, could foster the moral 
development of its citizens and then it could transform itself to people's state. 54 In this 
respect, radical culturalism enforced by the state implied the rejection of economism of 
contemporary liberalism and socialism and universalism of former religious orthodoxy. 
51 Tune;:, "Mekanik ve Organik Davalannm Yeni Zamanda ~irdigi. Sathalar." See Safa, "Felsefe ve 
Milliyetc;:ilik," pp. 5, 11. 
52 Idem. For characterization of society as an organism. see Safa, "Milliyetc;:iligin Birkac;: Hakikati," p.5 
53 Tune;:, '"Mekanik ve Organik Davalan." Tun~ noted that organic conception of state and society also paved the 
way for the development of their criticisms in the modem ages. The criticism of organism was first developed in 
England to ensure further political and economic freedom to the individual. Based on individual as the 
constitutive category of all social, political and economic activity, he stated, criticisms of organicism viewed 
society as a contractual relationship among rational individuals. In short, terms of organism were employed but 
the relationship among them was reversed. The whole was replaced with its parts. 
54 Tun~, "Devlet ve Terbiye," (State and Education) CumhuriYet. (November 22, 1942). 
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Search for a Reconciliation Between the Legal Order of the State and the Moral 
Order of the Society 
Traditionalist-conservative appeal to the secular vocabulary in reference to an hybrid-
organic metaphor also hinted for new functions attributed to the state in its search to 
promote new national sensibilities. Relatedly, state paternalism over society was the 
ultimate manifestation of the traditionalist-conservative search for the protection of 
national essence and interest. 55 Moreover, appeals to organic metaphors resulted in a 
conception of state as an ideal-type institutionalization of national values which would 
safeguard the natural order of society. These were alternative paths for unique national 
development in terms of multiple processes in the social, political, and economic 
spheres. Thus, traditionalist conservatives resorted mutual-dependency between the 
state and society. Turn;: further elaborated this point as follows: 
. . . Today's states and nations have common origins of existence: and the existence of one 
dependence on the e."<istence of the other. This is the main point of distinction which 
differentiates them from their antecedents. Thus, distinction between state and nation is 
unthinkable. It is natural that, due to the complexity of the issues and the rather limited hwnan 
power, there arise some temporary tensions. HO\\e\'er, in the end these tensions strengthen the 
solidarity in-between, and contribute to reciprocal adaptation. Today's state, essentially is just 
the reflection of the public power of the citiz.ens. It is formed by the utilization of the public 
power of citizens who live on shared territories. The nations' ~tion for a state power 
depends on tradition on the one hand, and on contingencies, on the other... HO\\e\'er, the 
reason of obedience is a matter of reciprocal identification bemeen the state and the nation, and 
of the fuct that the distinction betm:en the mo would cause an absolute disaster. 56 
Traditionalist-conservative state was not a mere instrument of national 
perfection which imposed a rational order over the society. If it remained as an 
institution "above-society" then its ideals would never be consolidated in society. Tun~ 
envisioned a state order which was in harmony with society. According to Tun~, as 
also revealed in Baltac1oglu's Tiirk Rejimini Nir:;in Severim, (Why I Like the Turkish 
Regime?), legal rational authority of the state had to be reconciled with the 
"spontaneous moral order of the nation."57 Turn;: and Baltac1oglu's conceptions of 
55 Baltac1oglu, "Toprak Kanunu," p.::?, "Hecy:yin Ostiinde Vatan Var," p.2. See also Tuns:, "Devlet ve Millet." 
Safa. "Ekonomi ve Milliyets:ilik," p.5. For Safa, state had to act on behalf of the public interest when there 
emerges a tension between labour and capital. 
56 Tun9, "Devlet ve Millet.·· 
57 See Baltac1oglu, "Tiirk Rejimini Ni9in Severim," p.2, "Millet Nedir, Ne Degildir?" (What is or not 
Nation?)Yeni Adam. 616 (December 17, 1942) p.2. Morality, history and tradition were seen as the pillars of the 
natural order of the society, see Tun9, --~ecaat." For state paternalism, see Safa., "Milli Ekonomi;' (National 
Economy) Cutaralt1, 57, (November 24, 1942), p.5. Also see Tun9, "Eski ve Yeni Donya GOrilijlerimiz," (Our 
Old and New Worldviews) Cumhurivet, (October 11, 1942). 
329 
state, as well as Safa's understanding of the ideal state as an interventionist-
protectionist instrument of the society, in contrast to the impotent liberal state of 
western societies, fell firmly within the paternalist tradition. 58 As noted by Tun~ 
... the progress of the new life. accumulation of e~µ:rience. and the rise of new 
beings;incidents and responsibilities led to the emergence of an unexpected resistance 
against mechanical theorizing. The rapid development of economy and industry 
eventually resulted in the intensification of the relation between men. in the di\ision of 
labour and hence in the increase of solidarity. In the face of the community. that has 
emerged out of this life. the differentiated individuals of the mechanistic notion 
di ed. 59 sappear 
This envisioned model of philosophical organism, when applied to state - society relations, 
was responsible for traditionalist-conservative challenge of Kemalist positivist modernism. 
Thus, Baltac1oglu tried to point out that the universal state had to be re-traditionalized to 
further maintain the unity with authentic society which was a "living entity, composed of 
separate parts''6° Society and state essentially referred to different modes of "orders" for 
reconciliation in the process of re-traditionalization of the universal strucrures of 
modernity. 61 This was the only way to achieve the unity between the rational order of the 
state and cultural order of society. If it was achieved, then, the historical dualisms, be they 
cultural, legal and administrative, inherited from the preceding Ottoman regime, could also 
be eliminated. Only on this new relationship between the society and the state, the 
fundamental principles of national ethics would prevent the growth of egoism and 
selfishness. As stated by Tun9, only the new holism represented by nationalized state could 
further foster the deepening of the sense of social obligation. However, Tun9, like Safa, 
drew his limits for this new holism represented by the national state. Accordingly, 
Holism of the new ages should not hinder the original development of the individual .... A 
general ethics has to complement this policy ... Individuals have to be trained with a 
creative ethics and political attitudes which would ensure the development of the whole 
and civiliz.ation. 62 
58 Safa, "Fikir Hfirriyeti," (The Freedom of Thought) Cmaralt1. 8 (September 27, 1941), p.5. 
59 Tum;, "Mekanik ve Organik Davalanrun Yeni Zamanlarda ~irdigi Sathalar." 
60 Baltac1oglu, "'Diinyamn Ol~lan," p.2. See also Baltac1oglu, "'Milli Mant1ga Dogru." (Towards the National 
Rationale) Yeni Adam. 447 (July 22, 1943) p.2. See also Baltac1oglu, "Ahlakta Tiirke Dogru,"p. 2. 
61 Baltac1oglu, ··sosyete Hayatmda Normal ve Anormal," (The Normal and the Abnormal in Social Life) Yeni 
Adam, 354 (October, 9, 1941), p.2, "Ahlakta Tiirke Dogru," p.2, "Gelenek," p. 2. For a similar evaluation, see 
Turn(, "'Mekanik ve Organik Davalanrun K1~metleri ve Bunlardan Almacak Dersler." Also see Safa, "Sosyoloji 
ve Milliyet.,:ilik" p.5; Baltac1oglu, "Ananecilik ve Muhafazakarhk" p. 2, "Milli Anane" p.2. 
62 Tun.,:, "Mekanik ve Organik Davalannm K1)metleri ve Bunlardan Almacak Dersler." 
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It meant that there should be congruenc1es between the national order 
represented by the national ethics and that has been protected and enforced by the 
institutional fabric of the modem state. The peculiar conception of nationalization of 
the state and its institutional framework fed from this precept. In traditionalist-
conservative vocabulary, nationalization did not come to mean to force the society to 
transcend itself towards some abstract ideals. As emphasized by Baltac1oglu, 
nationalization [read re-traditionalization] would maintain a coincidence between the 
procedures and rules enforced by the state and values experienced in society. 63 The 
existing political order had to seek its legitimacy in reference to its closeness to the 
cultural practices of the society. Traditionalist conservative turned his face to the 
cultural ethical realm in handling with the corruption of daily life by the historical 
diffusion of an abstract model of westernization [read modernization] through a 
modernizing state. 
Traditionalist conservative did favour a paternalist state but also a "limited 
government," in a special sense. Governments were seen as instruments to make 
practical arrangements in society.64 For traditionalist conservative, government had to 
foster policies which would maintain social, economic development of the citizens. 
Government, which was different than the state, could not be the source and model for 
public virtue. Perfection of the citizens could only be secured through expansion of the 
role they played in the functional division of labour in society. It did not come to mean 
that government did not have any role in the moral life of the nation. Yet, the guide of 
nation was not the government, but it was history and tradition being promoted and 
protected by the national state. 
As noted earlier, for Agaoglu as well as Safa and Baltac1oglu, society, 
government and the state were different entities. Government was a weaker entity, best 
confined to the tending of existing arrangements. The ability of the government to 
63 Baltac1oglu, "TOrk Rejirnini Nii;in Severim," p.2. 
64 Baltac10glu, "Sav~tan Sonra Ttirkiye," p.2. See also Baltac10glu, "Plans1z Htikiirnetler," (Governments 
Without a Plan) Yeni Adam, 565 (October 25, 1945), p.2. 
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manipulate the society was inherently limited. Yet, the state was more than the sum of 
its functions. It was the symbol of the new public spirit. Rather than pursuing some 
abstract models of modernization that were seen as magic formulas of human 
perfection, government had to find a guiding reference in history and in national 
culture. Moreover, as stated by Ulken, government had to strengthen local 
administrations especially the municipalities, and had to contribute to the development 
of people's ability of self government and initiative through its support for 
foundations. 65 It was also expected to back voluntary foundations and professional 
associations which would bestow the ability of the individual to take initiative. 66 
However, the ideal of Republican government, as it had to best reflect itself in its 
educational policy, was not to create a model of revolutionary virtuous people. This 
was the core principle of Baltac10glu's educational philosophy. Moreover, Baltac1oglu 
affirmed that self-government had to be considered as the relevant method of 
education. 67 Baltac1oglu had claimed that self-government and the fostering of 
individual's sense of initiative-taking were fundamental principles of his pedagogy 
which viewed the learning as an empirical and experimental process. For him, self-
govemment would also foster the development of a realistic approach. 68 
For the traditionalist conservative, as already noted before, national/collective 
and individual/particular perfection could only be realized in work process which was 
based on a functional division of labour in society because, as assured by Baltaetoglu 
"work leads to creativity."69 In this respect, Tun~'s paraphrasing from the well-known 
Faust of Goethe was illustrative. For him "what exists at the beginning was neither 
6'\ .. 
- Ulken, "Hiirlilk ve Mesuliyet", p.4. 
66 Idem. 
67 Baltac1oglu, "Alh Umdeye Gore Terbiye IV - Cumhuriyet Terbiyesi," (Education According to the Six 
Principles IV -Republican Education) Yeni Adam, 224 (April 13, 1938), p.14. 
68 Baltac1oglu, "Koy Enstitfileri," (Village Institutes) Y eni Adam, 279 (May 2, 1940), p. 2, "Yeni Devletin 
Kiiltiir Programlan," (The Cultural Programs of the New State) Yeni Adam. 66 (April 4, 1935), p. 10. Also see 
Baltac1oglu, ictimai Mektep Prensipleri (The Principles of Social School) (1stanbul: Tecelli Matbaas1, 1935), 
Terbivenin K1vmeti ve Vas1talan (The Value and Means of Education) (innit: Muallimlerevi Ne:¢yatl, 1933). 
69 Baltac1oglu., .. tstedigimiz Terbiye Nedir?" (What Kind of Education Do We Demand'!) Yeni Adam, 58 
<February 7, 1935), p. 2. 
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logos nor power but action, namely labour."70 It is not surpnsmg to see that 
Baltac1oglu' s new educational philosophy was also based on the same principle. Thus, 
for him, real work bestowed the man a real ethics of survival and a realist life 
conception. 71 It is noteworthy to remind that this conception of work was not in 
contradiction with their conception of man as moral entity. n Yet, work ethics would 
promote solidarity and mutual-dependence among the citizens. As revealed in Olken' s 
A~k Ahlakz, it would also contribute to the development of a sense of responsibility 
shaped by the hierarchical structure of the modem stratified societies (meratipler cemiyeti). 
Class and Democratic Order 
Individuals in society were interdependent through various roles they acquired in the 
functional division of labour in society. Their unique identity was consolidated in a 
sense of affection to the moral and political order of the society since it was the society, 
that is the surrounding moral community which shaped and socialized the individual 
personality. Thus, individual, could be conceived as "the substratum and carrier of the 
moral unity called, society."73 State policies had to motivate the individual for self-
realization and to contribute to the development of a unique democratic order. 
Democratic order was generally appraised as the best means for individual self-
realization, without forcing him to grow into maturity through governmental sanctions. 
A basic demarcation line with Kemalists, who favoured a united classle$ society, 
was that modem democracies, in traditionalist-conservative vocabulary, was class 
societies. 74 Emphases made on the themes of solidarity and functional dependence in 
70 Tww, "I~ Adamlan," (Businessmen) Cumhuriyet, (February 24, 1942); Baltac1oglu, "Topluluk Terbiyesi 
Nii;:in Veremiyoruz?" (Why Can Not We Provide CommUllal Education) Yeni Adam. 172 (April 15, 1937), p. 8. 
71 Baltac1oglu, "Toplu Tedris Teknigi," (The Technique of Mass Education) YeniAdam. 65 (March28, 1935), p.5. 
72 Baltac1oglu, "Milli Anane," p. 2. 
73 Baltac1oglu, "Yonetim Korarm," (Administrative Theory) Yeni Adam. 441 (June 10, 1943), p.2. See also 
Baltac1oglu, "Toplu Tedris Teknigi;' p. 5; Dlken, ''Ferd ve Cemiyet," pp. 57-70, ·'Maksad;' (The Objective) 
Felscfo Y1lhW.. I (1932), pp. 1-7. 
74 For Balta,oglu, distinguishing charncterics of the denux.utic order were the development of science, industry and 
secularism. See Ball:acloglu, "Tezat," p. I, "Demokraside Terbiye," p. 2, ''lnktlab Edebiyan Ne Olabilir'?" p.7, 
''Sanayileyiren Devlet," (lndustrialmng State) Y eni Adam. 49 (December 6, 1934 ), p. 4; T~, "Bugiinkii. Hayatnmzm 
Aki~lan," (The Flows of Our Life Today) Hm'.m 6, 136 (July 1939) quoted in Atatttrk Devri Fikir HayatJ II, (Intellectual 
Life in Atati.irk's Era), Mehmet Kaplan. inci Enginiln ct. al., eds. (Ankara: Killtiir Bakanhgi Yaymlan, 1992), pp. 331-3. 
Also see Dlken, Milletlerin UyaruS1 (The Awakening of the Nations) (lstanbul: 1945), pp. 56-58, "Demokratik 
Cemiyetlerde ileri ve Geri," (Back and Forth in Demcx,utic Societies) Istanbul. (July 15, 1946), pp. 3-5. 
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traditionalist-conservative texts did not come to mean that traditionalist conservatives 
dismissed the term "class" from their political literature. On the contrary, they were aware 
of the fact that classes and political and economic tensions among them were essential to 
understand the historical dynamics of modem society. Thus, Safa claimed that non-chaotic 
class relations in Turkey did not come to mean that there was no classes in Turkey.75 But 
this emphasis on "class" did not come to mean that traditionalist-conservative intellectuals 
viewed classes as basic agents of politics in modem societies. Classes had only an illustrative 
power to understand modern society. Classes only appeared as part of the social order for 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals. Associational institutions, as argued by (Jlken in 
Hurluk ve Mesulluk (Freedom and Responsibility), such as foundations, voluntary 
associations, professional corporations, which also emerged from the process of works, 
were essential for politics. 76 They placed emphasis on these organizations, since the 
development of human personality by involvement in these units would both contribute to 
the development of democratic politics of responsibility and a sense of belongingness, 
solidarity, and dependence, and would lead the individual to realize his responsibilities to his 
nation. 
Thus, politics had to take as its aim the integration of nation and to set up an 
organic balance among functionally differentiated classes, since, for Dlken, 
monopolization of wealth in modern societies had resulted in severe political and 
economic tensions. Still, these tensions were natural, for Safa, because every society 
was based on competition, divergence and struggle among its members. 77 These were 
the natural outcomes of the normal functioning of the society. Besides tensions and 
competition, there also emerged functional dependence among these classes and 
groups based on modem division of labour. Thus, state, for Safa had to be a means for 
arbitration for the natural economic and political tensions in society. 78 In a similar vein, 
Tuny claimed that 
75 Saia, --t~de ve D1~da Milli Ekonomi," p.5. See also Safa "Ekonomi ve Milliyet~ilik," p.5. Safa argued 
that there are two factors of production, namely labour and capital. These two factors of production generate 
value and value circulates in the fonns of wage and profit. 
76 .. 
Ulken, "HlirlUk ve Mes'ulluk," p. 4. 
11 Safa, "i~eride ve Dt~da Milli Ekonomi," p.5. See also "Safa, "Ekonomi ve Milliyet~ilik,"' p.5. 
78 For further discussions on corporatism, see Safa, "Milli Cemiyetlerde ideal," p.5 
334 
the state which protects the institution of private property eventually goes under the 
dominance of social groups/classes and of social body. The direction that an object takes. 
depends on the junction of the multitude of the forces which act upon it. Thus. in our 
time. the main goal of the states is to find out this junction. 79 
Agaoglu' s appraisal of "society as a set of tensions created by the economic 
organization of the society;" Safa's discussions on corporatism as a method of state 
arbitration between capital and labour and Tun~'s model of "state as an arbitrator" 
between capital and labour; 80 Baltac1oglu' s paternal state and Olk en's classification of 
modem society in reference to a continuous competition between monopolized wealth, 
organized labour, and traditional peasantry, were an integral part of the traditionalist -
conservative attempt to incorporate the concepts of 'state,' 'class,' and 'conflict' into 
the Republican political vocabulary. Their attempt was in contradiction with the 
Kemalist contention which viewed the society as a classless organization of united 
brotherhood of citizens. 81 Classes, conflicts, and tensions were natural outcomes of the 
modem economic division of labour. Thus, in order to control these tensions and to 
maintain an harmonious organic integration of particular interests around the general 
national one Safa proposed a corporatist system. In his words, 
National economy gathers these unions within the framework of cooperative order which 
is under state control. All those issues concerning consumption, production, finance, 
wage/salary, price are handled in these cooperation's whereby employees and employers 
have equal weight. In the case of failure of consensus between two sides, State interferes 
in the name of public. 82 
In this respect, Tuny stated that the state had to act as an arbitrator among various 
interests in order to protect the general interest. Thus, he assured that 
due to the acceleration in the socialist movements in the past years. almost all strands of 
liberal thought have acknowledged the indispensability of the enhancement of the power 
of the state to the expense of their preceding emphasis on private property. On the other 
hand unions have been formed to protect common interest and to limit the power of state 
and private property, which are the two most powerful institutions of the new world .. 
79 Tww, "Devlet ve Millet." For consequences of multiple class tensions on state, and evaluations on 
corpotarism as a system conflict management, see Safa, "Ekonomi ve Milliyet¥ilik," p.5. 
80 See Safa, "Milli Cemiyetlerde ideal," p.5, "Milli Birlik ve Ahlak," p. 4; TWl\: "!stikbal 1¥in Yeni Ufuklar" 
Also Tuny, ·'Bugiinkii Amerikan Dii~iincesi ve Diinya Kurtul~u Tasavvuru," (Contemporary American Thought 
and the Imagination for the Liberation of the World) Cwnhuriyet, (April 18, 1943); Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferd (The 
State and Individual) (lstanbul: Sanayi-i Nefise Bas1mevi 1933), p. 43. 
81 Ulken, "Demok.ratik Cemiyetlerde ileri Geri," p.4. A.gaoglu, ibid. See also Taha Parla, Ziya Gokalp. 
Kemalizm ve TOrkiye"de Korporati:zm (Ziya Gokalp, Kemalism, and Corporatism in Turkey) (lstanbul: ileti~im 
Yaymlan, 1989), pp. 81-101. 
82 See Safa, "Ekonomi ve Milliyet(filik.," p. 5. 
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States and nations of our time face with such important responsibilities as the just 
arrangement of division of labour. negation of class and group differentiation and the 
cqualiz.ation of their economic interests. 83 
Having characterized modem society as a tension-ridden entity, traditionalist 
conservatives affinned that the best means for reconciling these tensions would be 
parliamentarianism since it would guarantee the political representation of interests. 
Representation would balance and harmonize the controversial relations among labour, 
wealth, and land and would pave the middle way between economic freedom and political 
equality. For Olken, democracy, in its modem meaning, referred to 
the rule by people. It is the acceptance of principles of freedom and equality. at first hand 
The basic problem of the present period, that is the practical possibility of democracy, 
arises out of the question of the compatibility of these two principles. In other words the 
question runs as follows: Can freedom be fully ensured if legal equality is not 
accompanied by the functional freedom of the citizens. that is economic equality?84 
The most important social question in modem democracies was to maintain a balance 
between freedom and equality and to harmonize the interests among land, labour, and 
capital. The answers provided for the methods of maintaining this balance among land, 
labour and capital characterized their respective conceptions on reformism and/or 
radicalism in politics. Basic features of reformist and radical politics were formed 
constituted in reference to the appreciated rhythm and harmony in establishing or 
challenging a balance among land, labour and capital. 85 Thus, "conservative" and/or 
"liberal" aspirations were assumed to derive from the intensity of responsiveness to the 
"social question," generated by the unique tensions among land, labour and capital86 
but not always in relation to political stands in religious issues. 
It must be noted that "land, labour and wealth question" and "democracy" as 
defined by Ulken, and Baltac1oglu in his Demokrasi ve Sanat, were relevant only in a 
highly differentiated modem capitalist economy with a sophisticated division of labour. 
It was the theory of political representation, which the traditionalist conservatives were 
83 Ulken, "Demokratik Cemiyetlerde Ileri Geri," p.4; Tun~, "Devlet ve Millet." Also see Safa, Milli Ahlak," 
p. 5, "Milliyetiriligin Birkat; Hakikati," p. 5. 
84 .. . 
Ulken, idem. 
85 Idem. 
86 See also Baltac1oglu, "ingiltere"de Siyasal Partiler,"' (Political Parties in England) Yeni Adam. 164 (February 
18, 1937), p.6. 
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committed to. In line with Ulken, Baltac10glu claimed that one of the important 
features of modern political parties was their relations with functional groups m 
society. 87 Political parties \Vere not merely instruments for the articulation of 
particularistic economic and/or political interests but were expected to function as a 
means of reconciliation between particular and general interest. 88 They were expected 
to be responsive to the "social question," as Dlken chose to pronounce. This emphasis 
on political parties, as means of maintaining balance among land, labour and wealth 
supported the corporatist aspirations within traditionalist-conservative intellectuals. 
Only through this theory of representation social and political justice could be 
maintained among three fundamental interests. 89 
Furthermore, modern political ideologies could be characterized as 
"progressive" and/or "reactionary" in terms of their conception of the relations among 
"land, labour and capital." Accordingly, 
In modem democracies, "social problem", finding solutions to the problem of land and 
labour, has become the basic issue on the agenda. Those theories and political parties 
which dwell upon this problem. and try to find solutions without disregarding the 
majority of the citiz.ens should be regarded as progressivist. And those theories and 
political parties which do not consider this as a problem, and which give priority to riches 
at the expense of the common good should be regarded as reactionary. 90 
For Dlken, conservatism, as a modern political ideology, gained its likely importance in 
reference to its cautious approach towards the "social question." In Dlken's words: 
In general, there might be different proposals regarding the function of the parliament 
with respect to social problem. Those which propose rapid action can be named as radical, 
those which propose slow action taking as conservative and those which opt for moderate 
action as free. 91 
87 Bal -1 "P ·1 ., ., 11 tac1og u, artJ. er, pp. -· . 
88 Idem. For Baltac1oglu.. the newly established Democratic Party and National Development Party (Milli 
Kalkmma Panisi) were factions of the Republican People's Party. He proposed the Republican People's Party to 
transform itself to a "party of association" from a "party of revolution." For Baltac10glu modern political parties 
which articulated and harmonized the associational interests would be more functional than factions of the 
"'revolutionary parties." See also Baltac1oglu, "Muhalefot Gruplan," (The Opposition Groups) Yeni Adam. 601 
(July 4. 1946), p.2. For Safa's evaluation on political parties, see Safa, "'Gazete, Halk ve HUktlmet," (Daily, 
People and Govenunent) Tasviri Etkar quoted in Yeni Adam. 414 (December 2, 1942), p.9. For criticism of 
Democrats, see Safa, "Celal Bayar'm itirafl," p. 10. Safa. like Baltac10glu, pointed out that the newly emerged 
political parties were the factions of the ruling People's Party. 
89 Viken. "Demokratik Cemiyetlerde Ileri Geri," p. 5 
90 Ibid., p.4. 
91 Idem. See also Baltac10glu. "Partiler,'' p.2. 
337 
It was argued that conservatism, like "liberal" and "radical" politics in democratic 
societies also shared the ideal to consolidate the representative democracy. Its 
distinguishing characteristic could not be derived from its reactionism, but from its 
vision of gradual and manageable perspective towards the economic, social, and 
political tensions generated by the competition of basic interests in modern society. 
Conservatism as opposed to radicalism, proposed a moderate, balanced and harmonious 
style of manipulation of conflicts and tensions in modern democratic societies. 92 
The Question of Democracy 
In the main traditionalist-conservative texts, the basic feature of a democratic system 
was defined as a search of balance between freedom and equality of the citizens. The 
distinguishing features of democracies in different countries were determined by the 
cultural and historical authenticity of respective nations. Moreover, it was the 
historically unique nature of the "social question," namely differing relations among 
land, labour, and capital, which were also responsible for the emergence of different 
forms and traditions of democracy.93 Though consolidation of representative 
democracy became one of the political ideals of the contemporary world, every nation 
had followed different paths of consolidation because of its unique history and 
culture. 94 Thus, Dlken assured that "a political doctrine of party program can not fully 
be implanted from one nation to another"95 in order to promote democratic order in 
the receiver country. In line with Dlken, Baltac1oglu confirmed that 
as any other political regime democracy depends on the social body to which it adopted .. 
There is no one democracy, but there are democracies. Aside from a homogeneity, among 
certain democracies, it is possible to observe contrariety with respect to their basic 
principles. The concept of democracy should be employed with the nation, on which it is 
96 grounded 
92 Olk.en, "Demokratik Cemiyetlerde lleri Geri," pp. 3-5; Safa, "D1~da ve icrerde Milli Ekonomi," p.5. 
93 O!ken, ibid., p. 4. Also Safa, ''Demokrasi ve Sosyal Adalet," (Democracy and Social Justice) Haber quoted in 
Yeni Adam. 550 (July 12, 1945), p. 10; Agaoglu, Devlet ve Ferd. pp. 36-41. 
94 Olken, ibid., pp. 4-5. See also Safa, "Demokrasi Kavramt," (The Concept of Democracy) Haber quoted in 
YeniAdam. 538 (April 19, 1945), p. 9, "lnsan Yok, Millet Var,"p. 5. 
95 Olken, "Demokratik Cemiyetlerde ileri Geri," p. 4. 
96 See Baltac1oglu's editorial note appeared in Yeni Adam. 538 (April 19, 1945) p.9. For Safa's point on 
different meanings of democracy, see Safa "Demokrasi Kavramt," p. 9. 
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Political ideologies, which sought to formulate alternative solutions to the 
problems of modem capitalist economies, had to be responsive to the particularly 
unique historical and cultural conditions of each nation because there was not a 
universal democratic order which could be imitated from somewhere else. Thus, Safa 
maintained that 
in different types of Western democracies. that is the systems compiled of American, 
English and French types. there is no common conception of the sovereignty and rule of 
the people. Those who propose a regime. identical with Western democracy. in Turkey, 
aspire for something incredible. Because there is no such model of democracy. It is not 
possible to observe a democratic regime. which has emerged out of abstract legal 
principles regardless of national conditions. either in history or in the present world. It is 
unavoidable that Turkish democracy would face the catastrophe of the Constitutional 
Law. translated by Midhat Pasha. and/or the model of constitutional monarchy, adopted 
by Ahmed Ru.a. if it does not take into account these national conditions. 97 
For Ulken, as well as Baltac1oglu and Safa, it was not possible to talk about an absolute 
political formula which would solve all of the problems of nations around the world. 98 
Thus, a working progressive democratic solution applicable to one cultural geography 
could be reactionary in other one. Accordingly, 
for example in some western countries the political parties can be categoriz.ed as a) liberal 
interventionist b) interventionist c) protectionist. Peculiar conditions of a country can put 
the liberal interventionist political parties into the ideal position of democrat and 
progressive. Because in such countries industry is at the stage of continuous development, 
even to the extent of spreading to other countries. Under these conditions protectionist 
and interventionist policies might blockade social development Ho\\ever, there are also such 
countries in which large industry does not exist The country cannot establish large industry on 
its own due to the effect of capitalist countries. In these countries state intervention becomes an 
imperative to support the farmers, tradesmen and merchants, to actively initiate industrial 
establishments, and to supervise over economic development. Under these conditions, the 
struggle for the endurance of economic independence against foreign effects has progressive 
and democratic connotations. And if in such a country, liberal policies regarding customs, 
industry contain the threat of inviting foreign capital and the risk of losing national economic 
independence, then liberal interventionist stand is no more than reactionary? 99 
Historically and culturally-bound rhythm and intensity of social, economic, and 
political tensions in various societies also set the limits of rights and obligations of 
individuals and groups in different democracies all over the world. 100 Traditionalist-
97 Safa, "Demokrasi Ne Terctirne Edilebilir Ne De intihal" (Democracy Can Neither Be Translated Nor Copied) 
Vakit quoted in Y eni Adam. 607 (August 15, 1946 ), p.10. 
98 Idem. See also Safa, "Insan Yok Milet Var," p.5. 
99 Ulken, "'Demokratik Cemiyetlerde ileri Geri," p. 5 
IOO ld<..m. See Baltac1oglu, "'Yeni A<larn'm Yolu," (The Path of Yeni A.dam) Yeni Adam. 613 (September 1, 
1949) p. 2. Baltac1oglu stated that he was a democrat and republican in politics. He added that Turkish 
democracy could develop in its own unique path because of its unique historical and cultural determinants. 
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conservative circles rejected the cosmopolitan liberal premises on these grounds. 101 
Safa further argued that the Marxist challenge raised against the classical liberties and 
rights of man emerged due to the hypothetical and rationalist bias of the classical liberal 
theory of rights which were based on an abstract model of man and society. Excessive 
individualism of modem liberal societies and ineffectiveness of the liberal state to 
manipulate class tensions and interests resulted in the emergence of Marxism. Liberal 
order, for Safa, failed to managing class conflicts in modem liberal societies and could 
not establish a balanced relationship between "freedom" and "equality. 102 
Agaoglu, Baltac1oglu, Tun~, Safa, and Ulken viewed democracy as a system 
which was most suitable for the self-realization of the individuals. Still, for Olken, the 
foremost problem of democracy in the modem world was to find a balance between 
"freedom" and "equality." For Ulken neither freedom nor equality of the citizens could 
be substituted for each other, because this would give rise to the rule of oligarchies or 
dictatorships in modern societies. 103 In Ulken' s words: 
In parliamentarianism the role of the political parties is to represent social classes and 
professional strata in the parliament and to hannoniz.e the clashes in-between. If social 
movement does not take place in the way resolving the social problem, reconciliation of 
these different perspectives continue without any beneficial outcome. On the contrary, if 
progressive steps for the realization of democratic ideal are taken, then political 
perspectives take on more limited and artificial forms. Different forms dictatorships 
emerge out of the destruction of the hannony among the parties which represent social 
classes. to the benefit of one. 104 
The balance among economic freedom, initiative, and political equality had to be 
established. Lack of this balance would give way to the "loss of freedom" to attain 
"equality" or vice versa. In his words: 
Does not economic inequality lead to active suppression of a part of the citiz.ens by the 
others? Even if all kinds of privilege and domination are outlawed, is it sufficient to avoid 
domination due to economic equality? For example would a rich peasant with plenty of 
land. not force the poor ones to work as usufruct and shareholders and thus put them into 
the position of half-slaves? Or would a powerful capitalist, who has monopoly over big 
101 Still, Safa argued that democracy was a political system which emerged in industrial capitalism and was the 
best means to manipulate the tensions between industrial and working classes. Democracy was the political and 
legal outgrowth of class societies. See Safa, "Ekonomi ve Milliye~ilik," p.5. 
102 Safa, "Diinyada insan Var Mt?" (Is There Man in the World?) Yeni Mecmua, (July 18, 1941), p.4. See Safa, 
"Ekonomi ve Milliye~ilik," p.5; "Eski ve Yeni Hilrriyet," (Old and New Freedom) Tasvir'i Etkar. (July 17, 1941). 
103 DI.ken, '·Demokratik Cemiyetlerde ileri Geri," p. 3. Safa, ""Ekonomi ve Milliyet1;ilik," p.5. 
104 .. 
Ulken., ibid., p. 5. 
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industrial enterprises. not determine the wages of the workers on the basis of his O\\n 
interest even if it contrasts nith the \\ish and need of the workers? How can the 
democratic ideals of equality and freedom can be achieved spontaneously. with these risks 
at hand? Thus. is it not required to give up one for the sake of the other?105 
Classical rights of the indi·vidual. i.e. freedom of thought and consciousness. the 
right to have property, etc., were praised by the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals. 
Still, there was a nuance. In traditionalist-conservative vocabulary these rights were not 
absolute categories. Thus, Safa claimed that 
in our time it is clear that to search for the rights of abstract man is useless. Man gains 
his real substance within the framework of the race and nation to which he belongs. We 
should approach and understand him within national structure. His strength is the 
strength of his national structure. 106 
Limits to classical liberal rights were set by history, culture which were also held 
responsible for the uniqueness of any democratic order in modem world. 107 
Parliamentarianism, political representation, and political parties were assumed to be 
the backbones of modem democratic system. 108 Indeed, for Baltac1oglu political 
parties in modem societies were expected to rely on a functional division of labour in 
society. Associational organizations were the basis of real parties and emergence of 
real parties would promote the consolidation of modem democratic representative 
system. 109 As it was stated by Ulken 
Parliamentarianism is required for the spontaneous realiz.ation of the ideals of freedom 
and equality in a democratic society. Existing political parties should be clear on their standing 
with respect to the social problem. Here, clarity means that a party should express its social 
doctrine in detail and ... declare its own way for the realiz.ation of democracy. no 
Nevertheless, there should be a balanced relationship between representation and 
responsibility; the general interest and particular interests; and "freedom" and "order"111 in 
order to prevent the breakdown of the democratic parliamentarian system. For 
105 Ib'd I ., p. 3. 
106 Safa, "Thinyada insan Var Mi?" p. 4, '"Ekonomi ve Milliyetiyilik.," p.5, "Eski ve Yeni Hilrriyet." 
107 For an illustrative example, see Safa, "Dfinyada insan Var M1T p.4. 
108 Ulken, "Demokratik Cemiyetlerde ileri Geri," p. 4. 
109 B I -1 . .. a tac10g u, "Hecy!ym Ustilnde Vatan Var," p. 2. 
110 Ul .. k .Dem kr ik C . l d 1·1 . G . " 4 
·en. ·· o at enuyet er e en en, p. . 
111 For Baltac1oglu general interest was above the particular interests which were articulated by various political 
parties. be they lilx."fal, conservative, individualist. statist, right or lcfi. See Baltac1oglu. ''Her ~in Ostilnde 
Vatan Var," p. 2 For Safa there could not be ·'particular freedoms granted'" before the "freedom of the nation." 
See Safa. "Milliyetiyiligin Birkaiy Hakikati," p.5, "'Ekonomi ve Milliyetiyilik,"p. 5. 
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Baltac1oglu, democracy historically emerged as a balanced system against the absolutist 
claims of freedom, which would result in anarchy, and rule of dictatorships1i::! Besides 
the institutionalization of the representational institutions. Tun~ also argued that social 
justice and order had to be maintained in order to consolidate a democratic order. 11 ~ 
Thus, he further claimed that imbalances had to be melted by social justice in order to 
prevent private economic interests from imposing themselves on the state. 
Traditionalist-conservative vocabulary sought for a balance between economic 
freedom and political equality and it was hoped that it could be achieved when a 
balance between economic and political power of the state was established. 114 
112 See Baltac1oglu, "Anar~i, DiktatorlUk, Demokrasi ve Tarih," (Anarchy, Dictatorship, Democracy and 
History) Yeni Adam, 619 (October 13, 1949) p. l. For a similar evaluation, see Safa, "Ekonomi ve Milliyett;ilik," 
p. 5. 
113 Tunt;, ''1stikbal lt;in Aranan Y eni Ufuklar." For changing conceptions of freedom in modem world, see Safa, 
"Eski ve Y eni Hilrrivet." 
114 Tun~, "1stikbal -ii;in Aranan Yeni Ufuklar," "Ahlakm <;:~itleri ve Zamarunnzm Ahlalo.." Safa also pointed 
out the necessity to establish a harmonious relationship between "freedom" and ··responsibility." For him, 
corporatism was the best means to consolidate this relationship between the interests of capital anJ labour. State 
would be responsible for maintaining a balance between ··freedom" and "responsibility" under the imperatives of 
the national good. See Safa, ''Ekonomi ve Milliyet~ilik." p.5. 
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CHAPTER9 
CONCLUSION 
Turkish politics entered into a new period by the establishment of the Republic 
m 1923. Within a decade after the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, the ruling 
Republican intelligentsia came to complete the radical program of W estemization 
under the tutelage of the newly established scientific nation-state,. Science for the new 
state came to provide a new means for the resolution of social problems. Revolutionary 
rationale of the Kemalist state represented a voluntarist and purposeful interference 
into the process of social change where "creative spontaneity" seemed to be sacrificed 
in favour of the "rational organization" of the society in order to institutionalize a 
model of civilizing modernism. 
Radicalism of the scientific national state was first directed at the existing social, 
political, and economic order inherited from the Ottoman Regime. The Revolutionary 
cadre then held a more radical stand against organized religion which had been 
perceived to be the main reason for the backwardness of Turkish society. Kemalist 
revolutionary radicalism which could be characterized as forced-modernism, 
nationalism., and scienticism had mobilized the people and intelligentsia for challenging 
an entire past of the society. In this respect, it aimed to tum a political revolution into a 
cultural one. It also established new set of propositions about the nature of just rule and 
legitimate government around which the new political and intellectual alignments and 
cleavages were obtained from the 1920s onwards. 
During the revolutionary period from 1923 to 1931, new political conflicts 
emerged between the defenders of the newly established Kemalist institutions and the 
traditional, religiously-framed ones. Students of Turkish politics have conventionally 
classified this cleavage through the antipodality between modem/secularist and 
traditionalist/religious outlooks and elite groups which derived their legitimacy through 
these mutually-exclusive stands. The first group of modernist/secular elites, while 
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challenging the religious status quo, also felt the necessity to defend the Kemalist 
achievements in politics and culture. Religious status quo was symbolically represented 
by the traditional institutions of Caliphate and Sultanate until the mid- l 920s. After the 
mid- l 920s and following the abolishment of these traditional institutions, status quo, 
which the Kemalist radicalism aimed to transform came to refer to traditional religious 
social and cultural practices. Thus, political and social reaction raised against Kemalist 
radicalism on established religious practices and institutions were articulated by 
reactionary, religiously oriented groups. It ultimately led to the idea to conserve and/or 
revive those religious practices, traditions, and institutions. 
By the end of the 1920s, religiously-oriented groups, which had considerable 
political impact in the First National Assembly, were almost totally neutralized. 
Following the War of Independence, the main clash was between the Republican 
secularists and savants of the Ottoman regime who were in allegiance with religious 
groups that kept their loyalty to the Sultanate and Caliphate. They were willing to 
derive the true essence of Islam to prevent the religious tradition from total dissolution. 
These religiously oriented groups totally rejected Republican constitutionalism and 
aimed to preserve traditional Ottoman institutions of Caliphate and Sultanate in the 
new constitutional order. 
Meanwhile, a new cleavage among the Kemalist secular intelligentsia 
coincidentally appeared. These new intellectual groupings, unlike the religious 
reactionaries appeared as a resistance to Kemalist rationalism in politics. This new 
cleavage within Kemalist modernist secular intelligentsia developed into a schism 
between traditionalist conservatism and Kemalist rationalism. Traditionalist 
conservatism, which first appeared as a Bergsonian-inspired affiliation to Kemalism, 
then acquired a visible political stand by the end of 1920s. What was fundamental 
about this intellectual grouping was that they were also an organic part of the secular-
modemist Republican intelligentsia. Nevertheless, they were not the masters of the 
political game and stayed at the periphery of the Kemalist power structure. 
Traditionalist-conservative ideals and aspirations first started to circulate in the cultural 
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institutions of the Republic, such as the university and other institutions, such as the 
Turkish Language Association. since this group of intelligentsia were mostly employed 
in the academia and/or had active roles in those cultural institutions. 
With the clarification of the ultimate political and cultural ideals of the 
Republic, a sense of group consciousness among the traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals started to develop through their collective action in some associations, 
such as the Turkish Philosophy and Sociology Association in the late l 9:20s, Turkish 
Philosophy Association in the late 1930s. The journals, Kiiltiir Haftas1, Yeni Adam, 
insan in the 1930s and 1940s also contributed to the circulation of traditionalist-
conservative ideals and to their reaction against the Republican consensus after the 
Revolution. Circulation of these ideas and aspirations ultimately resulted in the 
emergence of a premature traditionalist-conservative milieu among the ruling Kemalist 
intelligentsia. 
Meanwhile, Republican radicalism had created a rupture in the political 
vocabulary of the time. New intellectual groupings within the secular modernist 
intelligentsia appeared to provide answers about the nature of Kemalist modernism, its 
future course of the development and its impact on society, culture and tradition. 
Traditionalist-conservative opinions appeared in this conjuncture and adopted a new 
stand about Kemalist modernism without an anti-Revolutionary intent. This Republican 
conservatism, while agreeing on the basic structure of the state distanced itself from 
omnipresent rationalist revolutionism and provided a competing vision of Kemalism 
and modernism. 
Emergence of a traditionalist-conservative vocabulary was due to the fact that 
from 1930s onwards, Republican intelligentsia tended to generate a coherent and 
systematic theory of Kemalism. The new political culture was basically republican and 
secularist. It rejected, at least officially, all the signs of the Ottoman Regime and posed 
its aim and focus as being progressive under the guidance of science and technology. 
The ultimate aim of the secular modernist intelligentsia was set to safeguard the 
cultural authenticity of the Turkish nation. The cultural components of the collective 
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identity, such as ethnic ongms, customs and language etc., gained a political 
significance for elucidating the Past, Present and Future of the Republican citizen. New 
conception of citizenship, rights and obligations of the individual towards the state 
were defined in a secular-legal framework. Kemalist culturalism represented a rupture 
from the Ottoman past and traditionalist conservatism developed within the confines of 
this 'political and cultural vocabulary of rupture' which at the same time proclaimed 
the emergence of the 'new.' 
In this respect, traditionalist-conservative ideas and aspirations flourished within 
the Kemalist power structure. Traditional conservative body of thought, which could 
be characterized as a personalist, Bergsonian, moralist perspective, could be developed 
fully only after the dissolution of the traditional religious cosmology since the ultimate 
traditionalist-conservative objective was to provide a "history" to the Kemalists' 
rootless vision of civilizing modernism. In other words, the ultimate traditionalist-
conservative contention was to re-traditionalize Kemalist modernism and to force 
Islam towards a national development. It was based on modem political concepts, such 
as nationalism, democracy, freedom and republicanism. 
Traditionalist-conservative ideals and aspirations developed in the rather fast 
course of institutionalization of the modem nation state structures. These ideals aimed 
at shedding light on the nature of Republican order and the new means of maintaining 
stability, order and continuity of the Kemalist status quo. Kemalism and traditionalist 
conservatism, standing on the edge of the Kemalist power structure, manipulated the 
consolidation of the structures of modernity, most notably the nation-state and 
capitalism. Capitalism and nation state together with nationalism were central to the 
Kemalist and traditionalist-conservative visions of modernity. 
In the 1930s, public debate between the Marxism-inspired Kadro intellectuals 
and traditionalist-conservative protagonists of Kemalism indicated the fact that the 
Bergsonian, personalist, mystic-moralist aspirations of the traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals had started to achieve a political significance as competing conceptions of 
Kemalism. In Ottoman-Turkish polity, as revealed by Olken in his Turkiye 'de <;agda.§ 
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Dii~nce Tarihi (History of Contemporary Thought in Turkey}, Bergsonian philosophy 
became a crossroads of protomodemism, anti-scienticism, anti-positivism, anti-
materialism/mechanism, anti-Pan Islamism. 1 During the early thirties, materialist 
philosophy of Kadro and its historical-materialist perspective, which was proposed as a 
relevant method to explain the historical phenomenon of Kemalism, provoked and 
united diverse critics of materialist-positivist and mechanist philosophies around the 
ideal of creating an alternative philosophical and political understanding of Kemalism 
through some alternative terms and concepts. Bergsonism affected all traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals on the evils of modernism and rationalism and also provided 
a vocabulary through which future hopes in dealing with fatal maladies of civilizing 
modernism were formulated. 
Bergson's legacy for the Republican intelligentsia reached its apex during and 
after the War of Independence. Tun~, Agaoglu, Safa and Baltac1oglu were committed 
to the ideals of the War of Independence and this had politicized their Bergsonian 
background. It also had significant impact on the intellectual life of the young Republic 
since creativity, dynamism, elan, vitality, and the Bergsonian conception of tension 
were utilized, in varying tones, to illustrate the reasons for new dynamism in society, to 
characterize the modem life and to affirm a political optimism in the age of nation-
building. 
The importance of traditionalist conservatism for Republican life lay in its 
quest to elaborate an alternative philosophy of nature and life. Ultimately, these 
intellectuals were trying to replace the positivist evolutionism with an alternative 
progressive evolutionism based on the notion of "creative evolution." The new life 
metaphysics they offered, contrary to the firm Kemalist belief derived from nineteenth 
century positivism, did not privilege science as the only means to explain all spheres of 
human life. Traditionalist conservatives aimed to develop a competing approach to 
1 Hilmi Ziya tnken, TUrkive'de Cagdas Diisiince Tarihi (History of Contemporary Thought in Turkey), 3rd ed. 
(istanbul Olken Yaymlan, 1992), pp. 375-82. 
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Kemalist scienticism which pinned its hopes on science as the means for knowledge, 
enlightenment, and civilization. 
Modem Turkish traditionalist conservatism which heavily utilized the 
Bergsonian philosophy developed in four philosophical and political lines: the first was 
against the anti-collectivism/societalism of Republic inherited from Ziya Gokalp's 
positivism; the second was on cultural nationalism; the third challenge was on 
institutional Islam; the last line attacked scientist/positivist modernism. The Kemalist 
idea of "transcendentalist state," as delineated by Metin Heper in his State Tradition in 
Turkey, solidified a peculiar power relation between the Kemalist state and society 
where the state was privileged before the society and society before the individual. 2 
This privileged idea of state easily paved the way to collectivist/solidarist tendencies 
and revealed itself as a devotion to populism and solidarism for which Ziya Gokalp had 
been praised as its greatest ideologue. Agaoglu, Baltac1oglu and Olken promoted 
personalism, which was erroneously labeled by Kadro as an example of individualism 
and liberalism in the Turkish context. Safa and Tun~ criticized vulgar organism and 
Safa emphasized "philosophical organism," and "functional interdependence" between 
the part and the whole. All these notions of the traditionalist conservatives showed 
their deviation from dominant solidarist tendencies inherent in Kemalism. Traditionalist 
conservatives did not adhere to the Kemalist vision of a united, classless nation since 
"tension," either in social and individual realms, was praised as the real reason for 
dynamism, creativity and spontaneity. Lack of severe tensions among classes and/or 
groups, as in the Turkish case, did not come to mean a lack of functionally 
interdependent classes and/or groups. Olken's theory on work or Safa and Agaoglu's 
conception of a society, as composed of groups and/or classes, led to a conception of 
society which was a divided but was a functionally interdependent entity. They all had 
the common concern of bringing out a new synthesis that would solve the tensions 
between the individual and society, and society and state . 
., 
- See Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington, U.K.: The Eothen Press, 1985). 
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In an age of rapid social, political, and economic change, everything that had 
once been accepted as 'right and just' was being questioned under the overshadowing 
presence of the Revolutionary imagination. StilL unlike the religiously-oriented 
reactionaries of the early 1920s, traditionalist conservatives \Vere devoted to the 
Kemalist ideals of democracy, republicanism, and nationalism. Moreover, the 
transformation had also created a persistent dread among the traditionalist-conservative 
intellectuals of the time. Thus, Baltac10glu' s traditionalism was based on a romantic 
search for the historical and cultural permanents responsible for socio-psychological 
order and unity. He regarded Kemalists' search for Order solely in the political sphere 
as causing cultural and political ambivalence and alienation of state structures from the 
society. He, like other traditionalist-conservative figures recognized the transformative 
effects of Kemalist Revolution but felt uncomfortable about the possibility of its failure 
to fully consolidate its own values and principles. This, he thought, would result in 
further alienation of the nation from its state. What was unique in this traditionalist-
conservative sentiment was its identification with the existing Kemalist institutions and 
power structures, but not with the traditional Ottoman and religious traditions. Their 
ardent support of the Revolution was a result of their optimism about the potential of 
the Revolution to bring about the reforms necessary to abolish the cultural and political 
dualities experienced by Turkish society. Elimination of this duality was one of their 
central concerns. 
This is why they paid singular attention to the feeling of non- belongingness 
and isolation which they observed in society and reflected in their work. In other 
words, traditional identity was excavated as in the case of Safa' s literary criticism of 
mimetic modernism, to picture those components responsible for not ratifying the man 
as such as a member of the new political entity~ namely the nation. On this point, 
conservative intellectuals tried to show that Kemalists' broad confidence in Reason and 
in its regulative capacity over the society had an erosive effect on the traditional ways 
of conducting the daily life. The mimetic models of civilization imposed on society was 
conceived to be the utopia of an alienated group of intelligentsia. Traditionalist-
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conservative intellectuals devoted themselves to bringing into light the unintended 
consequences of this rationalist utopia which would tum the society into an object of 
rational manipulation. 
\Vhat the traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia objected was the Kemalist 
conception of state as an instrument for rational control of the society. Kemalist 
revolutionaries deemed the new nation-state to be a momentous institution in the 
evolution of society. It was a search for a deep structure in society that would 
simultaneously raise it to a higher level of modem societal organization i.e. the level of 
nation. Ultimately, Kemalism perceived the society solely as an object of manipulation 
for political power. Correspondingly, the ruling Kemalist intelligentsia conceived social 
change as a manipulated political process on the road to attaining a higher level of 
civilization. Baltac1oglu' s educational philosophy, Tun~' s critic of positivist 
progressivism, or 01.ken' s criticism of rationalism intended to show that the real danger 
for the Revolutionary movement was its attempt to move beyond the phenomenal 
world; from the world of appearances to the essentials, to the world of the inner truth 
of the society to realize a 'project' of civilizing modernism. 
In the sociology of Baltac1oglu or 01.ken, society was the only solid realm 
where the manifestation of creative life force would freely reveal itself Society was the 
only actual and concrete collectivity. Consequently, a radical project of change had to 
lean upon the existing institutions whose basic function was to contextualize and re-
traditionalize the rootless vision of modemity.3 For traditionalist conservatism the 
locus of worldly power was nation and its nation-state, and the creative spirit of society 
was derived from its national tradition. Still, for the traditionalist conservative circle, 
authenticity of the nation did not only stem from the rational essence of the political 
institutions but from the living energy of the society crystallized in history, beliefs and 
customs which could be utilized to nationalize and re-traditionalize the universal state 
structures. 
3 Baltac1oglu, Demokrasi ve Sanat (Democracy and Art) (istanbul: Sanayi-i Nefise Bas1mevi, l 931 ), p. 33. 
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"Nationalization" did not come to mean the nationalizing of tradition and 
culture. Culture and tradition were sui generis national. "Nationalization" in 
traditionalist-conservative vocabulary came to mean nationalization and re-
traditionalization of the universal institutions and structures of modernity. By 
implication, it attempted to provide a historical base to Kemalist modernism. With 
these concerns in mind, traditionalist-conservative intellectuals attached extreme 
importance to tradition, culture, and history. It is this emphasis which made it possible 
for a meaningful relationship to be formed between traditionalist conservatism and 
Kemalism, which despite its civilizing modernism, still upheld the motto of "we 
resemble ourselves. " 
In the early Kemalist era, political and intellectual groupings posed themselves 
either as the defenders of Past, as in the case of reactionary Islamism, or as the owners 
of the Future, like the Kemalist radicals. Each of these groups distanced itself from the 
Present since it was characterized by a deep turbulence, ambivalence, and chaos. 
Contrary to Islamism that viewed the Present as a deviation from the past practices, 
values and norms of the Golden Age of the Prophet, Kemalists tended to see the 
present state of society as a moment of transcendence. The Present was interpreted by 
the traditionalist-conservative intellectuals as the historical moment which bore both 
the Past and Future within its folds. This perspective distanced traditionalist 
conservatism from reactionary Islam and future-oriented utopianism ofKemalism. 
Traditionalist-conservative literature, sociology and philosophy aimed to show 
the disparity between what was above society [read Kemalism and/or westernization] 
and what actually took place within society. Particularly, Safa's conservative literature, 
to borrow Michel Foucault's phase, was an archeology of the Present, as a search for 
the layers of Past intertwined with the Present.4 More precisely, this conservative 
literature aimed to show how differing conceptions of "truth" could be used to 
characterize the Present as a chaotic state due to the clash between multiple 'truths.' 
~ See David Couz.ens Hoy ed., Foucault: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 27-41. 
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Traditionalist conservatives focused on the multiple images of life in Present as an 
amalgam of past and future visions. For them, it was culture and history which had an 
undeniable effect on the formulation of future ideals and present state of affairs. Thus, 
their sensibility towards cultural questions was derived from the discrepancies they 
perceived between 'what ought to ~e the future of Turkish culture" and 'what is 
secured at Present.,, 
Kemalist practices of creating an inclusive collective national identity led the 
traditionalist-conservative intellectuals to focus on the pathologies of the unseen world 
of individual which at the end would cause disorder their identity. It would also 
annihilate all accustomed roles and functions in society. Traditionalist-conservative 
endeavour can best be understood as an attempt to demonstrate the depth, intensity 
and scope of the present consequences of cultural dualities in society and in the worlds 
of individuals. For them, in a parochial society still devoted to the religious symbols, 
forced modernism would reveal itself as an attempt to create an 'insular totality' and a 
tension-creating model imposed on rebellious selves that were squeezed caught up 
between the Past and the Future. Traditionalist-conservative intellectuals focused on 
the peculiar manifestations of the parochial personality in a modem society; a restricted 
and surrounded self between West and East; between science and tradition; between 
reason and superstition; between past and present. 
They then offered a diagnosis and prescription to the ongoing crisis in society. 
This was a crisis of adaptation, and was emerged due to the disjunction between state 
fostered alien values and norms and authentic culture. The distance between state's 
civilizing ideals and the workings of society, which revealed itself as isolation, 
loneliness, and non-belongingness in the life sphere of the individuals, had to be 
eliminated. This was the reason for their radicalism directed against religious umma 
tradition. The crisis of adaptation implied the inability of the traditional social structures 
to adapt themselves to new norms and values, on the one hand, and the incapability of 
the state institutions to penetrate into the society to redefine the authentic symbols of 
social identity, on the other hand. Traditionalist conservatism offered a middle way 
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between religious reactionism and modernist radicalism. They were neither fully 
subordinated to state's problem of consolidating the rules of the new power game nor 
did they initiate a reaction against the ongoing Kemalist revolution. Instead, through an 
involvement in arts and ethics, they chose to act as the "moral innovators" of the new 
nation. Their precepts can be taken as part of a theory of cultural nationalism in which 
the idea of nation was proposed as a moral community. The reasons for moral, social 
and political decadence on the one hand, and future possibilities of the creative 
evolution of Turkish society towards a unique synthesis of civilization and culture, on 
the other, were searched. 
In their mind re-traditionalization of the universal structures of modernity 
together with Turkification of Islam were necessary to maintain a genuine authentic 
self Two inclusive collective identity claims - modem/secular and traditional/religious -
collided with each other on the question of defining the terms of national identity. The 
collusion between these competing truth claims would result in the disorganization of 
the individual self Collusion would also have drastic effects at the social level. 
Disorganization, confusion and disorder would emerge both at the individual and social 
levels. An anticipated social self and a politically relevant one had to be the synthesis of 
the Past and Present. Thus, basic political categories had to have relevant references in 
culture and history. However, this was not a simple return to the past since there was 
more than one tradition, namely, religious and national. 
This peculiar traditionalist-conservative stand resulted in the support for the 
T urkification of language and religion which ultimately pushed traditionalist 
conservatism to adopt a radical stand towards religious reactionism. Traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals, without exception, were all opposed to the revival of Islamic 
umma tradition which was based on the brotherhood of the Muslims all over the world. 
And yet, traditionalist-conservative endeavour aimed to liberate the moral and social 
action of the individual and nation state's will from the restrictions of Islamic dogma 
without destroying it, since religion was a natural bond in society, like language and 
customs. This philosophical and political distance between religious reactionism and 
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conservatism became mostly visible by the appearance of Safa's journal Tiirk 
DU~iincesi by the mid-l 950s. Safa asserted that the difference between conservatism 
and religious reactionism could be found in their stand towards novelty. 5 'Reaction.' 
for Safa, was a natural trait in the process of the modification of the living organism. 
Sociologically, the objective of 'reaction' was to restore the status quo ante. But Safa 
argued, their conservatism never attempted to restore the status quo ante. It was a 
search for the essentials and permanents in the Past and the Present and those desired 
to exist in the Future. For this reason alone, their conservatism adopted an historicist 
and traditionalist stand. Thus, it was natural that in an age of progress and change 
every society generated its own conservatism and conservatives. Conservatism, unlike 
religious reactionism, never resisted change and novelty. It only held Past but never 
gave up novelty.6 
A detailed analysis of the writings of traditionalist-conservative figures of the 
1930s and 1940s would reveal that the adaptation of Bergson's concepts of tension, 
conflict, creativity and spontaneity was responsible for the development of a peculiar 
traditionalist-conservative conception of society and politics. Moreover, having been 
inspired from Bergson's critique of utilitarian-rationalism, traditionalist conservatism, 
developed a comprehensive challenge against the utilitarian moral assumptions. 
Throughout the 1930s, Bergson-inspired conceptions of 'individualism, irrationality, 
freedom and religiosity' were developed in their corpus of writings. 
For traditionalist conservatism, political ideologies could not be defined as a set 
of principles and procedures. They were the products of definite cultural systems and 
were designed to meet the needs of a particular society. Societies did not experience 
the same level of development. It meant that they lived at different historical time 
intervals. Thus, specific answers provided to meet the needs of a particular society in a 
definite historical time interval, by such ideologies as liberalism and/or socialism, for 
. . 
· Pevami Safa, ··rrtica Nedir?" (What is Reaction?) Tiirk Diisiincesi. (May 1, 1959), pp. 1-2. 
6 Ibid. 
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instance, were not relevant at another time span for even the original society. In this 
sense, Kemalism was an historical opening for the Turkish nation. 
Spread of cultural products from advanced to less advanced societies created 
various forms of reactions in the receiving societies. In ~1uslim countries it, first, 
provoked religious reactionism, which ultimately claimed the revival of Great Islamic 
Tradition as an aim and value in itself Secondly, it resulted in an upsurge of imitative 
westernization project(s) which become an asset only for the alienated intellectuals in 
the receiver society. Lastly, imitative modernization stimulated various forms of 
conservatisms as middle roads between religious reactionism and radical westernism. 
Traditionalist conservatives, as the representatives of the middle road, asserted that by 
mobilizing the historical consciousness and natural traits of the society, Turkish 
revolution, at least in intention and in its initial stages of development, symbolized this 
third alternative for modernizing societies. 
Traditionalist-conservative conceptions of "conservatism" and reactionism" 
were based on their peculiar conception of society as a living entity composed of 
functionally interdependent parts, which I have referred to as "hybrid organic 
analogy." In this way, "reactionism" and "conservatism" were conceived to be natural 
phenomena emerging in societies in their transition to modernity. For traditionalist 
conservatives "hybrid organic analogy" led them to see the society as a living 
organism. Thus, it was natural that any living organism would defend itself against any 
external threat. "Hybrid organic analogy" of traditionalist conservatism was supported 
with a creationist evolutionary vision of society. For them historical nation, which 
constituted itself as an authentic self in its customs and experiences, denoted a higher 
stage of organization as compared to the universal system of religious communities. 
Thus, for traditionalist conservatives, 'conservatism' emerged as a natural 
response of the society to preserve its uniqueness and vitality. The ultimate 
conservative aim was to prevent the dissolution of the national tradition. Conservatism 
was also a novel answer to the problems of forced-modernization by providing a 
coherent set of principles and values derived from society's natural response to 
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preservmg all that belonged to itself It translated society's creed to protect its 
particularity and authenticity. It was the expression of the social resistance to excessive 
Westernization. It was also a resistance to any kind of civilizing modernism. 
In the traditionalist-conservative perspective, Islamic reactionism was provoked 
by the limitlessness of the revolutionary desire for 'progress.' Revolutions provoked 
reactions in every country, be it the French or the Russian case. As already noted. for 
traditionalist conservatism, reaction was not an accidental and pathological 
phenomenon but was an organic necessity. However, the unwavering devotion of 
Islamic reactionism to History and Tradition considered to have emerged from an 
ahistorical perspective. Kemalism and traditionalist conservatism, on the other hand, 
were the symbolic expressions of the authentic Turkish experience of transition to 
modernity. As noted by Safa, Kemalism did not emerge from "the book of revolutions" 
but it sprang out as a vital organic necessity i.e., from the reflex of the living organism 
to defend itself,"7 thus it could be understood, defended and legitimized through 
traditionalist-conservative ideals and aspirations. 
In the final analysis, what the traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia wanted to 
do was to mobilize the national tradition to achieve traditionalist-conservative 
objectives within a political environment shaped by Kemalist radicalism. Traditionalist 
conservatives, up to mid 1930s taken an uncompromising stand against all forms of 
radicalism, as represented in their dispute with the Kadro intellectuals or in their 
individual polemics with socialist and/or Marxist oriented intelligentsia who viewed 
Kemalism as a form of revolt by the oppressed nations of the world against capitalist 
West. This reaction against radicalism was retarded after the University Reform in 
1933, when the leading traditionalist figures were expelled from their post in the 
Turkish academia. Then, following the tough response of the Republican radicals to 
traditionalist-conservative figures, traditionalist-conservative intellectuals stepped up 
their critique of the religious reactionaries of the Republic in order to restore their 
7 Safa. Tlirk Dcvrimine Bak1slar (Glam:es at the Turkish Revolution) (istanbul: Ottlken Ne¢yat A.$, 1990, 
(19381), pp. 107-11, 193-97. 
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prestige and influence within the Kemalist power structure. They had begun to 
recognize that a clash within the Kemalist structure would endanger their position. 
Repression of the religious reactionaries by the regime was successful in the 
short term. But the ruling elites could not manage this dash with religious reactionaries 
with repression alone. Thus, in the long run, the Republic felt the necessity to create its 
own moralists and the traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia were there to answer the 
call of the Republic as the moral creators of the nation. Another area of support by this 
group of intellectuals for the regime was in the clash of the regime with religious 
reactionaries. Republicans leaned upon· nationalism and tried to tum universal Islam 
towards a national path of development. It is crucial to note that traditionalist-
conservative intellectuals perceived Kemalist nationalism as a potentially conservative 
and anti-cosmopolitan [read anti liberal] force. Traditionalist-conservative devotion to 
culturalism and their attempt to tum the development of religion to a national path 
gave signs of a new cleavage structure in modernist Kemalist intelligentsia. Though 
radical Kemalists and this conservative faction were republican in the fullest sense, the 
latter's response to religion through cultural nationalism had revealed the first signs of 
a new cleavage within Republican intelligentsia on secularism-nationalism axis. From 
then on, the latter would be characterized by its insistence on religious impulse derived 
from the national tradition. Faced with the radical modernism of the Kemalist policies, 
traditionalist-conservative intelligentsia responded by turning towards a national and 
unique way of development. They utilized some progressive issues, such as 
nationalism, culturalism and secularism to generate a bulwark against radical vision of 
civilizing modernism. 
In the 1930s, traditionalist-conservative intellectuals were located in the 
intellectual stratum but they were not included in the political center. Politicization of 
the traditionalist-conservative vocabulary by the ruling elites during the one-party rule, 
their allegiance, resistances and appropriation of these themes had important 
repercussions since it led to the emergence of a conservative milieu within the ruling 
Kemalist center. Traditionalist conservatism created a sense of politics and a ready-
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made corpus for RPP during its transformation from early radicalism to evolutionism in 
the mid- l 940s. The other crucial point to remember is that despite the timidness of 
traditionalist-conservative figures towards the rising political elites in the mid-1940s, 
the liberal opponents of RPP also utilized traditionalist-conservative themes in varying 
degrees. By transition to multi-party politics, traditionalist-conservative themes began 
to be widely utilized as a new policy framework by the newly emergent political elites. 
In fact, traditionalist conservatism, which was being exploited both by Republicans or 
Democrats by the mid of 1940s, did not serve to further consolidate the rule of the 
competing elite groups. What it did, as an intellectual group, was to further legitimize 
the state. 
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in 1934-1950 Period (in chronological order) 
"Ni9in Gazete Cikariyorum," (Why I am Publishing Daily?) I (January, I, 1934) : I 
"Turkiye Milli Bir Terbiye Plaruna Muhta9," (Turkey is in Need of a National 
Education Plan) !(January 1, 1934) : 2. 
"Tezat," (The Contradiction) 3 (January 15, 1934): I. 
"Demokraside Terbiye," (Education in Democracy) 4 (January 22, 1934): 2. 
"Bergson," 4 (January 22, 1934): 5. 
"Irk Nazariyesi Battldrr, Milliyet Nazariyesi Haktrr," (Racist Theory is False, Theory of 
Nationality is True) 4 (January 22, 1934): 11. 
"irtica," (Reaction) 5 (January 29, 1934): I. 
"Fikir Gazetes~" (Serious Daily) 5 (January 29, 1934): L 
"Liseler Nastl Islah Edilmeli?" (How Should High Schools Be Reformed?) 5 (January 
29, 1934) : 2. 
"D Grubu Resim Sergisi," (Painting Exhibition of the Group D) 6 (February 5, 1934): 6. 
"Inkllab Edebiyat1 Ne Olabilir?" (What Can the Literature of the Revolution Be?) 6 
(February 5, 1934) : 7. 
"Inkllabm Mektebi," (The School of the Revolution) 7 (February 12, 1934): 5. 
"Devleti;i Tiyatro, Selami izzet' e Cevap" (Statist Theatre, Reply to Selami izzet) 7 
(February 12, 1934): 7. 
"Umumi I~timaiyat Ne Demektir?" (What Does General Sociology Mean?) 11 (March 
12, 1934): 11. 
"Buylik Tarih Filozoflan," (Great Philosophers of History) 12 (March 19, 1934): 11. 
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"Hegel'e Gore Tarih Felsefesi," (Philosophy of History According to Hegel) 13 
(March 26, 1934) : 11. 
"Sark ve Garp," (The East and the West) 17 (April 23, 1934): 8. 
"En Buyiik Devlet Siyaseti Nedir?"(What is the Greatest State Policy?) 17 (April 23, 1934) :8. 
"Kadro'ya Gore Yeni Adam Yeni Adam'a Gore Kadro," (Kadro for Yeni Adam and 
Yeni Adam for Kadro) 7 (April 23, 1934) : 11. 
"Cumhuriyetin Kiiltiir Siyaset,"(The Cultural Policy of the Republic) 18 (April 30, 1934 ): 9 
"Cemiyet Mi Ferd Mi?" (Society or Individual) 23 (June 4, 1934 ): 8. 
"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri 1, i\:timaiyat" (Lectures of People's University: Sociology) 
24 (June 11, 1934): 8. 
"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri 2, Terbiye," (Lectures of People's University: Education) 
25(June18, 1934): 2. 
"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri 3, i9timaiyat," (Lectures of People's University: Sociology) 
25 (June 18, 1943): 8. 
"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri 4, Terbiye," (Lectures of People's University: Education) 
26 (June 25, 1934): 2. 
"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri 5, Terbiye," (Lectures of People's University: Education) 
27 (July 2, 1934) : 2. 
"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri l9timaiyat," (Lectures of People's University: Sociology) 
28 (July 2, 1934): 2. 
"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri Terbiye," (Lectures of People's University: Education) 24 
(July 9, 1934) : 2. 
"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri i9timaiyat," (Lectures of People's University: Sociology) 
28 (July 9, 1934): 8. 
"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri Terbiye," (Lectures of People's University: Education) 29 
(July 16, 1934): 2. 
"Kadro Ya Cevap," (Reply to Kadro) 29 (July 16, 1934): 8. 
"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri l9timaiyat," (Lectures of People's University: Sociology) 
30 (July 23 1934) : 8. 
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"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri Terbiye," (Lectures of People's Universify: Education) 31 
(July 30, 1934) : 2. 
"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri l9timaiyat," (Lectures of People's University: Sociology) 
32 (August 6, 1934): 2. 
"Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri l9timaiyat," (Lectures of People's University: Sociology) 
35 (August 30, 1934): 2. 
"Hurriyet Davas1 Batil Mtdtr?" (Is the Struggle for Liberty False?) 37 (September 13, 
1934) :1 
Halk Oniversitesi Dersleri I9timaiyat," (Lectures of People's University: Sociology) 41 
(October 11, 1934): 5. 
"Toplu Tedrisat Davast," (The Struggle for Mass Education) 47 (November 22, 1934): 5. 
"Dil Turk9ulugu," (Linguistic Turkism) 49 (December 6, 1934): 2. 
"Sanayile~tiren Devlet," (Industrializing State) 49 (December 6, 1934) : 4. 
"Halk Universitesi," (People's University) 54 (January 10, 1935): 16. 
"Halk Oniversitesi: Toplu Tedris Ozerine," (People's University: On Mass Education) 
55 (January 17, 1935): 16 
"istedigimiz Terbiye Nedir?" (What Kind of Education Do We Demand?) 58 (February 
7, 1935): 2. 
"Toplu Tedris," (Mass Education) 60 (February 21, 1935): 14. 
"Kultiir Bakanhgmm Y eni Lahiyas1 Nedir?" (What is the New Codicid of the Ministry 
of Culture?) 61(February28, 1935): 2. 
"Toplu Tedris Teknigi," (The Technique of Mass Education) 65 (March 28, 1935): 5. 
"Halk Evleri Ne Olmahdrr?" (What Should Be the People's Houses) 66 (April 4, 1935): 2. 
"Yeni Devletin Kultiir Programlan," (The Cultural Programs of the New State) 66 
(April4, 1935): 10. 
"Laik Terbiyenin Kendini istiyoruz," (We Demand the Secular Education Itself) 68 
(April 18, 1935): 2. 
"Halk Partisinin Yeni Program1 Ozerine," (On the New Program of the People's Party) 
72 (May 16, 1935): 2. 
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"Bu i~te insan Yeti~tirenlere ~en Yilkiimlillilkler," (Responsibilities of the Human 
Educators in this Work) 73 (May 23, 1935): 2. 
"i9timaiyat," (Sociology) 75 (June 6, 1935): 13. 
"Bir Kultilr Devletinin ilk i~i Bir Genc;:lik Kurumu Yapmakt1r,'' (The Primary Endeavor 
ofa Cultural State is to Create a Youth Institution) 76 (June 13,1935): 2. 
"Ni9in Realistim?" (Why I am realist?) 76 (June 13, 1935): 3. 
"En Bilyilk Devlet Siyasas1 Nedir?" (What is the Greatest State Policy?) 77 (June 20, 
1935):2. 
"Biz Killtilr Nedir Anl~dsm istiyoruz," (We Demand the Secular Education to Be 
Understood) 79 (July 4, 1935): 1. 
"Plansizhgm Sonu," (The Outcome of the Absence of Planning) 80 (July 11, 1935): 1. 
"Ben Ne Diyorum, Sen Ne Diyorsun," (What I am Saying, What You Are Saying?) 85 
(August 15, 1935): 2. 
"50 Milyonluk Tilrkiye," (Turkey of 50 Million) 90 (September 19, 1935): 4,7. 
"Yeni Nesle Yeni Dil," (New Language to the New Generation) 91 (September 26, 
1935): 4-5. 
"Killtilr Bakarnn ~celeri," (Ideas of the Minister of Culture) 92 ( October 3, 1935): 4, 11. 
"Atatilrk Ne Demektir?" (What Does Atatilrk Mean?) 96 (October 31, 193 5): 3. 
"Milrteci Kimdir?" (Who is the Reactionary?) 97 (November 7, 1935): 3. 
"Hukuk Nedir? Ne Degildir? (What is or is Not Law?) 98 (November 14, 1935): 4. 
"Peyami Safa," 108 (January 23, 1936): 3. 
"insan Bir Cismi Hendese Degildir," (Human Being Is not an Object of Geometry) 109 
(January 30, 1936): 3. 
"~k Dzerine Dil~ilnceler," (Views on Love) 110 (February 6, 1936): 4. 
"Inlalap m1 Edebiyatt Y arattr? Edebiyat mt Inktlab1 Y arattr?" (Does Revolution Create 
the Literature? Does Literature Create the Revolution? 116 (March 19, 1936): 3. 
"Yeni Ahlak Yeni Fikirde Degil, Yeni Sosyetededir," (New Morality Lies not in New 
Idea But in New Society) 118 (April 2, 1936): 2. 
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"Sistemler ve Hayatlar, Mefhumlar ve Gen;;ekler,'' (Systems and Lives, Concepts and 
Realities) 118 (April 2, 1936): 3. 
"Te~kilats1z Edebiyat,'' (Unorganized Literature) 119 (April 9, 1936) : 2. 
Bir Burjuva Alimi imi~ Emile Durkheim," (Emile Durkheim Was Said to Be a 
Bourgeois Scientist) 122 (April 30, 1936): 3. 
"idare Adamlan Neler Yapabilirler?" (What Can the Administrators Do?) 123 (May 7, 
1936):2. 
"Mekteplerde Demokrasi Var M1dir?" (Is There Democracy in Schools?) 123 (May 7, 
1936): 6-7. 
"Oz Ti.irk9e Ad1m1 Durdu Mu?" (Did Pure Turkish Trend Come to an End?) 131 (July 
3, 1936): 2. 
"Ki.ilti.iri.imi.izil Kurtarmak Lazim," (It is Necessary to Save Our Culture) 137 (August 
13, 1936): 2. 
"intikal Devrinde Ya~ayan Adam," (Man Living m the Age of Adaptation) 137 
(August 13, 1936): 3. 
"Mi.irteci imi~im," (I Was Said to Be a Reactionary) 139 (August 27, 1936): 2. 
"Gen9ligin Toplanacagi Yerler Halkevleridir," (People's Places are the Places for the 
Youth to Gather) 144 (October 1, 1936): 2. 
"Oil Devrimine inanmak Gerekir," (It is Essential to Believe in Language Revolution) 
144 (October 1, 1936): 12. 
"lnkdap Nasd Adam ister?" (What Kind of a Man Does the Revolution Demand?) 146 
(October 17, 1936): 2. 
"Felsefe Nedir? Ders l," (What is Philosophy? Lecture I) 152 (November 26, 1936): 14. 
"Feylozof Kimdir? Ders II," (Who is the Philosopher? Lecture II) 153 (December 3, 
1936): 14. 
"Felsefenin Mevzu Nedir? Ders III," (What is the Subject Matter of Philosophy? 
Lecture III) 154 (December 10, 1936) : 14. 
"Felsefenin Metodu, Ders IV,'' (The Method of Philosophy Lecture IV) 155 
(Decemberl7, 1936): 14. 
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"Feylosof ve Sosyetesi, Ders V," (Philosopher and His Society Lecture V) 156 
(December 24, 1936): 14. 
"Felsefe Doktrinleri, Ders VL" (Doctrines of Philosophy Lecture \1) 157 (December 
31, 1936): 14. 
"Felsefenin Problemi, Ders VII," (The Problem of Philosophy Lecture VII) 159 
(January 14, 1937): 14. 
"Felsefenin Tarihi, Ders VIII," (History of Philosophy, Lecture VIII) 16 l (January 28, 
1937): 14. 
"Bilgi Teorisi Ders IX," (Epistemology Lecture IX) 162 (February 4, 1937): 14-5. 
"Bilgi Teorisi Ders X," 163 (Epistemology Lecture X) (February 11, 1937): 14. 
"Bilgi Teorisi Ders XI," 164 (Epistemology Lecture XI) (February 18, 1937): 14. 
"Rasyonel Psikoloji," (Rational Psychology) 166 (March 4, 1937): 14-5. 
"Estetik Nicin Lazundtr?" (Why Aesthetics is Necessary?) 170 (April 1, 1937): 14. 
"Topluluk Terbiyesi Nicin Veremiyoruz," (Why Can Not We Provide Communal 
Education?)l 72 (April 15, 1937): 8. 
"Sanat Eseri Nedir?" (What is a Work of Art?) 172 (April 15, 1937): 14. 
"Artist Kimdir?" (Who is an Artist?) 173 (April 22, 193 7): 13. 
"Murteci Roman," (Reactionary Novel) 175 (May 6, 1937) : 2. 
"Artistik idrak Nedir?" (What is Artistic Comprehension?) 175 (May 6, 1937): 14-5. 
"Hayattm 46," (My Life) 188 (August 5, 1937): 18. 
"Cumhuriyetin 15inci Yd1," (15th Year of the Republic) 201(November,4, 1937): 3. 
"Sanat ve Sosyete," (Art and Society) 202 (November 11, 1937): 8. 
"Denizbank Bir Abidedir," (Denizbank is a Monument) 213 (November 27, 1938): 2. 
"Hayat1m 72," (My Life) 216 (February 17, 1938): 18. 
"Hiirriyeti Ni~n Severim," (Why Do I Like Freedom?) 217 (February 24, 1938): 2. 
"Halkevleri," (The People's Houses) 218 (March 9, 1938): 2. 
"Alti Umdeye Gore Terbiye" (Education According to the Six Arrows) 220 (March 
16, 1938): 2. 
"Yeni Adamm Yolu," (The Path of Yeni Adam) 222 (March 30, 1938): 2. 
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"Altt Umdeye Gore Terbiye II, Cumhuriyet Terbiyesi, " (Education According to the 
Six Arrows II, Republican Education) 222 (March 30, 1938): 14. 
"Altt Umdeye Gore Terbiye III, Cumhuriyet Terbiyesi, "(Education According to the 
Six Arrows III, Republican Education) 223 (April 6, 1938): 14. 
"Altt Umdeye Gore Terbiye IV, Cumhuriyet Terbiyesi," (Education According to the 
Six Arrows IV, Republican Education) 224 (April 13, 1938): 14. 
"Yeni Tefrikamtz, Sosyoloji Metodunun Kaideleri," (Our New Publication, Rules of 
the Sociological Method) 225 (April 20, 1938): 2. 
"Altt Umdeye Gore Terbiye V, Cumhuriyet Terbiyesi" (Education According to the 
Six Arrows V, Republican Education) 225, (April 20, 1938): 14. 
"Alt1 Umdeye Gore Terbiye V, Milliyet Terbiyes4" (Education According to the Six 
Arrows V, Education of Nationality) 227, (May 4, 1939): 14. 
"Altt Umdeye Gore Terbiye VI, Milliyet Terbiyesi," (Education According to the Six 
Arrows VI, Education ofNationality) 228 (May 11, 1939): 14. 
"Altt Umdeye Gore Terbiye VII, Milliyet Terbiyes4" (Education According to the Six 
Arrows VII, Education ofNationality) 229 (May 18, 1939): 19. 
"Pedagoj4 Diinii, Bugiinii, Y artnt I," (Pedagogy, Its Past, Present, Future I) 231 (June 
1, 1939): 18-9. 
"Pedagoj4 Diinii, Bugiinii, Yartm II," (Pedagogy, Its Past, Present, Future II) 232 
(June 8, 1939): 19 
"Ogretmen," (The Teacher) 233 (June 15, 1939): 2. 
"ideal Nedir?" (What is Ideal?) 233 (June 15, 1939): 3. 
"Pedagoji, Diinii, Bugiinii, Y artm III," (Pedagogy, Its Past, Present, Future III) 233 
(June 15, 1939): 18-9. 
"Sarkh," (The Oriental Man) 236 (July 6, 1939): 3. 
"Surada" (In the Council) 23 7 (July 13, 1939): 2. 
"Koy," (Village) 240 (August 3, 1939): 10-1, 19. 
"Koy, Egitmen ve Ogretmenleri," (Village, Instructors and Teachers) 240 (August 3, 
1939) :16-7. 
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"Humanizma Davas1," (The Question of Humanism) 241 (August 10, 1939): 5. 
"Maarif Surasmda Omanizma," (Humanism in the Council of Education) 241 (August 
10,1941):2. 
"Maarif Suralan Azalan Ne Diyor?" (What Do the Members of the Council of 
Education Say?) 242 (August 17, 1939): 10-1. 
"Turk Rejimini Ni9in Severim?" (Why I Like the Turkish Regime?) 247 (September 
21, 1939): 2. 
"insaniyet Var M1d1r?" (Is There Humanity?) 248 (September 28, 1939): 2. 
"Atatiirk'un Hayatt," (Atatiirk's Life) 254 (October, 9, 1939): 10-12. 
"Milli Sefimiz ve Maarifimiz," (Our National Chief and Education) 255 (October 16, 
1939): 2. 
"inonu'nun Sahsiyeti," (inonu's Character) 265 (December 25, 1940): 2. 
"Tabiat ve insan," (Nature and Human Being) 266 (February 1, 1940): 2, 19. 
"Ordu," (The Army) 275 (April 4, 1940): 2. 
"Koy Enstitiileri," (The Village Institutes) 279 (May 2, 1940): 2. 
"Tekamul ve Tekemmul," (Evolution and Perfection) 281(May16, 1940): 3. 
"Halk ve Biz," (People and Us) 307 (October 14, 1940): 3. 
"Talim ve Terbiye'de Inktlap," (Revolution in Training and Education) 312 (December 
19, 1940): 2. 
"50 Milyon Olal1m!" (Let's Be 50 Million!) 319 (February 6, 1941), p. 2. 
"Maarifte Siyaset," (Politics in Education) 322 (February 27, 1941): 10-1, 16. 
"Karanhk Noktalar," (Black Points) 325 (March 20, 1941 ): 2. 
"Turke Dogru," (Towards the Turk) 329 (April 18, 1941): 2, 16. 
"Erkek ve Kadm," (Man and Woman) 332 (May 8, 1941): 2. 
"Kahramanlar," (The Heroes) 333 (May 15, 1941): 2. 
"Agaoglu Kimdir?" (Who is Agaoglu?) 334 (May 22, 1941): 3. 
"Eski ve Yeni," (The Old and the New) 340 (July 3, 1941): 2, 8-9. 
"Mimaride Turke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Architecture) 341(July10, 1941): 2. 
"Turke Ogut," (Advice to the Turk) 346 (August 14, 1941): 2, 10, 15. 
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"Durma! Yarat," (Do Not Stop! Create) 348 (August 28, 1941): 2, 11. 
"Toplu Tedris ve Tatbikatt," (Mass Education and Its Implementation) 353 (October 2, 
1941): 10, 16. 
"Sosyete Hayatmda Normal ve . ..\normal," (The Normal and the Abnormal in Social 
Life) 354 (Octpber 9, 1941):. 2, 15. 
"Cumhuriyete inamyorum," (I Believe in Republic) 357 (Octpber 30, 1941): 2. 
"inonti ve Halk," (inonti and the People) 357 (October 30, 1941): 3. 
"Efsaneye Klyma!" (Do Not Sacrifice the Myth!) 360 (November 20, 1941): 2, 13 
"Yeni Adam Ailesine," (To the Family of Yeni Adam) 363 (December 11, 1941): 2. 
"Ti.irk Nedir?" (What is Turk?) 364 (December 18, 1941): 2. 
"Pedagog," (Padagogue) 365 (December 25, 1941): 2, 10. 
"Milli Anane,''(The National Tradition) 366 (January l, 1942): 2. 
"Felsefe de Turke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Philosophy) 367 (January 8, 1942): 2. 
"Resimde Turke Dogru,'' (Towards the Turk in Painting) 368 (January 15, 1942): 2. 
"Tiyatro'da Turke Dogru,"(Towards the Turk in Theatre) 369 (January 22, 1942): 2. 
"Ananecilik ve Muhafazakarhk,'' (Traditionalism and Conservatism) 370 (January 29, 
1942): 2. 
"Ahlakta Turke Dogru,'' (Towards the Turk in Morality) 372 (February 12, 1942): 2. 
"Deger Buhram," (The Value Crisis) 373 (February 19, 1942): 2 
"Mistik," (Mystical) 374 (February 25, 1942): 3. 
"Felsefe Dili,'' (Philosophical Language) 375 (March 5, 1942): 2. 
"ilmi Salahiyet," (Scientific Competence) 376 (March 12, 1942): 2. 
"Tarihi Nasil Ogrettim?" (How I Taught History?) 378 (March 26, 1942): 4. 
"Halledilecek En Bilytik Problemler,'' (Major Problems to be Solved?) 379 (April 2, 
1942): 2. 
"Maarifte Tilrke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Education) 382 (April 23, 1942): 2. 
"Felsefe Terimleri Dzerine Cikan Yalanlar," (Lies on the Philosophical Terms) 383 
(April 30, 1942): 2. 
"Milliyet9iligim,'' (My Nationalism) 384 (May 7, 1942): 2. 
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"Felsefe Terimlerinde Beynelminelcilik," (Internationalism in Philosophical Terms) 
385 (May 14, 1942): 2, 11. 
"Turke Dogru ve Milli Tiyatro Problemi," (Towards the Turk and National Theatre 
Problem) 387 (May 28, l 942): 2, 11 
"ikizlik," (Dualism) 387 (May 28, 1942): 3. 
"Ahlak Vicdam Nasti ve Ne Zaman Dogar?" (How and When Does the Moral 
Conscience Emerge?) 389 (June 11, 1942): 2. 
"Romanda Turke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Novel) 390 (June 18, 1942): 2. 
"Mimikte Turke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Mimic) 391 (June 25, 1942): 2. 
"Heykelde Turke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Sculpture) 392 (July 2, 1942): 2. 
"Dilde Turke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Language) 393 (July 9, 1942): 2. 
"Ahlak Terbiyesi," (Moral Education) 394 (July 16, 1942): 2,11. 
"Yap1ctlar," (The Constructivists) 396 (July 30, 1942), p. 2. 
"Turk Dil Kurultaymda i.H Baltac10glu'nun <;e~itli itirazlara Verdigi Cevaplar," 
(Some Answers Given by i.H Baltac10glu to Some Objections Raised in the 
Turkish Language Congress) 400 (August 27, 1942):. 2, 11. 
"Alim Tipleri," (Scholar Types) 401 (September 3, 1942): 2. 
"Uy Baba Tipi," (Three Types ofFather) 402 (September 17, 1942): 2. 
"Uy Kavram," (Three Concepts) 404 (September 24, 1942): 3. 
"Ahlak Buhrani,"(The Moral Crisis) 408 (October 22, 1942): 2. 
"Devleti Sayimz," (Respect the State) 411(November12, 1942): 2. 
"Soysuzlar," (The Degenerates) 412 (November 19, 1942):2. 
"insan Her~eyden Once Aktif Bir Varhktlr," (Human Being is First and Foremost an 
Active Being) 414 (December 2, 1942): 2. 
"Millet Nedir? Ne Degildir?" (What is or is Not Nation?) 416(December17, 1942): 2. 
"Gelenek," (Tradition) 417 (December 24, 1942): 2. 
"Yeni· Adam On Y~m Girdi," (Yeni Adam Celebrated its 10th Anniversary) 419 
(January 7, 1943): 2. 
"Klasikler," (The Classics) 420 (January 20, 19439, pp. 2, 7. 
"Maarif Suras1," (The Council of Education) 421(January21, 1943), p. 2. 
"Bu Nasll ilim," (What Kind ofa Science is This?) 424 (February 11, 1942): 2. 
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"Turke Dogru, Htfzirrahman ~it Oymen'e Cevap Veriyorum'' (Towards the Turk, I 
am Answering to Htfzmahman R~it Oymen) 427 (March 4, 1943): '.!, 4-5, 11. 
"Baltacioglu "Turke Dogru" Hakkmdaki Suallerimize Cevap Veriyor," (Baltac1oglu 
Answers Our Questions About "Towards the Turk") 431 (April 1, 1943): 4. 
"Henri Bergson," 433 (April 15, 1943): 3-11. 
"Tiirk Ahlak Gelenekleri," (Turkish Ethical Traditions) 434 (April 22, 1943): 2,11. 
"Ustiin Irk," (Superior Race) 437 (May 13, 1943): 2. 
"Plana Dogru," (Towards the Plan) 440 (June 3, 1943): 2. 
"Yonetim Korami," (Administrative Theory) 441(June10, 1943): 2. 
'"Ne Demek istiyorum?" (What Do I Mean?) 444 (July 1, 1943): 2. 
"Alimler, ilimciler," (Scientists and Scienticists) 446 (July 15, 1943): 2. 
"Milli Mantiga Dogru," (Towards the National Rationale) 447 (July 22, 1943): 2. 
"Roman Nedir?" (What is Novel?) 449 (August 5, 1943): 2. 
"Nufus Ronesans1," (Renaissance in Population) 456 (September 23, 1943): 2. 
"inonu," 461 (October 26, 1943): 3. 
"Orduna Guven," (Trust to Your Army) 473 (January 20, 1944):2. 
"Sanattan Anlamak," (To Know Art) 474 (January 27, 1944): 2. 
"Yoksullugun Oviilmes~" (Appraisement of the Destitute) 475 (February 3, 1944): 2. 
"Bugiinkii Kadm," (Today's Woman) 477 (February 17, 1944): 2. 
"Yap1c1 ilme Dogru," (Towards the Constructive Science) 480 (March 9, 1944): 3. 
"Dil Uzatanlara," (To Those Who Defame) 480 (March 9, 1944): 2. 
"Roman Nedir?" (What is Novel?) 481 (March 10, 1944 ): 2. 
"Yeni Terimler Nastl Yap1hr?" (How are the New Terms Invented?) 483 (March 30, 
1944): 2. 
"Zavalh Gelenek," (Poor Tradition) 484 (April 6, 1944): 3. 
"Maarif Vekilinin Genelgesi D zerine," (On the Circular of the Minister of Education) 
486 (April 20, 1944): 9. 
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"Bir Nahiye Miidiiri.ire A91k Mektup," (Open Letter to a Regional Director) 488 (May 
4, 1944): 2. 
"Bir Tarrif," (An Explanation) 490 (May 18, 1944): 2. 
"ilim Bakmundan Psikoloji," (Psychology in Terms of Science) 492 (June l, 1944): 2, 11. 
"Garba Dogru,'' (Towards the West) 493 (June 8, 1944): 2, 11. 
"ilme Dogru,'' (Towards the Science) 494 (June 15, 1944): 2, 11. 
"Kiiltiir ve Medeniyet,'' (Culture and Civilization) 495 (June 22, 1944): 3. 
"Sahici ve Yalanci Medeniyet," (Genuine and Imitative Civiliz.ation) 496 (June 29, 1944): 3. 
"Nufusa Dogru," (Towards the Population) 497 (July 6, 1944): 2. 
"Felsefe'ye Dogru," (Towards the Philosophy) 499 (July 20, 1944): 2, 11. 
"Feylozof Kime Derler?" (Who is Called a Philosopher?) 500 (July 27, 1944): 2, 11. 
"ilim Kafas1," (The Scientific Mind) 501(August3, 1944): 2, 11. 
"Diinyamn Olu~lan,'' (Becomings of the World) 503 (August 17, 1944): 2. 
"i~ Boli.imiine Dogru," (Towards the Division of Labor) 507 (September 14, 1944): 2. 
"Oz Tiirk9e Diigumii," (The Knotty Problem of Pure Turkish) 511 (October 12, 
1944): 2, 11. 
"U9 Tiirlii Somiirgecilik," (Three Types oflmperialism) 512 (October 19, 1944): 3. 
"Bizim Cumhuriyetimiz," (Our Republic) 513 (October 26, 1944): 2. 
"Altt Umde,'' (The Six Principles) 513 (October 26, 1944): 3. 
"Romana Dogru," (Towards the Novel) 519 (December 7, 1944): 2, 11. 
"Tabiat," (Nature) 523 (January 4, 1945): 3. 
"Avrupa Pedagojisi Neden Kocam1~trr?" (Why Did the European Pedagogy Become 
Outdated?) 527 (February 1, 1945): 2, 11. 
"Metodlu Supheye Dogru," (Towards the Methodical Skepticism) 528 (February 8, 
1945): 2. 
··Koye Dogru," (Towards the Village) 529 (February 15, 1945): 2. 
"09 Olay ve Bir Sonu9," (Three Events and One Result) 531 (March 1, 1945): 2. 
"Sanatta Garba Dogru," (Towards the West in Art) 534 (March 22, 1945): 2, 11. 
"Y eni Siir Anlay1~1m1z," (Our New Conception of Poetry) 536 (April 5, 1945): 1. 
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"Anlama Gticiine ve D~iinme Manasma Dair," (On the Capacity of Comprehension 
and the Meaning of Thought) 536 (April 5, 1945): 2. 
"Gokalp'e Yagmhk," (Enmity Against Gokalp) 537 (April 12, 1945): 2, 11. 
"Sav~tan Sonra Ti.irkiye," (Turkey After the War) 539 (April 26, 1945): 2, 11. 
"Edebiyat Var Mtdlf?" (Does Literature Exist?) 542 (May 17, 1945): 2, 11. 
"Toprak Kanunu," (The Land Law) 544 (May 31, 1945): 2. 
"Siir NedirT' (What is Poetry?) 550 (July 12, 1945): 2, 11. 
"Plansiz Htikiimetler," (Governments without a Plan) 565 (October 25, 1945): 2. 
"Benim Derdim," (My Problem) 567 (November 8, 1945): 2. 
"Bat1ya Dogru," 568 (Towards the West) (November 15, 1945): 2, 11. 
"Dil Devrimine Taktlanlar," (Those Who Stick to the Language Revolution) 569 
(November 22, 1945): 2, 11. 
"Tiirk Dil Kurultayi'nda," (In the Turkish Language Congress) 572 (December 13, 
1945): 2. 
"Yeni Bir Parti Kuruluyor," (A New Party Being Established) 572 (December 13, 
1945): 1. 
"Anl~tlmasi Gue; Olan Dogrular," (Truths Which Are Difficult to Understand) 577 
(January 17, 1946): 2, 11. 
"idarenin Sim," (The Secret of Administration) 579 (January 31, 1946): 2. 
"Pedagojinin Y alanlan," (The Lies of Pedagogy) 578 (January 25, 1946): 2. 
"Halk ve Aydmlar," (People and Intellectuals) 582 (February 21, 1946): 2, 11. 
"Deger-Karga~as1,'' (The Value Disorder) 583 (February 28, 1946): 2, 11. 
"Partiler," (Parties) Yeni Adam, 594 (May 16, 1946): 2,11. 
"inonii,'' 595 (May 23, 1946): 3. 
"C. H. Partisi," (R.P. Party) 595 (May 23, 1946): 2, 11. 
"Partilerin Yap1s1," (The Structure of the Parties) 597 (June 6, 1946): 2, 11. 
"Her~eyin Ustiinde Vatan Var," (There is Homeland Above Anything Else) 598 (June 
13, 1946): 2. 
"Muhalefet Gruplan,'' (The Opposition Groups) 601 (July 4, 1946): 2, 11. 
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"09 Devlet, Tek Dert" (Three States, One Problem) 603 (July 18, 1946): 2, 11. 
"Se~imin Ogrettikleri," (Lessons Drawn From Election) 606 (August 8, 1946): 2, 11. 
"Recep Peker," 607 (AU!:,'llSt 15, 1946): 3. 
"Bu Yol Anar~iye Gider," (This Road Goes to Anarchy) 608 (August 22, 1946): 2. 
"Demokratlar <;ocuk Gibi Konu~uyor?" (Democrats Speak Childish) 609 (August 29, 
1946): 2, 11. 
"Yeni Adarru Y~tacagim," (I Will Keep Yeni Adam Alive) 611 (December 4, 1947): 2. 
"Yeni Adamm Yolu," (The Path of Yeni Adam) 613 (September 1, 1949): 2. 
"MaarifSuralan," (Councils ofEducation) 614 (September 8, 1949): 2. 
"Bir Sanat ihtilali," (An Art Revolution) 16 (September 22, 1949): 2. 
"Millet Var!" (Nation Exists!) 616 (September 22, 1949): 1. 
"Koy Enstittileri Davas1," (The Village Institutes Question) 618 (October 6, 1949): 2. 
"Dinliler, Dinsizler ve Softalar," (Believers, Atheists and Bigots) 618 (October 6, 1949): 1. 
"An~i, Diktatorliik, Demokrasi ve Tarih," (Anarchy, Dictatorship, Democracy and 
Art) 619 (October 13, 1949): 1. 
"Benim Pedagojim," (My Pedagogy) 620 (October 20, 1949): 2. 
"Turk, Kendini Bil!" (Turk, Know Yourself!) 621 (October 27, 1949): 1. 
"Din K~1smda Devlet" (State vis-a-vis Religion), 621 (October 27, 1949): 2. 
"Medeniyet NedirT (What is Civilization?) 622 (November 3, 1949): 1. 
"Din Pedagojisi," (Pedagogy of Religion) 622 (November 3, 1949): 2. 
"Atattirk Mucizesi," (The Atattirk Miracle) 623 (November 10, 1949): 2. 
"Demokrasisiz Vatan, Vatansiz Demokrasi," (Homeland Without Democracy, 
Democracy Without Homeland) 626 (December 1, 1949): 1. 
"Din Zorbahgt," (Religious Despotism) 627 (December 3, 1949): 1. 
"Dil Davas1 Tehlikede" (The Struggle for Language is in Danger) 627 (December 3, 
1949): 2. 
"Gorenekler, Gelenekler," (Customs, Traditions) 628 (December 15, 1949): 1. 
"Alevi Tiirkler," (The Alawite Turks) 633 (January 19, 1950): 1, 5. 
"Tiirkiye, Kalkm!" (Turkey, Develop!) 635 (February 2, 1950): 1. 
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"Turk Okulunun Kalkmmas1," (Development of the Turkish School) 635 (February 2, 
1950): 2. 
"Diller, Uluslar," (Languages and Nations) 636 (February 9, 1950): l. 
"Turbe Fobisi,'' (The Tomb Phobia) Ulus quoted in Yeni Adam, 636 (February 9, 
1950): 5. 
"Kultiir-Medeniyet," (Culture-Civilization) 638 (February 23, 1950): 1. 
"Yarat1c1 Adamlar," (The Creative Men) 639 (March 2, 1950): 1. 
"Uluslar - Dinler," (Nations-Religions) 640 (March 9, 1950): 1. 
"Alevilik ve Turkluk," (Alawism and Turkishness) 640 (March 9, 1950): 2. 
"Muvafiklar, Muhalifler," (Supporters and Opponents) 641 (March 16, 1950): 1. 
"Yeni Adam1'm Davalanndan, Siir Davas1," (Among the Questions of Yeni Adam, the 
Poetry Question) 642 (March 23, 1950): 2. 
"Yeni Adam'm Davalanndan Din Davas1," (Among the Questions of Yeni Adam, the 
Religious Question) 645 (April 13, 1950): 2. 
"Realistler, idealistler," (Realists, Idealists) 646 (April 20, 1950): 1. 
"Demokrasi Dedigin," (The Thing You Called Democracy) 646 (April 20, 1950): 3. 
"Partiler ve Kaderleri," (Parties and Their Fates) 647 (April 27, 1950): 1. 
"Demokrasi Rejimi," (The Regime of Democracy) 648 (May 4, 1950): 1. 
"Kultiirleri Bakurundan Uluslar," (Nations With Respect to Their Cultures) 650 (May 
18, 1950): 1, 5. 
"Ni~in Demokrat Partiden Degilsin?" (Why You are not from the Democratic Party?) 
652 (June 1, 1950): 3. 
"Hukiimetler," (Governments) 653 (June 8, 1950): 1. 
"Demokrasi Ne Degildir?" (What is not Democracy?) 653 (June 8, 1950): 2. 
"Devrimler, Demokrasiler," (Revolutions and Democracies) 654 (June 15, 1950): 1. 
"Hukumet, Uyamk 01!" (Government, Open Your Eyes!) 654 (June 15, 1950):2. 
"Ni~in Halk~1yun?" (Why I am Populist?) 654 (June 15, 1950): 3. 
"Ink1lap ve Demokrasi," (The Revolution and Democracy) 655 (June 22, 1950): 2. 
"Maarif Politikast," (Educational Policy) 656 (June 29, 1950): 2. 
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"Miidahale Mi Inktlap Mi?'' (Is It Intervention or Revolution?) 657 (July 6, 1950): 2. 
"Ni9in Alt1 Ok9uyum?" (Why I am Six Arrowist?) 657 (July 6, 1950): 3. 
"U9 Tiirlii Komunizm," (Three Types of Communism) 658 (July 13, 1950): 1. 
"Pedagojim ve Koy Enstituleri," (My Pedago!:,ry and Village Institutes) 659 (July 20, 
1950): 2. 
"Dinliler, Dinciler," (Believers and Religious Bigots) 660 (July 27, 1950): 1. 
"Normal ve Anormal," (The Normal and the Abnormal) 662 (August 10, 1950): 1. 
"Turkiin Realistligi," (Realism of the Turk) 662 (August 10, 1950): 2. 
"Kur' an Felsefesi," (The Philosophy of Kur 'an) 664 (August 24, 1950): 2. 
"Evrimler, Devrimler," (Evolutions, Revolutions) 665 (August 31, 1950): 1. 
"Din Hayatmuz," (Our Religious Life) 666 (September 7, 1950): 2. 
"Kahplar, Ruhlar,"(Models and Spirits) 667 (September 14, 1950): 1. 
"Yeni Adamm Milliyet9iligi," (The Nationalism of Yeni Adam) 667 (September 14, 
1950): 2. 
"islam ilahiyat Fakiiltesi," (The Faculty of Islamic Theology) 668 (September 21, 
1950): 2. 
"Deger Dii~manhgi," (Enmity Against Value) 670 (October 5, 1950): 2. 
"ilkokulun Teknikle~mesi," (Technicalization of the Primary School) 672 (October 
19, 1950): 2. 
"Dil Devrimi,"(The Language Revolution) 673 (October 26, 1950): 2, 5. 
"Din ve Okul," (Religion and School) 674 (November 2, 1950): 2,5. 
Baltacioglu 's Articles Appeared in the Journal Din Yolu (in chronological order) 
"Bir Din Kongresi Toplamak Gerekiyor,"(It is Necessary to Convene a Religious 
Congress) Din Yolu, 1, 3 (April 5, 1956):2. 
"Din Ger9egi Nasd Bir Ger9ektir," (What Kind of a Reality is the Religious Reality?) 
Din Y olu, 1, 2 (March 30, 1956): 2. 
"Dinsiz Ahlak Olur Mu? Onlar Mi Yamhyor, Biz Mi?," (Can There Be an Ethics 
Without Religion? Are They Mistaking or are We?) Din Yolu, 1, 7 (May 3, 
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1956): 2. 
"Dinsiz Kalkmma Olabiliyor Mu?" (Can There Be Development Without Religion?) 
Din Yolu, 1, 5 (April 19, 1956): 2, 10 
··Ey Ttirkiyeyi Kalkmd1rmak isteyen iyi insanlar," (Hey, The Good People Willing to 
Have Developed Turkey) Din Yolu, 1, 4 (April 12, 1956):2. 
"Kur'an Ayetlerine Gore Allah Nedir? II" (What is God According to the Verses of 
Kur 'an? II) Din Yolu, 1, 2 (March 30, 1956): 7. 
"Kur'an Ayetlerine Gore Allah Nedir III" (What is God According to the Verses of 
Kur'an? III) Din Yolu, 1, 3 (April 5, 1956): 7. 
"Kur'an Ayetlerine Gore Allah Nedir IV," (What is God According to the Verses of 
Kur'an? IV) Din Yolu, 1, 4 (April 12, 1956): 7. 
"Kur'an Ayetlerine Gore Allah Nedir, V' (What is God According to the Verses of 
Kur'an? V) Din Yolu, 1, I (March 15, 1956): 7. 
"Ttirkiye'de Din Anlayi~1," (Religious Understanding in Turkey) Din Yolu, 1, 1 
(March 15, 1956): 2-3. 
"ilk Yapilacak i~ Bir Din Kongresi Toplamah," (First Thing to Do is to Convene a 
Religious Congress) Din Yolu, 1, 6 (April 26, 1956): 2. 
Hilmi Ziva Ulken 's Books (in chronological order) 
&k Ahlaki (Piety Ethics). istanbul: Ekspres Matbaas1, 1931. 
U mumi ictimaiyat (General Sociology). istanbul: Ebtizziya Matbass1, 193 1. 
Tiirk Tefekkilr Tarihi (History of Turkish Thought), 2 vols. istanbul: Ebtizziya 
Matbass1, 193 2, 193 3. 
insani Vatanperverlik (Humanist Patriotism). istanbul: Gtin~ Matbaas1, 1933. 
Telif£iligin Tenakuzlan (The Contradictions of Compromising). istanbul: Hamit Bey 
Matbaas1, 193 3. 
Metafizik (Metaphysics). istanbul: Vakit Matbaas1, 193 5. 
Turk Filozotlan Antolojisi (The Anthology of Turkish Philosophers). istanbul: Yeni 
Gitap~l, 193 5. 
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Turk Kozmolojisi, Turk Mitolojisi, Turk Hikmeti. Teknik Tefekkiir (Turkish 
Cosmology, Turkish Mythology, Turkish Wisdom and Technical Thinking). 
Ankara: B~vekalet Mudevvanat Bas1mevi, 1935. 
Uyams Devrinde Tercumenin Rolu (The Role of Translation in the Era of Awakening). 
istanbul: V akit Matbaas1, 193 5. 
Turk J\1istisizmini Tetkike Giri~ (Introduction to the Study of Turkish Mysticism). 
istanbul: ~am Matbaas1, 193 5. 
Yirminci Asir Filozotlan (The Twentieth Century Philosophers). istanbul: Kanaat 
Kitabevi, 1936. 
Turk Tarihinde Mezhep Cereyanlan (Sectarian Trends in the Turkish History).istanbul: 
Ahmed Said Matbaas1, 1940. 
iytimai Doktrinler Tarihi (History of Social Doctrines). istanbul: Yeni Devir Matbaas1, 
1940. 
Tanzimattan Sonraki Fikir Hareketleri (Intellectual Movements After the Tanzimat). 
istanbul: Maarif Bas1mevi, 1940. 
Posta Y olu (Postal Road). istanbul: Sirket-i Murebbiye Matbaas1, 1941. 
Seytanla Konu~malar (Dialogues with the Devil). istanbul: Ulkii Matbaas1, 1942. 
Mantik Tarihi (History of Logic). istanbul: Riza Co~kun Matbaas1, 1942. 
Ziya Gokalp. istanbul:Ahmed Said Matbaas1, 1942. 
Sosyoloji (Sociology). istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1943. 
Dini Sosyoloji (Sociology of Religion). istanbul: ibrahim Horoz Bas1mevi, 1943. 
Resim ve Cemiyet (Painting and Society). istanbul: Oniversite Kitabevi, 1943. 
Yanm Adam (The Half Man). istanbul: Sirket-i Murebbiye Matbaas1, 1943. 
ii;timai Ostyap1 Olarak Hukuk Tetkiklerine Giri~ (Introduction to the Studies of Law as 
a Superstructure). istanbul: LatifDin9b~ Bastmevi, 1943. 
Yeni Felsefe Cemiyeti ve Turkiye de Felsefe Cemiyetinin Tarihcesi (The New 
Philosophy Association and the Anthology of the Philosophy Association in 
Turkey). istanbul: Latif Din9b~ Bas1mevi, 1944. 
Milletlerin Uyam~t (The Awakening of the Nations). istanbul: Marmara Kitabevi, 1945. 
islam Dti~tincesi (The Islamic Thought) istanbul: Riza Co~kun Matbaas1, 1946. 
Tasavvuf Psikolojisi (Psychology of Sufism). istanbul: Kenan Bas1mevi, 1946. 
Ahlak (Ethics). istanbul: M. Sadik Kag1t91 Matbaas1. 1946. 
Sosyolojiye Giris (Introduction to Sociology). istanbul: 09ler Bas1mevi, 194 7. 
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Millet ve Tarih Suuru (Nation and the Consciousness of History). istanbul: Pulhan 
Matbaas1, 1948. 
Tarihi Maddecilige Reddiye (Refutation of Historical Materialism). istanbul: Karde~ler 
Bas1mevi, 1951. 
Veraset ve Cemiyet (Inheritance and Society). istanbul: Kutulmu~ Matbaasi, 1957, [1924]. 
Sosyoloji Problemleri (The Problems of Sociology). istanbul: Htisntitabiat Matbaasi, 195 5. 
islam Felsefesi Tarihi (History of Islamic Philosophy). istanbul:Osman Yali;m 
Matbaas1, 1957. 
Varhk ve Olu~ (Being and Becoming). Ankara: Ankara Dniversitesi Bas1mevi, 1968. 
Ttirkiye'de Cagd~ Dtisiince Tarihi (History of Contemporary Thought in Turkey), 3rd 
ed. istanbul: Dlken Y aymlari, 1992. 
islam Felsefesi Kaynaklari ve Etkileri (Origins and Impacts of Islamic Philosophy), 4th 
ed. istanbul: Cem Y aymevi, 1993. 
Hi/mi Ziva Ulken 's Articles (in alphabethical order) 
"Artist ve Filozof Tipleri," (Types of Artist and Philosopher) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 9 (March 
11, 1936): 165-72. 
"Bergson'a Dair Yeni Bir Kitap," (A New Book on Bergson) insan, 2, 12 (May 8, 
1939): 1004-7. 
"Bir Omiir Mii, Bir Jest Mi?" (A Life or A Gesture?) istanbul, (May 15, 1946): 3-4. 
"Bizde Tiirki;iiliik, Geciktiren Sebepler -Do~ -Biiyiiyii~ii," (Our Turkism, Reasons 
for Its Belatedness - Its Birth - Development) istanbul, (February 1, 1946): 2-3. 
"Bugiinkii Sanat," (Art Today) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 5 (February 12, 1936): 92-3. 
'"Cemiyet ve Marazi Suur," (Society and the Pathological Consciousness) Felsefe 
Yilhg1, I (1931): 23-130. 
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"Demokratik Cemiyetlerde ileri Geri," (Back and Forth in Democratic Societies) 
istanbul, (July 15, 1946): 3-5. 
"Descartes ve Skolastik," (Descartes and Scholastic) istanbul, (May 1, 1946): 6-8. 
''Destan ve insan I," (Myth and the Human Being I) insan, 22 (April, 1943): 3-6. 
"Destan ve insan II," (Myth and the Human Being II) insan, 23 (May, 1943): 3-6. 
"Destan ve insan IIL" (Myth and the Human Being IID in~ 24-25 (August, 1943): 3-6. 
"Din Sosyolojisi," (Sociology of Religion) Din Yolu. 1,4 (April 12. 1956), p. 6, 10 
"Dii~iinmenin Zorlugu," (The Difficulty ofThinking) insan, 14 (May 1, 1941): 1-2. 
"Eski ve Yeni Mecmualar," (Old and New Journals) insan, 1, 3 (June 15, 1938): 272-4. 
"Existentialism'in Kokleri I," (Origins of Existentialism I) istanbul, (August 15, 1946): 2-4. 
"Existentialism'in Kokleri II," (Origins of Existentialism II) istanbul, (September 1, 
1946): 3-4. 
"Ferd ve Cemiyet," (Individual and Society) insan, 1, 1 (April 15, 1938): 57-65. 
"Fikir Ananesi," (The Tradition of Thought) insan, 1, 4 (July 15, 1938): 281-4. 
"Frans1z ihtilali ve Eski Rejim," (French Revolution and the Ancient Regime) istanbul, 
(August 1, 1946): 3-5. 
"Hangi Batt," (Which West?) insan, 1, 3 (June 15, 1938): 185-6. 
"Hayali -Siyasi ve Hakiki Tiirk¥iiliik," (Imaginery - Political and Genuine Turkism) 
istanbul, (March 15, 1946): 2-3. 
"Hayat ve Kitaplar," (Life and Books) insan, 1, 3 (June 15, 1938): 270-1. 
"Hukuk Sosyolojisinin Unsurlan," (Components of the Sociology of Law) Sosyoloji 
Dergisi, 2 (1943): 105-6. 
"Hiirliik ve Mesulliik," (Freedom and Responsibility) istanbul, (October 1, 1946): 2-4. 
"iytimai Determinizm," (Social Determinism) insan, 1, 2 (May 15, 1938): 165-73. 
"iytimai Hadise Nedir?" (What is a Social Event?) insan, 1, 7 (December 1, 1938): 
396-401. 
"iQtimai T~ekkiiliin Temeli, i~," (The Basis of Social Organization, Work) insan, 2,8 
(January 1, 1939): 671-6. 
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"ii;timai Ost Yap1 Olarak Hukuk Tetkiklerin Gi~," (Introduction to the Studies of 
Law as a Superstructure) Sosyoloji Dergisi, 2 (1943): 22-66. 
"ideolog Nam1k Kemal," (Nam1k Kemal, the Ideologue) insan, 2,8 (January I, 1939): 
609-16. 
"ilim BitarafMtdir?" (Is Science Objective?) insan, 1,7 (December 1, 1938):458-62. 
"ilimde Metod, Di.i~i.ince de Aktl, Ahlakta Vicdan Dogru Yol Gostericidir Denir. Fakat 
Vicdan ii;in Olyi.i Nedir?" (It is Said that Method in Science, Reason in Thought, 
Conscience in Ethics Show the Right Way. But What is the Criterion for 
Conscience?) istanbul, (June 1, 1946): 3-4. 
"ilme ve 'ilmi Hal'e Dair," (On Science and 'Scientific Mood') insan, 21 (March, 
1943): 1-3. 
"imparatorlugun Tekami.ili.i I," (The Evolution of the Empire) insan, 1, 3 (June 15, 
1938): 241-59. 
"insan Sevgisi," (Philanthrophy) insan, 15-17 (August, 1941): 1-3. 
"insan ideali," (The Ideal Man) insan, 20 (February, 1943): 1-2. 
"islam Diinyas1m Tammak," (To Know the Islamic World) Din Yolu. 1,2 (March 30, 
1956): 6, 10. 
"islamiyette Eski Dinlerin izleri," (The Traces of Old Religions in Islam) istanbuL (July 
1, 1946): 4-5. 
"ismail Hakkt Baltac1glu'nun Felsefe Kitab1," (ismail Hakkt Baltac1glu's Book on 
Philosophy) insan, l,7(December 1, 1938): 402-4. 
"i~'e Dair," (About Work) insan, 2, 12 (May 8, 1939): 997-1002. 
"i~ Hakkmda," (On Work) insan, 2, IO (March 1, 1939): 823-31. 
"Maksat," (The Objective) insan, 1, 1 (April 15, 1938): 1-2. 
"Maksat," (The Objective) Felsefe Ytlhgi. 1 (1932): 2-3. 
"Medeniyetin Yilri.i~," (The March of Civilization) insan, 1, 2 (May 15, 1938): 84-91. 
"Medeniyette ilerleme ve Gerilme," (Progress and Retreat in Civilization) istanbul, 
(December 31, 1946): 2-4. 
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"Mekteplerde, Disiplin ve Ceza Meselesi," (The Question of Discipline and 
Punishment in the Schools) insan, 1, 1 (April 15, 1938): 71-5. 
":~v1e~rutiyetin Tereddi.it Devri," (The Period of Hesitation in the Constitutional Era) 
insan, 2, 10 (March 1, 1939): 669-78. 
"Orijinallik ve Garabet," (Originality and Strangeness) insan, 14 (May 1, 1941 ): 20-1. 
"Sanat ve Cemiyet," (Art and Society) insan, 3, 1-13 (April 1, 1941): 26-9. 
"Sartre ve Existentializme," (Sartre and Existentialism) istanbul, (September 15, 
1946): 2-3. 
"Sosyolojinin Mevzu ve Usulu," (The Subject Matter and the Method of Sociology) 
Sosyoloji Dergisi, I ( 1941-1942): 1-169. 
"Sark ve Garp," (East and West) istanbul, (November 1, 1946): 2-4. 
"Tanzimat Devrinde Ti.irk9i.ili.ik," (Turkism in the Tanzimat Era) istanbul, (February 
15, 1946): 2-3. 
"Tanzimat ve Hi.imanizma," {The Tan=imat and Humanism) insan, 2,9 (February 1, 
1939): 689-94. 
"Tarih Boyunca insan ideali," (The Ideal Man in the Course of History) Turk 
Dii@ncesi, 1,3 (February 1, 1954): 165-72. 
"Telifyiligin Tenakuzlan," (The Contradictions of Compromising) Mi.ilkiye, 25 (April 
1933): 3 - 15. 
"Ti.irk Miinevverleri Nelere inaruyorlar? (What Do the Turkish Intellectuals Believe 
in?) Din Yolu, 1,3 (April 5, 1956) : 4, 10. 
"Ti.irk<ri.ililk Anlayi~uruz," (Our Understanding ofTurkism) istanbul, (March 15, 1946): 3. 
"Ti.irkiye' de Pozitivizm Temayi.ili.i," (The Trend of Positivism in Turkey) insan, 2, 11 
(April 8, 1939): 849-53. 
"Ti.irkiye'de idealizm Temayi.ili.i," (The Trend of Idealism in Turkey) insan, 2, 12 
(May 8, 1939): 929-38. 
"Ti.irkiye D1~mda Ti.irk9illi.ik, Realist ve ilmi Turk<ri.ililk" (Turkism Outside Turkey, Realist 
and Scientific Turkism) istanbul, (March 1, 1946): 6-7. 
"09 Diinya Gori.i~ii," (Three Worldviews) insan, 15-17 (August. 1941): 14-7. 
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"Yeni Felsefe Tercumeleri," (New Translations in Philosophy) insan, 1, 1 (April 15, 
1938): 75-6. 
"'Yeni Klasik," (Neo-Classics) insan, 3. 1-13 (April 1, 1941): 1-2. 
"'Yunan Mucizesi," (The Greek ~1iracle) insan, 1, 3 (June 15, 1938): 187-8. 
"Zaman ve insan," (Time and Man) insan, 2, 12 (May 8, 1939): 987-92. 
"Ziya Gokalp'm Tenkidi," (The Critique of Ziya Gokalp) Cigir Mecmuasr, 7, 81 
(1939): 141-2. 
Peyami Safa's Books (in chronological order) 
F atih Harbiye, 3rd ed. istanbul: Otuken Y aymevi, 1973, [ 1931] . 
Bir Teredduttin Romani (Novel of A Hesitation). istanbul: Suhulet Kuttiphanesi, 1933. 
Btiyiik Avrupa Anketi (The Survey of Great Europe). istanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1938. 
Turk Inktlabma Baktslar (Glances at the Turkish Revolution). istanbul: Otuken 
N~riyat A.$., 1993, [193 8]. 
Felsefi Buhran (The Philosophical Crisis). Ankara: Recep Ulusoglu Basrmevi, 1939. 
Matmazel Noraliya'mn Koltugu (Mademoiselle Noraliya's Chair) istanbul, Nebioglu 
Yaymevi, 1949. 
Yalmzrz (We Are Alone). istanbul, Nebioglu Yaymevi, 1951. 
Biz insanlar (We, The Human Beings). istanbul: lnktlap ve Aka Kitabevi, 1959. 
Dokuzuncu Hariciye Kogu§u (External Ward Number Nine) istanbul: Inktlap ve Aka 
Kitabevi, 1963. 
Peyami Safa's Articles (in alphabethical order) 
"Abdullah Cevdet," Cumhuriyet. (December 1, 1932). 
"A~tk Mektup: M. Leon Pierre Quinte," (Open Letter to M. Leon Pierre Quinte) 
Cumhuriyet, (August 28, 1933). 
"Afet inanr'm Konferansr Mtinasebeti ile," (On the Conference of Afet inan) 
Cumhuriyet. (July 17, 1932). 
"Allaha Dogru Yone~," (Turning Towards God) Tasvir'i Efkar. (October 13, 1945). 
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"Almak ve <;alma~" (Paraphrasing and Plagiarism) Yeni Mecmua. (May 23, 1942). 
"Anahtar Arayan Dunya," (World in Search for a Guide) Cumhuriyet, (July 7, 1939). 
"Asd Harp," (The Real War) Hatta. (December 26, 1934): 2. 
'·Avrupa Medeniyeti Y1kllabilir Mi?" (Can the European Civilization Collape?) Tas\ir'i 
Efkar. (October 24, 1932). 
"Avrupa'daki Haklanm1z ve Vazifelerimiz," (Our Rights and Duties m Europe) 
Tasvir'i Efkar, (January 26, 1942). 
"Ayaktistii Cevap," (Answer in Haste) Cumhuriyet, (August 8, 1939). 
"Ay1pt1r Arkad~lar, Ayip!"(It is a Shame Friends) Cmaral!!, 32 (March 14, 1942): 2. 
"Avrupa Medeniyeti Y1klhyor Mu?" (Is the European Civilization Collapsing?) 
Cmaralt1, 45 (August 1, 1942): 5. 
"Bergson ve Zamammiz," (Bergson and Our Age) Cumhuriyet, (September 16, 1937). 
"Bilgi ve Enerji," (Knowledge and Energy) Tasvir'i Efkar quoted in Yeni Adam. 479 
(March 2, 1944) : 5 
"Billur Hakikat," (The Pure Reality) Vakit in Yeni Adam, 610 (September 5, 1946): 10. 
"Bir Antalojinin Hakikati," (The Reality of an Anthology) Ktiltiir Haftas1, 8 (March 4, 
1936): 142-9. 
"Bir Kadrocu Dostuma," (To a Friend of Mine from Kadro) Cumhuriyet, (August 1, 
1933). 
"Bir Mtinak~anm Sonu,"(End of a Debate) Cumhuriyet, (August 2, 1933). 
"Biyoloji ve Milliyet~ili~" (Biology and Nationalism) Cmaralt1, 38 (June 13, 1942): 5. 
"Biz Avrupal1 Mty1z?" (Are We European?) CmaraltJ., 59 (November 7, 1942): 4. 
"Bizden Evvelkilerin Edebiyat1," (Literature of Our Predecessors) Kultiir Haftas1, 7 
(February 26, 1936): 129-32. 
"Bu Bir ihtilal Harbidir," (This is a Revolutionary War) Tasvir'i Efkar, (February 28, 
1941 ). 
"Bu Dunyanm Derdi Nedir?" (What is the Problem of this World?) Cumhuriyet, 
(August 31, 1939). 
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"Bu Harpten Dogacak Kulttir Dunyas1," (The Cultural World to Emanate from this 
War) Haber in Yeni Adam, 546 (June 14, 1945): 10. 
''Buddha ve Nirvana," (Buddha and Nirvana) Cumhuriyet. (May 6, 1933). 
''BugOnkU Turk Siiri," (Today's Turkish Poetry) Cumhuriyet, (October 27, 1932). 
"Buytik Adam" (The Great Man) Yeni Mecmua (July 18, 1942): 4. 
"Canavar ve Kahraman," (The Beast and the Hero) (,)naralt!, 50 (September 5, 194'2): 5. 
"Celal Bayar'm itirafi," (Confessions of Celal Bayar) Vakit in Yeni Adam, 605 
(August 1, 1946): 10. 
"(1gir Mecmuas1 ve Topumuz Hakkmda," (The journal, <;1gzr and About All of Us) 
Cumhuriyet. (November 27, 1933). 
"Cumhuriyet ve Miisamaha," (Republic and Tolerance) Cumhuriyel (October 25, 1933). 
"Darulfiinun'dan Oniversiteye," (From Darulfilnun to the University) Cumhuriyet. 
(October 29, 1933). 
"Demokrasi Ne Tercume Edilebilir Ne De intihal" (Democracy Can Neither Be 
Translated Nor Copied) Vakit in Yeni Adam, 607 (August 15, 1946): 10. 
"Demokrasi Kavrami," (The Concept of Democracy) Haber in Yeni Adam, 538 (April 
19, 1945): 9. 
"Demokrasi ve Liberalizm," (Democracy and Liberalism) Cumhuriyet, (July 23, 1933). 
"Demokrasi ve Sosyal Adalet," (Democracy and Social Justice) Haber in Yeni Adam, 
550 (July 12, 1945): 10. 
"Din, Medeniyet ve ilim," (Religion, Civilization and Science) Ulus quoted in Yeni 
Adam, 640 (March 9, 1950): 6. 
"Din ve ilim," (Religion and Science) Din Yolu, 1,1(March15, 1956):3. 
"Dil Degi~mesinde iki Mesele,"(Two Problems in Change of Language) Cumhuriyet. 
(September 26, 1932). 
"Dogan Diinyanm Miijedecisisi," (The Harbinger of the Emerging World) Cmaralt1, 12 
(September 30, 1941): 5. 
"Diinya Gen9ligi ve Bizimki," (The Youth of the World and Ours) Cumhuriyet. 
(October 11, 1933). 
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"Dunya da insan Var Mi?" (Is there Man in the World?) Yeni Mecmu!!, (July 18, 
1941):4. 
"Dunyamn Muhta<; Oldugu Nizam," (The Order Which the World is in Need of) 
Cumhuriyet, (October 11, 1939). 
"Dunyayt Kurtaracak M~le," (The Torch to Save the World) Tasvir'i Efkar, (May 9, 
1945). 
"Edebiyat Ne Olmahdtr?" (What Should Be the Literature?) Cumhuriyet April 13, 1933). 
"Edebiyat ve Kiiltilr," (Literature and Culture) Ulus, (November, 19, 1950). 
"Edebiyat Tarihi Degil, Edebiyat Karnavah," (Not the History of Literature But 
Literary Carnaval) Kultilr Haftas1, 6 (February 19, 1936): 109-11, 
"Edebiyatydar ve Lisaniyatydar," (Men of Letter and Linguists) <;maraltl, 54 (October 
3, 1942): 5. 
"Edebiyat-1 Cedide'nin 50'inci Ytldonilmii," (50th Anniversary of the New Literature) 
ofTasvir quoted in Yeni Adam, 583 (February 28, 1946): IO. 
"Ekonomi ve Milliye~ilik," (Economy and Nationalism) <;maralt!, 36 (May 30, 1942): 5. 
"En B~ta Milli Menfaat," (National Interest in the First Place) Tasvir-i Efkar, (March 
12, 1941). 
"Esasta Anl~mak Sartttr," (It is Essential to Agree in Principle) Tasvir-i Efkar, (April 
15, 1942). 
'Eski ve Yeni," (The Old and the New) Cumhuriyet, (February 27, 1938). 
"Eski ve Yeni Hurriyet," (Old and New Freedom) Tasvir'i Efkar, (July 17, 1941). 
"Felsefe ve Milliyetyilik," (Philosophy and Nationalism) <;maralt!, 41(June4, 1942):10-11. 
"Fikir Hiirriyeti,"(The Freedom of Thought) <;maraltl, 8 (September 30, 1941): 5. 
"Fikret Misali," (Like Fikret) Tasvir quoted in Yeni Adam, (July 19, 1945): 10. 
"Fransa Dejenere Midir?" (Is France Corrupted?) Yeni Adam, 593 (May 9, 1946): 5. 
"Gaye ve Usul," (The Aim and the Method) Cumhuriyet, (July 29, 1933). 
"Gazete Halk ve Hiikilmet," (Daily, People and the Government) Tasvir'i Efkar, in 
Y eni Adam, 4 l 4(December 2, 1942): 9 
"Gen~lige Dair Bir iddia,"(A Claim About Youth) Cumhuriyet. (October 17, 1933). 
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"Gen9ligi Anlamak," (To Know the Youth) Cumhuriyet. (October 10, 1933). 
"Gen9lik ve Spor Bayram1," (The Youth and Sports Day) Yeni MecmuS!, (May 19, 
1939): 4. 
"Gen9lik ve ideolojiler," (The Youth and Ideologies) Killtiir Haftas1, 9 (March 11, 
1936): 162. 
"Hakiki Milnevver," (The Real Intellectual) Cumhuriyet. (November 15, 1933). 
"Hakiki ve Masai Turkiye," (Turkey in Tale and Reality) Cumhuriyet. (November 
28.1933). 
"Halktan Cikan Edebiyat," (Literature Emanating from People) Cumhuriyet. (June 12, 
1932). 
"Hangisi Taassup," (Which One is Fanaticism?) Tasvir'i Efkar quoted in Yeni Adam. 
499 (July 20, 1944): 5. 
"Harbin Sebebi Milliyet9ilik Midir?" (Is the Cause of War Nationalism?) Cmaraltt, 53 
(September 26,1942): 4. 
"Havaya U9an ideolojiler," (Ideologies Scattering Around) Tasvir'i Efkar, (August 14, 
1945). 
"Hayat K~1smda Sistemlerimiz," (Our Systems vis-a-vis Life) Cumhuriyet, (July 11, 
1933). 
"Humanizma ve Antigone," (Humanism and Antigone) CmaralY, 46 (August 8, 1942): 5. 
"Hurriyet Arna Hangisi? (Freedom, But Which One?) Vakit, in Yeni Adam, 609 
(August 29, 1946): 9. 
"Hilrriyet ve Felaket," (Freedom and Catastrophe) Vakit quoted in Yeni Adam, 600 
(June 27, 1946): 10. 
"Hilrriyet Sarho~lan," (The Liberty Drunkards) Yeni Adam, 569 (November 22, 
1945): 6. 
"Htirriyet ve Sahsiyet," (Freedom and Personality) Yeni Adam ,594 (May 16, 1946): 10. 
"Huseyin Cahid'in Mecmuas1," (The Journal of Hilseyin Cahid) Cumhuriyet. 
(November 18, 1933). 
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"Inktlab1mizda CHP Ftrkasmm Biiytik Rolu," (The Major Role of the RPP in Our 
Revolution) Cumhuriyet, (October 29, 1933). 
'"InkdabtffilZlil ideolojis~" (The Ideology of Our Revolution) Cumhuriy~ (July 29, 1933). 
"i9timai Edebiyat," (The Social Literature) Cumhuriyek (June 16, 1932) 
"idealsiz Adami <;eviren Bo~luk," (Hollowness Surrounding the Man Without An 
Ideal) Cmaralt1, 47 (August 15, 1942): 5. 
"iflas Var Mt?" (ls there Bankrupcy?) Cumhuriyet. (August 19, 1933). 
"iki Dergi ve iki isbat," (Two Journals and Two Proofs) Tasvir'i Etkar quoted in 
Yeni Adam 369 (January 22, 1942): 5. 
"ilim ve Devlet," (Science and State) Tasvir quoted in Yeni Adam, 576 (January 10, 
1946): 10. 
"ilim ve Nazariye Dii~manhgt," (Enmity Against Science and Theory) Cmaralt1, 55 
(October 10, 1942): 4. 
"insan Yaratan Eserler," (Works Which Create Man) Cumhuriyet, (April 28, 1937). 
"insan Yok, Millet Var!" (There is no Man, But Nation!) Cmaraltl, 4 (August 30, 
1941): 5. 
"insanm Yeni Manas1," (The New Meaning of Man) Turk Dilfilincesi, 1,3 (February 1, 
1954): 161-4. 
"ismail Hakkt Baltac1oglu ve Gazetes~" (ismail Hakkt Baltac1oglu and His Daily) 
Tasvir'i Efkar quoted in Yeni Adam, 315 (January 9, 1941): 6. 
"istenilen Bir Edebiyat," (A Desirable Literature) Cumhuriyet, (June 19, 1933). 
"Kahraman ve i~dam1," (The Hero and the Businessman) <;maraltl, 43 (July 18, 
1942): 5. 
"Kemalist Inktlabm Hakiki Hedet'i," (The Real Target of the Kemalist Revolution) 
Cumhuriyet, (December 4, 1932). 
"Kendi Kendimiz Olmakta Isranm1z," (Our Insistence on Being Ourselves) Tasvir-i 
Efkar, in Yeni Adam, 344 (July 31, 1941):13. 
"Kral Oedipe Masah," (The Tale of King Oedipus) Kultiir Haftas1, 18 (May 13, 1936): 338. 
"Kiiltiir ve Edebiyat," (Culture and Literature) Kiiltiir Haftas!:, 1 (December 15, 1936): 8. 
"Kultiir istiklali," (The Cultural Independence) Cumhuriyel (September 30, 1933). 
"Kultiir Mucadelesi," (The Cultural Struggle) Cumhuriyet. (May 12, 1933). 
"Madde Sizlere Omur," (Matter is Dead) Tasvir'i Efkar, (October 27, 1945). 
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''Maksim Gorki'ye Cevap," (An Answer to Maxim Gorki) Cumhurivet. (June 9, 1942). 
"Medeniyet ve Surat," (Civilization and Speed) Yedi Gun, (February, 10, 1937): 4. 
"Mehenk T~1," (The Touchstone) Tasvir'i Efkar, (April 12, 1945). 
"Mehmet Emin'in Bergson <;evirisindeki Hatalar Dsrune," (On Some Mistakes in 
Mehmet Emin's Translation from Bergson) Cumhuriyet .. (November 17, 1932). 
"Memleket ve Edebiyat," (Homeland and Literature) Kulttir Haftas1, 2 (December 22, 
1936): 33. 
"Memleketin Umumi Siyaseti," (General Politics of the Country) Tasvir quoted in Yeni 
Adam, 570 (November 29, 1945): 10. 
"Millete ve insana Dogru," (Towards the Nation and Man) Vakit quoted in Yeni 
Adam, 597 (June 6, 1946): 10. 
"Milli Ahlak.," (The National Ethics) Cmaralt!, 42 (July 11, 1942):5. 
"Milli Birlik ve Ahlak.," (National Unity and Ethics) Cmaraltl, 60 (November 14, 
1942): 4. 
"Milli Cemiyetlerde ideal," (The Ideal in National Societies) CmaraltI, 48 (August 22, 
1942): 5. 
"Milli Edebiyat ve Inlolap EdebiyatI," (The National Literature and the Literature of 
the Revolution) Cumhuriyet, (September 20, 1933). 
"Milli Ekonomi," (The National Economy) <;maraltI, 57 (October 24, 1942), p. 5. 
"Milli Olmak Zorlugu," (The Difficulty in Being National) Tasvir'i Efkar in Yeni 
Adam, 384 (December 18, 1941): 11. 
"Milliyet'e Cevap," (An Answer to Milliyet) Cumhuriyet, (July 2, 1933). 
"Milliyet~i Edebiyat," (The Nationalist Literature) Tan, (March 14, 1936). 
"Milliyet~iligin Birka~ Hakikati," (Some Truths About Nationalism) CmaraltI, 32 
((March 14, 1942): 5. 
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"Muhasebe EdebiyatI," (A Commentatory Literature) KultOr Haftas1, 12 (April 1, 
1936): 223-4. 
''Musiki Anketimizin Neticeleri I," (Results of Our Survey on Music I) Cumhurivet. 
(January 11, 1933). 
"Musiki Anketimizin Neticeleri II," (Results of Our Survey on Music II) Cumhuriyet. 
(January 12, 1933). 
"Miinevverin Hakki," (The Right of the Intellectual) Cumhuriyet. (November 22, 1933). 
"Nazim Hikmef in Se9ilmi~ Siirleri," (Selected Poems from Nazim Hikmet) 
Cumhuriyet. (October 13, 1932). 
"Neden Bir Mecmuarruz YokT' (Why We Do Not Have a Periodical?) Cumhuriyet. 
(May 19, 1932). 
"Okullanmizda Anadili Ogretimi," (Teaching of Native Language in Our Schools) 
Tasvir'i Efkar quoted in Yeni Adam, 433 (April 15, 1943): 6-7. 
"Okuyucu ve Romane," (The Reader and the Novelist) Tasvir-i Etkar, (June 14, 1944). 
"Onuncu Yda On Gun Kala," (Ten Days Left to the 10th Anniversary) Cumhuriyet, 
(October 20, 1933). 
"On Asnn Yildoniimii," (The Anniversary of Ten Centuries) Cumhuriyet. (October 29, 
1933). 
"Oturan ve Ayakta Gem;lik," (Active and Inactive Youth) 291 Yeni Adam, (July 25, 
1940): 10-1. 
"Paul Valery" Tasvir'i Efkar. in Yeni Adam, 558 (September 6 1945):10. 
"Politikarun iki Manas1," (Two Meanings of Politics) Cumhuriyet (October 5, 1933). 
"Program" (The Program) Turk Dosilncesi, l,l (December 1, 1953):1-3. 
"Psikoloji ve Milliyet~" (Psychology and Nationalism) Cmaraltt, 40 (Jue 27, 1942):5. 
"Roman - Buhran1 ve Meseleleri," (Novel - Its Crisis and Problems) Tasvir'i Efkar, 
(April 12, 13, 22, 1943). 
"Roman Cemiyetin Aynas1," (Novel IS the Mirror of Society) Tasvir'i Etkar, 
(November 23, 1942). 
"Roman Teknigi," (The Technique ofNovel) Milliy~ (October 9, 1958). 
"Romamn istikbali," (The Future of the Novel) Cumhuriyel (May 1, 1932). 
"Rtiya, Siir, Cinnet," (Dream, Poetry, Insanity) Tan, (February 20, 1936). 
"Saganak," (Pouring) Tan (April 14, 1936). 
"Sanat Felsefesi," (The Philosophy of Art) ~(January 30, 1935):2. 
"Sanat Ne i~indir?" (What is Art for?) Cumhuriyet. (September 22, 1932). 
"Sanat ve Surat," (Art and Speed) Cumhuriye!, (July 28, 1932). 
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"Sanat Eseri Bi~ey ifade Eder mi?" (Does Work of Art Mean Anything?) 
Cumhuriyet, (March 22, 1938). 
"Sanatta Ttirke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in Art) Tasvir'i Efkar, (May 5, 1942). 
"Sanatta Malum ve Me1Yhul," (The Known and the Unknown in Art) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 
14 (April 15, 1936): 262. 
"Sanatm Vatam," (Art's Homeland) Cumhuriye!, (July 13, 1939). 
"Sezi~, Tahlil ve Riyaziye," (Intuition, Analysis and Mathematics) Ktiltiir Haftas1, 13 
(April 8, 1936): 247-58. 
"Sosyoloji ve Millyet¢ik," (Sociology and Nationalism) <;maralt:L. 35 (May 23, 1942): 5. 
"Sovyet Rusya'da Inktlap Sanatt," (Revolutionary Art in the Soviet Russia) 
Cumhuriyet. (September 21, 1933). 
"Soysuzl~m1~ Sanat," (The Corrupted Art) Cumhuriy~ (May 10, 1938). 
"Sozde Mtinevverler," (Pseudointelletuals) Cumhuriyet (August 12, 1933). 
"Sozde Mtinevver Cesaretini Nereden Ahr," (From Where the Pseudointellectual Take 
His Courage?) Cumhuriyet. (August 15, 1933). 
"Statikten Dinamige," (From Static to Dynamic) Cumhuriyet, (July 31, 1933). 
"Sark - Garp Miinak~ma Bir Bakt~," (A Glance at the East - West Dispute) Kiiltiir 
Haftas1, 3 (January 22, 1936): 51-3. 
"Sark - Garp Miinak~ma Bir Bakt~ 2," (A Glance at the East - West Dispute 2) 
Kiiltiir Haftas1, 4 (February 5, 1936): 65-6. 
"Sark - Garp Mtinak~ma Bir Bakt~ 3," (A Glance at the East - West Dispute 3) 
Kiiltiir Haftas1, 4 (February 5, 1936) Kulttir Haftas1, 5 (February 12, 1936) : 85-6. 
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"Sark - Garp Miinak~asma Bir Bala~ 4," (A Glance at the East - West Dispute 4) 
Kiiltiir Haftas1, 4 (February 5, 1936) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 7 (February 26, 1936): 123. 
'Siir <;agim Degi~tiriyor," (Poetry Changes its Age) Cumhuriyet, (May 7, 1938). 
"Siir ve Nesir,'' (Poetry and Prose) Hafta. (January 20, 1935): 2. 
"Siir Oluyor mu?" (Is Poetry Dying?) Yedigiin, (October, 13, 1937): 4. 
"Siirde Mana," (The Meaning in Poetry) Tasvir'i Efkar, (April 3, 1945). 
"Siirde intikal Meselesi," (The Question of Understanding in Poetry) Cumhuriyet. 
(May 29, 1932). 
"Siire Dair Bir Konu~ma," (A Discourse on Poetry) Yeni Mecmua, (May 30, 1942): 4. 
"Siirin Mahiyeti," (The Nature of Poetry) Milliy~ (May 22, 1958). 
"Simdi,"(The Present) Y edigiin, (May 13, 1936): 4. 
"Tabir Krizi," (The Crisis ofDefinition) Cumhuriyet. (December 10, 1933). 
"Tarih ve Milliyet~ilik," (History and Nationalism) CmaraltI. 37 (June 6, 1942):6-7. 
"Tarih Kongresinde," (In the History Congress) Cumhuriyet, (July 7, 1932). 
"Tarih Kongresinde Dariilfunun Miiderrislerinin iddialart,'' (The Claims of Dariilfunun 
Scholars in the History Congress) Cumhuriyet. (July 18, 1932). 
"Turk Miinevverini Tiirkl~tirmek," (To Turkify the Turkish Intellectual) Cumhuriyc;t 
(April 24, 1932). 
"Tiirk~enin Kari~tkh~" (The Confusion of Turkish) Cumhuriyet, (May 5, 1932). 
"Uslubunu Kaybeden Diinya," (World Which Lost its Style) Tasvir-i Etkar, (March 3, 
1944). 
"O~ iddiamn Kiymeti,'' (The Value of Three Claims) Cumhuriyet, (July 10, 1933). 
"Oniversite,'' (The University) Cumhuriyet. (November 20, 1933). 
"Oniversitelerin Muhtariyeti," (The Autonomy of Universities) Vakit quoted in Yeni 
Adam, 601 (July 4, 1946): 9. 
"Vatan ve Ahlak," (Homeland and Ethics) <;maralt1, 34 (March 21, 1942): 5. 
"Yarinki Dilnyanm Ahlalo," (Ethics of the Future World) Tasvir'i Efkar, (December 
23, 1941). 
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"Yatalak Cemiyetlerin Gen'tligi," (The Youth of Crippled Societies) <;maral11, 49 
(August 29, 1942): 5. 
"Yeni Adam" Ulus quoted in Yeni Adam, 621(October27, 1949): 6. 
"Yeni Bir Dtinyaya Hasret," (Longing for a New world) Cumhuriy~ (January 12, 1938). 
"Yeni Turk Tezi ve Yeni Tilrk Mecmuas1," (The New Turkish Thesis and Yeni Turk 
Magazine) Cumhuriyet. (October 10, 1932). 
"Yeni Sanatlar Dzerine Bir Konu~ma," (A Discourse on New Arts) Turk Oii§iincesi, 2, 
10 (September 1, 1954): 241-50. 
"Y obaz ve Solcu Misyoner," (The Fanatic and Leftist Missioner) Milliyet in Din 
Yolu, 1,5 (April 19, 1956): 3. 
"Yuriiyen Inktlabm iki Merhalesi," (Two Stages of the Revolution in Progress) 
Cumhuriyet, (November 29, 1933). 
"Ziya Gokalp ve Durkheim," (Ziya Gokalp and Durkheim) <;maral11, 58 (October 31, 
1952): 4. 
AhmedAiaoil11's Books (in chronological order) 
Uy Medeniyet (Three Civilizations). istanbul, Milli Egitim Bastmevi, 1972, [1927]. 
ingiltere ve Hindistan (England and India). istanbul: Cumhuriyet Bastmevi, 1929. 
Serbest Insanlar Dlkesinde (In the Land of Free Men). istanbul: Sanayi-i Nefise 
Matbaast, 1930. 
Devlet ve Ferd (The State and Individual). Ankara: Sanayii Nefise Bastmevi, 1933. 
Ben Neyim (Who Am I?). Istanbul: Giiven Bastmevi, 1939. 
GonillsO.z Olmaz (Volunteering is Essential) Ankara: Zerbamat Bas1mevi, 1941. 
iran ve lnktlabt (Iran and its Revolution). Ankara: Zerbamat Bas1mevi, 1941. 
ihtilal Mi Inlolap Mt? (Is it Rebellion or Revolution?). Ankara: Alaeddin K.tral 
Bas1mevi, 1942. 
Serbest Frrka Hatrralan (Free Party Memoires), 2nd ed. istanbul: Baha Matbaas1, ·1969. 
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Ahmed Agaoilu 's Articles (in alphabetical order) 
"Altmt~ Yedi YII Sonra," (After Sixty-seven Years) Ktiltiir Haftas1, 3 (January 22, 1936): 
42, 58. 
"Al~ Yedi Ytl Sonra," (After Sixty-seven Years) Killtiir ~ 4 (Februmy 5, 1936): 62-80. 
"Ana Kanunlar ve Na.zim Kanunlar," (Fundamental Laws and Regulating Laws) Alan, 
(June 27, 1933). 
"Asri Devletin Selahiyetlerinin Geni~lemesi," (The Expansion of the Modem State's 
Authority) Cumhuriyet (November 23, 1932). 
"Basitten Miirekkebe, Siiriiden Millete," (From Simple to Complex, Hoard to Nation) 
Cumhuriyet. (November 20, 1932). 
"Basitten Miirekkebe, Sekilsizlikten Sekille~meye Dogru," (From Simple to Complex, 
From Formlessness to Formation) insan, 1, 3 (June 15, 1938): 204-8. 
Agaoglu, "Bir Kiiltiirden Otekine," (From One Culture to the Other) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 2 
(December 22, 1936): 22, 38. 
"Cevaba Cevap I," (A Reply to an Answer I) Cumhuriyet (January 1, 1933). 
"Cevaba Cevap II," (A Reply to an Answer II)Cumhuriyet. (January 3, 1933). 
"Cevaba Cevap ill: Milliyet Meselesi," (A Reply to an Answer ill: The Question of 
Nationality) Cumhuriyet (January 5, 1933). 
"Cevaba Cevap IV: Milliyet Meselesi ve Omeksiz Rejim," (A Reply to an Answer N: The 
Question ofNationality and Unprecedented Regime) Cumhuriyet (January 7, 1933). 
"Cevaba Cevap V: Sm1f ve Tahrif, " (A Reply to an Answer V: CI~ and Distortion) 
Cumhuriyet. (January 9, 1933). 
"Cevaba Cevap: Son Bir iki Soz Daha," (A Reply to an Answer: A Last Couple of 
Works) Cumhuriyet. (January 10, 1933.). 
"Dinde Manizme, i9timai Hayatta da Sm1flara ve Biiyiik Malikanelere Dogru," (Towards 
Manichaeism in Religion, Towards Classess and Large Estates in Social Life) insan, 1, 
7 (December 1, 1938): 356-60. 
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"Dogu ve Batt," (East and West) Yeni Adam. 90 (September 19, 1935): 5. 
"Diinyanm ikiye Boliinmesi: Sark ve Garp," (Bifurgation of the World: East and West) 
(Cumhuriyet. (November 18, 1932). 
"Garp ve Sark," (East and West) Vatan. 158 (September 5, 1923) in Atatiirk Devri Fikir 
Hayatl I (Intellectual Life in Atatiirk' s Era I), Mehmet Kaplan and inci Enginiin et. al., 
eds. Ankara: Kiiltiir Bakanhgr, 1992: 83-7. 
"Gidilecek Yol," (The Road to be Followed) Vatan. 144 (August 22, 1923) in Atatiirk 
Devri Fikir HayatI I (Intellectual Life in Atatiirk's Era I), Kaplan and Enginiin et. al., 
eds. Ankara: Kiiltiir Bakanhgr, 1992: 77-82. 
"Hukukta Tekamiil Devirleri," (Stages ofEvolution in Law) insan, 1, 2 (May 15, 1938): 117-23. 
"Inktlab1m1Ztn ideolojisi," (The Ideology of Our Revolution) Cumhuriyet, (November 14, 
1932). 
"ii;timai Tezatlar," (Social Contradictions) Cumhuriyet. (November 22, 1932). 
"i~tiraki;ikten Ferdi Mesaiye ve Miilkiyete Dogru," (To Individual Initiative and Property 
from Communitarianism) insan, 1,4 (July 15, 1938): 290-5. 
''KadrocuJar ve Demokn9," (Kadrocular and Democracy) CumhuriYet. (November 17, 1932). 
"Kadrocular," Cumhuriyet. (November 13, 1932). 
"Kadroculann idealleri," (Ideals of Kadrocular) Cumhuriyet. (November 15, 1932). 
"Maarifimizin Isiahi," (Reformation of Our Education) Alon. (June 21, 1933). 
"Meclis Ai;1brken," (During the Commencement of the Assembly) Vatan. 137 (August 15, 
1923) in Atatiirk Devri Fikir HayatI I (Intellectual Life in Atatiirk's Era I), Kaplan and 
Enginiin et. al., eds. Ankara: Kiiltiir Bakanhgr, 1992: 73-6. 
"Milli Suur," (The National Consciousness) Hakimiyeti Milliye. (August 8, 1924) in 
Atatiirk Devri Fikir Hayatt I (Intellectual Life in Atatiirk's Era I), Kaplan and Enginun 
et. al., eds. Ankara: Kiiltiir Bakanltgr, 1992: 97-IOI 
"Milliyeti;ilik Cereyamnm Esaslan," (The Principles of the Trend of Nationalism) 
Hakimiyet-i Milliye. (September 6, 1925) in Atatiirk Devri Fikir Hayatl I (Intellectual 
427 
Life in Atatiirk's Era I}, Kaplan and Enginiin et. al., eds. Ankara: Kiiltiir Bakanhgi, 1992: 
115-27. 
"Milliyet<rilik," (Nationalism) Alan. (July 10, 1933). 
"Munevver Ziimre Meselesi," (The Question of Intellectual Stratum) Cumhuriyet, 
(January 15, 1935). 
"Ne Dogu Ne Bat.I," (Neither the East nor the West) Cumhuriyet in Yeni Adam, 90 
(September 19, 1935): 5. 
"Nizamh Hurriyet," (Disciplined Freedom) Alan. (June 5, 1933). 
"Tarihi Devirler Arasmda Milliyet," (Nationality Between Historical Epochs) Turk Yurdu. 
3, 17 (March 1926): 534-7 in Atatiirk Devri Fikir HayatJ. I (Intellectual Life in Atatork' s Era 
I), Kaplan and Enginiln et al., eds. Ankara: Kiiltiir Bakanhgi, 1992: 154-60. 
"Tarihte Sosyal Inki~ l," (Social Evolution in History 1) Kiiltiir Haftas1. 17 (May 6, 
1936): 324-5. 
"Tarihte Sosyal I~ 2," (Social Evolution in History 2) Kiiltiir Haftast. 18 (May 13, 
1936): 337-8. 
"Tarihte Sosyal inki¢" 3," (Social Evolution in History 3) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 19 (May 20, 
1936): 354-5. 
"Tarihte Sosyal inki¢" 4," (Social Evolution in History 4) Kiiltiir Haftast, 20 (May 20, 
1936): 369. 
"Tiirk Hukuk Tarihinde Usul," (Method in the History of Turkish Law) insan, 1, 1 (April 
15, 1938): 39-43. 
"U mumi Harbin T esirleri, Muhtelif Devlet<rilik Tawlan," (Impacts of the World War on 
Various Etatist Modes) Cumhuriyel (November 26, 1932). 
"U<r Kiiltiir," (Three Cultures) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 1 (December 15, 1936): 5. 
"U<r Medeniyet," (Three Civilizations) Hayat 132 (June 6, 1929): 23-4. 
428 
"Sarp ve Garp" (East and West) Vatan. 158, (September 1923) in Atatiirk Devri Fikir 
Hayatt I (Intellectual Life in Atatiirk's Era I}, Kaplan and Enginiin et. al., eds. Ankara: 
Ki.iltiir Bakanhgt, 1992: 83-5. 
"Yarat1c1 Tekamiil," (Creative Evolution) Ki.iltiir Haftas1. 3 (January 22, 1936): 59-60. 
Mustafa Sekip Tune's Books (in chronological order) 
Ruhiyat (Psychology). istanbul: Devlet Matbaas1, 1929. 
Froydizm (Freudism). istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitabevi, 1931. 
Bergson ve Manevi Kudrete Dair Birka~ Konferans (Several Conferences on Bergson and 
the Spiritual Will). istanbul: A Halit Kitabevi, 1933. 
Cin Felsefesi Kaynaklan (Origins of the Chinese Philosophy). Ankara: B~ekalet 
Miidevvanat Bas1mevi, 1933. 
Yeni Turk Kadim ve Ruhi Miinasebetleri (The New Turkish Woman and Her 
Psychological Relations). Ankara, Recep Ulusoylu Bas1mevi, 1939. 
insan Ruhu Dzerinde Gezintiler (Voyages on Human Spirit). istanbul: Cumhuriyet 
Bas1mevi, 1943. 
Ruh Yapuruz ve Onun Tipleri Balrnmndan Ahlak (Our Spiritual Structure and Morality in 
Terms of its Types). istanbul: Kenan Bas1mevi, 1944. 
Ruh Aleminde (In the Spiritual World). istanbul: Dlku Basimevi, 1945). 
Henry Bergson. Y arat1c1 Tekamiil, (Creative Evolution), trans. by Tum;. istanbul: Milli 
Egitim Bakanbg. Y aymlan, 194 7. 
Fikir Sohbetleri (Intellectual Conversations). istanbul: Olkii Bas1mevi, 1948. 
Psikolojiye Giri~ (Introduction to Psychology). istanbul: istanbul Dniversitesi Edebiyat 
Fakiiltesi Yaymlan, 1949. 
Henry Bergson. Suurun Dogrudan Dogruya Verileri (An Essay on the Immediate Data of 
Consciousness), trans. by Tun~. istanbul: Milli Egitim Bakanhg. Yaymlan, 1950. 
Bir Din Felsefesine Dogru (Towards a Philosophy ofReligion) Ankara: Ttirkiye Yaymevi, 1959. 
429 
Mustafa SekipTunc's Articles (in alphabetical order) 
"Abdulhak Sinasi Hisar ve Fehim Bey,"' (Abdiilhak Sinasi Hisar and Fehim Bey) 
Cumhuriyet. (November, 22 1941 ). 
"Ahlakhgm <;~itleri ve Zamarum1zm Ahlaki," (Types of Virtue and Ethics of Our Age) 
Cumhuriyet. (March 28, 1943). 
"Ahlaksiz Adam Mi, Geri Adam Mt?" (Immoral or Undeveloped Man) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 15 
(April 23, 1936): 282. 
"Akd," (Reason) Mulkiye, 29 (August 1933): 1-3. 
"Akil Romantizmi" (Reason Romanticism) Cumhuriyet, (July 5, 1942). 
"Akil ve Hayat" (Reason and Life) Cumhuriyet, (July 12, 1942). 
"Akd ve Sezgi," (Reason and Intuition) Cumhuriyet. {July 26, 1942). 
"Akil ve ilim," (Reason and Science) Cumhuriyet. (July 19, 1942). 
"Akilc1hgm Kuvvet Ve Zaaflan," (The Power and the Weaknesses of Rationalism) 
Cumhuriyet, (August 30, 1942). 
"Aksiyon Felsefesi Bakimmdan Politika," (Politics in Terms of Action Philosophy) Turk 
Dii~uncesi, 1,1(July1, 1953): 10-2. 
"Asya ve Hendese Kafas1," (Asia and the Geometrical Mind) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 11 (March 
25, 1936): 203. 
"Bergson'a Gore Claude Bemard'm Felsefesi," (Claude Bernard's Philosophy According 
to Bergson) Mulkiye. 42 (September 1934): 1-6. 
"Bergson'a Gore Sanat ve Sanat Adami," (Art and Artist According to Bergson) 
Cumhuriyet. (May 6, 1945). 
"Bergson'un Golme Nazariyesine Dair," (On Bergson's Theory of Laughing) Cumhuriyet. 
(April 15, 1945). 
"Bir Din Felsefesine Dogru," (Towards a Philosophy of Religion) Din Yolu. 1,12 (June 
10, 1956): 4-5. 
430 
"Bugtinkii Amerikan ~uncesi ve Diinya Kurtulu~u Tasavvuru," (Contemporary 
.A.merican Thought and the Imagination for the Liberation of the World) Cumhuriyet. 
(April 18, 1943). 
"Bugtinkii Hayatmuzm Aki~lan," (The Flows of Our Life Today) Hayal 136 (July 1929): 3. 
"Bugtinkii Milletler ve Rubi Haletle~" (Today's Nations and Their Spiritual States) 
Cumhuriyet. (April July 27, 1941). 
"Devlet ve Terbiye," (State and Education) Cumhuriyet. (November 22, 1942). 
"Devlet ve Millet," (State and Nation) Cumhuriyet. (October 8, 1942). 
"Dil," (Language) Mulkiye, 41 (Auust 1934) : 1-3 
"Dil Meselemiz," (Our Language Problem) Bilgi. 1,10 (March 16, 1948): 31-5. 
"Din Felsefesinin Muhteviyat:I V," (The Subject Matter of the Philosophy of Religion V) 
Din Yalu. 1,16 (July 19, 1956): 6-7. 
"Din Felsefesiyle Felsefe Arasmdaki Miinasebet II," (Relationship Between Philosophy 
and Philosophy ofReligion II) Din Yolu. 1,13 (June 20, 1956): 7. 
"Din Hayatmm Diin ve BugtinO I," (The Past and Present of Religious Life 1) Din Yalu. 
1,3 (April 5, 1956): 10. 
"Din Meseleleri ve Bu Meselelerin Coztilme Metodu IV,"(Religious Problems and the 
Method to Solve These Problems) Din Yalu. 1,15 (July 10, 1956): 6-7. 
"Din Y olunda Gorunurden Gorunmeze," (From the Visible to the Unvisible in the 
Religious Path) Din Yolu. 1, 7 (May 3, 1956): 12. 
"Dini A~klama ve Dini Huzur VII," (Religious Explanation and Religious Peace VII) Din 
Yolu. 1,18 (August 10, 1956): 5-6. 
"Dini Fikirlerde Materyalist Telakkiden idealist Telakkiye ~i~ :X," (Transition from 
Materialist to Idealist Conception in Religious Ideas X) Din Yolu. 1, 21(September15, 
1956): 4. 
"Dini Suurun Mekam Telakkisi IX," (Religious Conscioueness' Conception of the Space) 
Din Yolu. 1, 20 (September 1,1956): 12-3. 
431 
"Diinkii Hayat1mlZ1.Il Alo~lan," (The Flows of Our Past Life) Hayat 139 (September 15, 
1929): 3-4. 
"Diinya Kultiirlerine Bir Bak.I~," (A Glance at the World Civilizations) Killttir Haftas1, l 
(December 15, 1936): 3-4, 
"Eski Ve Yeni Diinya Gorii~lerimiz," (Our Old and New Worldviews) Cumhuriyet. 
(October 11, 1942). 
"Eski ve Orta Zamanlann ilim Telakkisi," (Science Conception of the Ancient and 
Medieval Ages). Turk Dii~iincesi, l,4 (March, 19549: 250-4 
"Felsefe," (Philosophy) Felsefe Yilhgi, 1 (istanbul, 1932) : 131-6. 
"Gen~lik Nereye Gidiyor?" (Where is the Youth Heading?) Cumhuriyet. (June 7, 1942). 
"Hakikatte He~eyin Madde Oldugu iddias1,"(The Claim that Everything is Matter in 
Reality) Cumhuriyet. (December 10, 1944). 
"Hayatm Kiymeti ve G~irdigi Buhran" (The Value of Life and its Crisis Undergoing) 
Cumhuriyet (January 25, 1941). 
"Irk Psikolojisi," (The Psychology of Race) Tan quoted in Yani Adam. 434 (April 22, 
1943): 9. 
"i~ Alemi Tetkik," (Studying the Inner World) Cumhuriyet. (September 14, 1940). 
"ilim Bakumndan Ahlak," (Morality in Terms of Science) Cumhuriyet (June 23, 1942). 
"ilmi Ay1klama ve Dini A~klamarun Mukayesesi VI," (A Comparison Between Scientific 
and Religious Explanation) Din Yolu. 1, I ?(August 1, 1956): 5. 
"ingiliz Karakteri/' (The British Character) Cumhuriyet. (March 4, 1945). 
"insan," (Human Being) Miilkiye. 34 (January 1934): 1-2. 
"istikbal i~in Aranan Yeni Ufuklar," (New Horizons for the Future) Cumhuriyet. (June 
6,1943). 
"i~ Adamlan," (Businessmen) Cumhuriyet. (February, 24, 1942). 
"i~ ve Dii~Once," (Work and Thought) b, 1,2 (April, 1934): 81-4. 
432 
"izzet Beyin Fikri Sahsiyeti," (The Intellectual Character of izzet Bey) Dariilfunun 
Edebiyat Fakiiltesi Mecmuas1, 7,5 (March 2, 1931 ): 25-9. 
"J.P. Pavlov" Kiiltiir Haftas1, 14 (April 15, 1936):263-4. 
"Kader ve Kanun," (Faith and Law) Cumhuriyet. (April 26, l 942). 
"Kadm ve Sanat," (Woman and Art) Cumhuriyel (December 22, 1941). 
''Karakter," (Character) Millkiye, 36 (March 1934): 1-3. 
"Kendilerine En <;ok inananlar," (Those Who Mostly Belive in Themselves) Cumhuriyet, 
(December 3, 1944). 
"Kendi Kendine Olan Sanat," (Spontaneously Emerging Art) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 5 (February 
12, 1936): 89. 
"Kime Sikayet Etmeli?" (To Whom to Complain?) Hayat 133 (June 13, 1929): 44-5. 
"Ki~inin Degeri," (The Value of Person) Turk Dilsiincesi, 2,9 (August l, 1954):162-5. 
"Kiiltiiriimiiziin Ana Kum~1: ilm'i Niicum," (Main Fabric of Our Culture: Astrology) 
Kiiltiir Haftas1. 12 (April 1, 1936): 222-3. 
"Liberallik ve Suurlu Muhafazakarhk," (Liberalism and Conscious Conservatism) Turk 
Yurdu. 258 (July, 1956): 1-4. 
"Liselerde Felsefe Ogretimi Hakkmda Bir Muhtrra," (A Warning About Philosophy 
Teaching in High Schools) Bilgi, 1,1 (February 1, 1948): 7-13. 
"Madde ile Ruh Arasmda Sallanan Diinyamtz," (Our Wold that Sways Between Matter 
and Spirit) Cumhuriyet. (May 20, 1945). 
"Mehmet izzet," ~ 6,3 (1940): 72-5. 
"Mekanik ve Organik Davalart," (The Questions of Mechanics and Organic) Cumhuriyet, 
(September 13, 1942). 
"Mekanik ve Organik Davalanmn Kiymetleri ve Bunlardan Almacak Dersler," (The Value 
of the Questions of Mechanics and Organic and Lessons to be Drawn from These) 
Cumhuriyet. (September 27, 1942). 
433 
"Mekanik ve Organik Davalannm Yeni Zamanda G~irdigi Sathalar," (The Stages of the 
Questions of Mechanics and Organic in Modern Age) Cumhuriyel (September, 20, 1942). 
"Memlekette On Senelik Felsefe," (Ten Years of Philosophy in the Country) Varhk, 8 
(October, 29, 1929) in Atatiirk Devri Fikir Hayan 1 (Intellectual Life in Atatiirk's Era 
I) Kaplan, Enginiin et. al., eds. (Ankara: Ktiltiir BakanhgJ. Yay., 1992: 334-41. 
"Millet ve insan," (Nation and Man) Cumhuriyet. (April 7, 1943). 
"Milliyet Metkuresi N edir?" (What is the Ideal of Nationality) Milli Mecmua. 7 (January 
24, 1924): 99-101 in Atatiirk Devri Fikir Hayatt l (Intellectual Life in Atatiirk's Era I) 
Kaplan, Enginun et. al., eds. (Ankara: Ktiltiir BakanhgJ. Yay., 1992: 102-9. 
"Milliyet ideali ve Topyekun Milli Terbiye," (The Ideal of Nationality and National 
Education) Cumhuriyet. (April 5, 1943). 
"Milliyet~ilik," (Nationalism) Cumhuriyet. (March 21, 1943). 
"Muhafazakarhk ve Liberallik," (Conservatism and Liberalism) Turk DU~uncesi. 2 
(January 1, 1954): 88-9. 
"Miinevverlik Methumu," (The Concept of Intellectuality) Milli Mecmua 1 (November 1, 
1923) in Atatiirk Devri Fikir Hayat:l IT (Intellectual Life in Atatiirk's Era II) Mehmet 
Kaplan, inci Enginiin et. al., eds. (Ankara: Ktiltilr BakanhgJ. Yay., 1992: 455-60. 
"Neden Yaruhyoruz," (Why are We Mistaking?) Cumhuriyet, (December 14, 1941). 
"Nufus Saynru Kalkmma <;agJ.drr," (Census is the Age of Development) Yeni Adam, 93 
(October 10, 1935): 4, 11. 
"O Kadar Yalon Mt?" (Is it that Close?)Hayat. 135 (July 15, 1929): 2-3. 
"Otorite," (Authority) Mulkiye. 13 (April 1931) : 3-8. 
"Para ffirst ~1smda Millet ve Devlet" (Nation and State Against the Ambition for 
Money) Cumhuriyet. (November 15, 1941 ). 
"Pavlov' a Gore "Gaye" ve "Hurriyet" insiyaklan," (The Insticts of "Purpose" and 
"Freedom" According to Pavlov) Miilkiye, 40 (July 1934): 1-5. 
434 
"Peyami Safa ve Turk Inktlabma Balo~lar," (Peyami Safa and Glances at the Turkish 
Revolution) Turk Inlalabma Balo~lar (Glances at the Turkish Revolution). istanbul 
Oruken Yaymlan, 1990, [1938]: 17-27. 
"Psikanalizin Degi~mi~ Sekillerinde: Tahlili Ruhiyat," (From the Changed Forms of 
Psychoanalysis: Analytical Psychology") Kulttir Haftas1, 10 (March 18, 1936): 183-5. 
"Psikanalizin Degi~mi~ Sekillerinden 'Ferdi Ruhiyat," (From the Changed Forms of 
Psychoanalysis: Individualistic Psychology) Kulttir Haftas1, 9 (March 11, 1936): 163-4. 
"Ressamlanmiz," (Our Painters) Hayat, 143 (November 15, 1943): 1-2. 
"Ressamlanmm Anlamak i~in," (In Order to Understand Our Painters) Hayat. 143 
(October 15, 1929): 3-4. 
"Rasyonalizm ve Irrasyonalizm," (Rationalism and Irrationalism) Felsefe Ydhgi, II 
(istanbul: 1934-1935): 193-206. 
"Ruhi Halimiz ve Harb Hali," (Our Spiritual Temper and the State ofWar) Tu, 6,2 (1940):26-7. 
"Ruhiyatm Yeni Verimleri 4," (New Achievements of Psychology 4) Kti.ltiir Haftas1, 6 
(February 19, 1936): 103-4. 
"Ruhiyatm Yeni Verimleri 5," (New Achievements of Psychology 5) Kti.ltiir Haftas1, 7 
(February 26, 1936): 124-6. 
"Ruhiyatm Yeni Verimleri," (New Achievements of Psychology) Kti.ltiir Haftas1, 1 
(December 15, 1936): 12. 
"Ruhiyatm Yeni Verimleri," (New Achievements of Psychology) Kti.lttir Haftas1, 2 
(December 22, 1936): 23-4. 
"Ruhiyatm Y eni Verimleri," (New Achievements of Psychology) Kti.lttir Haftas1, 3 
(January 22, 1936): 43-4. 
"Ruhiyatm Yeni Verimleri," (New Achievements of Psychology) Kultiir Haftas1, 4 
(February 5, 1936): 63-4. 
"Ruya ve Mistik Dti.nya," (Dream and the Mystical Wold) Cumhuriyet. (September 10, 1941 ). 
"Sanatta Ahlak Davasi," (The Question of Morality in Art) (Cumhuriyet. (August 23, 1942). 
435 
"Sanatta Ferd ve Cemiyet," (Individual and Society in Art) Cumhuriyet (August 16, 1942). 
"Sefalet Kalkamaz MI?" (Can the Poverty Not Be Abonadoned?) Cumhuriyet. (August 
18, 1942). 
"Sahsiyet," (Personality) Mtilkive. 37 (April 1937): 4-6. 
"Sair ve Filozoflann Ri.iyayi Sezi~leri," (Poet's and Philosophers' Insights into Dream) 
Cumhuriyet, (August 17, 1942). 
"Secaat," (Bravery) Cumhuriyet, (November 25, 1941 ). 
"Siirin Sim," (The Mystery of Poetry) Cumhuriyet, (November 27, 1940). 
"T arihten E welki Ktilttiriimi.iz," (Our Pre-Historical Culture) Ktilttir Haftasi, 13 (April 8, 
1936): 243-4. 
"Tecriibeciligin Kuvvet ve Zaaflan," (The Power and the Weaknesses of Empiricism) 
Cumhuriyet. (September 6, 1942). 
"Ttirk~e' de ilk Ahlak Tarihi," (The First History of Ethics in Turkish) Cumhuriyet. (May 
30, 1943). 
"Ttirkiye'de Felsefe," (Philosophy in Turkey) it. III/2 (1937): 25-34. 
"Universite ve Universitemiz," (The University and Our Universities) Cumhuriyet. 
(October 17, 1938). 
"Yaratlct irade Meselesi," (The Question of Creative Will) insan, 1, l (April 15, 1938): 44-8. 
"Y eni Nesil Sairlerimizde Sairlik ile Veliligin Birl~me T emayiilleri," (The Tendencies of 
Unification of Poetry and Sainthood in the New Generation of Our Poets) Cumhuriyet. 
(March 18, 1945). 
"Yeni Tiirk Kad1m ve Rubi Munasebetleri Meselesi," (The New Turkish Woman and the 
Question of Her Psychological Relations) insan, 1, 2 (May 15, 1938): 151-64. 
"Yunan ve Orta Zaman Ktiltiirlerini Doguran Donya Gorii~leri," (Worldviews Which Gave 
Rise to the Greek and Medieval Cultures) Kiiltiir Haftasi, 16 (April 29, 1936): 303. 
"Zaman Fatihleri," (Conqueror of Time) Cumhuriyet. (June 15, 1942). 
"Zamane Adami," (Contemporary Man) Cumhuriyet. (November 13, 1940). 
436 
"Zaman11mzm Ahlak Meselesi," (The Question of Morality in Our Age) Cumhuriyet 
(June 13, 1942). 
"Zeka Nasti i~ler," (How Does the Intellect Operate?) Cumhuriyet. (April 16, 1943). 
"Ziya Gokalp 'e Ait Hanralanm," (My Memoirs of Ziya Gokalp) h, 5, 19 ( 1939): 146-8. 
Other Books and Articles 
"Ahlak ve Killtiir," (Morality and Culture) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 16 (April 29, 1936), pp. 301-2. 
Ai;1kgoz, Halil, Peyami Safa: Hikayeler (Peyami Safa: Stories). istanbul: Otiiken Ne~riyat 
A.S., 1980. 
~'Serif, Roman Sanat1 ve Roman incelemesine Giri~ (Art of Novel and Introduction 
to the Study ofNovel). Ankara: Birlik Yay., 1984. 
Altm~, Hayrani, Mustafa Sekip Tun9. Ankara: Kiiltiir Bakanhgi, 1989. 
Atay, N.H., ''Bir Omiir mil, Bir Jest mi? (A Life or A Gesture?) istanbul (May 15, 1946): 3, 11. 
"Atatiirk'iln Ban Vecizeleri," (Some Aphorisms of Atatiirk) Yeni Adam, 254 (October, 9, 
1939): 2. 
Avni, Huseyin, "Hukilmetin Program1," (The Program of the Government) Yeni Adam 
203 (November 18, 1937): 10, 19. 
Aydemir, Sevket Siireyya, "Agaoglu Ahmet Beye Cevap, Taklit Nedir? Mukallit Kimdir?" 
Cumhuriyet (Reply to Agaoglu Ahmet Bey, What is Imitation? Who is the Imitator?) 
(December 17, 1932). 
Aydemir, Sevket Sureyya, "Bergson Bahsi ve Hurriyet Telakkimiz," (The Bergson 
Question and Our Conception of Freedom) Kadro. 13 (January 1933): 42-5. 
Aydemir, Sevket Sureyya, "Bergsonism Yahut Bir Korkunun Felsefi ifadesi," (Bergsonism 
or the Philosophical Expression of a Fear) Kadro. 11 (November 1932): 43-50. 
Aydemir, Sevket Siireyya, "Bir Ruh Fantazisi Yahut Yerli Peygamber," (A Spiritual 
Fantasy or Native Prophet) Kadro. !(January, 1932): 31-7. 
437 
Aydemir, Sevket Sureyya, Cihan Ekonomisinde Turkiye (Turkey in the World Economy). 
Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Bas1mevi, 1931. 
Aydemir, Sevket Si.ireyya, "Oari.ilfunun Inkilap Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey iktisatc1hgt," 
(Darulfunun's Sensibility to the Revolution and Cavit Bey's Economism) Kadro, 14, 
(February 1933): 5-11. 
Aydemir, Sevket Si.ireyya, "Devlet9ilik Bahsi," (The Topic of Etatism) Cumhuriyet. 
(December 24, 1932). 
Aydemir, Sevket Sureyya, "Inkdap Bitti Mi?" (Did the Revolution Come to an End?) 
Kadro, 3 (March, 1932): 5-10. 
Aydemir, Sevket Siireyya, Inktlap ve Kadro (Revolution and the Cadre). Istanbul: Milliyet 
Bas1mevi, 1932. 
Aydemir, Sevket Siireyya, "ismail Hakki Beyin Mefkureciligi," (The Idealism of ismail 
Hakki Bey) Kadro, 29 (May 1934): 37-42. 
Aydemir, Sevket Sureyya, "Millet Nedir, Sosyal Nasyonalizm," (What is Nation? Social 
Nationalism) Cumhurivet. (December 22, 1932). 
Aydemir, Sevket Sureyya, "Son Soz," (The Last Word) Cumhuriyel (December 27, 1932.) 
Aydemir, Sevket Sureyya, Tek Adam (The Single Man), vol. 3, 2nd ed. Istanbul: Remzi 
Kitabevi, 1966. 
Aydemir, Sevket Sureyya, "Yan Munevverler Klubii," (The Club of Semi-Intellectuals) 
Kadro, 8 (August 1932): 40-3. 
Baydar, Mustafa, Edebiyat91lar Ne Diyorlar? (What Are the Men of Letters Saying?). 
istanbul: A. Halit Y ~oglu Kitabevi, 1960. 
Beige, B. Asaf, "Arkada Kalan Dari.ilfunun," (Darii/fonun in the Past) Kadro. 8 (August 
8, 1932): 47-8. 
Beige, B. Asaf, "Universite'nin Manas1," (The Meaning of University) Kadro. 20 (August, 
1933): 24-8. 
438 
Bozok, Hilsamettin, "Sarkm Tasfiyesine Dogru," (Towards the Purge of the Orient) Yeni 
Adam, 237 (July 13, 1939): 4. 
Burtin, Vecdi, Peyami Safa ile 25 Yil (25 Years with Peyami Safa). istanbul: Yagmur 
Y aymevi, 1978. 
"Celal Bayar'm Nutkundan Ba.ZI Miihim Par\:alar," (Some Important Parts from the 
Speech ofCelal Bayar) Yeni Adam, 203 (November 18, 1937): 11. 
Cambel, Hasan Cemil, "Turk Kiiltiir Davas1," (The Turkish Cultural Struggle) Yeni Adam. 
440 (June 3, 1943): 9,11. 
"Din Yolu'nun Biiyiik Anketi, Ulunay ve Peyami Safa Ne Diyorlar," (The Great Survey of Din 
Yolu, What are Ulunay and Peyami Safa Saying?) Din Yolu. 1,1(March15, 1956): 5-6. 
"Diinya Go~leri," (Worldviews) Kultiir Haftas1. 17 (May 6, 1936): 321-2. 
"Edebiyattm1zm Fikirsizligi," (The Thoughtlessness of Our Literature) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 7 
(February 26, 1936): 121. 
Egemen, Bedii Ziya, "Tiirke Dogru," (Towards the Turk) Yeni Adam, 430 (March 25, 
1943): 8-9,11. 
Ekeman, Nabi Zeki, "Memur Nedir?" (What is Civil Servant?) Y eni Adam, 366 
(December 1, 1942): 6. 
Ekiz, Osman Nuri, Muslim ErgOI, Vahap Karahasanoglu et al., Peyami Safa. istanbul: 
Toker Yaymlan, 1984. 
Ergenekon, Ali, ed., Kavga Y aztlan ... Peyami Safa (Polemical Writings ... Peyami Safa) 
istanbul: Bogazi\:i Yaymlan, 1989. 
Fahri, Ziyaeddin, "Tabiat ve Ahlak l" (Nature and Morality 1) Cumhuriyet (July 4, 1942). 
Fahri, Ziyaeddin, "Tiirkiye'de Bergsonizm l," (Bergsonism in Turkey 1) Cumhuriyet, 
(January 13, 1941). 
Fahri, Ziyaeddin, "Ti.irkiye'de Bergsonizm 2," (Bergsonism in Turkey 2) Cumhuriyet. 
(January 15, 1941). 
"Fikir Hayatmda Vahdet," (Unity in Intellectual Life) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 10 (March 18, 1936): 181. 
439 
Fahri, Ziyaeddin, "Tiirkiye'de Bergsonizm 2," (Bergsonism in Turkey 2) Cumhuriyet. 
(January 15, 1941). 
"Fikir Hayannda Vahdet," (Unity in Intellectual Life) Kiiltiir Haftast, 10 (March 18, 1936): 181. 
Gokalp, Ziya, ''Millet Nedir, Milli iktisat Neden ibarettir?" (What is Nation, What Does 
the National Economy Consist of?) iktisadiyat Mecmuas1. 1 (February 8, 1331), quoted 
in Yeni Adam. 611 (December 4, 1947): 6. 
Gokalp, Ziya, "Sehir Medeniyeti, Koy Medeniyeti," (The City Civilization, the Village 
Civilization) Ko..,uk Mecmua. 30 (January 15, 1923 ), quoted in Yeni Adam, 567 
(November 8, 1945): 4, 11. 
Goze, Ergun, Peyami Safa Nazim Hikmet Kavgast (The Dispute Between Peyami Safa 
and Nazim Hikmet), 5th ed. istanbul: Bogazi~i Yaymlan, 1991. 
Goze, Ergun, Peyami Safa. Ankara: Kultiir Bakanhg. Yaymlan, 1987. 
"Hendesi ve Mistik ~Once," (Geometrical and Mystical Thought) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 13, 
(April8, 1936): 241-2. 
"Henry Bergson: Asnrruzm En Bilyi.ik Feylosofu," (Henry Bergson: The Greatest 
Philosopher of Our Century) 317 (December 23, 1941 ): 8-9. 
"Hilmi Ziya Dlken Din i~in Ne Diyor," (What is Hilmi Ziya Olken Saying About 
Religion?) Din Yolu. 1,7 (May 3, 1956): 13. 
Hulagu, ismail Hakkt, "Okulda Turke Dogru," (Towards the Turk in School) Yeni Adam. 
427 (March 4, 1943): 4,11. 
ileri, S.Nuri, "Ekonomi Mezhepleri I," (Trends in Economics I) Yeni Adam 471 (January 
5, 1944): 10 
lleri, S.Nuri, "Ekonomi Mezhepleri II," (Trends in Economics in Yeni Adam 472 
(January 13, 1944): 10 
ileri, S.Nuri, "Ekonomi Mezhepleri III," (Trends in Economics III) Y eni Adam 473 
(January 20, 1944): 10 
440 
ileri, S.Nuri, "Ekonomi Mezhepleri IV," (Trends in Economics IV) Yeni Adam 474 
(January 27, 1944): 10 
"ingiltere' de Siyasal Partiler,'' (Political Parties in England) Yeni Adam, 164 (February 
18, 1937): 6. 
inonii ismet, "Tiirkiye Cumhuriyetinin Yap1c1s1, Atati.irk,'' {The Founder of the Turkish 
Republic, Atatiirk) Kurun. (11, 11, 1938), quoted in Yeni Adam. 254 (October 9, 1939): 3. 
Kafesoglu, ibrahim, "Turk Tarihinde 'Mukaddes Yurd' Telakkisi,"(The Conception of 
'Holy Fatherland' in Turkish History) Cumhuriyet, quoted in Yeni Adam, 579 (January 
31, 1946): 10. 
"Kadro," Kadro. 1 (January 1932): l. 
Kol~ak, Sabri, i.H. Baltac1oglu: Egitimin Felsefesini Yapan Pedagog (i.H. Baltacioglu: 
The Pedagogue Who Formulates the Philosophy of Education). izmir: Ege Oniversitesi 
Matbaas1, 1968. 
Koni, Yunus Kazim, "Baltac1oglu'nun N~rettigi Bir Kitap Dolayis1 ile,'' (On Account of a 
Book Published by Baltac1oglu) Yeni Adam, 418 (December 31, 1942): 11. 
Koni, Yunus Kazim, "Hiimanizma Meselesi,'' (The Question of Humanism) Y eni Adam, 
268 (February 15, 1940):12-3. 
Koni, Yunus Kazim, "Ziya Gokalp," Yeni Adam, 254 (October 9, 1939): 13. 
Kopriilii, M. Fuat, "Milliyet~ilik ve Irkythk," (Nationalism and Racism) Yeni Adam. 277 
(April 18, 1940): 4. 
Kiiltiir, As1m, "Baltac1oglu'nun Fikirleri," (The Ideas of Baltac10glu) Yeni Adam. 391 
(June 25, 1942): 4-5, 11. 
"Kiiltiir Nedir?" (What is Culture?) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 1 (December 15, 1936): 1. 
"Makina ve Kiilti.ir," (Machine and Culture) Kiiltiir Haftast, 15 (April 23, 1936): 281-2. 
Milet Raymond, "Bergson 80'inci Ytldoniimil," (Bergson's 80th Anniversary) Yeni 
Adam, 273 (March 21, 1940): 9-15. 
Ozgen, Rasim. "H. Bergson," Yeni Adam. 241(August10, 1939): 6-7. 
Ozgen, Rasim, "H. Bergson," Yeni Adam. 242 (August 17, 1939): 6-7. 
Ozgen, Rasim, ''H. Bergson," Yeni Adam, 243 (August 24, 194'.!): 6. 
"Peyami Safa Diyor ki," (Peyami Safa Says ... ) Her Av. I (1937): 119-1'.!3. 
441 
"Ruhun Bekas1," (The Survival of the Spirit) Kiiltiir Haftas1, 12 (April 1, 1936): 221-2. 
Sadi, Kerim, "Fichte ve Sosyal Ekonomi," (Fichte and the Social Economy) Yeni Adam, 
156 (December 24, 1936): 16. 
Sanay, Eyyiip, Hilmi Ziya Olken. Eski~ehir: Anadolu Dniversitesi Bas1mevi, 1992. 
Taranc1, Cahit Sttkt, Peyami Safa: Hayatl ve Eserleri (Peyami Safa: His Life and Works). 
istanbul: Semih Lotfi, Kitabevi, 1940. 
Tekin, Mehmet, Peyami Safa'run Roman SanatJ. ve Romanian Uzerinde Bir ~ (A 
Research on Peyami Safa's Novels and Art ofNovel). Konya: Sel~ Dniversitesi Yay., 1990. 
Tozlu, Necmettin, Ismaytl Hakkt Baltacloglu'nun Egitim Sistemi Uzerine Bir AfMtmna (A 
Research on Ismaytl Hakkt Baltaetoglu's Educational System) (istanbul: Milli Egitim 
Basunevi, 1989). 
Tor, Nedim, "Devletin Yap1ctltk ve idarecilik Kudretine inanmak Lazun," (It is Necessary to 
Believe in State's Power of Construction and Adnrinisbation) Kadro. 15 (March, 1933): 13-9. 
Yontem, Ali Canip, "Bergson ve Ziya Gokalp," (Bergson and Ziya Gokalp) Cumhuriyet 
(January 22, 1941). 
